Lee Irons & Theonomy

In an attempt to reduce the theonomic thesis to absurdity, Lee Irons took a swipe at various quotes from the late Greg Bahnsen. I’ve dealt with just a few of Irons’s arguments (italics) below.

"The ‘No other standard’ argument [is] ‘Where else can we find God's standards for socio-political justice, except in Scripture, particularly, the Mosaic civil legislation? If we reject the divinely-revealed civil law, we are left with no other standard, condemned to wander in a fog of personal bias and subjective relativism.’

One way to respond to this argument is to question the assumption that Scripture is a sufficient source of guidance for societal and political questions. No doubt the Bible contains many general principles that are to be observed, but why should it be regarded as a detailed blueprint for society? After all, we don't go to the
Bible to find specific directions for other equally important human endeavors, such as art and architecture, literature, the culinary arts, medicine, technology, etc.”

Dr. Bahnsen’s claim is that the rejection of “standards” in the realm of civil government leads to subjective relativism. Irons, however, addresses a different thesis all together, having to do with a “detailed blueprint” – one that gives “specific” directions. Irons tries to support his argument by noting that Bible does not give us specific directions for architecture, literature, culinary arts and other endeavors he says are “equally important.” In passing we might note that if is true that the Bible has given us no standard for such endeavors, then Irons’s claim that such endeavors are “equally important” is of course a dubious one since the Bible has much to say about the role of civil government.

The Westminster Confession affirms that the general equity of the OT civil law is applicable for today. Accordingly, it is confessional to argue that the God-ordained punishment for rape is death. The general equity of that punishment for such wrongdoers, of course, would not include the mode of punishment (e.g. stoning verses firing squad), for that would entail a “detailed blueprint” containing “specific directions” that go beyond the general equity of the law in view. Accordingly, that the Bible does not disclose a detailed recipe for baking a cake or finding a cure of cancer should not discourage us from obtaining a defensible justification for putting lawfully convicted rapists to death. A more thoroughgoing argument would have to be put forth to lead us to the conclusion that God has abrogated the death penalty for rapists.

At best, Irons’s argument reduces to: if the Bible doesn’t tell me how to build a bridge, write a literary masterpiece, create a scrumptious meal, develop a cure for cancer or design and manufacture an integrated circuit, then we should not assume it is sufficient to guide us in the realm civil government. Presumably, Irons believes that the Bible is a source of guidance for at least some things, such as how one obtains peace with God. Yet does the Bible’s silence on the specifics of modern medicine cast doubt on the general equity for sins such a rape? “Has God said?”

“The Westminster Confession acknowledges that there are areas of life "which are to be ordered by the light of nature, and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the Word, which are always to be observed" (WCF I.6).”

Implicit in Irons’s assertion is the following argument: If there are areas of life that are to be governed by light of nature, according to the general rules of the Word, then we cannot know which sins are to punished by civil magistrate and what those punishments should be.

The civil case laws of the OT, being God’s law, could have never been at odds with the light of nature, which is also God’s law. Accordingly, we may always look to the civil case laws without fear of contradicting the light of nature. After all, are we to suspect that under the older economy Israel could violate God-given conscience by submitting to God’s given word? Does the light of nature tell us today that a rapist should live but under the older economy it confirmed death?

If there are areas of life that are not covered by the case laws yet are covered by the light of nature, then we’d have no choice but to rely on the law of nature. In such cases we’d have no way of offering a justification of what we could know, but neither would such reliance in such circumstances invalidate the contemporary validity of the case law. Essentially, all Irons has asserted is that if there are some instances that the civil case laws are impotent, then they are irrelevant in all circumstances.

“Scripture is not sufficient for the art of cologne and perfume manufacture, although one particular recipe is given in the Mosaic law (Exod. 30:23-25). Does that mean we should only make the Levitical perfume? Are all other non-Biblical scents autonomous and sinful?”

Irons’s argument reduces to:

1. Scripture is not sufficient for the art of cologne and perfume manufacturing
2. Scripture delineates a recipe for anointing oil
3. All other scents are not sinful
4. Therefore, the civil case laws are not applicable for today

Typically, where Reformed thinkers disagree is over the justification of the premises pumped into validly formed arguments. I the case of Mr. Irons's argument, I'm afraid we don't even agree on what a validly formed argument even looks like.

“Properly defined, the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture states that the Bible is "the only rule of faith and obedience," (WLC # 3), directing
us "how we may glorify and enjoy" God (WSC # 2). The Scriptures "principally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man" (WSC # 3). In other words, as Paul states, the primary purpose of Scripture is to "make us wise unto salvation through faith in Christ Jesus" (2 Tim. 3:15).”

Irons’s argument reduces to: If the Bible principally teaches how man may be saved, then it may not teach us how to govern ourselves in the realm of civil magistrate.

What I find most amusing over the controversy that surrounded Mr. Irons is that it was the non-theonomists who were so outraged at the trajectory of their own position. Irons was merely representing the non-theonomic thesis with shocking clarity.

If nothing else, Reformed Christians should appreciate that the light of nature does not reveal to us which sins are punishable by civil magistrate, let alone what those punishments should be. Accordingly, apart from the theonomic thesis there can be no objective standard for the penalty of steeling a loaf of bread for a starving child. Subjective relativism can always justify death in such cases. Whereas theonomy (i.e. God's law) offers an epistemologically sound justification for a lesser penalty. With respect to harsher crimes, such as rape, does the non-theonomist think that death is never an appropriate sanction, or is it just to be considered a sanction that can no longer be defended by Scripture? At the very least, if we are to govern ourselves strictly by the light of nature apart from special revelation, wouldn't the non-theonomic Christian be constrained to argue that all sins deserve death, since all men know by nature that the just wages for all sins is eternal destruction? Since the light of nature argument fails the non-theonomist, shouldn't he then be willing to concede that the penalties of the civil case laws of the OT are at least permissible today, even if they were no longer required? Or is it that we may only legislate laws that do not resemble God's those given to ancient Israel? What is it to be non-theonomic after all?

How does the non-theonomist, without being arbitrary and inconsistent, refute Mr. Irons's conviction that same sex marriage, although still sinful in the modern world by his estimation, is biblically justified as a God given civil right? Again, what is it to be non-theonomic after all?

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Back To The Garden

The theological perspective that posits that Adam would have been confirmed in righteousness and translated into a state in which he could no longer sin had he passed an alleged probation period is not deducible from Scripture. After all, if it were, then I would think that someone in the history of the church would have proved it by now. What is most insidious is not that theologians speculate but that they raise their speculations to the level of revelation. After vain speculations become canonized, then it’s only a matter of time that those who are constrained by sola scriptura will be chastised for not affirming in their dogmatic assertions that which goes beyond the boundaries of sound exegesis. "Good and necessary inference" has taken on new meaning I'm afraid.

As John Frame so aptly noted:

"For thirty years or so there has been a movement in American evangelicalism to
recover the past, to remedy the “rootlessness” that many have felt in
evangelical churches. In the 1950s and ‘60s, the intellectual leaders of
evangelicalism were for the most part biblical scholars, apologists, and
systematic theologians. But at the end of the twentieth century, church
historians, and theologians who do their work in dialogue with ancient and
recent history, have become more prominent. Reformed theology has participated
in this development, so that many of its most prominent figures, such as [I’ve
deleted the names] do theology in a historical mode. The history-oriented
theologians tend to be uncritical of traditions and critical of the contemporary
church. But their arguments are often based on their preferences rather than
biblical principle and therefore fail to persuade. The Reformed community, in my
judgment, needs to return to an explicitly exegetical model of theology,
following the example of John Murray."

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

Reformed Folk & The Power of Contrary Choice

Libertarian free will (LFW) can simply be defined as the ability to choose contrary to how one will. My position on the matter is straightforward. LFW is a philosophical surd. If it is true that one can choose contrary to how he will, then the future God believes will come to pass might not come to pass; and even if the future does come to pass as God believes, he will not have been justified in his belief. He would have just been lucky.

John Frame once noted: “I don't know how many times I have asked candidates for licensure and ordination whether we are free from God's decree, and they have replied ‘No, because we are fallen.’ That is to confuse libertarianism (freedom from God's decree, ability to act without cause) with freedom from sin. In the former case, the fall is entirely irrelevant. Neither before nor after the fall did Adam have freedom in the libertarian sense. But freedom from sin is something different. Adam had that before the fall, but lost it as a result of the fall.”

I resonated with John’s observation the very first time I read his lament. This is a very serious matter. These men to whom John refers may have very well been ordained and licensed in Reformed denominations (or gone to teach at seminary), yet without any appreciation for the implications of their religious philosophy.

It’s one thing not to appreciate that Adam was not able to choose contrary to how he chose. It’s quite another thing to accuse as being in opposition to the Reformed confessions one who does appreciate the folly of the philosophical notion of “the power of contrary choice”.

Recently, on a well known Reformed website, I was accused by an ordained servant in a Reformed denomination that I was “outright denying that Adam was created righteous and innocent, contrary to all the Reformed confessions.” If this were indeed true, then I trust by God’s grace I'd give up my office as an elder in my denomination.

In a discussion having to do with the freedom of the will in general and Adam's first sin in particular, my "opponent" asserted that Adam could have chosen contrary to how he did, which of course I deny (and in this instance challenged the notion).

I was told by this ordained servant (who I will simply refer to as OS) that:

“The pre-Fall and post-Fall distinction is what is completely escaping you.”

I responded: “Did the metaphysics surrounding LFW change with the fall?” (John Frame's point I believe.)

Given OS’s assertion regarding the distinction he thinks I am missing, it would seem to follow that he thinks the metaphysics surrounding LFW has been altered since the time sin entered into the human race. Yet OS (somewhat happily) responded with: “The mechanics of how man chooses something are the same before and after: he can always choose what his nature determines that he can choose.”

Now OS was close to correct with his answer. I did offer him a minor correction though: “The nature determines no action of choice. The nature simply determines the moral quality of the choice that will necessarily occur according to the inclination at the moment of choice. So then, an unregenerate man will sin; his nature determines that he must. His nature, however, does not determine what sin he will choose.”

Although OS indexed the determination of the actual choice to the nature (as opposed to correctly indexing it to the inclination that is consistent with the nature), he was indeed correct when he stated that the “mechanics of how man chooses something are the same before and after.” So given that OS affirms this with me that the mechanics of choosing have not changed since the fall, I am confused as to what he thinks is escaping me with respect to the “pre-Fall and post-Fall distinction”. (Could it be that he is thinking inconsistently, like those to whom John Frame was referring?)

I reject the notion of the power of contrary choice, just as OS says he does. I reject the notion that the metaphysics of choosing has changed since the fall, just as OS says he does. The only disagreement we had communicated, and it is a big one, is that OS affirms that “Adam could have willed to do the right thing” and in saying so, OS also affirmed that “[the impetus] would have come immediately from Adam, even though such ability to choose the good had been given him by God.” It would seem that he attributes this to the “power” Adam had (see below) and the “pre-Fall and post-Fall” distinction (noted above). For now we might just note that OS affirms two mutually exclusive propositions.

OS: “Let me state that again: Adam could NOT have thwarted God’s will in the garden.” “What I am saying is that Adam could have willed to do the right thing.” “Are you denying that Adam could have chosen to obey?”

Mustn’t it be true that if Adam truly could have acted contrary to how he did, then Adam truly could have acted contrary to God’s decree? After all, had Adam acted as OS says he could, then the decree would have been thwarted - hence OS's contradiction.

OS also stated: “You are outright denying that Adam was created righteous and innocent, contrary to all the Reformed confessions.

This is false. What I stated (and argued) was that Adam was not able to choose contrary to how he did, yet this is does not imply that Adam was not created righteous or innocent.

The ability to choose contrary to how one will is libertarian freedom, a philosophical surd that being created innocent and righteous cannot legitimize. I deny LFW and, therefore, affirm that Adam could not choose contrary to how he did. OS claims to deny LFW yet asserts that Adam could have chosen contrary to how he did. What OS has done is the deny the literal label LFW, while affirming its meaning! So we have two things going on here – my alleged apostasy from the Reformed confessions and OS's internal contradictions. (Something tells me that the allegations are being driven by the contradictions.) With respect to what I have been accused of, does my denial of Adam’s supposed ability to choose contrary to how he did lead one to rationally conclude that consistency on my part would require me to deny that Adam was created in righteousness and innocence? A premise would seem to be missing in that line of reasoning.

OS also said: “You deny that Adam was created with the power to obey.”

This is false. As I clearly noted: “YES Adam prior to falling had the ‘power’ to perform spiritual good. Just as Tom’s quote from Calvin notes, Adam had the power to choose good over evil, but as Calvin also noted in that same excerpt, this power could be exercised ‘if he so willed; so now we have power and what Calvin called ‘the will’ to contend with. The ‘power’ is akin to the nature and liberty – liberty being the ability to act as one wants – the nature in that case being un-fallen, yet mutable. Accordingly, Adam could have stood and not fallen – ‘if he [so] wished’ – which is to say – had he been so inclined..."

I was most clear in my affirmation that Adam had the power to obey. Nonetheless, the power to obey does not imply that Adam could have chosen contrary to how he did anymore than a car’s power to run can direct the car in a direction contrary to the way in which it ends up moving. What OS did seems rather apparent. OS equivocated over the use of the word "power". He apparently confused the "power" the Confession speaks about with the "power of contrary choice"! He assumes that Adam had the power to choose contrary to how he did, which is LFW.

Toward the end, OS stated just prior to locking the thread: “you are using the term “molinist” as if it was all about Adam’s will before the Fall, and wasn’t about middle knowledge and man’s ability after the fall. You cannot project the one onto the other, like you are so obviously doing. I am very tired of this thread, and am therefore closing it.”

I’m hesitant to even try to address this remark because it lacks any discernable progression of thought. It’s more of an emotional outburst than anything else I’m afraid. What I will note, however, is that OS has seemed to miss the relevance of my reference to his Molinistic type assertions. OS is under the impression that since he affirms that God’s plan could not be thwarted, he is somehow Reformed in his thoughts about the will of Adam. I merely pointed out to him: “OS, no Molinist thinks that God’s decree won’t come to pass (or be thwarted). Molinism affirms two essential points: 1) Man will act in accordance to God’s decree; and 2) man could act contrary to how he will. Both of these sentiments you have affirmed in this thread. Accordingly, you do not distance yourself from the Molinist when you say that man will act in accordance with God’s decree. This is precisely what Alvin Plantinga and W.L. Craig affirm. You affirm the tenets of Molinism when you say that Adam *could* have acted differently than he did. The Molinist says, as do you, that Adam could have chosen contrary to how he did, yet that Adam would choose according to God’s decree (i.e. not thwart God’s decree).”

In the final analyses, if OS truly denied LFW, wouldn't he deny that Adam could have chosen contrary to how he chose? Yet he’s not willing to do this. In fact, he bolstered his argument by attributing Adam’s alleged freedom to choose contrary to how he did to the “pre-Fall distinction”, affirming my suspicion that he falls into the category of those examined by John Frame.

God’s plan according to Molinists who affirm LFW will not be thwarted. Accordingly, the affirmation that God’s plan will come to pass is not evidence to convict one of the repudiation of LFW. So, OS’s appeal to God’s immutable decree is of no help to him since all good Arminians affirm this. (I am not suggesting for a moment that OS is Arminian; I have little doubt he affirms the "Five Points.") I seriously do wonder whether OS believes that fallen men can choose different sins than they do and whether men in glory will be able to choose different righteous deeds than they will. If he does believe this, then he is quite consistent with his libertarian freedom philosophy. If he should answer NO, then he is happily inconsistent and simply consigns LFW to the prelapsarian paradigm.

I’m not saddened so much that men don’t appreciate the distinctions that I have tried to make on this subject. Nor am I terribly surprised that ordained servants are sometimes confused in their thinking when it comes to the metaphysics of choice. I am saddened, however, how easily people – especially when they are ordained servants – are willing to say that X-and-so does not affirm the Reformed standards. That is a far-reaching problem in our day.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

True-Counterfactuals?

“Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! for if the mighty works, which were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.”

The verse above is often used as a proof-text to defend the philosophical notion of true-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Calvinists, however, should never make such appeals.

First it should be noted that Calvinists do not draw a distinction between possible and feasible worlds. They are the same in number for the Calvinist because creaturely choices, which are always necessary and never free in the libertarian free will sense of the word, do not violate human responsibility. Accordingly, any possible world would have been feasible for God to actualize had he wanted; whereas within Molinism feasible worlds are considered a subset of possible worlds – the former being distinguished from the latter in that within the system of Molinism God could have actualized any feasible world without violating human responsibility yet he could not have actualized any non-feasible possible world (where men are responsible for all their choices) due to the non-cooperative intentions of the alleged free moral agent.

The Calvinist appreciates that repentance is an evangelical grace and not something that can be self-generated through agent-causation even in the presence of miracles. After all, if the reprobate will not believe Moses, then neither will he believe one who is raised from the dead! So – if Jesus was speaking in terms of true-counterfactuals, then at most all that he could have meant was that had he performed the same miracles in Tyre and Sidon, then God would have accompanied those miracles with the grace of repentance. What would then become of the Lord’s rebuke?!

If we are to take Jesus literally by allowing his words to support the existence of true-counterfactuals, then it would be arbitrary not to be equally rigorous in our literal interpretation by allowing the verse to be considered in light of man’s moral inability. Accordingly, we would be constrained to interpret the verse as teaching that had God actualized a world wherein similar miracles had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, then God would have also chosen to effect by his sovereign grace repentance in Tyre and Sidon in that world. But such a literal interpretation would negate the prima facie rebuke Jesus obviously intended. After all, what sort of rebuke is it to say that God would have granted unmerited favor to a group of unworthy sinners had he performed miracles before them that were performed before another group that did not respond to such miracles in repentance and faith?

Jesus’ simple point was that the people of his day were even more hardened than those in Tyre and Sidon. To make this point he must suspend the doctrines of total depravity and effectual calling, but never does he establish a philosophy of true-counterfactuals and human autonomy. To suggest a philosophy of true-counterfactuals can be erected upon such a verse is to open the verse up to many problems, including a denial of sovereign grace, which happens to be consistent with the Molinist’s manipulation of the verse in view.

If there are true-counterfactuals of this sort, this verse certainly does not support such a claim.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

An Untraditional Tradition

“Where are you going to college next year?” is probably the number one question asked of high school senior women. Not, “How are you planning to serve Christ in his Kingdom after you’ve finished secondary education?” The less customary of the two questions, the second question, presupposes that the woman will, or at least suggests that she should, serve Christ in her near future endeavors. The question is one of how, not whether. Whereas at best, the more standard query even if it assumes without mention that the woman is to serve Christ in her future endeavors presupposes that she will do so only in the orbit of further formal education. At best the question becomes, “Where are you going to college next year so that you can best serve Lord?” Does that question sound strange only because it is not often asked? Or does it sound strange for some other reasons? Another question we might ask is why is it assumed that college is the defacto medium by which a young woman is to serve the Lord in her immediate post high school years?

As a general rule college affords the woman the greatest opportunity to land a career outside the home. Let’s even assume for argument sake that it affords the greatest opportunities across the board for pure education. Are these the only disciplines, career and academia, that the Christian woman is to pursue? Or is she to be active in pursuing other disciplines, such as the knowledge and practice of true holiness, righteousness and grace? Clearly a woman can pursue and practice godly living in the pursuit of science and a career. Yet she cannot pursue science and career if she pursues Christ centered living in a particular way that would exclude college and career. A woman whose ambition is to remain in her father’s home in order to serve full time in the context of her family, church and community cannot pursue a career that requires rigorous formal education outside the home. So isn’t the obvious choice to pursue a formal education and career for the glory of God? Why not do it all?

God does not reveal to us the details of our calling. He gives us biblical principles to live by in order that we might work out our salvation, even with fear and trembling. As we walk along life’s path we are never, not even for a moment, to lean on our own understanding but in every way we are to acknowledge God and in doing that he will direct our paths. So right from the start we are not to come to God with our lawful desires and ask him to bless them. Rather, we are to strive to have our desires and affections informed, shaped and confirmed by the word of God’s wisdom and the Spirit of his grace. With that in mind, how many women seek God’s leading on whether or not to pursue the usual course of college? The answer is pretty much the same as how many fathers even consider any other option for their daughters? Apart from serious consideration, how can one feel confident that even an attempt at a godly pursuit of college and career is the choice God would have a woman make? Again, we are not to come to God asking him to bless our desires and choices until we have first come to him in a posture of humility and neediness, asking him to give us the desires of his heart.

So what’s a woman to do? Here are some ideas that are by no means exhaustive.

1. First off, a woman should think critically about the popular defenses for pursuing college and career. Any defense of college and career that makes appeals to blessings received simply begs the question of whether the decision is a wise one. God is gracious and good. Not only does he bless us in our unwise yet lawful pursuits; he even gives us good things in our rebellion. Accordingly, God’s kind providence that might follow any decision is never proof that the decision was a wise one. Moreover, any defense of college and career that points to the very desires for such pursuits equally skirts the issue. All our desires are tainted with sin and not all lawful desires are wise. Accordingly, lawful desires cannot vindicate the wisdom to pursue such desires. Finally, any defense of college and career that points to natural ability begs the question of how one should use those enabling gifts.

After coming to a greater appreciation that a career outside the home cannot be justified as the wisest decision based upon blessing, desire or ability, one can begin to evaluate a decision to go against older traditions that are now considered passé.

2. A godly woman would do well to acknowledge the opportunity cost of college and career pursuits. She should know, in other words, what she must reject in order to pursue college and career. There is a severe cost, namely a particular kind of Christian servitude, expensed by taking fifteen credit hours and studying two to three hours per week per classroom hour. The Apostle Paul is clear that a single person’s interests can be more narrowly focused on the Lord than a married person who must have his interests “divided” by focusing on his spouse. “The woman who is unmarried, and the virgin, is concerned about the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both in body and spirit, but one who is married is concerned about the things of the world, how she may please her husband.” 1 Corinthians 7:34 In light of this revelation, the godly woman would do well to know that in her singleness she is most enabled to pursue the Lord. Every godly woman with the help of her father would do well to wrestle with how she will spend her single years as a vessel of honor, glorifying God and enjoying him.

3. Finally, it would seem wise for the woman to consider her probable future calling as a wife and mother as she considers her intermediary years between high school and marriage. There are generally two types of considerations, one positive and the other negative. Will the woman’s post-high school, pre-marital pursuit positively impact her ability to serve as a wife and mother? Will she pursue domestic skills and learn hospitality in those years of singleness that will enable her to fulfill her calling before God? On the negative side, will the woman’s post-high school, pre-marital pursuit negatively impact her ability to prosper in her future calling, for instance by taking on financial obligations that will leave her no choice but to work outside the home and utilize day care, if not even prolong marriage and child bearing? In a word, the godly woman should be prepared to answer the question of how a college and career path or a more domestic pursuit will prepare her for her probable calling in the Lord.

In summary, a godly woman should think critically about the popular defenses of college and career in order that she might evaluate the prospect of college and career truthfully. Simultaneously, the woman of excellence will weigh in the balance the opportunity costs of choosing one pursuit over another while considering the positive and negative impact any given pursuit will have upon one’s ultimate goal.

Not trusting in one's own understanding and desiring that the Lord direct one's path will no doubt require a tuning out of the world's agenda and a tuning of the heart to God's ways. Because Christianity is a radical religion we should not be suprised that choices rooted in the principles of the faith will appear extreme even to Christians - especially as the church becomes more at home in the world.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Wright, Obama, Hannity & The Church

Jeremiah Wright has many problems rooting from deplorable theology. Notwithstanding, my concern is neither with Jeremiah Wright nor his undiscerning spiritual protégé who is incapable of distinguishing between covenantal obligations toward honoring one’s bigoted grandmother and the lack of obligation toward a reckless pastor. What is much more tedious is Sean Hannity’s abhorrence with Wright’s indexing of the 9/11 attacks to the United States military involvement on foreign soil. I could support a criticism by Hannity if it were that Wright’s bald assertions are not philosophically defensible due to an apparent lack of revelational justification. After all, how does Wright know that the 9-11 providence was God’s judgment due to the mistreatment of innocent people, let alone the mistreatment of other God hating nations? How does an Arminian even come up with any God ordained purpose given their view of free will? Yes, Jeremiah Wright has is issues. That much is obvious.

What is more remarkable in this current political divergence is not that a prospective president might have a bigoted spiritual mentor but rather that the conservative right, which Sean Hannity fairly represents in his ideology, completely discounts the possibility that the United States deserves God’s judgment and that 9-11 might have been the finger of God pressing in on a rebellious nation.

If our nation is arrogant it is because its leaders have lost their way. If our nation is arrogant it is because its leaders do not plead the mercies of Christ. Any nation is arrogant that does not desire to submit to King Jesus, the head of nations. (Psalm 2) It is not only the duty of all nations to take heed to Psalm 2, it is wise to do so. If our leaders have lost their way, then it is most likely because the church is not the salt and light she is called to be. For instance, the United States has no just-war theory that is justifiable but how can she when the fragmented Christian church has none? Even should the United States ever enter into a just war (and even if it is in one now), it is not in a position to justify its actions due to its commitment to natural law theory. Does the church have good answers for a government with no guide? Not being able to justify killing should be a terrifying proposition for those who are called to wield the sword. It’s not, however, neither for most American Christians nor their elected officials. The church by and large wants to be pluralistic in the realm of civil government because the church, as a general rule, opposes the general equity of the civil case laws of the Old Testament.

Those with a high regard for Old Testament civil law do well to be politically involved. But they are not to overdue it because another principle abides, which is our kingdom is not of this world. It is more biblical to place the accent on educating the church and making disciples of all nations than to trying to persuade the irreligious how they ought to govern society. The Reconstructionist often needs balance whereas the American evangelical needs a more Puritan understanding of the universal relevance of God's law.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Timmy Is Joining The Church

“Timmy is joining the church this Sunday.” How often have we heard such a sentiment? A better question is “Why do we hear such a sentiment?” I am fully persuaded that the reason we hear such things is because evangelicalism is overtaking the church – even the Reformed church. In the minds of most Timmy is not joining the church upon baptism let alone birth but upon his confirmation of faith.

The Orthodox Presbyterian Church’s “Directory for the Public Worship of God” [DPWG] most clearly and decisively opposes evangelicalism in Chapter 4, Section B, Paragraph 2 where it instructs that “…Although our young children do not yet understand these things, they are nevertheless to be baptized. For the promise of the covenant is made to believers and to their seed, as God declared unto Abraham: ‘And I will establish my covenant between me and thee and thy seed after thee throughout their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee.’ In the new dispensation no less than in the old, the seed of the faithful, born within the church, have, by virtue of their birth, interest in the covenant and right to the seal of it and to the outward privileges of the church… So the children of the covenant are by baptism distinguished from the world and solemnly received into the visible church.”

Before we proceed it should be noted that the official position of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church is that the “covenant of grace was made with Christ as the second Adam, and in him with all the elect as his seed.” (Westminster Larger Catechism (WLC), Q&A 31) The denomination also affirms that all within the visible church are not elect; therefore, there exists within the visible church those with whom God has not made His covenant of grace. Assuming the denomination does not contradict itself in its doctrine, we my safely conclude that when the standards teach that children of professing believers are to be baptized – because the covenant is made with them – it is treating such children as elect in Christ. Accordingly, such children are to be “distinguished from the world and solemnly received into the visible church.” But what is it to be “distinguished form the world and solemnly received into the visible church”? According to the [Westminster] standards of the denomination, to be received into the visible church includes entering “into an open and professed engagement to be wholly and only the Lord’s,” which is contrary to how the denomination’s catechism instructs its members to regard “strangers from the covenant of promise” who are not to receive baptism until “they profess their faith in Christ…” Infants born of professing believers are not only to be considered among those with whom God has established his covenant; they are also to be regarded as already disciples in Christ, which is why they are to be baptized, as opposed to targets for evangelistic conversion. New Testament baptism is a call to discipleship, not conversion.

The DPWG goes on to state in paragraph 4 of the same section “that, although our children are conceived and born in sin and therefore are subject to condemnation, they are holy in Christ, and as members of his church ought to be baptized…” [Emphasis mine] Parenthetically we can note that the official position of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church is that baptism does not make someone a member of the church but rather it is to be administered to those who are already "members of his church." The DPWG, possibly borrowing from 1 Corinthians 7:14, regards covenant children as “holy in Christ” and, therefore, among those who ought to be baptized. Moreover, paragraph 4, borrowing from Ephesians 6:4, instructs professing parents of children “to endeavor by all the means of God’s appointment to bring [children] up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.” Just prior to the Apostle Paul’s instruction to parents he instructs the children in Ephesus to obey their parents “in the Lord.” These children without qualification are included in the number of all hearers in Ephesus who by the apostle are called “saints”, “faithful in Christ Jesus”, “blessed”, “chosen”, “accepted in the beloved”, “sealed with the Holy Spirit of Promise”, “quickened”, “saved”, “his workmanship created in Christ Jesus”, “fellowcitizens with the saints”, “of the household of God”, “partakers of his promise in Christ”, “forgiven”, “beloved children” and “children of light”. Does the average evangelical Protestant regard his children as the Apostle Paul would have us? Or do evangelicals, Reformed or not, regard their covenant offspring as those who must “join the church” after making a credible profession of faith? Does the Reformed Christian who embraces limited atonement tell his children that Jesus died for them? The Apostle Paul tells his hearers, even at Corinth where professions of faith were less credible, that Jesus died for their sins. (1Corinthians 15:3) Covenant children were not only regarded as being among the elect for whom Christ died; they, as part of the church, were regarded as already partaking of the purchased redemption, having been "sanctified in Christ Jesus, [and] called to be saints." (1Corinthians 1:2) The baptized were treated according to what the sign of baptism signified, namely union with Christ.

Indeed, children must “improve” upon their baptism – as do adults. The Confession draws no significant difference between the two. Question 167 of the WLC asks “How is our Baptism to be improved by us?” Answer: “The needful but much neglected duty of improving our Baptism, is to be performed by us all our life long... by serious and thankful consideration of the nature of it... by being humbled for our sinful defilement, our falling short of, and walking contrary to, the grace of baptism... by growing up to assurance of pardon of sin, and of all other blessings sealed to us in that sacrament; by drawing strength from the death and resurrection of Christ, into whom we are baptized... and by endeavoring to live by faith, to have our conversation in holiness and righteousness, as those that have therein given up their names to Christ; and to walk in brotherly love, as being baptized by the same Spirit into one body.” Both child and adult is to improve upon his baptism.

Note well that the WLC does not exhort those who have been baptized unto conversion. Such baptistic theology is contrary to Scripture. Rather, the Confession instructs that the baptized continue in faithfulness. The doctrine of the Bible, which the Orthodox Presbyterian Church follows in its standards, instructs all within the visible church to grow in the assurance of pardon and in brotherly love, as those who have already been baptized into one body by one Spirit. Even when we find severe warnings in Scripture pertaining to falling away from the faith, we find on the heels of such warnings encouragement in the Lord:

“Let us draw near with a true heart in full assurance of faith, with our hearts sprinkled clean from an evil conscience and our bodies washed with pure water. Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for he who promised is faithful. And let us consider how to stir up one another to love and good works, not neglecting to meet together, as is the habit of some, but encouraging one another, and all the more as you see the Day drawing near."

“Though we speak in this way, yet in your case, beloved, we feel sure of better things—things that belong to salvation.”

“But we are not of those who shrink back and are destroyed, but of those who have faith and preserve their souls.”

It is often said that baptists engage in "dry baptism" in their practice of infant dedication. What I find more true is that Reformed paedobaptists engage in wet-dedication in the sacrament of baptism. For the most part, both deny the covenant status of their offspring. Neither treats his offspring as already alive and engrafted into the risen Christ. Not only are professing Christians to regard their children as converted disciples of Christ; they need not always qualify their biblical terminology with systematic language, another topic for another time. For now we might note that "There is, in every sacrament, a spiritual relation, or sacramental union, between the sign and the thing signified: whence it comes to pass, that the names and effects of the one are attributed to the other." With that in mind, how often will a Christian say that he is saved by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost? For that matter how often do we hear Christians acknowledge that they are truly eating Christ's body and drinking his blood in the sacrament of communion? We hear all too often what the sacraments are not; yet the accent in Scripture falls upon what these sacraments actually confirm, namely interest in Christ. Accordingly, it is not hard to understand that as long as Christians regard their children as outside of Christ, the church will have a hard time reclaiming the sacramental language of Scripture. I say this as one who has no interest in jettisoning systematic theology.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Resurrection or Conversion?

What is the main focus of Paul’s soteriology, redemption-accomplished or applied? Well, is it the gospel or conversion? Coming at this from a slightly different angle – Who is the central Actor in the drama of redemption, the Holy Spirit or the Christ whom the Holy Spirit reveals?

Clearly the gospel is the central theme of the New Testament and consequently Paul’s theology. In particular, that Christ is raised from the dead, with all its implications, is the primary message of Paul. Naturally, therefore, when it comes to the application of redemption, Paul doesn’t abandon his teaching on the resurrection in order to preach conversion. Rather, Paul turns our attention to the reality of the believer’s existential union with the resurrected and ascended Crucified One. {Unless there is serious error that must be corrected, Paul’s emphasis is not on how one appropriates Christ but rather on the ramifications of being in Christ already.}

Not justification through faith alone (through an alien righteousness) but intimate union with Christ, which envelopes the glorious reality of justification, is Paul’s message to the church. Properly understood, it is all the benefits in this life that proceed from effectual calling, as identified in a sound formulation of the ordo salutis, Paul has in view when he expounds redemption-applied; not in some atomistic, compartmentalized sense but in all its fullness, occurring all at once through one baptism into Christ. The picture Paul paints is as poetic as it is profound. Notwithstanding, certainly Paul distinguishes (for instance) sanctification from justification but he never separates the two from union with the resurrected and ascended Christ. It is because of this, I believe, that Paul does not detract from the eschatological implications and sheer profundity of the believer’s participation in the first resurrection and age to come. It’s not that Paul was not a systematic theologian. He was. Yet Paul had a more pressing message to deliver, from which other theological intricacies can (and should) be derived, but never at the expense of laying hold of the already-not yet reality in Christ that is so prominent in Paul’s soteriology.

Paul’s soteriology is eschatological in nature, for when was the new age inaugurated but at the resurrection. Accordingly, when one is united to Christ by the instrument of faith, he is united with the firstborn from the dead, thereby entering into the new creation – Christ’s body, the church. When the many brothers are raised in Christ (separated by time in a single harvest), they are made partakers of the new age not only in and through but with Christ their brother, Lord and forerunner. Accordingly, Paul does not see glorification as the only aspect of the believer’s eschatological-salvation. Rather, Paul sees the entire process of salvation (and it is a process!), as entering into and living within the already inaugurated age that awaits its final consummation in Christ, the first fruits of those who are asleep.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

Bridging The Gap A Bit

Romans 1: 18-21 teaches many things including all men know God through revelation. “For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness; because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse: Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened.”

Although man knows God by general revelation – apart from special revelation man is ill-equipped to articulate the justification of his true belief in God, which is God’s general revelation of Himself to man’s mind. Although man knows many things such as: he ought to reason according to the law of contradiction; his rational mind corresponds to the external, mind-independent world; he ought not to murder; and he is under God’s wrath; apart from special revelation man, unaided by Scripture, is unable to offer a justification for what he knows. It is not that he won’t; he can’t. This is what I suspect Van Til meant when he would say that unbelievers know and do not know at the same time. Unbelievers know but unaided by special revelation their epistemological creed must reduce to skepticism and knowledge falsely called.

Colossians 2:3 declares that "All the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hid in Christ." Now how can we reconcile the apostle’s two points, that all men know God and yet estranged from Christ there is no knowledge to be obtained? The answer should be apparent. Apart from having the mind of Christ, one is reduced to foolishness, which Romans one makes clear. One cannot justify anything he knows apart from Christ's word. As Dr. Bahnsen would say, Christ is not just the way back to the Father; He's the way back to the Father's world! So Van Til is right in that man knows (in one sense) without knowing (in another sense). {Interestingly enough, several years ago Alvin Plantinga said to me that Van Til believed that unbelievers do not know anything - just another example of one not going to the original sources!}

How can I justify that I exist? Prior to conversion I knew I existed but apart from an appeal to Scripture I would not have been able to deduce or argue with justifiable premises my existence. I would have known but not known (that I new). For the believer, the Spirit of God bears witness with the believer's spirit that he is a child of God. (Romans 8:16) Accordingly, since Scripture teaches that God only adopts in Christ existing beings, I can know I exist since I know I am adopted. To deny this is to deny God's special revelation in Scripture, the law of contradiction, which is an attribute of God who has revealed Himself, and God's infallible witness to me. My knowledge of my existence comes by an immediate revelation from God. Although this revelation is not found in Scripture, there is no way of justifying my knowledge of this truth apart from Scripture. (That is not to say that I cannot know I am adopted without having the philosophical acumen to justify that knowledge.) In this sense, not all knowledge is revealed in Scripture or deducible from Scripture alone. However, all knowledge is revealed by God’s revelation or deducible from revelation. If nothing else, Scripture is a necessary condition for the justification of all knowledge, which Clark and Van Til agreed upon.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

Vincent Cheung Meets the Triabloguer

About a year ago, Triabloguer Paul Manata tried to take Vincent Cheung to task for asserting that God immediately and directly causes people to believe everything they believe. In spite of the fact that Vincent Cheung states that God causes men to know in this way; I do not find in the quotes provided by Manata that Cheung believes that God causes men in this way to believe all they believe. In other words, when knowledge is gained, Cheung is quoted as asserting God acts immediately and directly upon the mind. Yet, as Cheung knows, not all beliefs constitute knowledge; so without further evidence I cannot take Cheung to mean that God acts immediately and directly when one believes that which he does not know. Cheung may believe that but I do not believe that he does, which does not mean I disbelieve that he does. I have no basis for either belief. Nonetheless, let us assume with Mr. Manata that when Cheung says that "God causes people to believe lies as he wishes (and as Scripture teaches)..." that Cheung means that God does so immediately and directly.

Now for Manata's criticism of Cheung's epistemology:

"God immediately and directly causes people to believe everything they believe. Lie or truth. At this point I would like to know how Cheung knows anything? How does he know that God is not deceiving Cheung? If he replies that he has deductively valid arguments, deduced from scriptural premises, he doesn't escape. This is because the argument is only good if the premises are true. Cheung takes his understanding of verses and this understanding he has was immediately conveyed to his mind by God. Could God be deceiving Cheung? How would Cheung know?... So, when those divines who argued for an infralapsarian position, from the texts of Scripture, their understanding of those texts was wrong, according to Cheung, and their understanding, according to Cheung, was immediately conveyed by God on the occasion that they read those texts. Is Cheung better than those men? ...Cheung would need to show in a non-question begging manor that he was not deceived in this instance..."

I will break-up and interact with Manta's quotes in more manageable pieces below.

"God immediately and directly causes people to believe everything they believe. Lie or truth. At this point I would like to know how Cheung knows anything..."

For Cheung, sufficient and necessary conditions for knowledge are justified true belief, where justification is maximal warrant and, therefore, excludes inductive inference.
What is not being considered in the above criticism of Vincent Cheung’s epistemology is that although God can cause one to believe a lie; God cannot cause one to know a lie. Accordingly, Cheung, like Paul Manata or anyone else, can have reason to believe false propositions but such false beliefs can never entail the same confirmation that accompanies knowledge, since by the nature of the case what is falsely believed is contrary to truth and, therefore, the consistency that accompanies knowledge. How does Cheung know anything? Well, by the same way anyone else knows anything – by possessing true belief due to maximal warrant, which does not occur when one believes anything false (like a lie).

"How does he know that God is not deceiving Cheung?"

One cannot be deceived into knowing something false. One can only be deceived into believing something false. False beliefs can even be rational. In fact, we often do well to think falsely about many things. For instance, if my wife calls me on my cell phone and our home number appears on the caller-ID, then I should believe she is calling from home; although it is possible that the caller-ID is not functioning properly and that she did not make the call from home. In such a case, I should believe something false.

Deceptive-beliefs fall into the more general category of inference since one cannot be deceived into knowing something false. Accordingly, our query need not be limited to how one knows he is not being deceived but rather can be expanded to: how one knows that he knows. In other words, how can men who can believe falsely know anything and know that they know?

How one knows is discussed above. In the like manner, one knows that he knows in the same manner in which one knows anything – by way of belief due to maximal warrant, which always entails truth.

"If he replies that he has deductively valid arguments, deduced from scriptural premises, he doesn't escape. This is because the argument is only good if the premises are true. Cheung takes his understanding of verses and this understanding he has was immediately conveyed to his mind by God. Could God be deceiving Cheung? How would Cheung know?"

In the final analyes, one can believe false propositions either due to deception or carelessness, or even rationally. One can even believe they know when they don’t. Such error can take many forms, including elevating rational inference to maximal warrant, or being deceived over the truth of premises in a deductive argument. However, if one is deceived about the truth of premises, he doesn’t have maximal warrant. The only question at this juncture is whether God when deceiving men through a lying spirit or “immediately” gives men the same confirmation as when he grants men maximal warrant. Manata seems to think that Cheung thinks so. I, however, do not assume that since it is not deducible from what I have read in Cheung. I would argue that God does not grant men such maximal warrant because it would be impossible to do so! There are no isolated truths that do not impinge upon other truths. Accordingly, for God to grant maximal warrant to a false proposition would mean that God could contradict himself, given what maximal warrant entails. Consequently, when God causes men to believe a lie - He does just that. He causes men to believe, not know, a lie. Such a truth could entail men believing that they know something when they don’t, but doesn’t Manata’s own epistemology allow for that?

Manata reasons by false disjunction. That one can believe he knows something that is false, does not imply that one cannot know that he knows when he knows. It doesn't matter who or what is the cause of deception or error because even when God causes the error He does not do so by granting maximal warrant for the false belief. Roman Catholic apologists make the same category of mistake when they allege that fallible men who can mistakenly believe cannot infallibly know gospel-truth contained in God’s word apart from an infallible magisterium. Romanists compound the error (and even introduce a new inconsistency to their position) by introducing the need for an infallible magisterium; yet the intitial mistake is the same, which proceeds upon the premise that fallible men cannot acquire knowledge directly from God. Now obviously Manata does not think his position entails such an error - hence his criticism of Cheung's position. Manata’s criticism is not peculiar to occasionalists or scripturalists but rather may be applied to any epistemology that allows for knowledge and false-beliefs, even his own I would imagine.

"So, when those divines who argued for an infralapsarian position, from the texts of Scripture, their understanding of those texts was wrong, according to Cheung, and their understanding, according to Cheung, was immediately conveyed by God on the occasion that they read those texts. Is Cheung better than those men?"

If correct doctrine means “better than those men,” then yes, the high-Cavlinists were better. Cheung can know that infralapsarianism is false and that his position is true yet while believing he knows things he doesn’t.

"Cheung would need to show in a non-question begging manor that he was not deceived in this instance."

Why must Cheung be able to persuade someone else that he knows something in order to know something? Moreover, that Cheung can be wrong does not mean he cannot know he knows. It only means that he is capable of believing he knows when he does not know. Either Manata must consign himself to skepticism or claim perfect knowledge if he doesn’t allow for fallible men to know while being capable of being deceived.

Finally, I would argue that one can know that God would never deceive him, which is not to say that God does not deceive men; He does.

I would hope these Reformed thinkers are speaking by each other.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

Molinism, Dualism & the Nicene Creed

Possible world discussions involve modal claims regarding the way reality might have been. Yet not all possible worlds are feasible worlds. (Thomas Flint coined the terms possible / feasible world, though the ideas preceded him.) In layman terms, a possible world is one that is internally consistent though might include actions individuals would never freely perform. Accordingly, it would not be feasible for God to actualize possible worlds in which moral agents will not freely cooperate to bring about the realities those worlds contemplate. For the Calvinist, possible worlds are identical in number with feasible worlds because within Calvinism, actions of choice are not according to libertarian freedom; therefore, whatever is possible for Jones to do is feasible for God to bring to pass – should God so desire. The reason being, God causes men to cooperate.

Obviously possible worlds are not God, nor his will, yet they are eternal. They are, however, a reflection of his logic, which is why it is not dualistic for there to be such abstract entities. Possible worlds are necessary and find their origin in God’s attribute(s). We can rightly say, therefore, that God’s necessary (or "natural") knowledge requires knowledge of such worlds. This is a far cry from Molinism's use of middle-knowledge, whereby God somehow knows contingently true conditional propositions about creaturely free actions couched in the subjunctive mood; such as, if Jones were in state of affairs y, he would freely choose x. Such an alleged truth cannot come from God’s necessary knowledge since the truth is alleged to be contingently true, making its truth-maker itself, nothing or some mystical entity residing outside of God and his control. Yet God, somehow, eternally acquires the knowledge of how creatures would freely behave in various circumstances. Christian or pagan?

Consider Plantinga: "It seems to me much clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than that the truth of propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way."

Plantinga, as brilliant as he is, since he is not moved by the arbitrariness and inconsistencies of Molinism, would do well to put down the pagan philosophers for a time and pick up some orthodox creeds and confessions. If the unreasonableness of Molinism doesn't constrain men such as Plantinga, maybe a greater appreciation for the heretical implications of the system might. Molinists need to come to terms with the fact that any ungrounded truth implies dualism and, therefore, results in an outright denial of the historic Christian faith, which affirms that "the Father, the Almighty, [is the] maker of heaven and earth, of all that is, seen and unseen, [which would include any contingently true-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (not that there are any)].

Molinism is riddled with many theological and philosophical problems (e.g. ungrounded truth; God being informed by entities outside himself; all the problems pertaining to LFW, etc.) because the system is an avoidance of truth. It was invented in order to get out from under the complete and total sovereignty of God; so we should expect it to reduce to absurdity in obvious ways. Molinists confess pagan ideas that oppose orthodox Christianity.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Molinism - problems, problems, problems

Molinists and Calvinists agree over the soundness of the following argument, where x is a creaturely choice.

1. Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen
2. God foreknows x
3. Therefore, x will happen

Molinists and Calvinists even agree that the following argument is fallacious as written:

1. Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen
2. God foreknows x
3. Therefore, x will necessarily happen

The fallacy in view is that of transferring the necessity of the inference to the conclusion. The Molinist will not accept, however, that the fallacy can be made to disappear a number of different ways. One way is by establishing that a necessary condition for God’s foreknowledge of x is the necessity of x. Molinists assert that x will occur, not necessarily but contingently. Of course a contingent x, by definition, truly might not occur. Accordingly, Molinists are left with God knowing that x might not occur while knowing it will occur – but these are contradictory truths and, therefore, impossible for God to know. Accordingly, God’s foreknowledge of x presupposes the necessity of x for the simple reason that might and will are semantically antithetical and it is true that x will occur. Consequently, if x will occur, then it is false that it might occur.

Another way of making the fallacy disappear is to argue successfully that necessarily, God foreknows x. Molinists agree in the validity but not the soundness of the following argument (in other words, they agree with the form of argument but not with all the premises):

1. Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen
2. Necessarily, God foreknows x
3. Therefore, x will necessarily happen

Molinists deny that necessarily God foreknows x. In fact, pop-Molinist William Lane Craig states “Christian theology always maintained that God’s creation of the world is a free act, that God could have created a different world – in which x does not occur – or even no world at all. To say that God necessarily foreknows any event x implies that this is the only world God could have created and thus denies divine freedom.”

In passing we might note that Molinsts are not typically well read in the areas of Reformed systematics and historical, Reformation Protestantism. In part IV, Section VII of Jonathan Edwards’s classic, The Freedom of the Will Edwards has much to say on this matter under the heading “Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.” Edwards so eloquently states that “It no more argues any dependence of God’s will, that his supremely wise volition is necessary, that it argues a dependence of his being, that his existence is necessary. If it be something too low for the Supreme Being to have his will determined by moral necessity, so as necessarily, in every case, to will in the highest degree holily and happily; then why is it not also something too low for him to have his existence, and the infinite perfection of his nature, and his infinite happiness, determined by necessity. It is not more to God’s dishonor to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy… and, in every case, to act most wisely, or do the thing which is the wisest of all; for wisdom is also in itself excellent and honorable… One thing more I would observe, before I conclude this section; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the glory of God to necessarily determined by superior fitness in some things; then neither does it to be thus determined in all things…”

My appeal to Edwards as a representation of Reformed, Orthodox theologians is merely to show that Craig’s remark is a bit gratuitous to say the least. Reformed thinkers consider libertarian free choices a philosophical surd, not just as the silly metaphysical notion pertains to man but as it pertains to God as well. Not only do Molinists like Craig not appreciate that the necessity of the divine will is held by a vast number of Calvinists, notice too the imprecision in Craig’s remark where he speaks of freedom. Molinists do not draw any distinction whatsoever between liberty (i.e. the ability to choose as one wants), and the power of contrary choice, which is the alleged ability to act contrary to how one will (libertarian free will). The two are the same for the Molinist; yet the former idea pertains to moral accountability, whereas the latter is metaphysical notion that in the end would destroy moral accountability. It’s sad to consider but has anyone ever read a Molinist where he has interacted with the notion of liberty, which is the very seat of moral accountability? Why isn’t the ability to choose as we want a sufficient condition for moral accountability? Do Molinists tell us why liberty is insufficient? No, they simply ignore the matter of liberty and make the bald assertion that we must be able to choose contrary to what we will in order to be morally responsible agents. What is it after all to be able to choose x, when we intend to choose ~x? If that’s a caricature of libertarian freedom, then will a Molinist explain this metaphysical notion in light of the infinite regress problem that is inherent to the notion?

Pressing on, we should see that the minor premise that “necessarily, God foreknows x” is indeed true. If God’s foreknowledge of x was not necessary, then it was contingent. Forget for a moment that future contingencies - being truly contingent - defy eternal truth values with respect to their outcome, (which Open Theists have demonstrated). How about the simple truth that everything eternal (God and his thoughts) must be necessary? After all, did God deliberate? Did God move from not knowing to knowing? Moreover, where is “x will happen” grounded if not in the eternal, determination of God? And if there, what does it mean to determine x without determining a cause of x? Did contingent causes determine God’s eternal decree, which would include the Arminian notion of "contingent certainties"?!

A third way to get rid of the fallacy is to utilize facts that are grammatically in the past tense yet contemplate acts still future. The progression below takes no shortcuts so it might seem a bit tedious, but each step is appropriate.

Establish the necessity of God’s belief about Tom’s choice:
1. 100 years ago God believed that Tom will do x tomorrow
2. If x is believed in the past, it is now necessary that x was believed then
3. It is now necessary that 100 years ago God believed that Tom will do x tomorrow

Establish the necessity of Tom’s choice, given the necessity of God’s belief:
4. Necessarily, if 100 years ago God believed Tom will do x tomorrow, then Tom will do x tomorrow
5. If p {i.e. God's historical belief about Tom's choice} is now necessary (3), and necessarily if p, then q; then q {i.e. Tom's choice of x tomorrow: (consequent from 4)} is now necessary [transfer of necessity principle]
6. Therefore, it is now necessary that Tom will do x tomorrow [3, 4 and 5]

Establish that Tom does not act freely, given the necessity of Tom’s choice:
7. If it is now necessary that Tom will do x tomorrow, then Tom cannot do otherwise
8. Therefore, Tom cannot do otherwise than x tomorrow
9. If one cannot do otherwise, then one does not act freely
10. Therefore, when Tom does x tomorrow, he will not do it freely

Molinists will again find the argument valid but take issue with some of the premises, namely 5 if not also 2. With respect to 2, a Molinist might wish to assert that the necessity of the past does not apply to the entire past, but that’s an arbitrary stricture. A Molinist might also object to premise 5, where a change of modality occurs whereby accidental necessities (necessities about the past) are intermixed with metaphysical necessities having to do with actions of choice. This, however, represents a classic case of drawing a distinction without a relevant difference. The Molinist objection is to the transfer of necessity principle, yet they permit the very same principle of logic when dealing with the validity of argument 3! Accordingly, their objection should only be with premise 2 of argument 4, but are they prepared to argue that the past is contingent and not necessary?!

Given an objection to the transfer of necessity principle, the Molinist position reduces to: Tom's choice of x will necessarily occur but contingently. What is it though for x necessarily to occur by contingent means? In other words, what does it mean for a necessary occurrence to fall out contingently?! (Again, "will = might" for the Molinist.)

In summation, Craig’s lament with argument 3 is that one cannot prove the necessity of God’s foreknowledge. If one can prove that necessity, then I am led to believe by his say-so that he would accept the conclusion of argument 3 above, which asserts the non-contingent nature of choice. Consequently, the issue with Craig and his disciples over the 10-step proof should not be over any change in modaltity in step-5, since the same sort of modality change occurs in argument 3 without objection! Craig’s objection to argument 3 is not a change of modality objection but rather strictly a metaphysical objection pertaining God’s free will. Having no modality objection there, Craigites should find none in argument 4 either. Consequently, Craig and his disciples should at least begin by conceding that in time God’s foreknowledge became necessary (step 3 – argument 4), which should lead him to embrace all the valid arguments on the page as being sound given no modality objection for argument 3. Now why won’t they? Because the matter is ethical, not intellectual, that’s why. God has blinded the Arminian to the glorious doctrines of grace, which is why they say things like: “How can God find fault, for who can resist his will?” I’m afraid that Arminians don’t recognize that Romans nine is speaking to them.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

Presumptive Regeneration (and presumptive non-regeneration)

It should be indubitable among Bible students that Scripture and, therefore, Reformed Theology teaches that infants born of professing Christians ought to be regarded as elect in Christ unto salvation. Although sadly too often covenant children fall away; they are without exception to be regarded as elect until such time they demonstrate otherwise. Added to this, all who are to be regarded as elect are also to be regarded as regenerate. Such consistency does not preclude admonitions to make one’s calling and election sure, another matter altogether. There is no need to rehearse here a defense for the Reformed position with respect to the external status of covenant children other than to say that Ishmael, a foreknown apostate, was to receive the mark of inclusion into the people of God (a birthright indeed!), and nothing in the New Testament overturns that precept. Consequently, it is still the case under the newer economy that all those who qualify as part of the visible church are to be regarded as God's invisible-elect and those regarded as such are always to be regarded as already subdued.

Presumptive Regeneration:

When we turn to the question of presumptive regeneration, we are no longer to concern ourselves with how one is to be regarded but rather what is normative with respect to the actual (real-time) state of one’s soul. It is normative that covenant children born of faithful parents are elect, for God delights more in saving the seed of the faithful than damning them. However, it is quite another thing to argue that covenant children are typically regenerate early in infancy. I may presume election (and therefore final adoption) for the children of the faithful, as well as regeneration to occur at some time in their lives for this is normative, but I may not presume regeneration in early infancy for covenant offspring (though such infants are to be regarded as regenerate).

The Westminster Divines were indeed correct that elect infants dying in infancy are regenerate and united to Christ; nonetheless, one may not leap from that justifiable Westminster-premise to the conclusion that all elect infants are regenerate in infancy; nor ought we to reason that the mere possibility of early infant regeneration demands the normative probability of early infant regeneration.

Presumptive Non-regeneration:

Although presumptive regeneration is a false doctrine, Scripture does not afford us the premises to reason and presume that covenant infants are without regeneration either, let alone to be treated as such. Archibald Alexander could not have been more wrong when he wrote: "The education of children should proceed on the principle that they are in an unregenerate state, until evidences of piety clearly appear, in which case they should be sedulously cherished and nurtured. . . . Although the grace of God may be communicated to a human soul, at any period of its existence, in this world, yet the fact manifestly is, that very few are renewed before the exercise of reason commences; and not many in early childhood."

Presumptive Non-regeneration worse in ways:

We must not embrace the false doctrine of presumptive regeneration – nor should we embrace the equally false doctrine of presumptive non-regeneration. Note well that the latter doctrine is more harmful than the first, for at least the first doctrine allows one to consider his covenant child as he ought - a disciple of Christ; whereas the teaching of presumptive non-regeneration demands that the child be regarded as outside the camp with the wrath of God abiding upon him, a monstrous practice that is not only foreign but also contrary to the teachings of sacred Scripture.

Presumptive Regeneration does not necessarily lead to more error:

Both presumptive regeneration and non-regeneration are false doctrines. And although it might often be the case - those that embrace the former doctrine need not have a lax attitude toward making one's calling and election sure. After all, Scripture is replete with warnings not to fall away and exhortations to persevere even when conversion is assumed if not even infallibly known. For even the technician of grace, the Apostle Paul, with full assurance of his conversion buffeted his body lest he be a castaway. Consequently, those that hold to the erroneous and presumptive doctrine of presumptive regeneration need not be delinquent in practice with respect to encouraging others unto final salvation. Accordingly, a deficient doctrine of presumptive regeneration need not reduce to a hyper-Calvinism of any sort. On the other hand, those who hold to presumptive non-regeneration, like our Baptist brethren and our latent-baptist paedobaptist brethren, always (if consistent) make the mistake of treating covenant children wrongly as pagans.

Regarding one as elect and converted need not lead to nominalism; but it should lead to rejoicing more in promise than fruit:

As we treat our covenant children from the womb as disciples of the Lord, we are to instruct them to believe the entire Bible as we call them to “accept, receive, and rest upon Christ alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life,” (just as we with credible professions must do as well all our days). Although we are to presume the election of infants born of faithful parents, we may not presume anything at all regarding their regeneration while yet in early infancy. We're to remain agnostic as it were with respect to the probable state of their soul, but is that so terrible? After all, I'm to regard infants in the church as regenerated disciples of Christ (are there any other kind!), and on their way to glory through proper nurturing and employment of the means of grace - a most happy thought indeed. Upon fruit we may presume their actual conversion, which although a great blesssing, our greatest rejoicing is not to be found in the fruit we see later but in the child's birth into a Christian home, which allows him to be baptized in the name of the Triune God as a disciple of Christ! Coming at this from another angle, should we rejoice less over our covenant child's eternal state should God decide to take him while still in the womb rather than after he professes Christ? If not, then why not?

The only way that the fruit of conversion can become a greater occasion for rejoicing than a birth to faithful parents is if one doubts God's promise and precepts in the first place! Isn't my a priori confidence in my child's salvation simply confirmed by a good profession and not established by the fruit I see? Shouldn't I expect to see fruit if I am believing God's precepts and promises in the first place? Isn't my utmost rejoicing to be found in God's promise and precepts (signed and sealed at the font), which precedes the always future outcome of the embraced promise, namely the ever abundant fruit of salvation? What is more extraordinary after all, that God would place an undeserving child in a covenant home and place His mark upon him, or that He would keep His promise(!) according to His precepts?

Something horrible to presume:

As for presumption, if we want to presume anything unfortunate regarding the children of professing believers, then presume that those who do not confess Christ by their late teens are more probably reprobate than not; which is all the more reason to encourage our covenant youth to make their calling and election sure, even today.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

Even Understanding Aquinnah at Dusk is a Matter of Faith, not Sight

Faith then understanding is the necessary order of embracing the beauty and wisdom of all we would otherwise never understand. Whereas the carnal mind, which will not indeed cannot walk by faith, requires understanding before it will exercise faith. Accordingly, it is not hard to appreciate why the carnal mind never arrives at understanding. Christ is not just the way back to the Father; he's the way back to the Father's world.

As Tozer noted, it is one think to hear a sweet lute played sweetly and quite another thing to hear about it.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

Infants Dying in Infancy

Since we are to treat as Christians all those born into households that profess the true religion, then we are to consider such ones who die in infancy as dying in Christ.

If the parents of such a child are weak in the Lord yet credible Christians, then I believe we are to speak as if the child is in glory due to the child's position in the visible church. Our confidence would of course be diminished to some degree as compared to our expectations for the offspring of faithful parents who lose children in infancy.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006