More on Merit

Condign merit presupposes that the recipient of reward has claim upon it rooted in pure justice, which is not a factor in congruous merit, which presupposes that the giver of reward finds it appropriate or fitting to bestow reward upon a recipient. The latter entails a magnanimous posture of the giver, whereas the former entails moral obligation toward the recipient that is predicated upon actions that have intrinsic value worthy of honor and reward. Regarding what is known as the Covenant of Life, Reformed folk should appreciate that both condign merit and congruous merit have no biblical support.
 

Many Reformed thinkers posit a form of ex pacto merit, a reward that is due not out of what is fitting to bestow or out of intrinsic value of good performed that warrants reward but because of contractual terms. In other words, ex pacto merit implies meritorious reward that is due a recipient because the terms of a compact sanction blessings in exchange for something done. Specifically, an increasingly popular idea is that Adam would have merited a confirmation in righteousness, translating him into a glorified state, had he obeyed the terms of the Covenant of Life for the entire alleged probation period. Not only is that view widely held in Reformed circles, it is also thought that to deny it is to undermine the gospel.

Ex pacto merit is best considered from at least two vantage points. First, was there an offer of confirmation in righteousness in the prelapsarian covenant? And secondly, if Adam was offered a glorified state as part of the terms of that covenant, would it be equivocal to say he was in a position to have merited the outcome, eternal glory?

Regarding the first question, an affirmative answer is not deducible from Scripture. By drawing analogies to the Second Adam who entered into glory upon completion of his earthly work, it is often presupposed that Adam could have earned an eternal state, but that of course entails question-begging as it pertains to God’s covenant with Adam, as opposed to deducing an answer from premises found in Scripture. Such a notion of merit implicitly denies Sola Scriptura (and the laws of deduction). Turning to the second question, allowing for a moment the speculative notion that Adam was offered confirmation in righteousness and resultant glory (as opposed to
perpetual communion with God without any prospect of ontological transformation), if one agrees that there is no place for condign merit, then he should agree that it would be equivocal at best to say that Adam could have “merited” glory. Even had the terms of the covenant prescribed such an outcome as wonderful as eternal glory, it is nonsensical that one can “merit” reward from another who receives zero benefit from the one being rewarded. Mustn't on some level the one issuing reward (in this case God) receive benefit from the one being rewarded if we're to call the outcome "merited" and not unmeritied favor bestowed? After all, when God discharges the wages of sin, it is because he is justly offended, is it not? Shouldn't the reverse hold true? If one is it to earn a reward from God, shouldn't God owe a debt that is a matter of justice deserved and not merely a matter of contractual terms that are not an essential property of God? At the very least, wasn't the entering into covenant a matter of divine condescension? Is God lacking in something that Adam could have filled-up? Secondly, I find it even more absurd to think that a creature could by good works merit something from God when such good works would require God to effect in the creature those works necessary to obtain the reward. What is it after all to merit something based upon a performance that requires the one who is to issue the reward to bring to pass the performance of the performer?! Yes, you have heard right, libertarian freedom is a metaphysical surd even for the prelapsarian era, something that escapes too many Reformed folk, even seminary professors. Wouldn't Adam even prior to the fall have owed his willing and doing of God's good pleasure to God alone? Or was Arminianism true before the fall and just not after? In the third case, in common parlance when one merits something the reward received is in accordance with the magnitude of work performed. So, in sum, how can good works for a finite period of time that are efficaciously wrought in man by God’s determination and providence (no less) wherein God gets nothing in return be the grounds for meriting such a disproportionate reward, relative to the work performed, such as an eternal state of not being able to sin, a state of non posse peccare?

For Adam to have performed sufficient works in order to have been confirmed in righteousness he would have needed that which only God could have supplied; the reward would have been greater than the work performed; and the work would have been of no benefit to the one bestowing the reward. Now if one is willing to admit all that, then he should also acknowledge that to call such work “meritorious” is to make "merit" a vacuous term. I'd simply prefer to consider such pure condescension on God’s part as unmerited favor toward a creature. Yet aside from tagging speculative ideas with inappropriate and misleading terms, it is an even greater monstrosity to pass such musings off as the Reformed position, let alone essential to the gospel.

Finally, it's interesting to me that the infralapsarian position seems to require such a prelapsarian compact, for in the infralapsarian construct creation must exceed redemption in glory and grandeur. That is not to say that I am pleased with the framing of the supra-infra debate. I am not, if for no other reason than God's purposes are multi-faceted and not just linear. Yet with that said I find the teleological supra schema of Hoeksema, Clark and Reymond most attractive in what it it aims to put forth (as opposed to Beza's construct for instance). For in the contemporary supra-schema, God's choice to redeem presupposes men as fallen. Damnation becomes not an end in itself but justice that presupposes sin, a very biblical concept indeed. Of course the infra position is simply a denial of true Calvinism.

More Muddled Musings & Flip Wilson's Geraldine

{Click on the title to see what I'm talking about.}

Somewhat of a mantra (or at least a reoccurring theme) on this site has been “inclinations are never chosen” for if they were (and if choices are always according to inclinations) then it stands to reason that any choice would require an infinite regress of choices and inclinations. Paralyses would set in before anyone ever chose anything!

When Misty Irons states that “the homosexual orientation [is] a fallen and yet unchosen condition…” what distinction is she trying to draw? After all, are any of our fallen inclinations chosen? Does the married man, for instance, who is bent on lusting after strange women (or strange animals for that matter), choose such an inclination? Of course not for our inclinations are never chosen. Notwithstanding, most certainly our present inclinations and subsequent choices flow from the font of past inclinations acted upon. The man who acts in such a way as to sear his conscience will be able to act in that same manner with much less resistance the next time similar temptation comes to bear. Conversely, the man who exercises himself unto godliness, gaining increasingly greater mastery over his members, is able to resist the devil with less effort when temptation should come through the hand of divine providence moving the pawn-tempter. So, although we don’t choose our inclinations directly, our choices certainly impact our future inclinations and subsequent choices. There is something called will-formation after all. The world is rational and our choices do have consequences for which we are responsible.

So why is it that the sin of lusting after the same sex should gain some special status of consideration as opposed to the acts of thievery, serial killing or bestiality for that matter? All of these transgressions proceed from inclinations that are in accordance with a “fallen and yet unchosen condition” do they not? Now obviously lusting after the same sex is unnatural in a way that other sinful desires are not. Desiring shelter in a storm, for instance, is natural even though such a natural desire could become sinful when the shelter gained is against the owner’s wishes. So, at least in some sense, the inclination to lay down with the same sex is more deviant than otherwise lawful desires that are desired unlawfully. However, does even a severe step-change in abnormality give us occasion to question whether one is less culpable for his transgression, or give us any more occasion to pause and reconsider the simple remedy for sin, which is a persistence in heart felt confession, true repentance and genuine faith in God? Is the fact that our fallen nature is not chosen any reason at all to cause us to approach the more deviant behaviors with a different antidote, or more sympathetically than God does? (Even a non-nouthetic counselor should agree.)

Let me now substitute “axe murderers” for “gay men” and “homosexual” in Mrs. Irons’s quote:

“But it's not enough to present abstract doctrines and theological definitions. I also read from the testimonies of two axe murderers who were professing Christians who talked about what it was like to grow up with the dawning awareness that they were axe murderers. To me this was the centerpiece of the class, because if you haven't heard people describe it for themselves, you can never fully appreciate what people mean when they say, ‘I didn't choose this.’ I don't know how people in the class felt about those testimonies, but everyone listened in a respectful silence.”

Now I can almost hear the sound of well meaning Christians saying “Come on Ron. Certainly you see the difference between being an axe murderer and a homosexual.” Well, not really – at least not in any consequential sense when God’s word as opposed to autonomous reason becomes our standard. God does not draw a relevant distinction between the two transgressions, other than that the latter one is often a sign of reprobation! (Romans1:27, 28) Special revelation would have us believe that God’s abhorrence often precedes the abominable practice of homosexuality and not the reverse. God’s wrath already abides upon the homosexual and his sin is just a foretaste of what is to come if he doesn’t repent. The transgressions are indeed equal in that those who would engage in the abominable practices of murder and homosexuality are to be punished by death (Exodus. 21:12; Leviticus 20:13) and await God’s eternal damnation. (1 Corinthians 6:9; Galatians 5:19-21; Ephesians 5:5; Revelation 21:8) The fact of the matter remains, the acts of murder and homosexuality proceed from the very same “unchosen condition” that has not been buffeted and brought under subjection.

At the end of the day, Mrs. Irons is for some reason impressed by the lame testimonies of a certain category of transgressor that reduce to no more than Geraldine's quip “the devil made me do it.” That the human condition, whether fallen or remade, and its associated inclinations are not chosen is as irrelevant for the homosexual as it is for the common punk-thief, Flip Wilson's Geraldine (pictured above), and the sinner whose heart has been subdued by grace. Men are responsible for their inclinations and choices because God says so. Some men get justice and others get grace. Nobody gets injustice from the hand of God.

What is most terrifying is that Mrs. Irons is teaching in a PCA church, if I am to believe her Blog entry. What is more alarming is her observation that “No one [in her class] was hostile, everyone was trying to think and understand. Maybe the reason it all went so well was because our church is very young. The vast majority of members are in their 20's and 30's.” Would these 20 and 30 year old Christians sympathize with the testimony of a self-deceived axe murderer, rapist, thief, or whoremonger who would dare justify himself with: “I didn’t choose this..."?

What an insidious approach of Satan’s it is to use a former minister’s wife who claims to be Reformed to legitimize in any respect a practice that in then end will bring eternal torment to those who would indulge themselves, even according to an “unchosen condition.” To the secularist, Mrs. Irons appears more loving than your run of the mill Reformed Christian. Yet one need not be a profound exegete or an acute logician to navigate through the muddled musings of Mrs. Irons. One simply needs to be committed to Scripture over feelings, that’s all. But again, and with all sincerity, what should we expect from those whose primary form of revelation on such matters is “natural” and not “special”?

Ron

Lee Irons & Theonomy

In an attempt to reduce the theonomic thesis to absurdity, Lee Irons took a swipe at various quotes from the late Greg Bahnsen. I’ve dealt with just a few of Irons’s arguments (italics) below.

"The ‘No other standard’ argument [is] ‘Where else can we find God's standards for socio-political justice, except in Scripture, particularly, the Mosaic civil legislation? If we reject the divinely-revealed civil law, we are left with no other standard, condemned to wander in a fog of personal bias and subjective relativism.’

One way to respond to this argument is to question the assumption that Scripture is a sufficient source of guidance for societal and political questions. No doubt the Bible contains many general principles that are to be observed, but why should it be regarded as a detailed blueprint for society? After all, we don't go to the Bible to find specific directions for other equally important human endeavors, such as art and architecture, literature, the culinary arts, medicine, technology, etc.”

Dr. Bahnsen’s claim is that the rejection of “standards” in the realm of civil government leads to subjective relativism. Irons, however, addresses a different thesis all together, having to do with a “detailed blueprint” – one that gives “specific” directions. Irons tries to support his argument by noting that Bible does not give us specific directions for architecture, literature, culinary arts and other endeavors he says are “equally important.” In passing we might note that if is true that the Bible has given us no standard for such endeavors, then Irons’s claim that such endeavors are “equally important” is of course a dubious one since the Bible has much to say about the role of civil government.

The Westminster Confession affirms that the general equity of the OT civil law is applicable for today. Accordingly, it is confessional to argue that the God-ordained punishment for rape is death. The general equity of that punishment for such wrongdoers, of course, would not include the mode of punishment (e.g. stoning verses firing squad), for that would entail a “detailed blueprint” containing “specific directions” that go beyond the general equity of the law in view. Accordingly, that the Bible does not disclose a detailed recipe for baking a cake or finding a cure of cancer should not discourage us from obtaining a defensible justification for putting lawfully convicted rapists to death. A more thoroughgoing argument would have to be put forth to lead us to the conclusion that God has abrogated the death penalty for rapists.

At best, Irons’s argument reduces to: if the Bible doesn’t tell me how to build a bridge, write a literary masterpiece, create a scrumptious meal, develop a cure for cancer or design and manufacture an integrated circuit, then we should not assume it is sufficient to guide us in the realm civil government. Presumably, Irons believes that the Bible is a source of guidance for at least some things, such as how one obtains peace with God. Yet does the Bible’s silence on the specifics of modern medicine cast doubt on the general equity of the law as it pertains to the temporal punishment for transgressions such a rape? “Has God said?”

“The Westminster Confession acknowledges that there are areas of life "which
are to be ordered by the light of nature, and Christian prudence, according to
the general rules of the Word, which are always to be observed" (WCF I.6).”

Implicit in Irons’s assertion is the following argument: If there are areas of life that are to be governed by light of nature, according to the general rules of the Word, then we cannot know which sins are to punished by civil magistrate and what those punishments should be.

The civil case laws of the OT, being God’s law, could have never been at odds with the light of nature, which is also God’s law. Accordingly, we may always look to the civil case laws without fear of contradicting the light of nature. After all, are we to suspect that under the older economy Israel could have violated God-given conscience by submitting to God’s given word? In other words, was there a tension for the OT believer between submitting to natural law and special revelation? Or, does the light of nature tell us today that a rapist should live but under the older economy it confirmed death?

If there are areas of life that are not covered by the case laws yet are covered by the light of nature, then of course we’d have no choice but to rely on the law of nature. In such cases we’d have no way of offering a justification of what we could know, but neither would such a reliance in such circumstances invalidate the contemporary validity of the case law. Essentially, all Irons has asserted is that if there are some instances that the civil case laws are impotent, then they are irrelevant in all circumstances.

“Scripture is not sufficient for the art of cologne and perfume manufacture, although one particular recipe is given in the Mosaic law (Exod. 30:23-25). Does that mean we should only make the Levitical perfume? Are all other non-Biblical scents autonomous and sinful?”

Irons’s argument reduces to:

1. Scripture is not sufficient for the art of cologne and perfume manufacturing

2. Scripture delineates a recipe for anointing oil

3. All other scents are not sinful

4. Therefore, the civil case laws are not applicable for today

Typically, where Reformed thinkers disagree is over the justification of the premises pumped into validly formed arguments. I the case of Mr. Irons's argument, I'm afraid we don't even agree on what a validly formed argument even looks like.

“Properly defined, the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture states that the Bible is "the only rule of faith and obedience," (WLC # 3), directing us "how we may glorify and enjoy" God (WSC # 2). The Scriptures "principally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man" (WSC # 3). In other words, as Paul states, the primary purpose of Scripture is to "make us wise unto salvation through faith in Christ Jesus" (2 Tim. 3:15).”

Irons’s argument reduces to: If the Bible principally teaches how man may be saved, then it may not teach us how to govern ourselves in the realm of civil magistrate. Is an internal critique of such an assertion even necessary?

What I find most amusing over the controversy that surrounded Mr. Irons is that it was the non-theonomists who were so outraged at the trajectory of their own position. Irons was merely representing the non-theonomic thesis with shocking clarity.

If nothing else, Reformed Christians should appreciate that the light of nature does not reveal to us which sins are punishable by civil magistrate, let alone what those punishments should be. Accordingly, apart from the theonomic thesis there can be no objective standard for the penalty of steeling a loaf of bread for a starving child. Subjective relativism can always justify death in such cases. Whereas theonomy (i.e. God's law) offers an epistemologically sound justification for a lesser penalty. With respect to harsher crimes, such as rape, does the non-theonomist think that death is never an appropriate sanction, or is it just to be considered a sanction that can no longer be defended by Scripture? At the very least, if we are to govern ourselves strictly by the light of nature apart from special revelation, wouldn't the non-theonomic Christian be constrained to argue that all sins deserve death, since all men know by nature that the just wages for all sins is eternal destruction? Since the light of nature argument fails the non-theonomist, shouldn't he then be willing to concede that the penalties of the civil case laws of the OT are at least permissible today, even if they were no longer required? Or is it that we may only legislate laws that do not resemble those given to ancient Israel? What is it to be non-theonomic after all?

How does the non-theonomist, without being arbitrary and inconsistent, refute Mr. Irons's conviction that same sex marriage, although still sinful in the modern world by his estimation, is biblically justified as a God given civil right? Again, what is it to be non-theonomic after all?

Ron