Sanctification and Moralism

Sanctification is too often only thought of in terms of that process whereby a converted sinner is gradually transformed in mind and affections  according to the preceptive-will of God and consequently into the image of Christ.  At best, too often sanctification is merely seen in terms of becoming truly Christ-like, and if truly Christ-like then truly human (since Christ is the perfect image of God in man). Yet when speaking of sanctification the New Testament speaks more in terms of a one-time break with sin, a definitive act of sanctification.  In this light, sanctification is more akin to effectual calling, justification and adoption - a one-time act never to be repeated or undone.  Indeed, that God will complete a progressive sanctifying work in all his children should be  a source of confidence and joy for every believer.  Notwithstanding, we should expect that the degree of understanding of God’s finished work of definitive sanctification in the life of the believer will, to some extent, influence the attainment of progressive sanctification in the experience of the believer.  After all, to think Christ’s thoughts after him, as we walk in him, includes thinking true thoughts about God’s work of definitive sanctification. Moreover, to think wrongly about sanctification is to “obey” in our sanctification not according to the truth of our sanctification.

At the very heart of sanctification is life from the dead. The believer is delivered once and for all from the bondage of sin and raised to walk in newness of life. In that great familiar hymn, Charles Wesley put it this way: “Long my imprisoned spirit lay, fast bound in sin and nature's night; thine eye diffused a quickening ray; I woke, the dungeon flamed with light; my chains fell off, my heart was free, I rose, went forth, and followed thee...”  

Is it not true that he that is dead is freed from sin? Hasn’t the believer truly died with Christ? Accordingly, as dead and raised in union with Christ, isn’t the believer freed from sin and, therefore, no longer under its bondage and dominion? Isn’t it true that the believer has been crucified with Christ and it is no longer the believer who lives but Christ who lives in and through the believer?  Isn’t the very imperative not to let sin reign in our mortal bodies premised upon the incongruity of what the contrary contemplates, sin having reign over the believer’s body? Doesn’t the incongruity presuppose the reality of resurrected life in union with Christ?  Sure, sin indwells every believer, but the truth of the matter is the believer is no longer in the flesh but in the Spirit; so it is as the Westminster Divines rightly wrote, “…the saints grow in grace, perfecting holiness in the fear of the Lord.” Indwelling sin is not enslaving sin, for the Christian is a slave to Christ.

Falling into the error of perfectionism is hardly a danger in Reformed circles, but what is at risk is building a doctrine of sanctification upon personal experience, observation and Christian testimony. I fear that sentimental fundamentalism along with moralism has made its way into Reformed churches.  “Being saved” is understood primarily in terms of justification, which is all that God does; and we must do the rest. After being justified, the believer must respond by living a moral life in gratitude for God’s saving work in Christ, or so it is often told without remainder.  To whip up devotion to God and his ways by exciting gratitude for Christ’s atoning work on the cross, (even pity for the Savior in Romanist and many Fundamentalist circles), is often what is preached as the impetus for living the Christian life. Obligation to obey because of the Savior's sin bearing, life giving death upon the cross is all we have to move us. The very fact that every believer is a new creation in Christ and as such actually desires to run in the ways of the Lord is not a reality that is preached - if it is not also denied, at least implicitly. Devotion ends up becoming a work of the flesh, a dead moralism as it were. It even can become that which ultimately must cause one to differ from another, as there is little expectation that the Spirit will cause every believer both to will and to do of God’s good pleasure as he so determines.  God actually inclining the wills of his subjects so that they desire to participate in his foreordination of good works in the orbit of family, work, community and church is no longer in view. Sadly, it's exchanged for man, in the flesh, determining the good works that God has somehow mysteriously foreordained man to walk in through obligation, not sovereign transformation. In the end, it is we who determine our sanctification, and lip-service is given to biblical Calvinism as it relates to the divine initiative and subduing grace.

When sheep are taught over and over again that they are slaves to sin and under its bondage, as little children they lose the joy of salvation and begin to believe there is no hope other than through the arm of the flesh. Moralism and legalism begin to set in, and eventually the weary are tempted to give up. This is not good news. The self-effort and "good works" that once plagued the new convert, having been a source of robbing him of the joy, wonder, awe and sheer profundity of his justification through faith alone, becomes an hindrance to enjoying and participating in God’s saving work in sanctification. Justification and sanctification have been rent asunder as God is portrayed as being operative in the former, leaving the latter a matter of self-effort alone - a kind of saved by grace, kept by works - a despairing thought indeed. Have I gone too far? Well, note well that if God does not take the divine initiative of causing the believer both to will and do of his good pleasure and, also, fulfill his promise of completing a work of grace until the day of Jesus Christ, then the Christian is as alone in his sanctification as he possibly can be. What must be grasped is that anything short of pure Reformed theology in this regard is not the teaching of biblical sanctification. The message of grace should be so abundant - appear so one sided, that onlookers will mistake the truth for license to sin! "Shall we continue in sin so that grace may abound? God forbid. How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein?"

So, where do we go from here? Well, I think these are some starting points that the Christian church might begin to regain in emphasis as opposed to what is widely found in the evangelical church today…

1. More preaching and teaching on union with Christ in election, incarnation, atonement, resurrection, and ascension must take center stage.

2. A realized eschatology – (e.g. God made us alive with Christ; God raised us with Christ; God seated us in heavenly places with Christ -> i.e. “we have been saved”)

3. The divine intention to sum up all things (in heaven and earth) in Christ (i.e. the eschatological and cosmic dimensions of God’s plan for the ages…)

4. Salvation, not merely justification and conversion

5. Ministers must preach to the church, those in union with in Christ, not the supposed lost that might be members or attending.

6. Inauguration & consummation (i.e. already not yet paradigm)

7. The relationship of the imperative to the indicative must be regained, with the indicative taking priority and laying the foundation for the imperative. (e.g. Behave this way, because you are this person in Christ; the unity of the Spirit exists, therefore, maintain it… as opposed to: create peace because Jesus died for you…)

Paul Manata: Free Will for Reformed Dummies

“I don't know how many times I have asked candidates for licensure and ordination whether we are free from God's decree, and they have replied ‘No, because we are fallen.’ That is to confuse libertarianism (freedom from God's decree, ability to act without cause) with freedom from sin. In the former case, the fall is entirely irrelevant. Neither before nor after the fall did Adam have freedom in the libertarian sense. But freedom from sin is something different. Adam had that before the fall, but lost it as a result of the fall.” John Frame

Plain and simple, Reformed folk, especially pastors and professors, need to wrap their minds around a Reformed understanding of the workings of the human will and how it relates to God’s decree and moral responsibility. Confusion abounds, or as Paul Manata puts it, there is no “unified message” among Reformed thinkers and many prominent ones are “apparently at odds with each other.” I agree, which is why I am exceedingly well pleased to see that Paul has put his mind and skill to this important matter and provide the Reformed community with a timely primer on free will and moral responsibility.

If one is looking for a polemical defense of Reformed Theology (RT) as it relates to determinism, freedom and moral culpability, Paul’s paper is probably not for you. Paul aims at a different target and hits it in the bullseye. He aims to lay the groundwork for fruitful reflection and discussion while showing that RT is inherently a kind of determinism, and that RT entails harmonious compatibility between determinism, man’s freedom and moral accountability. Paul defends his general thesis by concise appeals to the Westminster Confession of Faith, with reference to its teachings on God’s eternal decree, divine providence and exhaustive omniscience, which includes foreknowledge. Again, Paul is not setting out to defend RT per se as it relates to these matters, but rather define RT as it relates to them, as well as establish some suitable boundaries or fence posts from within intramural discussions can take place. That is not to say that his paper is void of any defense of RT in this regard, but that is not his primary focus. In fact, Paul spends considerable time walking his readers through the thought process of non-Reformed positions.

Paul, playing off John Feinberg’s classifications of necessity, draws a distinction between what he calls “nature determinism” and “act determinism." That man acts according to his nature is not an argument against libertarian freedom, nor is it an adequate defense of a Reformed stripe of determinism. Although Reformed thinkers confuse the two and often strictly argue in accordance with nature determinism, in doing so they beg most crucial questions and in the process look foolish in front of skilled Molinists.This distinction also plays into the erroneous idea that by establishing irresistible grace, libertarian freedom is refuted.

After setting the stage by showing that Reformed theology is clearly a type of determinism, Paul takes up the task of showing that if RT is consistent, then determinism must be compatible with man’s moral accountability and freedom, because RT, following Scripture, affirms both. Paul then waltzes his readers through classical compatiblism and the main objection against it (the "consequence argument", which is that there is no possibility of freedom given determinism). It is alleged that if we are not in control of all determining factors, then we cannot be free – a premise that has been affirmed (and denied) from within opposing camps. The lack of agreement is mostly due to ambiguity within the complaint.

Paul then moves to a discussion on semi-compatiblism, which strongly denies the freedom to do otherwise; it doesn’t posit hypothetical freedom, as do classical compatiblists. The position focuses on necessary conditions for moral accountability, which do not include an ability to choose between alternative possibilities, but do require “control,” which Paul later refines in light of man’s ability to be responsive to reason and innate understanding of moral responsibility.

Paul then takes on libertarian free will and its associated axiom that “ought” implies “can.” Within a deterministic framework we cannot do otherwise, but if “ought” implies “can," then determinism must undermine moral responsibility. He then addresses those libertarians who posit that what is required for moral responsibility is not libertarian freedom but rather that man himself is the ultimate source of his actions. A supporting argument would be that if an agent could be physically prevented from acting in any other way but one (such as with a Frankfurt counter example, or FCE) so as to ensure that no other choice is made, then no other choice could be made. If one can be kept from a contrary choice, then he could not act except but one way - yet he’d be responsible for acting when left to his own deliberation, which suggests that one need not have alternate possibilities in order to be morally responsible. FCEs help show that moral responsibility is not conditioned upon alternate possibilities. This illustrative theory is often used to support the premise that when man is the ultimate source of his action he has met the sufficient condition for moral accountability. Accordingly, it is maintained by "narrow source" incompatibilists that one can be responsible apart from alternate possibilities, if he is the ultimate source of his actions. (FCEs are useful for the determinist too.)Then Paul segues into agent-causality, a position which reduces to man being sovereign not just over his actions but his will too. 

(Digression: I can see how a Calvinist can make fair use of Frankfurt counterexamples but not libertarians. For within Molinism, for instance, "will choose x" does not imply "must choose x", a non-issue for determinists (for will implies must for a determinist). Naturally, a Calvinist would not be establishing ultimate sourcehood by the employment of FCEs, but he could defeat an objection against the ability to choose otherwise as being necessary for moral accountability, but such a defeater presupposes a deterministic metaphysic, which of course would not be persuasive to a Molinist; yet the argument would be valid (even sound) just the same. In other words, given a Molinist's metaphysic, a physical constraint to choose otherwise does not imply a metaphysical constraint to choose otherwise. So, for the Molinist, although the agent would be prevented from choosing other than x, he would still be metaphysically free to choose other than x. FCE's are a powerful tool in the right hands but not in the hands of libertarians, and I've digressed enough.)  

Eventually Paul's paper gets into synchronic tendencies in the Reformed tradition, where Paul is constrained to underscore that although there is liberty within the Reformed tradition to work out models of determinism (as long as they don’t get outside certain Reformed fence posts) there is no place to eradicate determinism from RT, as some seem to want to do. Paul interacts with quotes by contemporary Reformed professors, which demonstrate that confusion does abound over the matter of pure contingency and necessity. Paul interacts with Duns Scotus' view that is apparently being appropriated by some Reformed thinkers. Paul then gets a bit more polemical and employs a foreknowledge argument that incorporates an accidental necessity argument, which simply states that in the past are future tense truth propositions regarding creaturely choices. If it was true yesterday that Alice would choose x, then Alice's future choice of x is as necessary as the past.

Finally, Paul distinguishes between overcoming libertarian objections in the realm of conversion and overcoming them in the realm of most choices, "mundane" ones. That is a distinction that must be maintained, for there has been an argument floated out there at a renowned Reformed seminary that libertarian freedom is refuted by the doctrine of irresistible grace.

Paul’s desire in producing this work is to provoke thoughtful reflection and discussion within the Reformed community. I don't know of a better topic for him to have selected for the main objection to RT is its inherently deterministic doctrine. The confusion that abounds must first be cleared up within the camp if we’re to attract outsiders to RT. If more professors dumb down determinism, or exchange it for something else, then those attracted to the name RT will not be attracted to actual RT.

May God be pleased to grant increase to Paul Manata's most excellent work. 

A Common Error Among Calvinists - Rationalism At Its Worst

It is indeed true that Jesus died only for the elect and that all for which he died will be saved. Notwithstanding, it is not a matter of logical necessity that the Holy Spirit unites the elect to Christ.

As a five point Calvinist, I would argue that we can know from revelation that Universalism is false and that all who were chosen in Christ were purchased by Christ; and that the Holy Spirit will unite them and them only to Christ. And although it is true that the Triune God works in harmony, it is not a matter of logic that those for whom Christ died will be saved; yet it is true they will be saved.

First off, there is no universal principle that vicarious suffering and payment necessitates payment received. For instance, if I were to suffer and pay for something on behalf of someone I love yet require that the person willfully pick up the purchased possession, a refusal of one to do so would not obstruct justice. It is incumbent upon one to show why it is necessary that God apply redemption given that the reception of a purchase is not universally necessary for injustice not to obtain. (Again, it’s not a question of whether God determined to apply redemption to all the elect but rather whether not doing so would violate logic or justice.) 

It is indeed true that:

“If Jesus' death atoned for everyone's sins, then everyone would go to heaven.” P*

Notwithstanding, the Calvinistic meaning of atonement is the issue of debate and penal substitution does not imply the consequent. In other words, P* is not deducible by solely considering the judicial, vicarious sufferings of Christ as penal substitute. It’s a bit more complex than that, obviously.

Narrowly considered, the nature of the cross does not in and of itself necessitate that redemption must be applied. (Rather, redemption must be applied due to God’s determination, which was not constrained by logic or justice but rather purpose.) As well, although P* is true (according to Scripture), it is not placed within a very interesting polemic because the common argument does not involve an internal critique of the Arminian position and it begs too many crucial salvific questions regarding: divine intent within the Godhead as it pertains to redemption accomplished and applied; the extent of the fall as it pertains to man's will; and the metaphysics of the will with respect to pure contingency and necessity.

The polemic attributed to Owen (I do not say it is Owen's) does not attack Arminianism because it begs crucial questions. For instance, if irresistible grace was not necessary for faith to be implanted, then P* could be false. If God did not desire to work in harmony with respect to election, redemption and application, then that premise could be false. If God does not by grace cause people to persevere in their sanctification (which too was purchased at the cross), then that premise could be false.

In the final analyses: (1) God’s revelation pertaining to the fullness of grace and the unity of the Godhead as it pertains to the divine redemptive intention is what informs us of the truth or falsity of P*. It's not enough simply to assert P*. (2) Given the truth of P* (in light of all revelation), the often alleged logical necessity of the consequent in P* needs to be demonstrated as a part-and-parcel with the concept of penal substitution.

Now let me really put the cookies on the table. If penal substitution alone requires that another be set free, then why the need for existential union with the substitute in order for sinners to be forgiven? Why aren't the elect free from condemnation apart from being baptized into Christ - i.e. while outside Christ, if substitution alone requires justification? Accordingly, Owenites must at least argue that substitution logically requires that God regenerate sinners, a tall order to prove indeed from the doctrine of substitution.

I can't die for a serial killer and justice be served. In the like manner, substitution alone is not enough for redemption otherwise I would have been set free while unconverted, a clear violation of Ephesians 2. Regarding the serial killer example I would somehow have to be united to the killer (or rather he to me) in perfect union if we are to glean anything from Scripture in this regard. No doubt, the Trinity's harmonious intention as revealed in Scripture results in the gracious particular application of redemption. Moreover, for the intention of the substitution not to become effectual is of course impossible because limited atonement is biblical but that's the issue of debate and, therefore, may not be assumed in the definition of substitutionary atonement! We must deal with Arminians with intellectual honestly. What must be grasped is that the substitutionary death of Christ and particular redemption are not the same thing! The latter has to do with intention or design of the substitionary death and how it relates to redemption-applied i.e. with a view toward efficacy and application, which being the issue of debate may not be infused into the definition of substitution.

Lastly, that the Holy Spirit converts all that Jesus died for speaks to the harmonious plan of redemption as revealed in Scripture but says nothing about some supposed double jeopardy that would have occurred had Christ died for men who remained unconverted men. Double jeopardy occurs when the same man pays twice for the same sin and it would occur if one in existential union with Christ went to hell. One cannot pay for his sins once the sacrifice for his sins is his made his own or appropriated, which occurs upon union and not at the time of propitiation! Accordingly, baptism into Christ's work is what makes Christ's sacrifice the sinner's sacrifice. Consequently, it's only upon existential union with Christ that there is no condemnation. And it is only upon union that double jeopardy could come into view.

Ron

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