Deduction, Induction, TAG and Certainty

Deduction as a construct does not bring forth certainty any more than induction. Inductivists try to move from what might be thought to be known, or considered most probably the case, to what is not yet believed with the same veracity. Induction is “open ended” we might say, because induction as a process is never fully exhaustive. Rather, it comes to an end once one is satisfied with his personal pursuit. To put it another way, once cognitive satisfaction has been achieved the inductive pursuit is over, but it always stops short of philosophical certainty due to the nature of induction.

The deductive process on the other hand often leaves people with the impression that as a construct deduction brings forth knowledge. This would only be true, that deduction yields knowledge, if epistemic certainly was only a matter of construct, which it is not. Indeed, if the deductive process is valid, then the conclusion certainly follows from the premises. Whether the premises are reliable, however, is another matter altogether that requires further investigation having nothing to do with the deduction at hand. Deduction itself does not bring forth knowledge because for one to know the conclusion for what it truly is, he would first have to justify the premises that lead to the conclusion, which the immediate deduction in view does not achieve. That does not mean that deduction cannot aid in obtaining knowledge. The justification of many propositions that can be known comes by way of deduction.

Akin to those common errors, people often require a "philosophically certain" proof. I understand what epistemic certainty is, and appreciate what people mean by psychological certainty. I also understand what constitutes a valid and invalid argument, and what distinguishes those types of arguments from sound and unsound arguments. But what is a “philosophically certain argument”? People are certain, not arguments. Whether sound arguments will persuade someone to any degree of certainty is the job of the Holy Spirit, not the apologist.

Deduction is not a sufficient condition for knowledge. First, there is the "garbage in garbage out" consideration. The conclusion of a valid deduction need not be true; it only needs to follow from the premises. Accordingly, further investigation into the truth of the premises must occur for there to be the possibility of knowledge; yet that lies beyond the scope of the deduction at hand. Added to that, the Holy Spirit must grant justification for beliefs, which truth and structure alone cannot produce. Finally, the Holy Spirit must grant the knowledge that a valid deduction is reliable given true premises, which deduction cannot do. In short, God produces knowledge. He might even use weak inductive inferences in the process, but when knowledge is attained, the justification for what is believed to be true is through the illuminating power of God. Knowledge does not rely upon the induction or deduction that might have been employed in the process, but rather when one knows he has been taught by God.

A word or two might be in order regarding transcendental arguments (TAG in particular). TAG has a distinctly inductive aspect to it because with TAG the Christian investigates what must be true in order for some experience to be intelligible. Such explorations are inductive in emphasis. Notwithstanding, the manner of the investigation is not "open ended" because the premises within TAG do not merely support the conclusion, they ensure it. That point is missed by those who think TAG is inductive: http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2006/03/impropriety-of-trying-to-prove.html The aspect of "closure", where the premises ensure the conclusion, is unique to deduction, not induction. Moreover, the conclusion from TAG is not a mere hypothesis, but rather a sound conclusion derived through a deductive process that justifies its premises authoritatively. Finally, TAG falls short of being fully inductive because there is no asserting the consequent with TAG, as there is with all scientific inference, the playground for induction. Nonetheless, TAG has an inductive aspect to it because of the exploratory nature of TAG.

Of course TAG is deductive, but it is unlike all other deductive arguments. What sets TAG apart from garden variety deduction is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others - but that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience. More on that here: http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2010/03/to-us-only-thing-of-great-significance.html

As Bahnsen often quipped, "The proof of God's existence is that without Him one could not prove anything." That is nothing other than "Proof presupposes God" (or "If Proof, then God" since God is a necessary precondition for proof). Bahnsen's deduction and a defense of it can be found here:http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2010/04/bahnsen-misunderstood-servant-of-lord.html

(Given the inductive and deductive aspects of TAG, we shouldn't find it at all strange that Van Til said that in what he called the "Christian method" of apologetics, we find "elements of both induction and of deduction in it, if these terms are understood in a Christian sense.”)

Pastorally it should be said that we do not come to know the truth through cleverly devised proofs. Nothing could be further from the truth. We know God by nature (through revelation and conscience), and we must justify that knowledge by Scripture, the Christian's ultimate authority. I know my Savior lives because God has revealed that to me in His word. That is not my defense of the Christian worldview, but it's certainly a defensible fact. In other words, we don't "reason" ourselves to God, but our belief in God is indeed reasonable. In fact, it is not just reasonable; it is justifiable and true, which is to say it constitutes as knowledge.

Apologetically speaking, belief in God is the only reasonable position to hold if for no other reason, it is unreasonable to argue against God's existence because to do so one must first presuppose those tools of argumentation that only are defensible given God's existence. The precondition of intelligible experience is God. The justification for the precondition of intelligible experience is God’s word. An elaboration of that distinction is for another day.

Ron

Question Begging From Another Radical 2 Kingdom Proponent

I'm publishing this piece again because I've been reminded of late that the Escondido crowd remains loud and a problematic force against the reasonableness of Reformed epistemology and morals.

More question begging from the Radical 2 Kingdom camp, this time by Darryl Hart.

Indeed, one can have a justification for x while not being able to offer it. So, to use Darryl Hart’s example, one can have a justification for discerning curves from fastballs while being incapable of articulating that justification. In such cases what one lacks is the ability to articulate a justification - he does not lack having a justification. Notwithstanding, we ought not to think that because one can know something apart from being able to articulate a justification that, therefore, giving a justification is superfluous, or that those true beliefs that are not self-consciously justified must be as credible as those that are self-consciously justified. Let's not pretend that the ability to justify a belief is morally irrelevant, or that a robust justification lends no force to a rational defense of a belief.

The article leaps from (a) the premise that people do know things they aren't prepared to justify to (b) the grand implication that offering a robust justification for beliefs is of little use if only we can muddle through without having to give one. In the final analysis, the article begs the question of whether there actually exists an epistemic justification for laws in general and civil laws in particular and whether that justification is available to us, let alone useful for society. So, once again, R2K confounds the ability of societies to function apart from Scripture with the question of whether there is a moral imperative to apply Scripture to society whenever possible. In essence, R2Kers reason in the same fashion we see in the comic above. They have a preconceived conclusion that they'll arrive at any which way they can.

I might as well mention here that the Bahnsen reference employed by Darryl Hart is terribly misapplied. Bahnsen (with Van Til) thought that men know things that they are unwilling, even incapable of justifying. Accordingly, the reference with respect to one being reduced to absurdity does not speak to the question of whether men know how to count, or whether men know there should be degrees of punishment for transgressions. Nor does it pertain to the reasonableness of men holding to such beliefs they aren't prepared to justify. Certainly Bahnsen did not count it foolish for secular governments to dish out harsher punishments for rape than driving five miles over the speed limit. Not at all, for there is nothing contained in Bahnsen's theonomic thesis that would have prevented him from appreciating that societies can and do function apart from any sort of self-conscious epistemic warrant. What Bahnsen deemed foolish was not the implementation of law by unbelievers but rather the mindset that would abandon any hope in the only ultimate justification of such abstract entities. His issue was with the arbitrary and inconsistent manner in which unbelievers oppose themselves in their reasoning. The Bahnsen reference pertains to men not giving an account (an articulated justification) for their counting - it does not imply that men, unaided by Scripture, do not know how to count or aren't justified in their counting.

R2K might be the most unifying movement today within the Reformed tradition. Non-theonomists and theonomists alike oppose R2K. It reminds me of Dwarves and Elves uniting against Orcs.

The Impropriety of Trying to "Prove" The Absolute Truth Value of a Transcendental Inductively

For x (some aspect of human experience) to be the case, y must also be the case since y is the precondition of x. Since x is the case, y is the case. M.B.
Applying the above transcendental formulation in traditional form we end up with:

Prove A:The Christian God exists.
Step 1 ~A: (Assume the opposite of what we are trying to prove): The Christian God does not exist.
Step 2 (~A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience since God is the precondition of intelligibility
Step 3 (~B): There is intelligible experience (Contradiction!)
Step 4 (~ ~A): It is not the case that God does not exist (Modus Tollens on 2 and 3)
Step 5 (A): --> God does exist (Law of negation.)

Many Christians hold to the above argument, which is transcendental in nature. A common debate among certain apologists will be over whether step 2 can be shown to be philosophically justified. Immediately below is what I believe to be a feeble justification for step 2 of the above proof but I have seen it enough that I believe it is worth interacting with.

Subsidiary "argument" that is intended to justify step-2 of TAG:

Premise 1: Within the worldview of Christianity intelligibility can be justified.
Premise 2: All worldviews that we have been confronted with cannot justify intelligibility.
Conclusion: Since we cannot deny intelligibility, and since only the Christian worldview so far can justify it, then the Christian worldview is true.

Some believe that step-2 of TAG can be inductively proved because every worldview that a particular apologist had encountered has been refuted. It is argued by such apologists that the “rational inference” that God exists is based upon a statistical-confidence one might have from refuting many opposing worldviews. One of the problems I have with this justification is how can an inductive argument justify the God of Christianity when it cannot justify the heart of Christianity, the Resurrection of Christ? In other words, an inductive justification for step-2 presupposes uniformity in nature, yet the existence of the Christian God requires discontinuity, the Resurrection! How does one plan on justifying discontinuity on the basis of induction, apart from presupposing the self-attesting word of God? Moreover, the conclusion of the subsidiary argument that is intended to justify step 2 of the transcendental argument, which is “the Christian worldview is true,” exceeds the scope of the premises. Induction is a posteriori in nature and can only yield as its maximal conclusion something that is probably true. To conclude that something is true by inductive inference is to employ the fallacy of asserting the consequent. If step 2 is probably true, then it might also be false; yet Christians have a more sure word of knowledge. Moreover, that the Christian worldview is "more reasonable" than the non-Christian worldview remains unjustified because the question of whether one is even philosophically justified in his use of induction, so that rational inference may be drawn, has not been established. There are no freebies in Philosophy.

In order to rationally infer that God’s existence is "most probable,” one must first presuppose that which the conclusion of the subsidiary argument does not afford – God’s actual, ontological existence(!), which is the necessary precondition for inductive inference. This problem is insurmountable. In arguing for the high probability of God’s existence, the apologist, like the unbeliever who argues against God’s existence, presupposes tools of argumentation that presuppose God’s actual existence. The subsidiary argument, which concludes that God might not exist, begins by presupposing the actual intelligibility of both deduction (TAG) and induction (the justification for step 2), which presuppose God's actual existence! Accordingly, one’s presupposition of God’s actual existence ends up contradicting his conclusion that God’s existence is only probable. Accordingly, one would have to revise his presupposition-hypothesis to “God might not exist.” In doing so, one will not be able to justify actual induction or deduction. Actual rationality presupposes neither a probable God or a conceptual scheme. In order to infer that God’s existence is philosophically uncertain, one must first borrow from a worldview that comports with philosophical certainty so that there can be philosophical uncertainty. That worldview is the Christian worldview.

In summary, the Christian need not evaluate an infinite number of worldviews in order to know (and justify) that there are only two worldviews. In the like manner, the Christian need not witness an infinite amount of deaths to know that all men are mortal. We have an appeal for such premises, the truth of God’s word, which tells us that there are only two worldviews; one is that revelation is the necessary precondition for the justification of intelligible experience and the other is a denial of the Christian worldview. Moreover, induction requires as its necessary precondition something more than a conceptual scheme for God’s existence.

TAG is sound in that the form is valid and the premises are true. We must keep in mind that the truth of any valid conclusion is not predicated upon the consensus of the truth of the premises. Accordingly, since unbelievers will not accept the truth claims of the Bible and, therefore, step 2 of the proof, the only thing the Christian can do is refute the hypothetical competitors. In doing so we might gain more psychological confidence that God exists. Notwithstanding, a demonstration of the soundness of an argument does not make an argument sound. The apologist merely demonstrates the veracity of TAG to a watching world when he exposes the various forms of the one unbelieving worldview for its arbitrariness and inconsistencies.

There is no limit to the number of sound deductive arguments for the Christian worldview. Most of which are not very useful or interesting, such as: God exits or nothing exists; not nothing exists; therefore, God exists. As Dr. Bahnsen noted, proof of the Christian worldview is child's play. The beauty of TAG as a special kind of deductive argument is not in the reductio but in the transcendental challenge, which shows that to argue against Christianity one must first presuppose only that which Christianity affords.










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Epistemology and Quasi-Gettier Considerations

"And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing."
1 Corinthians 13:2

In discussions over what constitutes knowledge there are some obvious axioms that have occurred to my mind. For instance, a person can know only that which is true. Furthermore, for something to be known it must be believed.  Although true belief is necessary for knowledge, with little effort it can been seen that it is not sufficient for knowledge to entail.  An example might prove useful. Say someone held the true belief that the President of the United States for most of the 1980’s had the initials R.R. yet thought him to have been Roy Rogers (and not Ronald Reagan). The belief would correspond to the truth merely by coincidence thereby not qualifying as knowledge.  But can such a belief be justified? Imagine, for instance, that the true belief was held by the child of a truthful parent who had in undetected jest told the child that Roy Rogers was the 40th president. In such an instance the child having not detected, say, a rare moment of dry wit in his parent could have been justified in believing that the 40^th president was Roy Rogers and, therefore, had the initials R.R. After all, it’s not so strange that an American cowboy actor born in the Midwest in 1911 and dying in California (which is true of both R.R.s) could become President of the United States.

Maybe we should consider a scenario that includes a true belief that is less controversial with respect to its justification – a belief that would be warranted for an intelligent adult. By looking at a clock on the wall one can believe it is noon when actually it is noon, but what if the clock had stopped running at exactly midnight the night before? The true belief that it was noon would be justified, but would such a belief constitute knowledge? It seems rather intuitive that such a true belief would not constitute knowledge given the faulty clock. Accordingly, we must distinguish (a) a person being justified in believing a proposition from (b) the justification of the proposition itself. In other words, it can be most rational and even incumbent upon a person to believe a proposition (entailing justified belief) even though that which should be believed is not verified let alone true (entailing lack of justification for the proposition itself).

Certainly in the pursuit of defining the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge we may properly include in the mix a condition that would prohibit a justification that entails false beliefs, like believing the clock is working when it is not. Not only must the person be justified in his true belief, there can be no existing true proposition (e.g. the clock is broken) that if known would undermine the person’s reliance upon reasons for the belief. After all, if such were not the case – if one actually can know the time based upon a broken clock, then upon learning the clock is broken one would lose his justification for his belief and thereby any knowledge he was thought to have had. Therefore, we must maintain that a robust theory of knowledge cannot make room for a loss of knowledge due to at least some type or classification of acquired truth. Succinctly, one cannot know p if there exists at least some class of undermining evidence that if acquired would result in a loss of justification for the belief.  In such cases, that which defeats the justification for knowledge is not a believed proposition (that is internal to the subject) but rather an existing one that is external to the mind. What sort of existing propositions that would qualify as a type or class that would undermine knowledge needs further examination.

Feasibility of an undermining proposition

Now what if the clock was not broken? If the clock was not broken, then the conditions for knowledge that would be met are justified true belief (JTB) plus no existing propositional defeater of the justification. The question that immediately comes to my mind is whether the possibility of a broken clock should come into play. In order to have knowledge that it is twelve noon must the believer have positive verification of the accurate workings of the clock in question (as opposed to clocks in general), or is the mere absence of an existing defeater proposition (as opposed to the potential of one existing) enough for knowledge to obtain?  Should the possibility of the clock being broken, even when it’s not broken, be enough to relegate such  JTB to something less thank knowledge? In other words, must the defeater actually exist or can it feasibly exist in order to undermine one’s knowledge of the time?

For argument sake, let’s call such true belief “knowledge” when the clock is functioning properly. Without having verified the clock the person’s justification for his true belief of the time would be the same whether the clock was broken or not. Accordingly, when the clock is functioning properly the certainty of the time is no greater than when the time is not known (due to a faulty clock) yet possibly thought to be known. Accordingly, to tag such a non-defeated JTB as “knowledge” is not to be less skeptical than one who wouldn’t do so, but rather it is to define knowledge more inclusively. (It is often charged that not to call such inferences knowledge is to consign oneself to skepticism.)

Under such terms one can know the time while rationally believing that the time might not be known let alone true. In other words, the person could know the time while also believing with the utmost consistency within such an epistemic framework that the time could be other than what is believed. Such need not be the case with other sorts of knowledge, like knowledge of Scripture propositions for instance. It is not incumbent upon the subject to rationally question whether what is known from Scripture is actually true for the Holy Spirit provides the warrant for such true beliefs. But where "knowledge" is attainable without having positive verification of the source, then it is most rational to believe that something might be false yet while knowing it is true.

Statistics

Given a functioning clock, what if there existed a publication of accurate statistical evidence unrealized by the subject that clocks made by that particular manufacturer were faulty most of the time? Would such existing evidence be a defeater? The question presents no problem to one who would consider the mere possibility of a faulty clock as undermining the possibility of knowledge. It does, however, pertain to one with a more inclusive understanding of knowledge. Can one know the time because of a lack of relevant evidence that most clocks from the manufacturer are not reliable?

It would seem somewhat intuitive that one would not be justified in believing the time if he also believed the true proposition that most of the clocks from the manufacturer were faulty. It is widely held by those with a more inclusive view of knowledge that such known statistics, even when not known by all, would undermine knowledge in such instances for all people, even for those who were ignorant of the statistic.  (see: Alvin Goldman, fake barns)

A problem with such probability?

Now of course probability is useful because mere humans cannot capture all the causal factors that go into any event. Notwithstanding, whether a clock will function or not is a binary consideration – it either will or it won’t. Whether it functions or not is causally determined and if we could know all the determining factors then we could know with a probability of 100% the outcome with nothing left to chance. Given that it is impossible that a functioning clock would not have functioned (due to causal necessity), the obvious (or not so obvious) question is whether an unknown, unpublished statistical probability of a particular functioning clock (which proves to be 100% by the nature of the case) should override  statistically rational inference about any given particular clock that is drawn from a lot of many clocks that yields less than a 50% success rate. Indeed, Jones would not be justified in believing it is twelve noon if he were also to believe most clocks from this manufacturer are defective. That Jones happened to look at a functioning clock would be a matter of chance. Yet if the clock was working properly then there exists some statistical affirmation that the particular clock would necessarily have worked properly. Would the existence of such a true statistic about a particular clock override another true statistic that reported most clocks from the manufacturer were faulty?

It seems to me that most that hold to an inclusive view of knowledge would negate the possibility of knowledge obtaining through the means of a functioning clock manufactured by a disfunctional manufacturer. The reason being that had the subject known about the manufacturer he would not be rationally justified in believing the time based upon such a clock. But if we're talking about statistics not known by the subject-knower, then why is the manufacturer's track record for clocks more relevant than the statistics pertaining to the particular, functioning clock in question? Maybe that clock was made during a shift where the clocks never have failed. Again, if the clock works properly then there exists, whether known or not, some statistical reflection of that reality. Again, this presents no problem for those who have a less inclusive view of knowledge.

This leads to many other questions, not the least of which are: What is the scope of relevant defeaters? Are they statistical in nature? Must they be true, or does a well promulgaged lie yet not heard by the subject-knower come into play? Might they only be feasible, even if not spoken actually, let alone true? Must they be humanly knowable or merely true? Again, these do not come into play for those with a less inclusive view of knowledge, which of course does not undermine subjective certainty of what is rational to believe.

Other actual existing propositions

Other sorts of information, defeaters of a different variety than external propositions, can impinge upon warrant for beliefs. Beliefs that are actually acquired, as opposed to propositions not known yet true, are now in view. An acquired strong belief can prevent someone from believing something newly introduced and contrary to an earlier belief, but new evidence can also cast doubt on older beliefs. Indeed, new evidence can reduce even override previously held beliefs depending upon the epistemic or psychological commitment to them. Such defeaters are internal to the mind, already acquired and not only external.

Now then, say a mother is informed that her son has stolen money from one of his teacher’s desk. Until then she has been thoroughly justified in believing her son is truthful – and count it is true that he never has stolen property.  Yet she has recently noticed that her son has been wearing a lot of new clothes and that some of her loose change has been disappearing. In realty the son has not stolen; he has been working after school and buying clothes with money he has earned. Moreover, it is false that he stole from his teacher’s desk. At this juncture we can at least appreciate that even strong justification for beliefs can be diminished by contrary evidence. It is possible that the mother would not be as justified as before in believing in the integrity of her son. To some degree, even if minimally, the integrity of the son might become to some degree suspect in the mother’s mind; so it’s not hard to see that experiences can serve not only to bolster but also downgrade one’s justification for a given or set of beliefs, if not also render beliefs that were once justifiable no longer such.

Continued later, Deo volente

Confusion Over The Transcendental Argument For The Existence Of God

Generally speaking TAG is a deductive argument, but it is unlike all other deductive arguments. What sets TAG apart from garden variety deduction is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others – but unlike transcendental arguments that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience (or its denial). For instance, “If causality then God” merely means that causality is a sufficient condition for God and that God is a necessary condition for causality. Which is to say: if causality exists then it is logically necessary that God exists. However, such a premise does not delve into the question of how God and causality relate to each other. It does not tell us whether God exists because of causality or whether causality exists because of God. Causality presupposes God says more than causality is a sufficient condition for God and that God is a necessary condition for causality. If causality presupposes God then God must be logically prior to causality.

The transcendental argument for the existence of God is an argument that has as its conclusion God exists.

Prove A: The Christian God exists.
Step 1 ~A: (Assume the opposite of what we are trying to prove): The Christian God does not exist.
Step 2 (~A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience since God is the precondition of intelligibility
Step 3 (~B): There is intelligible experience (Contradiction)
Step 4 (~ ~A): It is not the case that God does not exist (Modus Tollens on 2 and 3)
Step 5 (A): --> God does exist (Law of negation.)
Q.E.D.

Whereas professing atheists are willing to concede the validity of the above argument Christians should happily concede that the argument is not only not fallacious (i.e. valid) but also sound. In other words, although professing atheists and Christians alike agree that the above argument has a valid form – i.e. the conclusion follows from the premises – Christians should agree that since the premises are all true and the form is valid the conclusion is true. But unfortunately Christians don't always grasp this point.

Christians often say that TAG does not achieve its goal because not every worldview is refuted in the argument. Such a claim simply demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope of TAG. The above argument is aimed to prove that God exists, which it does. To deny that it does is to reject logic and / or biblical truths. Again, the argument above has a specific conclusion, God exists. The conclusion of the argument is not that if God does not exist, then there could be no intelligible experience. In other words, the above transcendental argument does not aim to prove that God is the precondition for intelligible experience, though that is a premise used in the argument which is why the argument is transcendental. That is where Christians who oppose TAG get tripped up. They don’t appreciate what is being argued.

So what about step 2 of the argument? We can defend the premise of step 2 deductively by appealing to the absolute authority of Scripture. Of course the unbeliever rejects that authority; nonetheless that the unbeliever is dysfunctional does not mean that an appeal to Scripture is fallacious! After all, if a skeptic rejects logic should we then argue apart from logic? Since when does the dullness of an opponent dictate which tools of argumentation may be used? Of course, given the unbeliever’s suppression of the truth the Christian does well to defend step 2 inductively by performing internal critiques of opposing worldviews, which of course can only corroborate the veracity of step 2. It would be fallacious, however, to conclude because of such condescension toward the unbeliever that the conclusion of TAG (God exists) and the justification for its step 2 (God is the precondition of intelligibility) rest upon inductive inference. By the use of induction the Christian is merely acknowledging that the unbeliever refuses to bend the knee to the self-attesting Word from which step 2 can be deduced by sound argumentation. Since unbelievers will not accept the truth claims of the Bible and, therefore, a deductive defense of step 2 the only thing the Christian can do is refute the hypothetical competitors, but that hardly implies that step 2 cannot be proved by deduction.

Finally, it has been noted by some and popularized by Don Collet in the Westminster Theological Journal that the only way a transcendental argument may be formalized is thusly (TAG*):

C presupposes G if and only if both 1 & 2:
1. If C then God exists
2. If ~C then God exists

Given such a construct, we are no longer negating the metaphysicality of causality but rather the truth value of the predication of the metaphysicality of causality. In other words: ~causality (which is chaos) does not presuppose God so for the construct to make sense it must pertain only to prediction about causality. In other words, since non-causality is an impossible entity that defies creation, providence and intelligibility, such a formulation of TAG (TAG*) limits itself to predication only. Does the apologist really want to do that? Do we want to give up arguing that God is the precondition for the intelligible experience of actual causality? I think not. TAG* (as opposed to TAG) is indeed powerful but it does not pertain to anything other than predication; whereas TAG may pertain to predication and the reality that the predication contemplates.

Ron

John Piper on God and Fathers

"The children will have years of exposure to what the universe is like before they know there is a universe. They will experience the kind of authority there is in  the universe and the kind of justice there is in the universe and the kind of love there is in the universe before they meet the God of authority and justice and love who created and rules the universe.

Children are absorbing from dad his strength and leadership and protection and justice and love…

And all this is happening before the child knows anything about God, but it is profoundly all about God. Will the child be able to recognize God for who He really is in His authority and love and justice because mom and dad have together shown the child what God is like?"

I recently read those thoughts, which were attributed to John Piper. I’m informed they came from This Momentary Marriage (Wheaton: Crossway, 2009) 143-144.

It’s hard to believe that anyone who claims to be Reformed could write such things. Thankfully, children have a priori knowledge of God through which they encounter him in every intelligible experience. Unfortunately, the author has not encountered Calvin’s Institutes, Book 1, at least in any lasting, impressionable way, let alone Bavinck, Van Til or Romans 1.

I appreciate the author's desire to see fathers reflect God's character. Notwithstanding, who is the father to teach his son about, a god who can be encountered only after the child is exposed to his earthly father's love (or hate)? Thankfully, children are spared this sort of thinking because they don't read the author, but father's who drink him in are not so fortunate.They are told they must teach the child about God before God can reveal himself to the child. The undiscerning father can get a warped impression of the magnitude of his influence upon the child, which can (i) put undue pressure upon the father (ii) cause the father not to rely upon God to do what only God must do and (iii) cause the father to think that the child has no innate knowledge of the Divine and that the child can only know what God is like through knowing what his father is like.

Regarding iii, by these calculations a child cannot be culpable for his sin because his sin would be against a god who is thought to be (at no fault to the child) imperfect just like his father, which implies no true God at all. Accordingly, No God => No Transgression...And, No Transgression => No Culpability. Moreover, this type of thinking suggests that a child cannot know his father is sinful because the child supposedly has no innate understanding of righteousness by which to assess his father's love.

The Piper quote above fits quite well with his view of invincible ignorance, which I touch on here.

Truth, Goodness and Beauty in light of Common Grace (and Mario Puzo)

In discussions regarding Christ and culture the matter of how we are to approach literature is a must-consideration. Of course the extent of the fall and the idea of common grace (or as I prefer “common goodness”) must be considered in such an examination. A premise that arises, or is often assumed as axiomatic rather than one that is open for debate, is that unbelievers are actually capable of expressing “the true, the good and the beautiful.” This idea is closely related to the questions of whether fallen man is created in the "image of God" and what that phrase actually means.

Certainly there are some distinctions that all Reformed Christians draw with respect to how conversion impinges upon man as God’s “image bearer.” 1 Corinthians 11:7 declares that a man ought not to have his head covered since he is the image and glory of God. James informs us that men are made in God’s likeness. James 3:9 Notwithstanding, Scripture also informs that unconverted men have their minds blinded by the god of this world, which renders them not only incapable of seeing the light of the gospel but also blind to the glory of Christ, who is the image of God. It is Christ who is the image of God, and as Ephesians 4:24 teaches, it is through being re-created in Christ, the Second Adam, that man is restored as God’s witness to this glory. Man in Christ by the Spirit participates in true righteousness, holiness, and truth (as opposed to falsehood). Accordingly, the need to be restored in Christ presupposes, at least in some sense, fatal loss of the image Adam enjoyed. (I'm indebted to Robert Letham for these insights.) This radical antithesis is the basis for Van Til's insight, that although even the most mundane predication can resemble formal agreement between believer and unbeliever, there can be no agreement in principle. In principle, believer and unbeliever disagree over 1+1=2.

Christianity is too often considered only in soteriological terms. How can man be “saved?” To have such a narrow view of redemption is to pay precious little attention to the idea that Christ is not just the way back to the Father but the way back to the Father’s world. In this larger context we may ask - in what sense does the unbeliever, who does not embrace the Bible’s depiction of creation, providence and grace, communicate what the Bible has to say about truth, goodness and beauty? What does it actually mean that a fallen unbeliever is able to communicate the true, the good and the beautiful? For instance, is goodness merely a matter of external endeavor? Is to follow a set of rules, even the correct ones, sufficient for goodness, or does motive play a part (and if so, what quality of motive is in view)? Or, does all so-called “good” behavior accuse and condemn every man outside Christ? If so, then why? Is salvation judicial only, or does redemption include radical transformation, without which all good deeds remain filthy rags? Isaiah 64:6

In an effort to preempt a common objection I readily acknowledge that all of the believer’s works are tainted by sin. Notwithstanding, the Bible’s testimony is that only those who are converted by grace can attain unto any true virtue, which will always be a reality in the experience of the believer. Philippians 1:6; 2:13 Consequently, it is simply false to reduce man's ability to reflect truth, goodness and beauty to a matter of degree with respect to what the believer can mirror compared to the unbeliever. The gulf that exists between the two is as far reaching as earth and heaven, dust and glory.

Does the unbeliever have “half an orange” (Francis Schaeffer) or does he have an entire, rotten orange (Reformed view of the effects of the fall)? It is precisely because he only has the latter that believers often add to, rearrange and try to improve upon any secular attempt to communicate truth, goodness and beauty. This is why it is often said that “we must watch this play, or read that literary work, from a distinctly Christian perspective of redemption etc.” But after the story has been critiqued through the lens of Scripture, does it really resemble truth, goodness or beauty ? No, because the story itself needs to be redeemed from faulty notions and presuppositions. When the story is examined from a Biblical perspective, it should include the observation that what was depicted as good was actually a counterfeit good (all things considered), or a “counterfeit atonement” as was recently pointed out in my hearing. I am not suggesting that secular stories ought to be revised in the minds of believers but rather they be received and recognized for what they are and not something else. Any analogy to God's revealed truth must be seen as a false analogy. How, for instance, can biblical redemption be mirrored in the thoughts of an unbeliever?

In a last ditch effort one might wish to truncate a secular message pertaining to virtue by making such a qualification: "as far as the story goes, truth, goodness and beauty is portrayed." Yet such a caveat is aimed to abstract virtue from any biblical notion, portraying it as a standalone product without need of divine source or origin. What's more, it is to bear false witness against the story itself! It is to communicate things about truth, goodness and beauty that are not only the furthest things from the author’s mind but something he vehemently would oppose. So much for allowing the author's work to communicate the author's intent. After all, certainly the secularist rejects any notion that true virtue comes from God alone and that it can only be mirrored in man through the redeeming power of the gospel. For instance, in what sense does the Christian agree with Vito Corleone when in speaking with Johnny Fontane he instructs Sonny with these words on being a faithful husband and father, "A man who doesn't spend time with his family can never be a real man"? What is it to "spend time" and to be a "real man"? There can be formal agreement over the words while there is disagreement over principle regarding what would constitute a real man.

Now of course, it almost goes without saying that I have benefited all my life from the heathen’s efforts and I marvel, though surely not enough, at the mystery of providence in this regard. However, the benefits of what is commonly called "common grace" should not preclude one from recognizing the limits of such divine goodness as it pertains to what can be communicated in the arts in general and literature in particular. Again, there is no need to rewrite stories penned by fallen men to whom much has been given, but there is need, I do believe, to receive such works for what they truly are, recognizing in the process fallen man's unquenchable desire to be the would-be autonomous author of all that is true, good and beautiful. Recognize the ramifications of the curse as you digest man's efforts in the entertainment and stimulation it provides.

Van Til on Rome's influence:

An excerpt from Common Grace, by Cornelius Van Til, warns against the Roman communion’s notion of autonomous reasoning and its effect on Protestant, Reformed thinking as it pertains to conflating natural revelation with things pertaining to natural theology. 

 “If we are to witness to the God of Scripture we cannot afford to deny common grace. For, as noted, common grace is an element of the general responsibility of man, a part of the picture in which God, the God of unmerited favor, meets men everywhere. But neither can we afford to construct a theory in which it is implicitly allowed that the natural man, in terms of his adopted principles, can truly interpret any aspect of history. He seeks for meaning in the facts of this world without regarding these facts as carrying in them the revelation and therewith the claims of God….Now surely, you say, no Reformed person would have any commerce with any such view as that. Well, I do not think that any Reformed person purposely adopts such a view. But we know how the Roman Catholic conception of natural theology did creep into the thinking of Reformed theologians in the past. And the essence of this natural theology is that it attributes to the natural man the power of interpreting some aspect of the world [such as pertaining to “Truth, Goodness and Beauty?!”] without basic error… The Christians and non-Christians have, on this basis, a certain area of interpretation in common. They have common ideas in the sense that they agree on certain meanings without any difference… It is not merely that men are, all of them together, made in the image of God…. [or] as Kuyper stressed, all men have to think according to the rules of logic…All these things are true and important to maintain. But it is when in addition to these it is said there are common notions, common reactions, about God and man and the world to all this speech of God, on which there is no basic difference between Christians and non-Christians, that natural theology is confused with natural revelation.” Bold and bracketed emphasis mine. 

If one wants to maintain that fallen man is created in the image of God because he retains the faculty of choice and the innate ability to reason, then fine. I can allow for such semantic distinction. It's quite another thing to conflate the provisions men have through natural revelation with the possibility of an autonomous construct of any true, natural theology (one that would allow natural man to evaluate virtue, for instance). Truth, beauty and goodness are ideas with theological import; and sin corrupts man’s “notions” of what constitutes these things, which is part-and-parcel to the want of any “common reaction" between the two races of men to such qualities.

Now for some quotes from the Godfather trilogy, true literature worthy of man's consideration and deep reflection. 

"A man who doesn't spend time with his family can never be a real man."

"Fredo, you're my older brother, and I love you. But don't ever take sides with anyone against the family again. Ever." 

Michael: "My father is no different than any other powerful man -- any man who's responsible for other people, like a senator or president." Kay: "You know how naive you sound...senators and presidents don't have men killed." Michael: "Oh, who's being naive, Kay?"

"Never tell anybody outside the family what you're thinking again."

"Some day, and that day may never come, I will call upon you to do a service for me. But uh, until that day, accept this justice as a gift on my daughter's wedding day."

"...and if I ever need any guidance, who's a better consiglieri than my father?"

Godfather 2

"My father taught me many things ... keep your friends close, but your enemies closer."

"If anything in this life is certain; If history has taught us anything, it's that you can kill anyone."  

"To you she's beautiful. For me, there's only my wife..."

 "I don't--I never knew no godfather. I got my own family, senator"

"Whatcha go to college to get stupid? You're really stupid!"

"Don't you know that I would use all of my power to prevent something like that from happening?"

"Your father did business with Hyman Roth; Your father respected Hyman Roth; But your father never trusted Hyman Roth"

"We're all part of the same hypocrisy, Senator. But never think it applies to my family."

"Good health is the most important thing. More than success, more than money, more than power."

"Every time I put the line down I would say a Hail Mary, and every time I said a Hail Mary, I would catch a fish."

"Hail Mary, full of grace...." BAM! Fredo gets it.

"I didn't ask who gave the order, because it had nothing to do with business."

Godfather 3 

"Just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in. [Our true enemy has not yet shown his face.]"

"Neri, take a train to Rome. Light a candle for the archbishop."

"All my life I kept trying to go up in society. Where everything higher up was legal. But the higher I go, the crookeder it becomes. Where does it end?"

"No, I don't hate you. I dread you."

"Politics and crime -- they're the same thing."

"This pope has very different ideas from the last one."

"Why was I so feared, and you were so loved?"

"Give me the order" [Michael:"You won't be able to go back... All my life I wanted out. I wanted my family out"] "Well, I don't want out. I want the power to preserve the Family. I'm asking for the order."

"Nephew, from this moment forward, call yourself Vincent Corleone."

 
 

A Couple of Oldies But Goodies by Michael Butler

Here is a very accessible introduction to Presuppostional Apologetics, written by Michael Butler (Greg Bahnsen's protégé).
 
Also, here is a more detailed explication of the Transcendental Argument for God's Existence, also by Michael Butler.

Trinity & Paradox

It has been rightly argued by some that we can distill these claims from the Athanasian creed:

1. The Father is God.

2. The Son is God.
3. The Spirit is God.
4. The Father is not the Son.
5. The Father is not the Spirit.
6. The Son is not the Spirit.
and,
7. There is only one God.

An apparent contradiction in view is:
A. f = g (premise)
B. s = g (premise)
C. f ≠ s (premise)
D. f = s (from 1, 2, by transitivity of identity)
Contradiction or Paradox? 

It seems to me that these conundrums can be dealt with in many ways by adding additional biblically informed propositions to the incomplete ones. Simply replace some of the abbreviated premises with premises that contain more biblical truth and paradox disappears, yet without being able to uncover the mysteries of the Trinity. (i.e. The solution is rational but ought not to be considered rationalistic.)

Equivocal terms lead to unreliable conclusions:

It should be noted up front that there is a semantic difference between is and =, for x is y does not imply y is x; yet x = y is equivalent to y = x. (Please don't read on without digesting that.) The leap from what x is (found in 1-7) to what x equals (the complaint in the "apparent contradiction" i.e., A-D) is fallacious, which I trust will become apparent.

Points 1-7 (which utilize "is") imply that three distinct persons all share in the one divine nature and occupy what can be called "the same divine space".  So far, so good. Points A-D that follow (which utilize "=" instead of "is") leads to confusion (and supposed paradox). Points 1-7 and A-D must be nuanced, for 1-7 does not imply the conclusion of A-D, which is not only an apparent contradictory but rather a real contradictory.

First, with respect to the confusing four points (A-D), the only way Jesus equals God is if Jesus and God are numerically identical - exactly the same without remainder. Yet God can mean Trinity, which Jesus is not. God can also mean the person of the Holy Spirit, which Jesus is not. Finally, God can mean the person of the Father, which Jesus is not. Accordingly, to say that "Jesus equals God" and the "Father equals God" is equivocal at best and if taken literally leads to modalism because identity is transitive, which would mean that Jesus and the Father are the same person.

With respect to points 1-7, indeed, we should rightly say that Jesus is God because Jesus shares the divine essence: he is very God of very God, but that is not what is implied in points A-D when things such as "Jesus = God" are stated. In other words, if what is meant by "Jesus is God" is that that Jesus equals God, then of course that would be incorrect. But that is not what is typically meant by "Jesus is God", which makes reference to his divine nature, one in being with the Father.

Jesus is a specific person. Accordingly, if Jesus equals God, then God must equal Jesus and, therefore, must be a specific person (the same as Jesus), which would preclude any other person from sharing in the divine nature such as the Father, which in turn would undermine the doctrine of the Trinity. So yes, Jesus is God because Jesus is divine, but Jesus and God are not synonymous terms - for if they were synonymous terms, then "Jesus is God" could be equated to "God is Jesus". (In simple terms of analogy, Jim is human does not imply Jim = human.)

Jesus does not equal God, for the Father and the Holy Spirit are also God yet are different persons than Jesus. There is more than one God-person in the Godhead, all of whom mutually indwell the other two. There is only one triune-God, that in three persons and oneness of being lives in perfect harmony.

More on the equally ultimate, unity and diversity:

The Father is God just as the Son is God, but an essential property of the Father’s *person* (not to be confused with the ontological essence), which merely is to say it can only be predicated to the person of the Father, is his relationship to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Being distinct persons, there are differences between the members of the Holy Trinity. The Father is not God apart from his intra-Trinitarian relationships. That to say, the Father is not God apart from being a member of the Trinity. These Trinitarian relationships are essential properties of personhood, not essence (lest Father is Son). If we cannot distinguish properties in this way, we cannot distinguish persons. Accordingly,  f does not equal s because neither f nor s have the same intra-Trinitarian relationship with the other two divine persons in the Godhead. So, as we fill in what it means for f and s to be g, we do so not in a vacuum but with other biblical propositions in view, informing us of g as it pertains f and s. Indeed, it is true that f is g and s is g, and if that was the end of the story we might be in trouble. Without further elaboration, f is  g plus s is g is consistent with  modalism, so we needn’t be surprised that such constructs, though true, must be interpreted through a biblical lens in order to avoid heresy.

Although I don’t deny the prima facie intuitive notions surrounding 1-7 that can lead to a conundrum, it can be maintained on the consistency of God and his desire to communicate to his people that those intuitive notions that appear logically problematic can disappear when we presuppose additional revelation, which is not to say that mysteries can be solved. Logic cannot solve true mysteries, but biblically informed logical pursuit can demonstrate that certain doctrines are not actually seemingly-contradictory.  It’s when we think intuitively, which is to say apart from Scripture, we can get in trouble. As I've noted elsewhere, that's an insight of Van Til's apologetic but not one that I think he carried into this thinking on paradox. (For instance, when we use only experience unaided by revelation we can think one essence necessarily implies one person; when we presuppose Scripture we can know that proposition is false.)

Finally, the original formulation if it is interpreted as allowing for f=s, (which is prior to the intra-Trinitarian elaboration that forbids such an interpretation), ends up implying that the sending of the Son was arbitrary, which means the Son could have sent the Father. The arbitrariness is not demanded by the original construct (1-7), rather it comes as a result of an interpretation of the original construct that does not consider other biblical truths, such as each divine person in his intra-Trinitarian relationship with the other two divine persons. In other words, without, for instance, an elaboration of how the Son relates to the Father, 1-7 might be wrongly inferred as implying an apparent contradiction, leaving it open that the Son could have sent the Father. In the final analyses, the original construct of 1-7 is true and it is fine as far as it goes; I believe it is most suitable for a creed, but it is not a full blown theology of the Trinity, which a creed ought not to be.

Finally, regarding the arbitrariness noted above (an idea I gleaned from Robert Letham's writings), there is good reason to believe that there is an actual appropriateness that the Son was sent in the incarnation and not the Holy Spirit, but the first construct is void of such implication.We may learn of the ontological relationship through the economic activity, as Dr. Letham rightly pointed out in his review of Dr. Robert Reymond’s Systematic Theology. So for example (and as Dr. Letham has written here) the submission to Father by the Son reveals something of who the Son is prior to his incarnation, which is consistent with the turning over of the kingdom to the Father by the Son in the eschatological consummation.

More on Paradox

If God is good, then he cannot ordain evil. God ordains evil and is good. Therefore, I have to accept "by faith" that although what appears contradictory is not. I'm to believe what appears to me to be defeated. Some Reformed Christians actually say that we are to think that way. We are to believe what we think looks false.

Greg Bahnsen had a response to that problem had by so many, which is commonly called the problem of evil. His answer was simply that God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil he ordains. With Bahnsen, I find that response sufficient to remedy any apparent contradiction between God’s goodness and his determination of all things including evil, but I don’t find the additional premise to be a stroke of genius by any stretch. The apparent problem had by so many is that they judge goodness by carnal standards, forgetting that God defines goodness and what is acceptable behavior for himself. (Note: That God defines goodness does not imply that goodness is arbitrary.)

That God’s goodness and his sovereign determination of evil appears contradictory to some hardly implies that it should appear contradictory to all. It’s simply too grand a claim to suggest that if some perceive contradictions then others should.

One might even expect to have a better chance of alleviating apparent contradictions by beginning with a simple presupposition that says there need not be any apparent contradictions. The belief in apparent contradiction can make one not only lazy but also very unjustified in his theology, just like by not believing that the inverse operation of subtraction is always addition can make a child think his wrong answers could be correct though they don't check out just right by performing the inverse operation. The less partisan will find the analogy acceptable, whereas those who blindly follow Van Til will no doubt throw the rationalistic flag at this juncture. Notwithstanding, the point that can be received by the less fearful who are brave enough to be their own man is simply that once we become committed to our ability by grace to alleviate apparent contradictions within God’s word, we might end up working a bit harder at resolving them rather than letting the axiom of apparent contradiction cause us to accept things as true that really appear false to us.  Now of course this comes at a price. There must be a willingness to accept the label rationalistic, but what’s the alternative, believing in something that appears false yet while hoping it is not?

Now some might say that we have reason to believe what appears false and that reason is the church teaches it, which reduces the belief to an inference short of knowledge if that's all the belief is based upon. There is a subtle distinction that must be teased out from such a theory. It pertains to the difference between a justification for believing something is true and a justification of the facts themselves that are believed to be true. I can believe a doctrine is true because the church teaches it, but it’s quite another thing to know those teachings are true. Such a justification of the truth of the church's teachings can only come from God. This is not to say that the God does not speak through the church, for he does. Notwithstanding, if one is basing a theological propositional belief on something other than God's testimony, then such a belief can hardly account as knowledge of the truth.

How can we know truth while it appears false? What would be the warrant for believing what appears to be a defeated proposition? If one says God's say-so, then why if I'm to believe what appears false ought I not disbelieve what appears true?

Not only do the following passages teach that we’re to hear from God and not men on these matters, the Confession's addresses cited below, in concert with Scripture, commend such a practice. (Matt. 16:13-17; John 4:39-42; Galatians 1:11, 12; I Thess. 2:13;  WCF 1.5 and 1.10; WCF 14.2) Note well that Paul when battling the Judaizers did not even cite the apostles but rather Christ alone in his defense of the gospel he knew to be true, for he did not receive it by man but from God.

In a nutshell, contradictions take the form of p = ~p, so if a doctrine is to appear contradictory it must appear to take that form. Until one shows how any Christian doctrine appears to take that form, he fails to show that any doctrine actually appears contradictory. But it gets much worse than that. Until one shows that any doctrine takes a contradictory form, he fails to show how it appears contradictory even to himself! Consequently, not only have these people failed to show that Christian doctrines are apparently contradictory, a universal claim of theirs that applies to every person – they even fail to show that they appear contradictory to them personally.

The only contradictions I’m finding are in their reasoning. They assert apparent contradiction and fail to demonstrate any.

Christian Paradox

Also, check TurretinFan on this matter.

Many well meaning Christians, even Reformed Christians, believe that many Bible doctrines must be embraced though they are seemingly contradictory. These Christians believe that many mysteries of the faith (if not all things ultimately) are really paradoxes, antinomies or apparent contradictions, same thing for our purposes. These apparent contradictions, though said not to be real, appear to imply a false orthodox proposition, since contradictions always contain a false proposition. For example, if God is one, then it would seem that God cannot be comprised of three persons who are all God, for one is not three. Consequently, one of the two orthodox horns appears false. Either there are three Gods or God is not one; yet since the Trinity is an orthodox doctrine, the antinomy must be embraced. Christianity ends up being apparently contradictory but not really. In other words, Christianity appears contradictory but it really isn't. Professing atheists have a field day with such lobs. Rather than the Christian’s apologetic appearing as aspirin tablets at the top of the knees low and away, we end up lobbing watermelons in the wheelhouse when we speak that way.

Does anybody really believe that we are to embrace as true both x and ~x at the same time, in the same sense? At the very least, I would hope that no Christian believes that we are to accept as true something that is actually false. But what about this – Are we to believe certain doctrines that appear false? Many Christians say “yes”. Some even say “YES!” It is believed by more than a few that some if not all doctrines must(!) appear contradictory - if we’re to remain humble and not let logic cloud our biblical reasoning. Accordingly, not only are we to accept doctrines that at first glance appear paradoxical to the rational mind, we simply cannot get around being subject to apparent contradictions. In other words, given our finitude and God’s infinitude, it is alleged that certain doctrines, even all doctrines, will always appear contradictory because of the “Creator-creature” distinction, a distinction I embrace with all my orthodox heart,soul and mind yet without letting it lead me down a dead end alley of skepiticism.

In order for two or more propositions to appear contradictory, I would think, in my creaturely finitude, that they must actually appear to take the form of a contradiction. After all, these supposed paradoxes are not claimed to be apparently consistent but rather apparently contradictory. So ask yourself, what is a set of propositions that looks like a contradiction and sounds like a contradiction but is not a contradiction? Clarkians will answer “A Van Tillian musing, of course!”

If the apparent contradiction imbedded in a particular doctrine cannot be made to disappear, then what  rational hope is there that the apparent contradiction is not a real contradiction? How can an actual contradiction be distinguished from an apparent one if the apparent seems actual from a creaturely perspective? After all, is there an acid test to distinguish real contradictions from ones that aren’t real but look real?

Until one reconciles an apparent contradiction, I don’t think he has any business embracing both horns of the supposed contradiction. (I appreciate that there are transition periods in one’s thinking but we’re not to live in a perpetual state of transition over any given doctrine. We are to prayerfully wrestle with things and press on.) Now then, let’s say one embraces Jesus’ humanity, which entails a localized body, yet also embraces the real presence of the mass. He would embrace what appears to him to be an apparent contradiction, which in this case would be a real contradiction. He would embrace something he thinks appears false, and in this case is actually false. Not good.

Now let’s move to two orthodox horns of what is a conundrum for some. Let’s say one embraces a Reformed view of God’s foreordination of all things along with human moral accountability, yet finds those concepts contradictory. If those concepts are truly contradictory then one of the premises must be false. If one is willing to accept what appears false, then why not the real presence? What would be the basis of accepting one false looking doctrine over another? To simply say that we’re to embrace the seemingly false doctrines the Bible teaches and leave the other false interpretations alone isn’t a workable principle. It's a recipe for arbitrariness and inconsistency.

Moreover, I find it highly improper to call any particular pair of doctrines an “apparent contradiction” because of the universality of the claim. It’s not only an unjustified claim; it’s a false claim too. What is seemingly contradictory to one person can be perfectly harmonious to another since apparent contradictions are not objectively contradictory but rather only perceived as such. Actual contradictions are universal, whether anyone appreciates them or not; yet apparent contradictions are subjective and only apply to those who think, for example, that the eternal decree an human responsibility are seemingly incompatible. Accordingly, it’s simply a misnomer to call any particular doctrine an apparent contradiction because of the idiosyncratic nature of each person’s level of confusion. I find it even a bit arrogant when one asserts that this or that doctrine is paradoxical since the who would voice such a claim would be setting himself up as the measure of another man's capacities, as if he were saying, “I perceive these doctrines as seemingly contradictory, therefore they are apparently contradictory (to all humans), but of course these parallel lines meet in the mind of God.” Now that might be a big pill for some people to swallow, but certainly such people are not saying anything like: “I don’t believe these doctrines need to appear contradictory (if they are indeed orthodox doctrines), but at the moment I’m still working through some things and I believe they might not be contradictory to others. The problem must be with me.”

Some helpful hints moving forward

If someone wants to assert a paradox, it might be helpful to identify the contradictory premises and show why either must be false. As soon as he shows how either one must be false, then should abandon that one. If he can’t show that one must be false then he hasn’t come across an apparent contradiction, now has he? Confusion does not imply contradiction.

So for example, how would one go about proving that the existence of Paris does not conflict with the existence of New York to one who thinks it appears that these two cities cannot exist in harmony? It would be helpful for the one who thinks there is a conflict to put forth his perception of the conflict. The confused one should explain what he thinks is the contradictory nature of the supposed paradox. I’ve been waiting for years to hear why it is seemingly contradictory that God’s foreordination of my actions, which proceed from my intentions, somehow alleviates my responsibility for my actions. God has a morally sufficient reason for the good and evil he determines, and I am responsible for what I do. These two propositions aren’t on a collision course; they’re simply on different tracks. Accordingly, there's not a whole lot to be reconciled.

True humility (coupled with half a sense) appreciates that to embrace something that appears false is not spiritual but in fact foolish. Only someone who is confused would say it looks false but I must embrace it out of humble obedience to God. Whereas one with more understanding will say it looks false so I must be missing something either in my overall theology or on this particular point. I either need to change some governing presupposition(s) or else get a better handle on this new item of consideration.

Another example might be helpful. One might reason from common experience that persons have a beginning, but since the Second Person of the Trinity had no beginning, the eternal sonship of the Second Person is an apparent contradiction. Yet such a paradox disappears when we let God define for us the realm of possibility as it relates to persons, finitude and being. In other words, these propositions are seemingly contradictory to the carnal mind that is not subject to the word of God, but when we let God’s word inform our thinking the propositions do not appear at odds with each other in the least. With that example in mind, the astute reader might find a terrible irony in all of this. It seems to me that Van Tillians are to get their framework for the possible realm from Scripture, and if we begin with Scripture to inform our thinking on what defines reality etc., apparent contradictions, which always incorporate autonomous thought, go away. When Scripture informs us of truth and the realm of possibility, we get a whole host of new propositions to play with, which is something CVT grasped well yet did not incorporate into his thinking in the realm of paradox. With Scripture as our presupposition, we begin to see that three persons and one being (descriptive of God) is as coherent as one person and one being (descriptive of man). The latter in one sense is more common to our experience, but the former is no less revealed to our minds. (It can even be argued that the latter is more common to our experience given that we are bombarded with the one and the many every moment of every day.) Since both are revealed truths, we don’t have a contradiction of x and ~x, but rather we find a harmonious x and y. If we’re talking about x and y, then there was no apparent contradiction between two x’s to begin with but rather only imprecise terminology that needed to be fleshed out a bit more. It’s the person who reasons apart from Scripture that finds himself with x and ~x. It’s only when we think in terms of necessarily one being = one person, which is not a revealed truth, do we run into problems with the Trinity in this regard.

Does all that make me a non-Van Tillian? Well, what are the essential properties one must maintain to be called a Van Tillian, or a Calvinist for that matter? Regarding the former, is it enought to believe that the Triune God is the necessary precondition for intelligible experience, and that Scripture is the justification of all knowledge, and to predicate against God one must presuppose that a common creator provides a fruitful connection between my mind and the external, mind-independent world? Is it enough to believe that formally the believer and unbeliever have much in common but in principle they disagree on everything? Does one need to embrace Calvin’s Geneva to be a Calvinist? I remember Greg Bahnsen while lecturing on the Westminster Confession saying that God’s determination of creaturely choices and man’s responsibility are not seemingly contradictory doctrines but only mysterious. Was he not Van Tillian? Regarding the problem of evil, Bahnsen noted that God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil he ordains. To put it in Gordon Clark’s terms, God is not answerable to anyone but himself.

Finally, nobody is saying that Christian doctrine can be exhausted in our finitude. All that is being said is that seemingly logical contradictions can be removed from doctrines that are pure. If I cannot relieve the tension, then I’ll be constrained either to change my overall theology or dig harder to learn why a new proposition that confronts my old thinking is not at odds with my existing theology. That’s how I became a Calvinistic paedobaptist. It is just not available to earnest Christians to embrace what appears to be contradictory, which is not to say we can exhaust the depths of the doctrines we know in part, or that mystery must be denied. It’s not to raise logic above God’s word, nor is it to be too rational (whatever that means). When did irrationality become a virtue?

Indeed, there are many Christian tenets that remain mysterious to my mind, but I am unaware of any antinomies contained therein. Nor do I believe that because I’m incapable in my finitude of plumbing the depths of any proposition that I’m consigned to a world of incompatible propositions. Biblical faith does not call us to embrace what appears to be false, which is why I can reject the alleged transubstantiation of the mass in good conscience.

Van Til, Bahnsen, Logic and TAG

“To us the only thing of great significance in this connection is that it is often found to be more difficult to distinguish our method from the deductive method than from the inductive method. But the favorite charge against us is that we are still bound to the past and are therefore employing the deductive method. Our opponents are thoughtlessly identifying our method with the Greek method of deduction. For this reason it is necessary for us to make the difference between these two methods as clear as we can.” (Van Til, Survey of Christian Epistemology, 9.)

“To put it simply, in the case of ‘direct’ arguments (whether rational or empirical), the negation of one of their premises changes the truth or reliability of their conclusion. But this is not true of transcendental arguments, and that sets them off from the other kinds of proof or analysis. A transcendental argument begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds, by critical analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful, or be intelligible to us. Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501-502.)

“Years ago Van Til realized that opponents of presuppositionalism tend to think that there are only two kinds of reasoning: inductive and deductive. Deductive reasoning stands opposed to inductive. However, there is also transcendental reasoning, in which the preconditions for the intelligibility of what is experienced, asserted, or argued are posed or sought. It, too, stands opposed to a purely inductive approach to knowledge. Critics seem to think that, since presuppositionalism does not endorse pure inductivism, it must favor deductivism instead. This logical fallacy is known as false antithesis.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 176, n. 55.)

The above three quotes were recently forwarded to me for comment because these sentiments of Van Til and Bahnsen are often (sadly so) misconstrued as affirmation of their denying the place of deduction and induction in the realm of presuppositional apologetics. (Having the books, I have verified the accuracy of the quotes.)

The beauty of the transcendental argument for the existence of God (TAG) as a special kind of deductive argument is not in the reductio but in the transcendental challenge, which demonstrates that to argue against God one must first presuppose that which only Christianity affords. In other words, TAG is certainly a deductive argument, but it's a unique kind of deductive argument, not in its form per se but rather in what it seeks to demonstrate. Transcendental arguments are concerned with the preconditions of any fact of experience – what must be true in order for any fact of experience to be that which it is. Van Til was careful to note that “the Christian method uses neither the inductive nor the deductive method as understood by the opponents of Christianity, but that it has elements of both induction and of deduction in it, if these terms are understood in a Christian sense.” (Van Til, page 10 - emphasis mine.) Why the qualifier "as it is understood by the opponents of Christianity" if Van Til did not believe that TAG incorporated deduction? Why not just say that the Christian method does not use deduction, end of statement? The reason is, TAG has aspects of not just deduction but induction too, as Van Til states with no ambiguity. TAG has a distinctly inductive aspect to it because with TAG the Christian investigates what must be true in order for some experience to be intelligible. Such explorations are inductive in emphasis. Notwithstanding, the manner of the investigation is not open ended because the premises within TAG do not merely support the conclusion, they ensure it. That aspect is unique to deduction. Moreover, the conclusion from TAG is not a mere hypothesis, but rather a sound conclusion derived through a deductive process. Finally, TAG falls short of being fully inductive because there is no asserting the consequent with TAG, as there is with all scientific inference, the playground for induction.

Van Til goes on to critique what he qualified as “exclusively” deductive arguments and “purely” inductive arguments that do not presuppose God. It was the anti-Christian Greek method of logic that Van Til and Bahnsen opposed but not logical apologetics. In other words, they never opposed deduction and induction but rather qualified these disciplines in reference to strictly secular uses of reason and inference. Even a careless reading of Van Til and Bahnsen bears this out, but one must first read the authors and not just read about them. And reading the authors would require reading past page 9 in Van Til, at least up through page 10. (Many perceived problems regarding Gordon H. Clark would also vanish if one would only simply go to the original source, rather than choosing sides in a partisan manner.)

Bahnsen typically employed modus tollens (MT) in his formal argument, yet he distinguished his employment of TAG from garden variety deduction. Mike Butler (at one time Bahnsen’s assistant) to my knowledge, also, has never pitted transcendental arguments against deduction. Butler has written TAG out, which is indeed deductive in form "For x (some aspect of human experience) to be the case, y must also be the case since y is the precondition of x. Since x is the case, y is the case." (Butler, The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence, 91 The Standard Bearer.)
Van Til and Bahnsen fully appreciated that TAG is a deductive argument strictly speaking (lest they contradicted themselves in practice). However, their focus in this regard was on what distinguishes TAG from the usual kind of deductive (and inductive) arguments. The unique quality of TAG that sets it apart from all other standard deductive arguments is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others - but that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience. In other words, with standard deductive arguments we try to deduce from a fact, or series of facts, other facts; no more, no less. If it's Sunday I'm with a congregation of saints from 9:30-12 in the morning. If I’m not with a congregation of saints at 10:00 a.m., then it’s not Sunday. That it’s not Sunday can be a standard deduction, yet my being with the saints at a certain time does not make Sundays possible. Kant's genius was that TA's are concerned with what must be true in order for something else to be possible. God’s revelation makes intelligible experience possible, whereas my being with the saints at a particular time does not make Sunday between 9:30 and noon possible.

Clearly, Bahnsen applied deduction in his demonstration of TAG. Accordingly, he was either inconsistent with himself, or we should interpret his statements as meaning something other than TAG is not strictly speaking deductive. With little effort we can reconcile Bahnsen's practice of TAG with his description of it. TAG is not like any other deductive argument because it does not reason from fact to fact in the standard Greek sense but rather reasons from fact to the preconditions of fact, which is Kantian, yet when in the hands of a Christian a very powerful tool.

Ron