Theonomy & The Woman Caught in Adultery

Anti-theonomists are often quick to point to the woman caught in adultery (recorded for us in John 8) as “proof” that the civil case law for adultery (if not by extension all civil case law) is no longer applicable. Before inferring whether Jesus’ handling of the situation abrogated the civil penalty for adultery, it might be appropriate to take a look at: (a) the implications of the law in this regard (b) the Bible’s teaching regarding our responsibility to submit to the divinely appointed laws of anti-God government and (c) Jesus’ modus operandi for dealing with what he believed to be the more critical issue that was before him, even at the expense of ignoring what was being asked of him while knowing full well that some would infer erroneous conclusions that cannot be deduced.

A word or two about the law:

Leviticus 20:10 and Deuteronomy 22:22 require that both guilty parties are to receive the same civil sanction for adultery. That is the requirement of the law. Yet for some reason the mob was uninterested in following the law of God even to that small degree, but rather they replaced God’s law with a manipulation of it (one that suited their own personal gain), not having brought to Jesus the man who sinned. Coupled with this concealment of the whole truth, John 8 explicitly states that the mob’s intention was to test Jesus in order to accuse him. Accordingly, not only was the report false by Christian standards (because of the concealment of truth), it was also malicious toward Jesus and not accompanied by a godly desire for justice because it aimed to get Jesus to follow the masses in a perversion of justice. Accordingly, had Jesus the Savior acquiesced to the masses and partaken of their misuse of the law, he himself would have been in violation of God’s law! Exodus 23:1-4 teaches: “you shall not bear a false report”, nor “join your hand with a wicked man to be a malicious witness”, nor “follow the masses in doing evil” nor “pervert justice.” (Note: I do not say that it is necessary that both parties be brought forward for either one to receive their just penalty. What if one escaped, or even died? Such an interpretation that would require both parties to be brought forward is not needed to vindicate the perpetual validity of the law and Jesus' suspension of it in this case on other grounds as mentioned above and below. In this particular case, that only the woman was brought forward can only at best corroborate the ill-intention of the mob, which was explicitly noted in the text and is no mere inference.)

In passing we might also observe that since the woman was caught in the act, it is very probable that her habits were well known, making her an easy prey for entrapment. Such would only lend credence to the malicious quality of the scheme while also implicating the mob for not being concerned with the woman’s licentious behavior until such time that it could be used for evil rather than good. Yes, penalties can and are to be used for good but the design of good too often loses its effect when the law is not carried out by those lawfully called who possess a lowly servant’s heart. (These servants are not individual mavericks of society but civil servants appointed to such service who in the end serve God and men.)

Submission to God’s providential infliction of unruly government:

Romans 13 teaches that we are not to take the law into our own hands but rather submit to God’s providentially ordained government, even when that government is pluralistic. This principle was to be followed during Jesus’ earthly ministry and the Jews knew it all too well: “So Pilate said to them, ‘Take Him yourselves, and judge Him according to your law.’ The Jews said to him, ‘We are not permitted to put anyone to death’” John 18:31 Yet the Jews conveniently were not interested in obeying that precept of submitting to God ordained Roman rule when it did not suit them: “Is it lawful to pay a poll-tax to Caesar, or not? Shall we pay or shall we not pay?’ But He, knowing their hypocrisy, said to them, ‘Why are you testing Me? Bring Me a denarius to look at.’ They brought one. And He said to them, ‘Whose likeness and inscription is this?’ And they said to Him, ‘Caesar's.’ And Jesus said to them, ‘Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's.’ And they were amazed at Him.” Mark 12: 15-17 With respect to the John 8, it must be deemed that it was unlawful under those circumstances for the law of Moses to be implemented; yet that would not seem to be the main impetus behind Jesus' behavior.

Jesus’ modus operandi for dealing with the point that he wanted to deal with, even at the expense of ignoring what was being asked of him and even sometimes at the expense of having that which was false assumed true by his hearers:

John 3:1-3: When Nicodemus stated his inference to Jesus that he was a teacher sent from God, Jesus neither affirmed nor denied the assumption. Rather, he turned the tables by telling Nicodemus he must be born again. Depending upon one’s pre-commitment it might be inferred that Jesus was or was not who Nicodemus thought, a teacher sent from God. Yet we cannot deduce anything in that regard from the text.

Mark 10:17-18: When a rich young ruler called Jesus good, he neither affirmed nor denied that he possessed that quality of person but instead said nobody is good but God. Depending upon one’s pre-commitment it might be inferred that Jesus was not good and, therefore, not God; yet the text neither affirms nor denies either conclusion.

Acts 1:6, 7: When the apostles asked Jesus whether he was at that time going to restore the kingdom to Israel, he neither affirmed nor denied such an intention but instead said that it was not for them to know the times or epochs that the Father has fixed by his own authority. Dispensationalists, given their pre-commitment to a restored national Israel, infer from the answer a confirmation of their theology, that the kingdom will be restored. Notwithstanding, no logical conclusion can be deduced from the text with respect to the restoration Israel’s kingdom.

John 21:20-22: When Peter asked Jesus whether John would be alive at the time of Jesus’ return Jesus told him that if he wanted John to remain until such time it was no business of Peter’s. Jesus then put to Peter his task, which was to follow Jesus. Jesus’ answer did not logically imply that John would remain or not, let alone whether Jesus would even return one day! The answer even caused a rumor among the brethren that John would not die (John 21:23). John in this very epistle (same verse: 23) remarked on the unjustified inference that caused the rumor: “Jesus did not say to him that he would not die, but only, ‘If I want him to remain until I come, what is that to you?’”

There are many more examples but the point should be obvious. We cannot logically deduce that which is not deducible! And when it comes to Jesus, the master of making the point he wants to make regardless of what precedes it, we must be doubly careful when assuming what is not said. In the final analyses, if we could deduce that John 8 demands the repudiation of theonomy, then I would think that a syllogism to that end, comprised of premises that don't beg crucial questions, could be constructed rather readily from the text.

At the end of the day, the use of the text to refute theonomy is on par with concluding that (a) Jesus was not a teacher sent from God; (b) Jesus was not good and, therefore, not God; (c) Jesus intended to establish Israel as a political power but failed with the passing of John.

That Jesus did not condemn the woman caught in adultery does not logically imply that she did not deserve death at the hands of godly men, let alone that any laws, rightly interpreted, have been abrogated.

In Summary (and this is the best part...):

The sole intent of the mob was the entrapment of Jesus and whether a life was callously taken in the process, without regard for godly motive, was of no consequence to these wicked men. Accordingly, had Jesus acquiesced to their plea by condoning the woman’s death on their terms, he would have partaken in their scheming and wickedness according to Exodus 23:1-4. Moreover, had Jesus allowed for the penalty under Moses to be enacted in this particular case, he would have implied that men need not submit to God’s ordained government, a clear violation of the general equity of God’s lawful principle of rendering unto Cesar that which is Cesar’s (which equity is also affirmed later in Romans 13).

Jesus was in a predicament. He did not want to condone the woman’s execution given the motivation of the witnesses and accusers, lest he himself could be guilty of paving the way for their sin and become an accomplice with them according to Exodus 23:1-4. Nor did Jesus want to suggest that the woman did not deserve immediate punishment for her sin as prescribed by Leviticus 20:10 and Deuteronomy 22:22.

Her action was indeed worthy of death, (lest the law which he authored had been abolished; yet he had already stated most unambiguously that he had not come to abolish the law. Matthew 5:17) Let there be no mistake about it, Jesus was for the death penalty when his law required the death penalty. He also required that such penalties be carried out not by perfect men but rather by those who had removed the plank from their own eye. Execution was to be carried out in a spirit of godly humility. Anything less than that was to do God’s bidding with a murderous heart, which would reduce to self-serving vengeance as opposed to righteous justice. We are God’s servants, and we not our own. Indeed, Jesus was concerned not only with the letter of the law but also the spirit in which it was to be followed. This must be appreciated by all Christians, especially theonomists.

Let there be no mistake - the people of God should at all times desire that the civil Law of Moses be upheld. What Jesus opposed was not his law (how ridiculous is that?!) but rather the Pharisees’ desire to substitute for it their traditions: “Jesus replied, ‘And why do you break the command of God for the sake of your tradition? For God said, Honor your father and mother and Anyone who curses his father or mother must be put to death.’” Now did Jesus contradict himself? Did Jesus want laws carried out that were not in accordance with the Roman law that was placed into authority by divine providence? Clearly Jesus did not contradict himself by requiring that the Pharisees uphold civil laws that would have conflicted with God-ordained Roman law. Consequently, Jesus’ question of “why” cannot logically imply that they ought to have carried out the penalties prescribed by Moses at that time. Rather, the question is looking for the reason behind their motivation not to carry out the Law of Moses, which in the case of the Pharisees was that they preferred the traditions of men - hence Jesus’ leading question and rebuke. In other words, although the law was not to be carried out at that time (lest God contradicted himself), there should have been a desire to do so that was in submission to the greater principle of obeying Roman law per God’s precept. Accordingly, no answer would have been solicited by Jesus and no rebuke required had they desired in godly submission to carry out lawful executions yet were constrained only by another principle of scripture - that of obeying God ordained government. Such was not the case, not by a long shot. The same hardness of heart and misguided motivations apply to the mob in John 8.

The dilemma solved:

Given the circumstances of no witness-accuser who possessed a heart for righteous judgment - the only one who could have put the woman to death and satisfied the full intention of the law both in letter and spirit would have been God himself. Accordingly, Jesus, unwilling to exercise his divine prerogative, invited anyone without sin to throw the first stone. By handling the difficult providence as he did, Jesus upheld Moses’ intention pertaining to a godly accuser's spirit, yet without compromising the deserved, temporal penalty for the woman. We might say that the case was thrown out of court due to the greater sin of the witness-accusers (and the priority of Roman rule, which I believe was secondary). Yet by couching the invitation as Jesus did, the Lord acknowledged both the rightful penalty and the unworthiness of anyone within that mob that day to carry out God’s law as in the manner God would have it - as God’s servant.

God is concerned with the spirit of the law but not at the cost of abrogation. Now if anyone wants to make more of the passage as it pertains to theonomy and suggest that Moses has been abrogated because nobody is without sin, then in turn they prove too much by relegating all temporal justice to the Final Day, a most absurd and unworkable principle. The only question I have at this juncture is whether the anti-theonomists will go out one by one in shame for butchering the logical implications of the text. Or will the angry mob of Jesus' day prove themselves more worthy than these?

As Calvin keenly observes:

"Christ appears to take out of the world all judicial decisions, so that no man
shall dare to say that he has a right to punish crimes. For shall a single judge
be found, who is not conscious of having something that is wrong? Shall a single
witness be produced who is not chargeable with some fault? He appears,
therefore, to forbid all witnesses to give public testimony, and all judges to
occupy the judgment-seat. I reply: this is not an absolute and unlimited
prohibition, by which Christ forbids sinners to do their duty in correcting the
sins of others; but by this word he only reproves hypocrites, who mildly flatter
themselves and their vices, but are excessively severe, and even act the part of
felons, in censuring others. No man, therefore, shall be prevented by his own
sins from correcting the sins of others, and even from punishing them, when it
may be found necessary, provided that both in himself and in others he hate what
ought to be condemned; and in addition to all this, every man ought to begin by
interrogating his own conscience, and by acting both as witness and judge
against himself, before he come to others. In this manner shall we, without
hating men, make war with sins…

Neither do I condemn thee:

We are not told that Christ absolutely acquitted the woman, but
that he allowed her to go at liberty. Nor is this wonderful, for he did not wish
to undertake any thing that did not belong to his office. He bad been sent by
the Father to gather the lost sheep, (Matthew
10:6;) and, therefore, mindful of his calling, he exhorts the woman to
repentance, and comforts her by a promise of grace. They who infer from this
that adultery ought not to be punished with death, must, for the same reason,
admit that inheritances ought not to be divided, because Christ refused to
arbitrate in that matter between two brothers, (Luke
12:13.) Indeed, there will be no crime whatever that shall not be exempted
from the penalties of the law, if adultery be not punished; for then the door
will be thrown open for any kind of treachery, and for poisoning, and murder,
and robbery. Besides, the adulteress, when she bears an unlawful child, not only
robs the name of the family, but violently takes away the right of inheritance
from the lawful offspring, and conveys it to strangers. But what is worst of
all, the wife not only dishonors the husband to whom she had been united, but
prostitutes herself to shameful wickedness, and likewise violates the sacred
covenant of God, without which no holiness can continue to exist in the world."

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Green Baggins on Theonomy...

It was recently brought to my attention that “Green Baggins” tried to argue “Why Theonomy Is Biblically-Theologically Wrong.” I interact with a couple of his points below.

“Lastly, there is nothing in Romans 13 that cannot be explained on the basis of natural law as explained above. The civil magistrate is there to punish evil. He is ordained by God to do that. The moral law has been implanted on his heart. Therefore, he should be a terror to those who do evil.”

It is evil to fantasize about murder and it is evil to murder. Are both evils to be punished by the sword? Which evils are civil magistrates to punish? What should be those punishments? How are we to justify the answers to those two questions? Natural law offers no answers to those questions and natural law proponents rarely try. Natural law is utterly impotent in this regard. We know from special revelation that general revelation reveals to us that all transgressions against God’s natural law deserve God’s wrath; so if we were to apply general revelation and natural law to the realm of the sword, then all sin would require immediate death, a monstrosity indeed. In other words, if "natural law" replaces the civil case laws, then all tansgressions require death by the sword. Is that what GreenBaggins wants to see? (Theonomy is most often construed as harsh. However, apart from theonomy, no argument with concrete, defensible premises can be levied to combat too harsh of punishments in a fallen world. For instance, how would an anti-theonomist combat a civil magistrate that determined stealing a loaf of bread was a crime worthy of death? The epistemologically conscious theonomist has an answer for too strict of laws in a fallen world; whereas the anti-theonomist is left to appeal to an idiosyncratic sense of justice, which reduces to subjectivism, arbitrariness and knowledge falsely called.)

“However, it is not the civil magistrate’s job to execute a boy for cursing his parents (as was true in the Old Testament civil laws).”

If Old Testament revelation informs us to execute a boy for cursing his parents, then general revelation cannot prescribe a lesser punishment for such a transgression let alone abrogate the penalty, lest God’s revelation (general and special) is contradictory. (Now one might dare to argue that general revelation affirmed the putting to death an incorrigible child under Moses but God has since time altered his general revelation on that point. That, however, would be a tall order to prove from Scripture, not that natural law proponents are particularly interested in employing Scripture to justify their philosophy of civil ethics.)

Since God’s forms of revelation cannot be contradictory, general revelation must either affirm special revelation by telling us that a boy ought to be executed for cursing his parents (which is impossible to prove from general revelation), or else general revelation does not prescribe any penalty for a boy who curses his parents; (it only reveals that is wrong to do so.) In either case, it cannot prescribe a different penalty than special revelation ever prescribed lest God is the author of confusion.

In the final analyses, even if the Old Testament case laws have been abrogated, all such would imply is that we are no longer required to prescribe laws and penalties that reflect the general equity of the Old Testament case laws. Now left to ourselves, what would the Christian want to prescribe if he could? I would like to think that the Christian would look to God’s word to justify which sins are best punished by the civil magistrate and what those sanctions in a fallen world might best be in order to please God. Even that, however, is inadequate because if God has indeed left us to our own in this regard, then there is no justifiable fault to be found with any sanction, for all sanctions would be, well, a matter of personal preference. At the end of the day, anything less than theonomy is tyranny.

What does God’s general revelation and natural law teach us with respect to the penalty for rape? Whatever your answer is, now prove it!

Anti-theonomists are simply arbitrary and inconsistent. In some instances they prefer Mosaic laws and in other instances they don't. In all instances they refuse to justify their preferences by the Old Testament scriptures, unless of course they can find a justification prior to Moses, say under Noah!

“It is the church’s job to instruct and to exercise church discipline. Nowhere in the New Testament does any writer say that the civil government is to rule itself according to Old Testament Israel’s civil law. Rather, every time the civil government is mentioned, it is in connection to the natural moral law.”

It is truly remarkable that any anti-theonomist could be a paedobaptist given such a hermeneutic. Latent dispensationalist-baptist - yes indeed.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

To Whom Did Mary Give Birth & Who Died Upon The Cross?

I won’t bother to get into the historical debate that surrounds these two topics but a word or two will be offered as “food for thought” regarding Mary giving birth to God the Son and a divine person dying upon the cross.

Did Mary give birth to a divine person, or just a human nature? If birth implies the origin of someone new, then only humanity came forth in the virgin birth since the person born of the virgin always existed. However, Mary carried a person (and not just an embodied nature) in her womb, and after her water broke, she then labored to bring forth the person she had carried. In common parlance we call that giving birth. Since a divine person was born, we must let that reality inform our understanding of birth (rather then let our understanding of birth redefine what occurred in that manger in Bethlehem). Birth need not precede the origin of a new person, precisely because the eternal Son of God, a person, was born of a virgin. It's really quite easy when we start with Scripture. Question 37 of the Westminster Shorter Catechism puts it this way, or rather it simply assumes the point when making another:

“How did Christ, being the Son of God, become man? Answer: Christ the Son of God
became man, by taking to himself a true body, and a reasonable soul, being
conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the virgin Mary, of her
substance, and born of her, yet without sin.” (emphasis mine)

Who was born of of the virgin Mary is the question we should be asking, not what was born. Sure, Jesus became man by taking to himself body and soul but it was Christ who was born of Mary. Accordingly, Mary giving birth to her Savior-son is not ground for Protestant objection. Aside from that, no unbiblical Marian dogma can be rationally inferred from such teaching.

Now for the 2nd condundrum. Did God the Son die on the cross, or just his humanity? A divine person took upon a human body and soul in the incarnation. That body is now glorified but before that, it lay in the grave – dead, awaiting resurrection life. Accordingly, a divine person's body lay in the grave. The body died in the death of a person, which is what happens when any person dies. Yet does the soul ever die, whether divine or human? We are not annihilationists after all. Are things getting a bit clearer? What's the problem that a divine person died? When we die our bodies will lie in the grave but the soul will remain operative in the intermediate state. So then, how does the death of the Second Person impinge upon the doctrine of the Trinity? Was the death of the body sufficient to do away with Jesus’ sovereign rule over the universe anymore than his being born of a woman? Must something more have died with the death of the Second Person? Is death even sufficient to stop the Rich Man (from Luke 16) from correcting God? One would have to ask how the Lord managed without a body if we may not say that the Second Person of the Trinity, at least in some sense, died upon the cross.

The same person who was born, died - and is now risen and ascended to God's right hand.

Happy Easter!

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Truth, Delivery and Imperfect Ministers

"Have I now become your enemy by telling you the truth?" Saint Paul

Imagine a man caught in the act of adultery by his wife and then responding more severely to the manner in which she reacted to his infidelity than to his own guilt. Even if the wife’s knee-jerk reaction were not to have taken into account her own sinfulness - is there a place for a husband to turn the tables on his wife without first dealing with the wretchedness of his own premeditated behavior? If the husband were to deal with the plank in his own eye, wouldn’t any perceived speck in his wife’s eye disappear, at least from his sight? Now imagine people “caught” in sin through the ordained preaching of the word and then becoming more disturbed, even outraged, by the manner in which the pastor delivered the message than their personal guilt before God. It seems to me that what is at work in both such cases is an avoidance of truth through a conveniently cultivated seared conscience. When feeling good about oneself (or at least the desire not to feel bad about oneself) takes precedence over a longing to be sanctified, there can be little chance of experiencing true contrition, the sine qua non of God-sent repentance. I have found that all too often mortification through the gospel-means of heart-felt, Spirit-wrought remorse is replaced by focusing on perceived imperfections in the messenger. One must question whether the evangelical graces of repentance, spiritual cleansing and biblical restoration can be present in such cases.

When subjective self-esteem becomes more important than developing objective Christian character, the crucified life becomes purely theoretical, an abstraction if you will. After all, wouldn’t one with a conscience that was laid bare before God be exceedingly more consumed with dealing truthfully and biblically with his own objective guilt than making an issue of any perceived flaw in the messenger’s bedside manner? Should not our first and greatest desire be to deal with our own sin before contemplating the imperfect instrument God is so often pleased to use to point it out? Indeed, would the manner in which the message was delivered be of any consequence whatsoever if we were in agreement with God and saw ourselves as we truly are, guilty before him? Not to belabor the point, but if the judge in the courtroom were even rude in the manner in which he interrogated a serial rapist, would we say the rapist "deserved" better? And assuming he did in some horizontal sense (i.e. creature to creature), would it not be true that if he were truly contrite he would not even notice - let alone complain about (!), the civility of the judge’s address? Of course not! If the guilty party were even in close proximity to thinking rightly about his sin, which is to say if he were dealing in reality, would he even notice any harshness at all, and if he did, would he not receive it as a divinely appointed, providential tempering of the justice deserved? If there were God-sent sorrow, would there even be any chance that the guilty party would become the messenger’s accuser? Sadly, in the church today this sort of thing has become all too common. When the Christian cloaks his guilt in the face of correction, the concealment is usually accompanied by the guilty party going on the offensive against God’s anointed; all in an effort try to extricate one’s own shame.

As David Wells rightly observes:

“To feel embarrassed because we were caught… deceiving, or (shamelessly)
self-promoting is an entirely good and healthy emotion! To argue, then, that we
need to be liberated from these uncomfortable feelings, that the ultimate
liberation is to become entirely shameless, is to sever our connection with the
moral law entirely.”

Unfortunately, all too often Christians are more concerned – even consumed, with ridding themselves - apart from any semblance of gospel formulation - of feeling shame. The objective reality of guilt is something that Christians are often pleased to live with as long as they don’t feel soiled. When shame is due to being found out by others, as opposed to agreeing with God’s objective verdict with a contrite heart, the cause of shame in the mind of the sinner is indexed to the messenger rather than to the holy demands of the Law-Giver. When one feels embarrassed and cloaks his guilt, the simple and obviously less painful solution becomes “kill the messenger!” The goal is to rid oneself from feeling bad. Contrition, something that is too often wrongly perceived as more Catholic than Protestant, is missing - otherwise the messenger would not be in danger!

I am aware of a pastor who (merely) stopped congregational singing in order to admonish the saints to sing out more loudly unto the Lord, as they were to have been engaged in the worship of the triune God. Yet sadly, there were some within the congregation who took great umbrage with the pastoral admonishment. Why was that? For those who were singing out as they ought, the correction obviously did not apply to them (other than being organically part of the whole congregation). However, for those who were not singing out, the correction was indeed appropriate. (I suppose if you throw a rock at a pack of dogs, the one who yelps the loudest is the one who gets hit most squarely.) Any number of examples could be cited. The general point is shouldn’t the guilty party be more concerned with receiving correction (and in this casing repenting of apathetic worship) than with the manner in which the pastor discharges correction? If a minister of God’s word dares to dare to speak the unvarnished truth, he better sugar-coat it and make sure to put the accent on his own need for grace. For a minister to reprove, rebuke or exhort without ensuring both in word and demeanor an acute understanding that he is the chief sinner, the one standing in need of admonishment might very well conjure up vain images (and assert them as dogma) of how far short the messenger falls from Jesus’ manner of conduct. Offense taken ends up being equated with an offense given, a monstrosity indeed. However, the ultimate deception results when the tables get turned, wherein the dismissal of guilt is exchanged for an attack on the messenger.

May God be pleased to protect his ministers and not allow them to cave into the pressures that would keep them from that part of their job description that requires them to be ready in season and out of season.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Good Works in Christ, Imitation or Transformation?

Mark Garcia’s book Life in Christ has afforded me occasion to reflect more upon “union with Christ” in particular with respect to good works.

Scripture is clear that we are to be imitators of Paul (as he is of Christ), and of God. (1 Corinthians 11:1; Ephesians 5:1) Yet for the believer it is not only true that we are to imitate Christ - we are indeed destined to do so. Moreover, not only is our imitation of Christ unavoidable (Ephesians 2:10) - it is no mere imitation but rather an actual fellowship in Christ’s suffering granted to all believers virtue of their spiritual union with Christ. As Mike Horton rightly noted (over ten years ago in his timely book “In The Face Of God”), “Christ’s cross was more than God’s method of saving us; it is our own cross, our own death, burial, and resurrection. We are united to Christ… Not only are we identified with his victory but are also destined to share in the ‘fellowship of his suffering.’”

We have an inheritance that is unshakable, which in a real sense serves as an impetus in the believer’s life toward the faithful reception of what the promise of final adoption contemplates. It is our unalterable union with Christ that not only ensures the eschatological reality that awaits all believers - it also defines the very path by which we must enter into that glory. That foreordained path is none other than Christ’s path of faith-wrought works and suffering. Just as we have been foreordained unto good works (Ephesians 2:10), we have also been predestined to become conformed to the image of Christ. (Romans 8:29) However, being an imitator and becoming like must be distinguished but can never be separated in the life of the believer. For one thing, the former can be the product of hypocrisy whereas the latter is unique to the believer and in one sense the very telos of our salvation. The believer’s obedience, which will be evidenced in this life and openly acknowledged on the last day in all who love the Lord, is not merely an imitation of Christ’s obedience but rather a divinely appointed fruit of being baptized into the once suffering - now glorified - Savior of men. It is part of our salvation and as such should be embraced through faith and certainly not avoided (not that it can be). Moreover, just as the believer’s alien righteousness is more near than far (to paraphrase Richard Gaffin), our obedience through suffering is granted within the orbit of a reality of intimate union with Christ’s "historical-experience", as opposed to being experienced in the context of mere imitation through vastly different circumstances that have little or nothing to do with the righteousness of Christ's gospel.

As we received Christ, so too are we to walk in him, and so we shall. We did not find Christ but rather he us. So too will our trials come in Christ, when we least expect them. We need not seek them out, let alone work for them. Our task, as we try to live peaceable lives in Christ, is to receive such trials and in turn respond in the strength and power of the Holy Spirit in a manner well pleasing to the Father through Christ.

To be saved from our sin is not only to follow Christ’s example by walking in his steps (1 Peter 2:21), it also entails a true participation in Christ’s sufferings to the end that we might be “overjoyed when his glory is revealed.” (1 Peter 4:13) From the believer’s vantage point we imitate Christ by grace because he first loved us. But we have another perspective that we do well to reckon as fact, especially if we are to think Christ’s thoughts after him as we endeavor to imitate him as we ought: All things are divinely appointed and working together in order to conform believers not into mere imitators of Christ but into the very image of him in whom they are united so that he might be the firstborn of many brethren who share not only in his suffering but through that union-suffering, his glory. This suffering, which to our shame we too often so desperately try to avoid, is no less a gift than the faith through which our God-appointed suffering is to be interpreted. (Philippians 1:29) Being a gift, it is not something to be shunned but rather accepted in its proper season - if we are to desire and experience a more intimate fellowship with Christ.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Rudy's Praise of McCain Went a Bit Too Far

Last night Rudy Giuliani with his eminent flare delivered some of the most quotable lines of both conventions in his repudiation of Barack O’Biden and endorsement of the McCain-Palin ticket.

For instance:

“Then [Obama] ran for the state legislature and he got elected. And nearly 130 times, he couldn't make a decision. He couldn't figure out whether to vote "yes" or "no." It was too tough. He voted -- he voted "present."… You have to make a decision.”

“He is the least experienced candidate for president of the United States in at least the last 100 years. Not a personal attack, a statement of fact. Barack Obama has never led anything, nothing, nada. Nada, nothing.”

“Well, I'll tell you, if I were Joe Biden, I'd want to get that V.P. thing in writing.”

“So -- so he changed his position again, and he put out a statement exactly like the statement of John McCain's three days earlier. I have some advice for Senator Obama: Next time, call John McCain.”

But how many of us who listened to the speech were struck by this:

“And we can trust [McCain] to deal with anything, anything that nature throws our way, anything that terrorists do to us.”

The last thing I was looking for in any of the speeches was a mistake, let alone a near-blasphemy. What does it mean, after all, that John McCain can deal with anything – again anything (!) – that “nature throws our way”? My immediate thought was, “Oh my, this man is challenging God, most unwittingly.” Hyper-sensitivity on my part? Well, maybe, but then I must ask, could one who was living in close proximity to Coram Deo make such boast? Would we have been O.K. had Rudy said that Senator McCain can deal with anything that God (not nature) throws his way? If not, then why does the word “nature” soften the claim? Isn’t what nature can throw our way equivalent to what God can throw our way?

Now some might respond with “Then why not qualify every statement of what you plan to do in the future with ‘if God so wills’”? In other words, is it not equally presumptuous to think that anything can be accomplished apart from God’s grace. Accordingly, if we don’t speak that way with respect to running an errand, then why need we take such care with our words when dealing with anything “nature” might throw our way? The difference, as I see it, is that when someone states “I’ll see you tomorrow” a claim of self-sufficiency in the face of adverse providence is not necessarily being purported, let alone promulgated. Accordingly, to add “if God so wills” to “I’ll see you tomorrow” need not alter or undermine the sentiment since it does not so much promote self-sufficiency as it does communicate a mere intention. In other words, leaving out “if God so wills” does not imply that the intention can be fulfilled apart from God’s will; whereas Rudy’s comment was aimed not at promoting a man’s intention but his moral fiber. Therefore, to have said that Senator McCain can deal with anything nature throws his way - if God so wills, does not make Rudy’s point at all! Instead, such a qualifier would actually eclipse his very point because given such a qualifier it could equally be said of Obama, and even the weakest of men.

In a last-ditch effort to save Rudy from his own words, we might be inclined to render his meaning as “McCain is so obviously full of grace, it’s unimaginable that God would not sustain him through anything he can dish out.” That, however, would be to overstate the grace God has bestowed upon this man (affording a frothy basis to anticipate extraordinary future-grace), while underestimating what God could bring upon him. Let's get hold of the fact that Katrina was less than the finger of God and that no man is to be compared to lesser men but to Christ. A healthy view of God's omnipotence and sober view of the fraility of man and his need for grace prohibts such sentiments as Giuliani expressed in his address. Obviously when put this way, Mr. Giuliani could not have meant what he actually said. But that's the point, isn't it? He wasn't even conscious of what he was actually saying. Autonomy got the best of him. His unthinking praise was grossly overstated and more importantly, highly offensive.

At the very least, in the realm of judgment in crisis, make no mistake that we are often preserved and kept from despair, even disgrace, because God prevents us from being exposed to more than we've been trained to handle. For anyone to presume that even the godliest saint will endure under any unprecedented disaster that will challenge judgment in unimaginable ways implicitly denies that we can be challenged beyond our understanding and experiences.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

"Developing a Trinitarian Mind" - Sound Observations & Advice from Robert Letham

In the August-September 2008 issue of Ordained Servant, a publication of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, Dr. Robert Letham had these brief yet worthy words for the church of Jesus Christ, especially its ministers, to reflect upon and put into practice.

Developing a Trinitarian Mind

Robert Letham

In one of the chapters of my book, The Holy Trinity, I describe at some length how the worship of the Western Church has been truncated by the comparative neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity. For most Christians—and I include members of Reformed churches—the Trinity is merely an abstruse mathematical puzzle, remote from experience. Despite our reservations about many aspects of the Eastern Church, Orthodoxy in contrast has maintained a pronounced Trinitarian focus to its worship through its liturgy, which has roots in the fourth century. This is no incidental matter; worship is right at the heart of what it means to be Christian and what the church should be doing. The sole object of worship is God. The God whom we worship has revealed himself to be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, three distinct persons in indivisible union. I have argued elsewhere that this is his New Covenant name (Matt. 28:19-20). It follows that our worship in the Christian church is to be distinctively Trinitarian. Yet if we were to thumb through any hymnbook, we would be hard pressed to find many hymns that contain clearly Trinitarian expressions, while many of our favorites could equally be sung by Unitarians—think of "Immortal, invisible" or "My God, how wonderful thou art." As for the average person in the pew, why not try a random survey next Sunday—ask a haphazard selection of half a dozen people what the Trinity means to them on a daily basis, and see what results you get? Then compare your findings with the words of Gregory of Nazianzus, who wrote of "my Trinity" and "when I say God, I mean the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit."

If this problem is as real as is generally recognized but yet as important as I have presented it, how do we go about seeking to redress it? There are no easy, slick solutions. This is not a matter to be resolved by a quick twelve-step program or in an adult Sunday school class. It will take much thought, careful teaching, and a concerted plan to put right what has for so long been askew—since I argue this has been a problem for centuries, with notable exceptions, at least since Aquinas. What is needed is to instill in our congregations a mindset directed, as of second nature, to think of God as triune. From there will come ripple effects on the way we think of the world around us, and of the people with whom we mix. What we need is to develop a thoroughly Christian view of God, the world, the church, ourselves, and others.

The first, and indispensable, steppingstone is ourselves as leaders of the church, and in particular those who are ministers of the Word. It is of the utmost importance that we saturate our minds with reflection and meditation on God, for we stand in the pulpit as no less than his representatives in speaking his Word. It means our consistently contemplating God in Trinitarian terms. John Stott has been accustomed to begin each day with a threefold greeting to the Holy Trinity; how far are your own prayers and thoughts of God shaped in this way? It takes disciplined thought and prayer, consistently day in, day out deliberately to think of God biblically, theologically, and ecclesially as triune. As leaders of the church you are called by God to do this. You cannot expect the congregation committed to your charge to follow suit unless you are leading the way. It means your being shaped and driven not by some man-made purpose or by the concoctions of management gurus but by the truth of the triune God himself drawing and molding you.

There are definite and particular ways in which your congregation can be taught to develop its grasp of the Trinity. The first such avenue is in your preaching and teaching. How often have you preached on the Trinity? The Church of England, in following the church year, has Trinity Sunday the week after Pentecost; this can provide an opportunity to draw attention to the Trinity at least once a year, as Advent is a reminder of the incarnation, Good Friday of the atonement, Easter Sunday of the resurrection, and Pentecost of the coming of the Holy Spirit. However, this is a bare minimum—just about starvation rations. Perhaps a short series may help, providing it is not something that is forgotten as you move on to other things. Much better is, on top of that, to refer consistently to God not always as "God" or "the Lord" but as "the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit," always bearing in mind that he is three in indivisible union.

The same principles apply to praying as to preaching. You may not be able to preach on the Trinity every week—it would be unbalanced if you did!—but you can pray every week. When you pray, pray "Our Father in heaven." What an amazing way to address God! It means that we, through Christ the Son, have been granted by adoption the same relationship to the Father that he has by nature! It immediately throws us into the context of prayer to the Father by the Holy Spirit (see Rom. 8:26-27) through the mediation of Christ the Son. We should bring this to expression regularly in our public prayers. We should show the congregation that this is the way we pray. We should show them that in prayer we are saturated in a Trinitarian atmosphere, given to share in communion with the triune God. We should impress upon our people that in the Holy Spirit, God the Trinity has come to dwell with us, indwelling—better, saturating—us and making his permanent residence with us (John 14:23).

This leads us to the nature of church worship and the structure of the service. In all the works of God he takes the initiative. He created in accordance with his free and sovereign will; no one was there to advise him. In grace, the Son became incarnate "for us and our salvation"; this too was the result purely of the grace of God, undeserved, unprompted. In our own experience, God himself brought us to new life by his Spirit; our faith and repentance is a response to his prior grace. We love him because he first loved us. Is it any different in worship? Is that primarily something we do? No, first of all God goes before us. He has called his church to himself. He is there to greet us. As we gather, it is to meet with him, but first he has drawn us. Moreover, our acts of worship are accepted because they are offered in union with Christ. He, in our nature, is at the Father's right hand. From this it follows that the elements of worship are a dialog in which the holy Trinity takes the initiative. Through his ordained servant, the Father through his Son by the Holy Spirit calls us to worship. He speaks to us in his Word read and proclaimed. He receives our praise and prayers. He communes with us in the sacrament. In the benediction he dismisses us with his blessing—which is far from a pious wish or prayer that such things might be, if it is the will of God. Rather, the benediction is a declaration of a real state of affairs, undergirded by his covenant promises. This is a dynamic view of worship, one that follows squarely in the Reformed tradition and is rooted in biblical teaching. Our congregations need to hear it, they need to understand it, they need to imbibe it and be permeated by it. At my previous church, our regular bulletin expressed this. Periodically we would draw everyone's attention to it and sometimes produce a written two-page memo explaining it, so as to keep it fresh in mind.

The call to worship is a good place to begin. I often use a congregational response to the call. It is based on Ephesians 2:18, where Paul says "For through him [Christ] we ... have access by one Spirit to the Father." These words impress on the mind the point that our worship can only be Trinitarian. So too does the famous passage in John 4:21-24, where Jesus says that those who worship the Father must worship in spirit and in truth. Every occurrence of πνεῦμα (pneuma, spirit) in John, except two, is a reference to the Holy Spirit, while the truth is consistently a reference to Jesus (John 1:9, 14, 17, 14:6). Hence, acceptable worship of the Father is in the Holy Spirit and in Christ, the Son. It is important that this is stamped upon the service right from the start. Christian worship is worship of the holy Trinity, nothing less.

The church where we now attend has, immediately after the call to worship, a short Trinitarian doxology which the congregation sings in response; it is varied from time-to-time so as not to get monotonous. Then the first hymn is very often, if not invariably, Trinitarian, a practice I have come to use myself as often as I can. Calvin thought this was the most appropriate way to begin too, so we are in good company. However, as I remarked, there is a considerable lack of explicitly Trinitarian hymns. Many from the ancient and medieval church have this focus. Our former music director in Delaware, Peter Merio—a graduate of the Sibelius Academy in Helsinki who also taught there—brilliantly arranged one gem from the fifth century that we dug up from the English Hymnal, edited by Ralph Vaughan Williams in 1933; but there are very few in Reformed circles with his capabilities. Some recent favorites try hard but fall into heresy—an ever-present danger in this area. The hymn "There is a redeemer," which I have heard sung in the OPC, is generally excellent but has a refrain, "Thank you, O our Father for giving us your Son, and leaving your Spirit till the work on earth is done." The Father does not leave the Holy Spirit; the Eastern and Western Churches divided over arguably less.

We have looked at preaching and teaching, prayers, the call to worship and benediction, hymns; there remain the sacraments. Baptism is into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Dare anyone say the Trinity is a recondite matter for advanced philosophers when every single member of the Christian church has the name of the Trinity pronounced over him or her? According to Matthew 28:18-20 it is the foundation for Christian discipleship. Similarly, in the Lord's Supper we receive and feed on Christ really and spiritually; this is by the Holy Spirit who makes the sacraments efficacious. Moreover, since the works of the Trinity are indivisible, in feeding on Christ by the gracious enabling of the Holy Spirit, we are given access to the Father in the unity of the undivided Trinity.

In short, every aspect of Christian worship is an engagement with the Trinity or, rather, a way in which the Trinity engages us. As leaders of Christ's church, we have the indescribable privilege of leading his people into the realization of something of what this entails. It is a task far beyond our capacities; we are utterly ill-equipped to deal in such transcendent matters. The Bible records that, when given a revelation of the veiled glory of God, human beings are brought to their knees, overcome, broken (e.g., Isa. 6:1-5, Ezek. 1:1-3:15, Acts 9:1-9, Rev. 1:9-18). Yet in his grace our God has admitted us to fellowship, communion, and union with him as his adopted children, so that we are being transformed from one degree of glory to another by the Spirit (2 Cor. 3:18). The Father and the Son have made their permanent residence with us in the person of the Holy Spirit (John 14:15-23). As ministers of the Word, we have been co-opted as instruments by which the flock of Christ are changed into his image by the Spirit so that Christ will be the first-born among many brothers. Doesn't that thrill you? Doesn't it make you want to know him better? Doesn't it impel you to develop a mind shaped by the knowledge of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit and to lead your congregation on to that goal too?

Robert Letham, a minister in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, teaches Systematic and Historical Theology at Wales Evangelical School of Theology. Ordained Servant, August-September 2008.
Counter since: 9/6/2006

Apologies With No Content

How many times have we heard “If I did x-and-so, I am truly sorry and ask your forgiveness”? Maybe we have said it ourselves. But what does it even mean after all? The “apology” is predicated upon an “if”, which suggests that the one extending the apology is not sorry for some actual offence but rather for an offence that is not believed was committed; and worse, as demonstrated by modus tollens, an offence that is believed was not committed! Given the “if”, the apology is disingenuous because the sorrow is as non-existent as the transgression is hypothetical.

Maybe look at it this way:

P1. If I sinned against you, then I’m sorry for sinning against you
P2. I sinned against you
Conlcusion: I’m sorry for sinning against you

The one offering the conditional apology says that premise 1 is true. Premise 2 is not deemed true by the one offering the alleged apology. Consequently, the truth of the conclusion is not established. Therefore, it does not follow that the person is sorry for having sinned against the other person.

Applying modus tollens, things become a bit more glaring:

p1. If I sinned against you, then I’m sorry for sinning against you
p2. I’m not sorry for (actually) sinning against you
Conclusion: It is false that I sinned against you

In the second way at looking at this, both premise 1 and 2 are deemed true by the one offering the alleged apology. Accordingly, not only is the person not sorry (premise 2), he must also believe it is false that he sinned against the other person because the negation of the consequent of P1, which is P2, necessitates the negation of the antecedent of P1, which is the conclusion of no sin against the other person. In other words, the one offering such a contingent apology implies that sorrow is a necessary condition for having sinned against the other person. Accordingly, if there is no sorrow, then the person is actually communicating that he did not sin against the person who believes he has been offended! By saying without having sorrow for actual sin: "If I sinned against you, then I'm sorry" does not imply that the person thinks he might have sinned. Rather, the statement actually underscores that the apology is being rendered by one who thinks he is innocent!

The moral of the story is, don't extend contingent apologies and don't receive them for what they truly communicate. It does nobody any real good. At best, one might mean by such an apology that he would not want to hurt someone else unnecessarily and that had he believed he was wrong, then he would be sorry and apologize. But even that communicates that there is disagreement over the question of whether an offence was actually given or just received (without warrant). So, why not just admit in the Lord, without any confusion, that there is disagreement and then seek to agree to disagree rather than offer some hypothetical apology for an hypothetical transgression?

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Theonomy - Second Verse, Same As The First

If God’s Old Testament case law ought to be exchanged for God’s natural law, then the necessary implication is that God’s natural law somewhere along the line became at odds with – contradicted - God’s Old Testament case law. More specifically, since we know that the Old Testament case law has not been altered, we must conclude that if any law has changed then it must be natural law. But isn’t natural law, being law, universal and invariant? If so, then why should we believe that it now contradicts Old Testament case law if it didn’t 3,000 years ago? Now someone might wish to argue that the ceremonial law now contradicts the finished work of Christ; so why can’t God’s case law now be at odds with natural law? The simple answer is that the ceremonial law and the finished work of Christ were not operative at the same time; so the latter may supplant the former without contradiction. In the case of natural law, it was from creation and was operative during the time of Moses, unlike the work of the cross. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that natural law is superior and contrary to the case law today if it was not under Moses. The simple reality is that natural law does not contradict Old Testament case law; nor were these laws ever functionally equivalent.

Natural law affirms to all men, at all times and in all places that each sin against God’s moral law deserves God’s wrath, but God’s ministers of justice are not always to punish evil doers to the fullest extent humanly possible. Natural law is known by all men everywhere, but it cannot be justified in any philosophically sound way apart from special revelation. What revelatory authority would one appeal to after all? Accordingly, if the state were to strive to follow natural law with a pure heart with respect to penal sanction – as if that were even possible, all men would be put to death, even for the least of all transgresssions, by unjustified tyrants who are left to employ autonomous and, therefore, arbitrary reasoning. Apart from a theonomic appeal to a law that is self-attesting, the state is left to grasp from its shelf a volume of natural law that does not exist.

At the very least, how might a Dispensationalist, or Klinean for that matter – same thing really with respect to this subject, argue that the general equity of the civil case law is not still relevant and binding today? The non-theonomic thesis, which promotes a religion of pluralism that denies that all kings are to offer homage to the Son, really reduces to a secular philosophy that implies that any law may be legislated as long as it is not God’s law, justified by his word! The anti-theonomist may of course support capital punishment for some sins he deems criminal but only when it satisfies his personal sense of justice, apart from God's written law informing him.

The relevance of God’s law as it pertains to the nations is that we are to be governed according to God’s revelation to Moses as the promise to Abraham is fulfilled. The two-kingdom social theory is simply an unworkable principle and, frankly, a gross affront on the kingship of Christ and the fullness of the great commission.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Sometimes We Do Agree...

Not often enough do opposing views come together in agreement but I did experience such a phenomenon w/ some strangers from Drexel while on vacation - in between reading Mark Garcia's book and tooling around Martha's Vineyard with the family.

For those who enjoy probability and like to see resolution to apparent disagreements, read on.

Date: 07/24/2008 at 09:28:28
From: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
To: dr.math@mathforum.org
Subject: Boy Girl probability

[Question]
I have a problem w/ this formulation (link below) in which you conclude that if a boy is selected from a family of two children that the probability of the remaining child being a girl is 2/3 http://mathforum.org/library/drmath/view/52186.html

[Difficulty]
In your solution you note four possible combinations of siblings and eliminate one of the possibilities (gg) because a boy was selected. That much is correct. The conclusion, however, would seem to ignore the fact that two of three remaining combinations are mutually exclusive, making one of them as impossible as set (gg), which was eliminated. In other words, given two mutually exclusive remaining sets of children, one is false and is also to be eliminated. See my solution below:

[Thoughts]
You correctly note that the set of (gg) is to be eliminated upon a boy being selected. That leaves three possible groups from which the boy was selected:

(1)bb
(2)gb
(3)bg

Although we don't know the age of the selected boy relative to his sibling (i.e. whether he's older or younger), we do know that the selected boy is *either* older or younger. If older, then (2) is eliminated. If younger, then (3) is eliminated. Consequently, from the entire sample of three possible combinations of siblings (even without knowing whether the selected boy is an older or younger sibling), one of the boy-girl combinations is to be eliminated because it *must* be false. That would make the probability ½ of the other sibling being a girl given a selected boy.

Somewhere in the thread it is correctly noted that more information can change the probability. What is missed, however, is that one need not know whether the the sibling is older or younger in order to know that it he must be older or younger. That he must be older or younger is information-enough to change the sample.

Ron

________________________________________
Date: 07/24/2008 at 13:15:11
From: Doctor Anthony
To: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
Subject: Re: Boy Girl probability

I don't follow your objection because 2 of the 3 combinations
remaining MUST be wrong. That doesn't mean that we know which two. Instead of reasoning in the manner you described from the archive consider the following argument:

We have a population of 2-child families and one such family is questioned. The information is that AT LEAST one child is a boy.

The sample space = 1 - Prob(2 girls)

= 1 - (1/2 x 1/2)

= 3/4

1/2 x 1/2 1/4
Prob(2 boys1 child is a boy) = ---------- = -----
3/4 3/4

= 1/3

and the probability of anything else is 2/3

- Doctor Anthony, The Math Forum


The Math Forum @ Drexel is a research and educational enterprise
of the Drexel School of Education:

________________________________________
Date: 07/24/2008 at 18:42:48
From: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
To: dr.math@mathforum.org
Subject: Boy Girl probability

We started with four combinations of siblings (let’s assume all
sitting in a room). Those combinations can be written as follows:

(1)bb
(2)gb
(3)bg
(4)gg

Then one child was randomly selected and it turned out to be a boy.

Consequently, we know that selected sibling did not come from sibling - set #4.

We now know that the three possible combinations of siblings, given the impossibility of ‘gg’ due to a boy having been already randomly selected, are as follows:

(1)bb
(2)gb
(3)bg

The randomly selected boy is one of the boys found within the three sets listed above.

To simplify matters we may rewrite the three possible sets as follows:

(1) Bob, Bill
(2) Gayle, Brian
(3) Bart, Gabriella


NOTE: With the same probably of 25%, the randomly selected boy can either be: Bob, Bill, Brian, or Bart. In other words, given the already randomly selected boy (who must be either: Bob, Bill, Brian, Bart), there are four equally possible sibling outcomes that can obtain:

(A) Given Bob, then 100% chance that sibling Boy-Bill obtains
(B) Given Bill, then 100% chance that sibling Boy-Bob obtains
(C) Given Brian, then 100% chance that sibling Girl-Gayle obtains
(D) Given Bart, then 100% chance that sibling Girl-Gabriella obtains

There is a 25% chance that any one of those four outcomes obtains.

Consequently, there is a 25% chance of the second sibling being one of either: Bill, Bob, Gayle or Gabriella – which reduces to a 50% chance that given a selected-boy, the remaining sibling would too be a boy.

If the above reasoning is sound, then your solution must be false because it contradicts the above solution. But rather than leaving you to find the error in your position, please let me try to perform an internal critique of it. You noted that 1 minus the probability of two girls in a family of two children is 75%. Of course that is true. Accordingly, as you noted, the probability of having at least one boy within a family of two children is 75%. That would be relevant if the question were: “Given two children, what is the probability of having
at least one boy?” which is 75%, of course. However, the question that we are to be concerning ourselves with is: “Given a randomly selected boy with a sibling, what is the probability that his sibling is also a boy?” – which is different question entirely. With respect to the problem we are to be solving, the “given” is the randomly selected boy - which can be the first *or* second child of the two children! The sample space that you concerned yourself with, (which gets you off on the wrong track I’m afraid), ignored the relevant statistic that from a two-boy family the randomly selected boy can be either the first or second boy.

From a sample space consideration, the problem is to be viewed thusly:

Girl sibling, randomly selected boy
Randomly selected boy, girl sibling
Randomly selected boy, boy sibling
Boy sibling, randomly selected boy

As I noted in my first post, we know that the randomly selected boy is either older or younger than his sibling. Accordingly, if he has a girl sibling, then there are two, not one, ways in which he might fall within that order. That statistic *is* implied in your reasoning. To be consistent, however, we must also recognize that there are two, not one, ways in which the *already* randomly selected boy with a boy sibling can fall within the order of his family. That statistic is *not* implied by the probability of there being at least one boy in a family of two children!

To simplify this even more, we might consider that there is a
randomly selected boy sitting in a room who has only one sibling:

That boy may have:

(a) An older brother
(b) A younger brother
(c) An older sister
(d) A younger sister

If the randomly selected boy is older than his sibling, then the
probability of (a) and (c) can be eliminated, leaving a 50% chance of his having brother. If the randomly selected boy is younger than his sibling, then the probability of (b) and (d) can be eliminated, leaving also a 50% chance of his having a brother. Added to that, the randomly selected boy has a 50% chance of being older than his sibling, and a 50 chance of being younger than his sibling. Consequently, it the statistically irrelevant whether the randomly selected boy is older or younger than his sibling because the probability of his sibling being a boy is the same 50% no matter whether the randomly selected boy is older or younger, and the
randomly selected boy has the same chance of being older than his sibling as he does being younger than his sibling. Therefore, we need not know the age of the randomly selected boy to know that the probability of his sibling being a boy is 50%.

Finally, we can demonstrate this empirically with playing cards. Let red cards stand for girl and black cards for boys. If a boy is randomly selected, then we can discard the two red 2s.

Red 2, Red 2
Black 3, Red 3
Red 4, Black 4
Black 5, Black 5

The remaining cards are now:

Black 3, Red 3
Red 4, Black 4
Black 5, Black 5

Now place the two red cards, which represent sibling girls, aside and keep the four black cards in your hand. Shuffle the black cards and draw a card at random. If you draw either of the black 5s, then the corresponding sibling would be a boy. If you draw a black 3 or black 4, then the corresponding sibling would be a red card, which represents a sibling-girl.

Probability of drawing a black 3 is ¼ or 25%, corresponding to girl- sibling

Probability of drawing a black 4 is ¼ or 25%, corresponding to a girl- sibling

Probability of drawing a black 5 is 2/4 or 50%, corresponding to a boy-sibling

Ron

________________________________________
Date: 07/25/2008 at 16:28:26
From: Doctor Garramone
To: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
Subject: Re: Boy Girl probability

Good day Ron

This is a Bayesian problem (posterior probability given the sample).

The 2/3 answer is right, by Bayes' Rule.

Probability of a girl given that you picked a boy = the probability of picking a boy-girl set from the three possible sets (b-b, b-g, g-g) is the probability of picking a b-g set (which is 1/2).

Pr(b-b) = 1/4 this part is not germane to this problem

Pr(b-g) = 1/2 1/2 1/2 2
------------ = --- = ---
Pr(g-g) = 1/4 1/2 + 1/4 3/4 3

Here's a brain teaser:

If there are 3 doors and behind one is a Corvette and you are told to pick one door which you then call out.

A pretty hostess will open a door that is not the door you chose nor will it be the one which has the car.

Now, you are allowed to switch your choice from your original choice to the other closed door or to stay with the first choice.

Which would afford the greatest probability of winning - to stay with your original choice or to switch to the other door?

Why?

- Doctor Garramone, The Math Forum


The Math Forum @ Drexel is a research and educational enterprise
of the Drexel School of Education:


________________________________________
Date: 07/25/2008 at 17:54:47
From: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
To: dr.math@mathforum.org
Subject: Boy Girl probability

Hi Doc. Anthony,

The Monty Problem has really nothing to do with this. But for what it’s worth, I’d switch doors given the problem *properly* stated. Also, I’m familiar with Bayes, but we mustn’t apply any formula to a problem that still defies definitive terms. SO, let me state the problem two ways to illustrate the semantic difficulty of this problem. I'm really hopeful we'll come to terms.

Problem 1:

In order to find a family, you randomly select a father of only two children, at least one of which is a boy. Therefore, it is equally probable that any of the three families below is the family indexed to the father.

BG
GB
BB

Consequently, there is a 2/3 probability that the family indexed to the randomly selected father has a girl. That is the way in which you have interpreted the problem.

Problem 2:

In order to find a family, you randomly select a *boy* from a set of families with only two children, at least one of which is a boy.

The boy can live within one of three type families:

BG
GB
BB

NOTE: Since 50% of all boys from families with only two children have a brother, there is a 50% chance that the randomly selected boy has a brother. With that in mind we can more easily find the confusion.

Wherein the confusion lies: Although 2/3 of all 2 children households with at least one boy have a girl, only ½ of randomly selected boys from such households have a sister and ½ don’t. Therefore, when the family in question is indexed to a randomly selected boy, the probability of a two child family with at least one son having a girl is only 50%. I must believe you will agree with that. With that in mind, let’s look at how the problem is usually stated: “If a family has two children and at least one of them is a boy, what is the probability that the family also contains a girl? Given the problem as stated, we need to know how we came across this
family in question before we begin to solve the problem. Is the family in question that has two children, with at least one of whom is a boy, indexed to a randomly selected boy who has a 50% chance of having a brother? Or is the family indexed to a randomly selected father?

Cheers,

Ron

________________________________________
Date: 07/27/2008 at 11:01:19
From: Doctor Garramone
To: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
Subject: Re: Boy Girl probability

Hi Ron,

The original supposition is that the families with two children are randomly produced and the distribution of these sets of two would be 1:2:1 according to the binomial distribution. That would lead to the Bayesian calculation of 2/3 which has been discussed in prior threads on this subject.

Looking at boys alone (from two children families) and then looking at the sibling, there is twice much chance of picking up a boy from a 2-boy family than from a boy-girl family EXCEPT that in the random population there are twice as many boy-girl families as there are boy-boy families. So the probability is even or 2:2 or 1:1, however you want to call it. This goes along with the intuition that if you meet a person who has a sib, what is the probability on the gender of the sib? 50-50 of course.

Language is NEVER as precise as mathematical equations. That's one reasons discussions like this one keep occurring.

You are right about switching the choice on the car but it took me a long time thinking about it as to why. The other similar problem is the three chest gold-silver coin problem. This is a classic one.

You have three chests, each with 2 drawers. One has a gold coin in each drawer, the next has a gold coin one drawer and a silver coin in the other, and the third has a silver coin in each drawer. If one chooses a draw at random (there are six drawers to choose from) and one finds a silver coin, what is the probability of finding a silver coin in the second drawer of that same chest?

It took me forever to figure that one out, too. Note that here your set distribution {S, S} {S, G} {G, G} is 1:1:1, not the 1:2:1 as with with gender problem.

- Doctor Garramone, The Math Forum


The Math Forum @ Drexel is a research and educational enterprise
of the Drexel School of Education:

________________________________________
Date: 07/27/2008 at 23:12:30
From: Doctor Peterson
To: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
Subject: Re: Boy Girl probability

Hi, Ron.

I've been watching this exchange, and want to make sure you have seen that we have dealt with the issue you are concerned about, namely the wording of the problem, both in the page you cite and elsewhere.

Have you see this page, linked from our FAQ on the problem?

Family or Child First?
http://www.mathforum.org/dr.math/faq/faq.boygirl.choose.html
That emphasizes that the wording makes a big difference, specifically because you must be able to determine from the wording that the family is chosen first, not the child, in order to make the answer of 2/3 valid.

Note that in your first message, you presented the problem as
if a boy is selected from a family of two children that
the probability of the remaining child being a girl is 2/3.

This wording pretty clearly says that the family is selected first, though it could be improved. The page you refer to is explicitly focused on the issue of wording, and shows how different ways of stating the problem change the result. But you, in apparently trying to argue that there is no version of the problem in which the answer is 2/3, keep rephrasing the problem to focus on choosing a child, rather than choosing a family:

Then one child was randomly selected and it turned out to be a boy.

and

However, the question that we are to be concerning ourselves with is: “Given a randomly selected boy with a sibling, what is the probability that his sibling is also a boy?” – which is different question entirely.

I think we agree that if the child is selected, the answer is 1/2. Do you agree, however, that the answer to the following version (from the FAQ) is 2/3?

From the set of all families with two children, a family is
selected at random and is found to have a boy. What is the
probability that the other child of the family is a girl?


- Doctor Peterson, The Math Forum


The Math Forum @ Drexel is a research and educational enterprise
of the Drexel School of Education:

________________________________________
Date: 07/28/2008 at 07:05:49
From: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
To: dr.math@mathforum.org
Subject: Boy Girl probability

Dr. Peterson,

If we word the problem as "if a boy is selected from a family of two children that the probability of the remaining child being a girl is 2/3" then the conclusion of 2/3 comes from at best an ambiguous question, or the answer is false. It is not true, as you wrote below that "This wording pretty clearly says that the family is selected first". At best the wording is ambiguous. Why is a boy *selected*? Was it because a randomly selected father referred to a son? If so, then the probability is 50%. Also, what is the semantic difference between a boy being selected from a family and a boy being selected from a set of boys all of whom come from such families described in
the problem?

W/ respect to the question: "From the set of all families with two children, a family is selected at random and is found to have a boy. What is theprobability that the other child of the family is a girl?"

How is the family "found to have a boy?" Does it come up in verbal discourse? The way the problem should be worded to conclude a 2/3 probability is: "A family is randomly selected among a set of families all having at least one boy. What is the probability that there is at least one girl?" When we get into the child being "found" or "selected" we are asking another question.

I have not read the link you supplied; I'll do so later.

I'll get back to Dr. Garramone later.

Thanks!

Ron

________________________________________
Date: 07/28/2008 at 07:16:35
From: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
To: dr.math@mathforum.org
Subject: Boy Girl probability

Dr. Peterson,

I should clarify that it's not an issue of whether the family was
selected first. The confusion lies within the boy be "selected" (even after). There's an increase probabilty of *no* daughter if the father of such a family refers to one of his children as being a son. This is no different than a random selection of a boy from the set of all families with at least one son.

Ron
________________________________________
Date: 07/28/2008 at 12:08:36
From: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
To: dr.math@mathforum.org
Subject: Boy Girl probability

I looked at the link. The way the two child with at least one boy family is selected is fine. In that case, yes, the probability of the woman having a girl is 2/3. That problem does not entail a child being 'found out' by any means that would entail an increase of probability of any remaining outcome. You are stricly eliminating two- girl families with the inquiry of the mother. It's quite another thing to set the problem up in such a way that entails a discovery of a boy by remembering that one child was a boy. Why would a boy have been remembered? Did the mother refer to a *particular* son? If that were the case, then a particular son would be the *first* child referred to. Accordingly, the prossibilities would be reduced to:

First Son referred to; Second daughter

First Son referred to; Second son

Cheers,

Ron
________________________________________
Date: 07/28/2008 at 23:53:10
From: Doctor Peterson
To: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
Subject: Re: Boy Girl probability

Hi, Ron.


Now I think we're on the same page; I wanted to make sure you saw at least some way of stating the problem in which 2/3 is the right answer, because your initial messages gave the impression you were using some nonstandard reasoning that would never yield that answer.

I fully agree that this problem is quite often presented in ways that do not really yield the supposed answer of 2/3 -- perhaps even on our site. Very likely some teachers or authors see the problem as a good one to share students up, but when they present it they either don't quite understand it themselves, or they are trying to oversimplify it, and the result is that they convince a lot of students that math is nonsense.

I just recently answered a question that put it this way, presumably quoted directly from a text:

While shopping in a supermarket you see a woman shopping with her daughter. You are told the woman has two children. What is the probability that the woman has two daughters?

I responded by first pointing out that the question was a little
ambiguous and rephrasing it in a way that was "presumably intended", then solving that; then I showed why the problem as stated was bad:

Are you equally likely to pick any family from the population of all two-child families with at least one daughter (which is the assumption of the solution you were shown)? Or are you equally likely to pick any daughter from such a family (which gives the result you think is more natural)? That is, is the focus on the mother or the daughter? I can't tell!

In reality, in fact, you are simply choosing at random from all
families with two children, at least one of whom is a daughter,
AND in which the mother is shopping with ONE daughter at this moment. That may increase the probability that a one-daughter family is chosen, since a mother with two daughters might often choose to take both shopping. So I think the problem is not stated in its clearest form. We try to state it better in our FAQ.

It may be that some of the versions you find us answering are bad questions that we are trying to make the best of, not always correcting the statement of the problem as we really should. Maybe we just hope that the student misquoted and the book said it better.

I don't want to answer what you've said here, because I'm not sure which version you are referring to. Just to make sure we're talking about the same thing, perhaps you can quote word for word a version or two for which you don't think the answer should be 2/3, but which we or someone else answer in that way, and we can discuss whether it is wrongly worded. We probably won't always agree on the meaning of the
English (English works that way!), but at least we can try to find the best ways to say it that we CAN agree on.


- Doctor Peterson, The Math Forum


The Math Forum @ Drexel is a research and educational enterprise
of the Drexel School of Education:

________________________________________
Date: 07/29/2008 at 08:16:21
From: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
To: dr.math@mathforum.org
Subject: Boy Girl probability

Dr. Peterson,

TWE does fine. It's Dr. Anthony, in my estimation that has not been as rigorous as he might have been in answering people. Even when I pointed out some of the ambiguities, he seemed to give no credence to what you and TWE see as a misleading representation of the problem. In turn he would continue to address the problem as (at best) he thought it was intended to be worded. Or (at worst) he didn't recognize the nuance (my issue) that you so obviously picked up on.

For what it's worth, I think that *most* of the time the problem is worded incorrectly *if* the wording is supposed to imply an answer of 2/3. The way the problem is typically worded in my experience demands a 50% answer. I encountered the Monty Hall problem this way too the
first time I heard it (not on your site). My suggestion would be, that we not answer the question according to how it is thought that it was probably intended. Rather, we should take the opportunity to show the problem in two forms and then get into why they yield different answers.

Yours,

Ron


________________________________________
Date: 07/29/2008 at 09:01:27
From: Doctor Peterson
To: rondig1@comcast.net (Ron DiGiacomo)
Subject: Re: Boy Girl probability

Hi, Ron.

Exactly.

I concur completely. The main point in any discussion of this
problem, or Monty Hall, should be the translation from English to math, not just the math.


- Doctor Peterson, The Math Forum


The Math Forum @ Drexel is a research and educational enterprise
of the Drexel School of Education:

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Hurray! Westminster Seminary California Not Guilty of Opposing Application - (a minor point at such a time)

"One of the more frequent false claims about Westminster Seminary
California which I hear from prospective students and others is
that "you don't believe in application in preaching." The short answer is:
nonsense." R. S. Clark / Professor WSC

It is my experience that WSC is many things (proud for instance?), but I would not say that they don't believe in preaching application. Of course believing that application should be preached and endeavoring to apply sound preaching (assuming sound preaching) are different matters.

I have read through my share of ministerial applications and although I believe I never conclusively prejudged one who went to WSC (and certainly never prejudged one as having no regard for application in preaching), one’s attending that institution in the last ten years does not in and of itself leave me with a favorable impression. In fact, specific red flags go up when I learn that someone studied at WSC anytime since the late nineties. These are red flags mind you and although they might be enormous and radiant, they are merely flags and no more (and they have nothing to do with application in preaching). I am not inclined to elaborate on those red flags, at least not here. They are obvious enough. Suffice it to say, when profound Reformed thinkers cannot be respected, there are serious problems that must transcend doctrine into manner of life.

I do believe that one who thinks for himself and is successful in resisting movement mentalities can escape WSC in relatively fine shape, if not even theologically prepared for gospel ministry. In fact, I can imagine (with a little effort) one so full of grace that he could be better off for having gone to WSC. Similarly, I suppose I can imagine that attending a Roman Catholic high school or serving a life sentence in prison could be a means of obtaining a keener Christian world and life view. No doubt – God is sovereign over what might appear to us as meager means.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006