1 Corinthians 13:2
In discussions over what constitutes knowledge there are some obvious axioms that have occurred to my mind. For instance, a person can know only that which is true. Furthermore, for something to be known it must be believed. Although true belief is necessary for knowledge, with little effort it can been seen that it is not sufficient for knowledge to entail. An example might prove useful. Say someone held the true belief that the President of the United States for most of the 1980’s had the initials R.R. yet thought him to have been Roy Rogers (and not Ronald Reagan). The belief would correspond to the truth merely by coincidence thereby not qualifying as knowledge. But can such a belief be justified? Imagine, for instance, that the true belief was held by the child of a truthful parent who had in undetected jest told the child that Roy Rogers was the 40th president. In such an instance the child having not detected, say, a rare moment of dry wit in his parent could have been justified in believing that the 40th president was Roy Rogers and, therefore, had the initials R.R. After all, it’s not so strange that an American cowboy actor born in the Midwest in 1911 and dying in California (which is true of both R.R.s) could become President of the United States.
Certainly in the pursuit of defining the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge we may properly include in the mix a condition that would prohibit a justification that entails false beliefs, like believing the clock is working when it is not. Not only must the person be justified in his true belief, there can be no existing true proposition (e.g. the clock is broken) that if known would undermine the person’s reliance upon reasons for the belief. After all, if such were not the case – if one actually can know the time based upon a broken clock, then upon learning the clock is broken one would lose his justification for his belief and thereby any knowledge he was thought to have had. Therefore, we must maintain that a robust theory of knowledge cannot make room for a loss of knowledge due to at least some type or classification of acquired truth. Succinctly, one cannot know p if there exists at least some class of undermining evidence that if acquired would result in a loss of justification for the belief. In such cases, that which defeats the justification for knowledge is not a believed proposition (that is internal to the subject) but rather an existing one that is external to the mind. What sort of existing propositions that would qualify as a type or class that would undermine knowledge needs further examination.
Feasibility of an
undermining proposition
Now what if the clock was not broken? If the clock was not
broken, then the conditions for knowledge that would be met are justified true
belief (JTB) plus no existing
propositional defeater of the justification. The question that immediately comes
to my mind is whether the possibility
of a broken clock should come into play. In order to have knowledge that it is
twelve noon must the believer have positive verification of the accurate workings
of the clock in question (as opposed
to clocks in general), or is the mere absence of an existing defeater proposition (as opposed to the potential of one existing) enough for
knowledge to obtain? Should the possibility
of the clock being broken, even when it’s not broken, be enough to relegate such
JTB to something less thank knowledge? In
other words, must the defeater actually exist or can it feasibly exist in order
to undermine one’s knowledge of the time?
For argument sake, let’s call such true belief “knowledge”
when the clock is functioning properly. Without having verified the clock the
person’s justification for his true belief of the time would be the same
whether the clock was broken or not. Accordingly, when the clock is functioning
properly the certainty of the time is
no greater than when the time is not known (due to a faulty clock) yet possibly
thought to be known. Accordingly, to tag such a non-defeated JTB as “knowledge”
is not to be less skeptical than one who wouldn’t do so, but rather it is to
define knowledge more inclusively. (It is often charged that not to call such inferences knowledge is to consign oneself to skepticism.)
Under such terms one can know the time while rationally believing that the time might not be known let alone true. In other words, the person could know the time while also believing with the utmost consistency within such an epistemic framework that the time could be other than what is believed. Such need not be the case with other sorts of knowledge, like knowledge of Scripture propositions for instance. It is not incumbent upon the subject to rationally question whether what is known from Scripture is actually true for the Holy Spirit provides the warrant for such true beliefs. But where "knowledge" is attainable without having positive verification of the source, then it is most rational to believe that something might be false yet while knowing it is true.
Statistics
Given a functioning clock, what if there existed a
publication of accurate statistical evidence unrealized by the subject that clocks
made by that particular manufacturer were faulty most of the time? Would such
existing evidence be a defeater? The question presents no problem to one who
would consider the mere possibility of a faulty clock as undermining the
possibility of knowledge. It does, however, pertain to one with a more
inclusive understanding of knowledge. Can one know the time because of a lack
of relevant evidence that most clocks from the manufacturer are not reliable?Under such terms one can know the time while rationally believing that the time might not be known let alone true. In other words, the person could know the time while also believing with the utmost consistency within such an epistemic framework that the time could be other than what is believed. Such need not be the case with other sorts of knowledge, like knowledge of Scripture propositions for instance. It is not incumbent upon the subject to rationally question whether what is known from Scripture is actually true for the Holy Spirit provides the warrant for such true beliefs. But where "knowledge" is attainable without having positive verification of the source, then it is most rational to believe that something might be false yet while knowing it is true.
Statistics
It would seem somewhat intuitive that one would not be justified in believing the time if he also believed the true proposition that most of the clocks from the manufacturer were faulty. It is widely held by those with a more inclusive view of knowledge that such known statistics, even when not known by all, would undermine knowledge in such instances for all people, even for those who were ignorant of the statistic. (see: Alvin Goldman, fake barns)
A problem with such probability?
Now of course probability is useful because mere humans
cannot capture all the causal factors that go into any event. Notwithstanding,
whether a clock will function or not is a binary consideration – it either will
or it won’t. Whether it functions or not is causally determined and if we could
know all the determining factors then we could know with a probability of 100%
the outcome with nothing left to chance. Given that it is impossible that a
functioning clock would not have functioned (due to causal necessity), the
obvious (or not so obvious) question is whether an unknown,
unpublished statistical probability of a particular functioning clock (which
proves to be 100% by the nature of the case) should override statistically
rational inference about any given particular clock that is drawn from a lot of many
clocks that yields less than a 50% success rate. Indeed, Jones would not be
justified in believing it is twelve noon if he were also to believe most clocks
from this manufacturer are defective. That Jones happened to look at a
functioning clock would be a matter of chance. Yet if the clock was working
properly then there exists some statistical affirmation that the particular
clock would necessarily have worked properly. Would the existence of such a true
statistic about a particular clock override another true statistic that
reported most clocks from the manufacturer were faulty?
It seems to me that most that hold to an inclusive view of knowledge would negate the possibility of knowledge obtaining through the means of a functioning clock manufactured by a disfunctional manufacturer. The reason being that had the subject known about the manufacturer he would not be rationally justified in believing the time based upon such a clock. But if we're talking about statistics not known by the subject-knower, then why is the manufacturer's track record for clocks more relevant than the statistics pertaining to the particular, functioning clock in question? Maybe that clock was made during a shift where the clocks never have failed. Again, if the clock works properly then there exists, whether known or not, some statistical reflection of that reality. Again, this presents no problem for those who have a less inclusive view of knowledge.
This leads to many other questions, not the least of which are: What is the scope of relevant defeaters? Are they
statistical in nature? Must they be true, or does a well promulgaged lie yet not heard by the subject-knower come into play? Might they only
be feasible, even if not spoken actually, let alone true? Must they be humanly knowable or merely true? Again, these do not come into play for those with a less inclusive view of knowledge, which of course does not undermine subjective certainty of what is rational to believe. It seems to me that most that hold to an inclusive view of knowledge would negate the possibility of knowledge obtaining through the means of a functioning clock manufactured by a disfunctional manufacturer. The reason being that had the subject known about the manufacturer he would not be rationally justified in believing the time based upon such a clock. But if we're talking about statistics not known by the subject-knower, then why is the manufacturer's track record for clocks more relevant than the statistics pertaining to the particular, functioning clock in question? Maybe that clock was made during a shift where the clocks never have failed. Again, if the clock works properly then there exists, whether known or not, some statistical reflection of that reality. Again, this presents no problem for those who have a less inclusive view of knowledge.
Other actual existing
propositions
Other sorts of information, defeaters of a different variety
than external propositions, can impinge upon warrant for beliefs. Beliefs that
are actually acquired, as opposed to propositions not known yet true, are now
in view. An acquired strong belief can prevent someone from believing something
newly introduced and contrary to an earlier belief, but new evidence can also
cast doubt on older beliefs. Indeed, new evidence can reduce even override previously
held beliefs depending upon the epistemic or psychological commitment to them.
Such defeaters are internal to the mind, already acquired and not only external.
Now then, say a mother is informed that her son has stolen
money from one of his teacher’s desk. Until then she has been thoroughly
justified in believing her son is truthful – and count it is true that he never
has stolen property. Yet she has
recently noticed that her son has been wearing a lot of new clothes and that
some of her loose change has been disappearing. In realty the son has not stolen;
he has been working after school and buying clothes with money he has earned.
Moreover, it is false that he stole from his teacher’s desk. At this juncture
we can at least appreciate that even strong justification for beliefs can be
diminished by contrary evidence. It is possible that the mother would not be as
justified as before in believing in the integrity of her son. To some degree,
even if minimally, the integrity of the son might become to some degree suspect
in the mother’s mind; so it’s not hard to see that experiences can serve not
only to bolster but also downgrade one’s justification for a given or set of
beliefs, if not also render beliefs that were once justifiable no longer such.
Continued later, Deo volente
Continued later, Deo volente
