Bahnsen's Use of Modus Tollens and Modus Ponens

It was recently asked of me why Greg Bahnsen argued transcendentally using Modus Tollens (MT) as opposed to Modus Ponens (MP), which I suppose is a fair question since even John Frame, it would seem to me, did not seem to see any persuasive reason why Bahnsen was a stickler about using one formulation rather than the other.

To argue by way of negation as opposed to affirmation is much more powerful because it reduces the opposing worldview to absurdity. There’s a reason, after all, why MT is referred to as a reductio ad absurdum argument. Both forms (MT and MP) are valid forms of argumentation; can be converted to the other; and argue to the same narrow conclusion – in this case that God exists. But it is one thing to say that causality logically implies God, which is what MP achieves, and quite another to argue that without God there could be no causality. The latter, of course, employs MT. At the very least, there is a tactical difference between: “Ccausality, therefore, God” and “No God, therefore, no causality”.

Consider the major premise: “If logic (predication, induction, or whatever), then God.” I’ll now try to show where we might use MP and where we should use MT to be most affective given that one major premise, with which both MP and MT may begin. First I’ll address MT.

The reason Bahnsen argued by way of negation (MT) in all his formal debates and in his classroom lectures on transcendental arguments is because he appreciated that no other formal construct illustrated more clearly and powerfully the point he wanted to make, that intelligible experience has no rational grounding given the negation of God’s existence. Bahnsen, following Van Til, wanted to argue that to predicate anything God must first exist (i.e. predication presupposes God). The way he chose to demonstrate that was by assuming for argument’s sake the opponents position that God does not exist, which required the negation of the consequent of the major premise, as opposed to the affirmation of the antecedent. By assuming the atheist’s worldview, Bahnsen for argument’s sake would negate the consequent of the major premise, “God”, which forced the conclusion that there is no logic (for instance). The reductio was apparent since logic was being presupposed by the one arguing the opposing position. By negating the consequent of the major premise the opponent is left to deal with the force of the conclusion: no predication – yet while all the time predicating! Bahnsen’s mantra was that to argue against God one must first presuppose God in his reasoning. Accordingly, he would argue by way of reductio: “No God”, which affectively led to the absurd conclusion of “no possibility of argumentation.” Bahnsen said over and over again that “the proof of God’s existence is that without him one could not prove anything.” That is precisely why he negated “God exists” in the minor premise - to show the absurd conclusion that there is no logic, etc.

Where MP might be found useful is in the apologist’s follow-up, which is to offer the solution to the quandary. Once one has been left with the absurd conclusion of “no logic” and cannot make logic comport with his unbelieving worldview, then by all means it is under good regulation to reformulate the argument with a new minor premise, that being the assertion of the antecedent – “Logic” (or causality, or prediction, or induction, etc.) In other words, once one is left with the conclusion of the reductio, which is the conclusion that his unbelieving worldview leaves him with(!) - it might be a good idea to assert the antecedent of the major premise (logic) in order to arrive at the conclusion: “God exists”: If logic, then God; ~God, therefore, ~logic (reductio). Ah, but there is logic (assert antecedent of major premise), therefore, God (MP). That is the only use of MP one will probably ever find in Bahnsen’s lectures, debates or writings with respect to this particular matter. MP is employed to give the solution to the dilemma. But even that can be done by MT! In other words, the conclusion of the argument is essentially "~God, therefore, logic". Accordingly, by treating that as a premise, we can simply add to the argument by negating logic in order to affirm God, which is to continue the argument with a form of MT rather than applying MP to the original major premise. In other words: If logic, then God. No God, then no logic. Logic, therefore, God.

With his debate against Dr. Stein, Dr. Bahnsen argued as his major premise: “If the uniformity of nature, then God” – (which was to posit the assertion that the uniformity of nature presupposed God’s existence.) The negation of God’s existence led to the absurd conclusion that there could be no possibility of the basis for all scientific inference, induction. Dr. Stein, a scientist and professing atheist, had no answer to his own dilemma. His scientific endeavors were all based upon the borrowed capital of God’s providence. The absurd conclusion of “no induction” left Stein with the task of proving how induction was indeed possible without the God of providence whom Scripture has revealed. With attorney Edward Tabash, although Bahnsen argued briefly that induction presupposes God (with his “toothpaste proof for God’s existence”), I would say that Bahnsen’s emphasis was on the necessary preconditions for morality (given that Tabash had Jewish relatives who suffered under Hitler). With the negation of God's existence, Awschwitz was morally irrelevant. (Doug Wilson employed the same sort of reductio with Dan Barker at the University of Delaware about a decade ago.) In both cases, “the toothpaste proof for God’s existence” and the “morality” argument, Bahnsen demonstrated through MT that morality and induction have their only grounding in God.

In a word, arguing by reductio is the most powerful way of demonstrating that the very tools of argumentation presuppose that which the unbelieving worldview does not afford, God’s existence. That is done, as Bahsnen so often said, by “assuming for argument’s sake that God does not exist”, which is the very conclusion the professing atheist wants to lead us to in his argument. In summary then, the reason we first argue by negation and not affirmation is that negation allows us to assume the opponent’s conclusion. In other words, it allows us to better lead the opponent by the hand by starting with his presupposition in the minor premise.

Now, of course, if we apply MT as I do immediately below, in which case it is posited “no intelligible experience” in the consequent of the major premise, then we conclude with the existence of God (i.e. it is not the case that God does not exist). Accordingly, what was demonstrated before in Bahnsen’s coupling of the minor premise and the conclusion (i.e. no God, therefore, no intelligible experience) is now located in what the major premise posits. Such an argument is not as readily accessible in my estimation - first because of the two negatives that are used in the major premise, plus the double negative found in the conclusion. Notwithstanding, I have employed that very argument on this site when I was not so much interested in concluding the ramifications of the reductio (no intelligible experience), but rather when my intention was to lead to the conclusion that God exists (by using MT).

Step 1 (A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience (since God is the precondition of intelligibility)
Step 2 (~B): There is intelligible experience
Step 3 (~A): It is not the case that God does not exist

Let’s now see what happens if we utilize MP rather than MT given the same major premise.

Step 1 (A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience
Step 2 (A): God does not exist
Step 3 (B): Therefore, there is no intelligible experience

Unlike the argument that concludes God’s existence, this argument leads to the same conclusion as Bahnsen’s use of MT, but by using MP instead. I find this terribly cumbersome, however, because in the major premise “no intelligible experience” is posited as the necessary condition for no God, rather than God being positively posited as the necessary precondition for intelligible experience: “If intelligible experience, then God” (because God is the necessary precondition for intelligible experience). Accordingly, in this argument MP needs some reworking to make the point more clearly that intelligible experience presupposes God (as its necessary condition). In other words, although the conclusion is the same as Bahnsen’s, the opposing worldview is not reduced to absurdity because a reductio form is not employed. Also, this argument gives way to the five negatives employed in the two premises and conclusion.

Finally, Frame finds no problem with the following use of MP.

If causality, then God
Causality
Therefore, God

The reason Frame’s use of MP is not as affective as Bahnsen’s use of MT is similar to a reason stated before. Although all the negatives are done away with in this formulation, Frame’s argument does not conclude with the absurdity that there is no causality (or science, or ethics, etc.), which is the very thing the unbeliever would otherwise be challenged to overcome. In other words, because Bahnsen’s use of MT concludes the negation of that which the unbeliever affirms, the unbeliever is more abruptly confronted with the challenge to prove how intelligible experience can possibly comport with the minor premise of no God. Also, MT no less than MP can be formulated with additional commentary to address necessary preconditions (as opposed to mere necessary conditions). Therefore, MT can offer both, the transcendental challenge and the reductio in one short, sharp, shock. Bahnsen wins outright – point, set, match. (Also, Frame until late did not seem to fully appreciate that an argument from presupposition requires that God be the precondition for both the denial and the affirmation of the intelligible experience under consideration. He now acknowledges the point.)

Finally, Bahnsen once wrote:

“A transcendental argument begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds, by critical analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful, or be intelligible to us. Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501-502.)

What Dr. Bahnsen meant was that whether we argue for or against morality (for instance) we arrive at the same transcendental conclusion, God exists. Accordingly, to make sense out of the belief that there is no morality (or that there is morality) one must presuppose God’s existence in that investigation. It should be obvious that Bahnsen did not commit this fallacy:

If morality, then God
No morality
Therefore, no God

Rather, he simply meant that whether one claims to believe or not to believe X, then God. The reason being, God is the necessary precondition for all beliefs, true of false.

Ron


Counter since: 9/6/2006

Federal Vision Teachers - Worthy to be Abhorred or Simply Dunces?

http://www.federal-vision.com/joint_statement.html

“We affirm that there is only one true Church, and that this Church can legitimately be considered under various descriptions, including the aspects of visible and invisible.”

This is one of the most troubling statements of the FV. The statement communicates that there is only one church, which can be described in terms of its being visible and invisible. The implication of such a construct is that the invisible church and the visible church are the same church. From that false premise comes much confusion and outright error. To make the point more clearly, consider the following modification of the statement: We affirm that there is only one true God, and that this God can legitimately be considered under various descriptions, including the aspects of transcendence and immanence. The modified statement, which uses the same construct of the FV statement, clearly communicates that the one transcendent God is the same God as the immanent God. That is true. Transcendence and immanence are simply two aspects of the one God. Is the FV statement true in this way? Is the visible church the same church as the invisible church? The FV statement clearly implies that they are one and the same; for it states that there is “only one true Church” that can be described in various ways, like visible and invisible. How can they claim such a theology and also claim to be Reformed?

In contrast to FV theology, now consider Reformed theology: “The catholic or universal Church, which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect, that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one, under Christ the Head thereof; and is the spouse, the body, the fullness of Him that fills all in all…The visible Church, which is also catholic or universal under the Gospel (not confined to one nation, as before under the law), consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion; and of their children: and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation.”

Note the difference. Within Reformed theology the invisible and visible churches are not the same church. The invisible church consists of the elect who will all possess Christ, whereas the visible church consists of those who profess Christ. On that basis alone, the FV may not be considered “Reformed” in any sense of the word. The FV is comprised of a bunch of muddled thinking men.

The Federal Vision blurs the visible-invisible church distinction and has a faulty view of the Covenant of Grace. Accordingly, they imagine that through water baptism one is united to the very life of Christ. Consequently, if one who was baptized with water were to deny the faith, he would in Federal Vision terms truly fall from grace and lose the life he had in Christ.

Federal Vision theology does affirm that all who have been justified will be glorified. Notwithstanding, how can one who has been justified be assured of his final state of salvation, glorification, if he can in fact fall from grace and lose the life in Christ he supposedly had? It is no wonder that assurance of salvation in the Federal Vision is limited only to the objective truth that those God has justified will be glorified. Federal Vision theology makes no room for personal, subjective assurance of one’s final salvation; indeed how can it if one can truly fall from grace and lose his life in Christ that is alleged to be given to all in the church?

The Federal Vision is correct that the “the decretally elect cannot apostatize”. But by blurring the visible-invisible church distinction and attributing a former life in Christ to those who outwardly deny the faith, the truly justified that will one day prove themselves elected unto glory is left no place to ground his assurance of his justification. After all, both those elected unto glory and those who deny the faith allegedly share in the same life in Christ and consequently must have the same grounds for assurance of perseverance, which becomes no grounds at all since some with life will not persevere.

Federal Vision proponents would do well to learn that the Covenant of Grace was established only with Christ as the Second Adam and in Him, with the elect. Consequently, the promises the covenant contemplates are restricted to the same, the elect – the invisible church, which comes from a systematic theology the Federal Vision abhors.

Any system of theology that would make such claims and create such confusion for God's people is abhorrent, but the teachers of the Federal Vision are not in my estimation so much to be abhorred but simply regarded for what they are, dunces. Note well, I would never use such language to describe those who are walking in the ways of the Federal Vision or even standing in the way. It is only the ones who have taken a seat in order to teach Federal Vision do I consider dunces. After all, it is they who have studied hard and still haven't a clue about the doctrines of church, salvation and covenant. For that they are to sit in the corner in shame.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Van Til, Bahnsen, Logic and TAG

“To us the only thing of great significance in this connection is that it is often found to be more difficult to distinguish our method from the deductive method than from the inductive method. But the favorite charge against us is that we are still bound to the past and are therefore employing the deductive method. Our opponents are thoughtlessly identifying our method with the Greek method of deduction. For this reason it is necessary for us to make the difference between these two methods as clear as we can.” (Van Til, Survey of Christian Epistemology, 9.)

“To put it simply, in the case of ‘direct’ arguments (whether rational or empirical), the negation of one of their premises changes the truth or reliability of their conclusion. But this is not true of transcendental arguments, and that sets them off from the other kinds of proof or analysis. A transcendental argument begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds, by critical analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful, or be intelligible to us. Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501-502.)

“Years ago Van Til realized that opponents of presuppositionalism tend to think that there are only two kinds of reasoning: inductive and deductive. Deductive reasoning stands opposed to inductive. However, there is also transcendental reasoning, in which the preconditions for the intelligibility of what is experienced, asserted, or argued are posed or sought. It, too, stands opposed to a purely inductive approach to knowledge. Critics seem to think that, since presuppositionalism does not endorse pure inductivism, it must favor deductivism instead. This logical fallacy is known as false antithesis.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 176, n. 55.)

The above three quotes were recently forwarded to me for comment because these sentiments of Van Til and Bahnsen are often (sadly so) misconstrued as affirmation of their denying the place of deduction and induction in the realm of presuppositional apologetics. (Having the books, I have verified the accuracy of the quotes.)

The beauty of the transcendental argument for the existence of God (TAG) as a special kind of deductive argument is not in the reductio but in the transcendental challenge, which demonstrates that to argue against God one must first presuppose that which only Christianity affords. In other words, TAG is certainly a deductive argument, but it's a unique kind of deductive argument, not in its form per se but rather in what it seeks to demonstrate. Transcendental arguments are concerned with the preconditions of any fact of experience – what must be true in order for any fact of experience to be that which it is. Van Til was careful to note that “the Christian method uses neither the inductive nor the deductive method as understood by the opponents of Christianity, but that it has elements of both induction and of deduction in it, if these terms are understood in a Christian sense.” (Van Til, page 10 - emphasis mine.) Why the qualifier "as it is understood by the opponents of Christianity" if Van Til did not believe that TAG incorporated deduction? Why not just say that the Christian method does not use deduction, end of statement? The reason is, TAG has aspects of not just deduction but induction too, as Van Til states with no ambiguity. TAG has a distinctly inductive aspect to it because with TAG the Christian investigates what must be true in order for some experience to be intelligible. Such explorations are inductive in emphasis. Notwithstanding, the manner of the investigation is not open ended because the premises within TAG do not merely support the conclusion, they ensure it. That aspect is unique to deduction. Moreover, the conclusion from TAG is not a mere hypothesis, but rather a sound conclusion derived through a deductive process. Finally, TAG falls short of being fully inductive because there is no asserting the consequent with TAG, as there is with all scientific inference, the playground for induction.

Van Til goes on to critique what he qualified as “exclusively” deductive arguments and “purely” inductive arguments that do not presuppose God. It was the anti-Christian Greek method of logic that Van Til and Bahnsen opposed but not logical apologetics. In other words, they never opposed deduction and induction but rather qualified these disciplines in reference to strictly secular uses of reason and inference. Even a careless reading of Van Til and Bahnsen bears this out, but one must first read the authors and not just read about them. And reading the authors would require reading past page 9 in Van Til, at least up through page 10. (Many perceived problems regarding Gordon H. Clark would also vanish if one would only simply go to the original source, rather than choosing sides in a partisan manner.)

Bahnsen typically employed modus tollens (MT) in his formal argument, yet he distinguished his employment of TAG from garden variety deduction. Mike Butler (at one time Bahnsen’s assistant) to my knowledge, also, has never pitted transcendental arguments against deduction. Butler has written TAG out, which is indeed deductive in form "For x (some aspect of human experience) to be the case, y must also be the case since y is the precondition of x. Since x is the case, y is the case." (Butler, The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence, 91 The Standard Bearer.)
Van Til and Bahnsen fully appreciated that TAG is a deductive argument strictly speaking (lest they contradicted themselves in practice). However, their focus in this regard was on what distinguishes TAG from the usual kind of deductive (and inductive) arguments. The unique quality of TAG that sets it apart from all other standard deductive arguments is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others - but that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience. In other words, with standard deductive arguments we try to deduce from a fact, or series of facts, other facts; no more, no less. If it's Sunday I'm with a congregation of saints from 9:30-12 in the morning. If I’m not with a congregation of saints at 10:00 a.m., then it’s not Sunday. That it’s not Sunday can be a standard deduction, yet my being with the saints at a certain time does not make Sundays possible. Kant's genius was that TA's are concerned with what must be true in order for something else to be possible. God’s revelation makes intelligible experience possible, whereas my being with the saints at a particular time does not make Sunday between 9:30 and noon possible.

Clearly, Bahnsen applied deduction in his demonstration of TAG. Accordingly, he was either inconsistent with himself, or we should interpret his statements as meaning something other than TAG is not strictly speaking deductive. With little effort we can reconcile Bahnsen's practice of TAG with his description of it. TAG is not like any other deductive argument because it does not reason from fact to fact in the standard Greek sense but rather reasons from fact to the preconditions of fact, which is Kantian, yet when in the hands of a Christian a very powerful tool.

Ron

John Piper on Infants Dying in Infancy

John Piper believes that all infants dying in infancy go to heaven but it would seem that faulty reasoning has caused him to ignore basic evangelical tenets. (Click on title to go to link.)

"I think they're all saved. In other words, I don't buy the principle that says that children born into "covenant families" are secure, and children born into "non covenant families" aren't. I don't go there."

He rejects the notion that the only saved infants dying in infancy are those born into covenant homes. He also rejects the idea that some born within covenant homes that die in infancy can be lost. Rather, he affirms that God saves all who die in infancy. Piper is not alone in these speculations. Presbyterian A.A. Hodge and Dispensationalist John MacArthur assert the same. I appreciate Piper much more on this matter for he speaks more tentatively regarding what he thinks; whereas Hodge and MacArthur are dogmatic in their claims. Hodge even went so far as to suggest the Westminster standards teach this form of universalism, which it does not.

"My reason for thinking they're all saved is because of the principle in Romans 1 where Paul argues that all people know God, and they are "without excuse" because they do not honor him or glorify him as God. His argument is that they are without excuse because they know things, as though accountability in the presence of God at the Last Judgment will be based, at least partly, on whether they had access to necessary knowledge."

Piper’s reasoning is terribly flawed. Piper reasons that if a person knows God, then he’s without excuse. Fine so far… until he deduces from that premise: If a person does not know God, then he needs no excuse. It is certainly true that if a man knows God, then he his culpable. However, it does not logically follow from that premise that those who do not know God are not culpable. That is fallaciously to deny the consequent based upon a denial of the antecedent. In other words, from if P then Q, we may not reason to not P, therefore, not Q. Even if Piper’s final conclusion were true, it would not follow from his premises. Simply put, that one is culpable for having knowledge of God does not imply that he is not culpable for something else apart from such knowledge, such as the inherited corrupt nature and imputation of Adam’s sin. Rather than deal with these, Piper seems to presuppose that sins proceeding from the corrupt nature either are not present in infants, or simply do not warrant damnation. In either case, the forensic and genetic aspects of sin are simply ignored in his treatment of the subject. (In passing we might note that it is a bit dubious to assert that infants do not know God. A defense of that premise might have been in order.)

"I think babies and imbeciles—that is, those with profound mental disabilities—don't have access to the knowledge that they will be called to account for. Therefore, somehow in some way, God, through Christ, covers these people."

"In some way, God, through Christ, covers these people?" What needs to be covered? Certainly not their sin, for Piper has already conceded that what these infants need is not a covering for sin but rather their just and deserved place in the kingdom. Moreover, why would Piper say that humans such as these are saved in death? Saved from what? Would he at least concede that elect infants dying in infancy are united to Christ through the monergistic work of regeneration, or would that smack of the need for too much grace? In the final analyses, either Piper has affirmed that the “salvation” of infants dying in infancy is a matter of justice alone, or he has implied that infants deserve mercy and grace.


Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

Libertarianism by any other name...

... is libertarianism. But non-libertarianism by the same name is of course something different. Confusion abounds...

Most libertarians hold to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). Yet a growing number of libertarians are abandoning their libertarian roots and embracing a Frankfurt version of libertarianism, which is no libertarianism at all. These “libertarians” don’t think they need to hold to PAP. These Frankfurt-libertarians hold to Frankfurt Counterexamples (FCE), which are aimed at bringing to naught the view that a moral agent is responsible for an action only if he could have acted contrary. The aim is to bring reconciliation between responsibility and determinism by arguing that responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise. The counterexamples can get quite creative, involving demons and chemicals and all sorts of will-altering stimuli.

With regard to all these scenarios that posit chips in brains and the like (certain FCE's), they can be refuted thusly with respect to their usefulness: Either determinism is true or it isn’t. There is no third option. If determinism is true, then these illustrations of demons, drugs and chips are all moot; for all would be determined and responsibility would become a non-entity for the libertarian incompatibilist. Accordingly, if determinism is true, then these silly scenarios (FCE’s) do not achieve their intended usefulness, which is to show that responsibility need not be accompanied by alternative possibilities. Without responsibility (due to the assumption of determinism), one cannot show that responsibility can be upheld at all, let alone apart from alternative possibilities (AP). In other words, FCE’s don’t save the day by providing an alternative source of responsibility if determinism is indeed true. There simply would be no responsibility to be found (anywhere) in the face of determinism given a commitment to LFW as a necessary condition for responsibility.

A Reformed “grounding objection” refutation:

Now if determinism is false, then of course the demon who would operate the chip could not know whether he actually would need to operate the chip in order to achieve his desired end until after the critical point of choice; there would be no grounding of the truth value of what the agent with the implanted chip would do under any set of circumstances. (Obviously such an argument should not be palatable to Molinists but strangely enough it’s employed by more than just Open Theists and Calvinists.) If the demon wants the agent to choose X, then the only way in which he could ensure that he does choose X is to externally cause him to choose X necessarily, which of course does not protect moral responsibility (in such cases) from a libertarian perspective. If the demon sees that it is very probable that the agent will choose X, then the demon might roll the dice and leave the agent alone in order that he choose X “freely”. Obviously in such cases given the contingent nature of LFW the desired end might not obtain, but the choice would be free and in accordance with libertarianism. Consequently, given libertarian freedom as a necessary condition for moral accountability, AP must therefore always apply in such instances of choosing with moral relevance since the demon, in order to ensure his desired outcome, would always have to preempt the unknowable choice with a short-sharp-shock. Pure contingency defies truth values that can be foreknown, therefore, the only way that AP can be taken away is to eliminate them entirely by external causality (simultaneously undermining libertarian moral accountability). It is impossible to ensure a desired outcome in this hands-off Frankfurter manner given radical free agency.

Desperation even more - will formation:

In a last ditch effort a wannabe libertarian might posit that the foreknowledge required to pull off this mad-scientist routine is bound up in the insights into an agent’s will-forming, which is to say that the a future creaturely choice can be known with certainty due to the predictability of a will that has been formed over time. The problem with such an idea is that will forming theorists don’t explain the sufficient condition(s) that must be met in order for a choice to no longer be purely contingent. Why do certain constraints upon the will that are brought to bear from prior (alleged) libertarian choices have more determining power over future choices, to the point of making those future choices metaphysically necessary (i.e. having no feasible alternative possibility), than other types of constraints? And if there can be no distinction made, then why should we believe that there are any?

An internal critique using Molinistic premises:

Finally, there is a subtle equivocation with these scenarios that utilize FCE’s. By addressing the equivocation we can attack the absurdity of the position more powerfully (on Molinistic terms!), while granting exhaustive omniscience for the demon and also allowing for the pure contingency of choice that libertarian freedom requires. In those cases where the agent chooses without outside chip-influence, he must do so (for the libertarian) from a metaphysical posture that is free. Accordingly, metaphysically speaking he in fact could choose contrary in no less a sense than if he was not wired to an implanted chip. It is only in those cases that he is actually externally prevented from choosing what he would that he could not choose contrary to how he would. What is relevant is that when he chooses freely he does so in a metaphysical sense, which presupposes true alternative possibilities of the metaphysical kind. The impossibility of choosing otherwise is only a logical one, constrained by the fact that it is true that the action will be physically prevented if it would occur: If the agent would choose ~X feely, then he’d be externally caused to choose X necessarily. Yet notwithstanding, when he would choose X freely, he indeed could (metaphysically speaking) choose ~X, otherwise he would not be able to choose X freely! {It boggles the mind why Molinists would undermine their own hard-fought distinctions between would-counterfactuals and might-counterfactuals by employing such novel attempts to move toward certain deterministic tendencies.}

This all reminds me of certain movements within Romanism. At one time (before 1994 and certainly 1965) it meant something to be a Romanist. Now one thinks he can deny Trent and still be Romanist.

Happy Christmas!

Ron


Counter since: 9/6/2006

Gospel, Blessings and Obedience

There has been a debate raging for quite a while in the Reformed tradition regarding obedience and the gospel. In my estimation the terms are ill-defined, which might explain why the debate is not progressing very well. It might be helpful to make some initial observations regarding points of agreement that are unfortunately not often assumed by the opposing "camps" let alone articulated by them. I believe Escondido holds one view and it's hard to say who all holds the other. No institution does in my estimation. Both views are extreme (but in a sense noble); yet both contain truth.

1. The gospel as it is narrowly defined in 1 Corinthians 15 does not address obedience. The gospel in that context is an historical fact only. Jesus died for our sins, was buried and raised from the dead. Whereas the gospel that Paul is jealous to guard in Galatians has to do not with Christ’s work but rather the appropriation of that work: it is appropriated by grace through faith alone apart from ceremonial law-works. In neither of those two cases does the gospel address obedience. Both sides of the issue should agree.

2. Now leaving aside for a moment any discussion regarding (a) elect infants dying in infancy, (b) other elect persons incapable of being outwardly called by the word, and (c) infants God regenerates in infancy – both sides should also agree that adults who come to faith are justified upon appropriating Christ’s perfect obedience and satisfaction through the evangelical grace of faith alone, which is accompanied by the evangelical grace of repentance unto life, also a necessary condition for pardon. (WCF 15.3)

3. Both sides also agree that faith without works is dead.

4. With respect to the question of whether justifying faith is an obedient response to the gospel call - it should first be observed that a sinner who tries to obey the command to flee the wrath to come and turn to Christ does so either with a regenerate heart or out of enlightened self-interest. When the latter occurs, obviously no justifying faith is present, obedient or otherwise. Accordingly, what the discussion is about is whether faith from a regenerate heart is obedient. Both sides should agree here too.

5. The question that remains is whether repentance and faith are acts of obedience. Before finding an answer, I think there is at least one more point of agreement between the sides that should be mentioned. As committed Calvinists, both sides agree that God alone effects faith and repentance in the application of redemption.

Getting to the nub of the matter:

In one sense, if God alone effects justifying faith in dead sinners through the gifts of faith and repentance, then it is somewhat misleading to refer the such implanted graces as obedience. Consider the case of the sinner broken before God who all of a sudden is converted by the invading work of the Holy Spirit. Would we say that such a one who was burdened and heavy laden with his sin and finally found rest in Christ was being obedient, especially if conversion was wrought without even a whisper of a command! What would one be obeying in such a scenario? They would be fleeing into the arms of a loving Savior out of pure desire and without any command. That is why it's hard for me to believe that anyone who did not have a personal axe to grind would insist that we must always consider justifying faith obedient. Certainly Scripture will support the distinction between the mental "acts" of resting upon and receiving Christ, and the physical acts that proceed from such faith, such as feeding the poor, comforting the sick, loving our wives, serving in our churches, etc. Remember James' epistle?

Yet on the other hand, given that the grace of faith can be exercised in direct response to a command to repent and believe, then of course there is an appropriateness in referring to justifying faith as obedient in such cases, simply because it is a response to a command. Imagine another case - this time a person who was a hardened criminal and not burdened with his sin. Then imagine God quickening such a one in his tracks after his hearing the call to repent and believe. In such a case, it is most fitting to describe such a response as obedient to the command (while not forgetting that God granted the obedience).

The error that one is trying to guard against will often dictate the position he defends. If one is jealous to guard against the notion of merit, then of course he will recoil over the term obedient faith (in the realm of justification). If one wishes to fight against antinomianism, then he might prefer to speak in terms of the gospel's demands and use terms like obedient faith. However, we must be willing to notice that people come to Jesus in different ways - some by heeding God's command and others in utter shame. (Paul Helm touches upon this point in The Begginings (Word & Spirit in Conversion.)

Escondido certainly has the backing of the Confession in that the Confession distinguishes between faith and the acts that proceed from faith: “By this faith, a Christian believes… and acts differently upon that which each particular passage thereof contains; yielding obedience to the commands, etc. But the principle acts of saving faith are accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ alone…” WCF 14.2

So yes, by the faith that justifies sinners, men do act and obey, but the principle acts of justifying faith are accepting, receiving and resting, which I believe Escondido wishes to distinguish from obedience. We should have no problem with that distinction; it’s a good one.

Let's take another conversion scenario that clearly bolsters Escondido's position. In those cases in which God regenerates infants, those infants are not merely regenerated without also sharing in all the benefits of Christ, including justification. Accordingly, lest justification need not be accompanied by faith, we must conclude that the seed of faith that is implanted in those regenerate infants is justifying faith. Indeed, that faith must (and will) be exercised during years of discretion, but nonetheless justifying faith is present. In all fairness, Escondido’s paradigm fits those situations much better, for how does a baby obey in conversion?! Again, there is a place for referring to obedience to the gospel call upon men’s lives in the realm of conversion (and even more so in the work of progressive sanctification), but it would be a monstrosity to suggest that a woman converted through the shame of adultery and an infant converted in the mother's womb are obeying when God grants them rest.

Another related item - Covenant Blessings and Obedience:

Mike Horton [MH] wrote “Law And Gospel,” an article that appeared in the October, 2006 issue of Tabletalk. In that article he wrote:

“The new covenant, like the promise to Adam after the fall, renewed in the
covenants with Abraham and David, is not like the Sinai covenant. The blessings of the new covenant do not depend on our obedience, but on God’s grace: He will put His Law within us, so that it will not only be an external command that condemns us but an inward longing of our heart; He will be our God and we will be His people – yet another one-sided promise on God’s part. Instead of always giving imperatives (like ‘Know the Lord'), in the new covenant people will know the Lord because He has revealed Himself as their Savior.”

I’d like to take a look at one part only within the larger context of what MH wrote. “The blessings of the new covenant do not depend on our obedience, but on God’s grace…”

In order to try to understand MH's meaning, we should be quick to acknowledge what he clearly affirms and in doing so not let anything he wrote contradict what must be considered bedrock for him.

MH in practice is not antinomian! He appreciates that faith without works is dead. Accordingly, he is not saying that all blessings of the new covenant can be received without good works being present in the life of the believer. Moreover, being a committed Calvinist he also should appreciate that good works are not the product of libertarian free will but rather a result of God working in his redeemed both to will and do of his good pleasure. Consequently, whatever MH’s point is, it cannot pivot upon the question of whether man needs grace to obey, or whether obedience will be present in those who receive blessings in the new covenant. He clearly affirms both, our need for grace and the resultant obedience that comes by grace. Moreover, certainly MH appreciates through scripturally informed experience that obedience begets blessings, and that this too is a principle that transcends testaments. In other words, MH must appreciate that proverbs living will generally be a means to good things bestowed (blessings if you will).

There are many discontinuities between the old and new covenant, yet notwithstanding there is no break in the principle that sovereign grace effects creaturely obedience, which in turn places us in the path of realized covenant blessings. In fact, the "willing and the doing" that God is pleased to grant is in-and-of-itself a covenant blessing! It is God who works in us both to will and to do. Sure, the blessings are more extraordinary under the newer economy but so will be the obedience! Can God under the newer economy be our God without our walking in his ways and obeying His imperatives? Neither covenant operated under a quid pro quo for our obedience is nothing other than what John Murray called the "reciprocal responses of faith.” Our obedience, which too is a grace, is necessary in order to receive many blessings that the covenant contemplates.

On the other hand, maybe MH means this:

When the apostle says in Ephesians 1:3 that we have been blessed with every spiritual blessings in Christ, I am struck afresh by the indicative, that these blessings are ours now - and that we are not dependent upon God's works of future providence in order to gain them. Our task is by grace to appreciate the full blown reality of these blessings and when we do, we too with Paul will praise God for them - even in spite of our circumstances. These blessings include our election unto holiness, the forgiveness of sins, the gift of the Holy Spirit, adoption as sons and the hope of glory. (I am grateful that Pastor Robert Letham so often gave thanks in his pastoral prayer for these blessings.) I would like to think that these are the blessings to which MH is referring that are not dependent upon obedience. The reason I am somewhat reluctant to read him this way is that all those blessings belonged to God’s elect under Moses! Yes, these blessings were theirs in much smaller measure, but nonetheless they were still there and they had nothing to do with obedience. Maybe MH is just comparing the physical blessings under Moses (that came through obedience) with the spiritual blessings under Christ (that are 100% ours without remainder through union with Christ). Maybe he is just not footnoting that today we have physical blessings under Christ (through faithful obedience), just like under Moses they had spiritual blessings (upon conversion). I remain perplexed over what the Escondido crowd is trying to say, but I couldn't be more clear on what Scripture says on these matters.

(In passing... Dr. Letham also kept another balance always before his congregation; although the accent may have fallen on the spiritual blessings we have through union with Christ, he always guarded against any inclination we might have toward Gnostic-dualism, placing before us the physical: incarnation, Supper and Christ's desire to heal the sick (just as "for instances"). We must not forget the physical blessings of the covenant. As he recently reminded me, “God created the heavens and the earth.”)

As for Sinai and the covenant of life:

Under Moses there could not have been an offer of everlasting life through obedience that was anything but disingenuous given that God’s people had past sins, concupiscence and Adam’s guilt imputed to them. That apostate Israel assumed they could have been received as righteous by law-works does not imply that the covenant under Moses was to have been understood as making such an hypothetical / conditional offer. That Paul by grace finally counted his pedigree as loss and wanted to be found in Christ for his righteousness does not suggest the terms of the covenant under Moses! In other words, Israel's error should not be read back into the terms of the Mosaic covenant. Accordingly, I must reject any paradigm (for these and other reasons) that would suggest that Sinai was a republication of the Covenant of Life. In addition, the notion that the Covenant of Life held out the prospect of an ontological change that contemplated a glorified state is beyond any good and necessary inference that can be drawn from Scripture alone, making the notion speculative at best. Finally, the notion of personal merit not only goes beyond such speculation, it also confounds the creator-creature distinction and the very terms of the covenant. That any creature under any economy, even the prelapsarian state, could merit anything before his creator is obviously false as I argue here, lest we make merit a vacuous term and imply (unwittingly in Escondido's case) that Adam had the metaphysical ability (autonomy) to act contrary to how he did, a philosophical surd. Unfortunately, not only is Escondido advancing all these sorts of views, they are are trying to pass them off as confessional and even essential to the gospel. In a large respect, their insistence exceeds their error.

A Common Error Among Calvinists - Rationalism At Its Worst

It is indeed true that Jesus died only for the elect and that all for which he died will be saved. Notwithstanding, it is not a matter of logical necessity that the Holy Spirit unites the elect to Christ.

As a five point Calvinist, I would argue that we can know from revelation that Universalism is false and that all who were chosen in Christ were purchased by Christ; and that the Holy Spirit will unite them and them only to Christ. And although it is true that the Triune God works in harmony, it is not a matter of logic that those for whom Christ died will be saved; yet it is true they will be saved.

First off, there is no universal principle that vicarious suffering and payment necessitates payment received. For instance, if I were to suffer and pay for something on behalf of someone I love yet require that the person willfully pick up the purchased possession, a refusal of one to do so would not obstruct justice. It is incumbent upon one to show why it is necessary that God apply redemption given that the reception of a purchase is not universally necessary for injustice not to obtain. (Again, it’s not a question of whether God determined to apply redemption to all the elect but rather whether not doing so would violate logic or justice.) 

It is indeed true that:

“If Jesus' death atoned for everyone's sins, then everyone would go to heaven.” P*

Notwithstanding, the Calvinistic meaning of atonement is the issue of debate and penal substitution does not imply the consequent. In other words, P* is not deducible by solely considering the judicial, vicarious sufferings of Christ as penal substitute. It’s a bit more complex than that, obviously.

Narrowly considered, the nature of the cross does not in and of itself necessitate that redemption must be applied. (Rather, redemption must be applied due to God’s determination, which was not constrained by logic or justice but rather purpose.) As well, although P* is true (according to Scripture), it is not placed within a very interesting polemic because the common argument does not involve an internal critique of the Arminian position and it begs too many crucial salvific questions regarding: divine intent within the Godhead as it pertains to redemption accomplished and applied; the extent of the fall as it pertains to man's will; and the metaphysics of the will with respect to pure contingency and necessity.

The polemic attributed to Owen (I do not say it is Owen's) does not attack Arminianism because it begs crucial questions. For instance, if irresistible grace was not necessary for faith to be implanted, then P* could be false. If God did not desire to work in harmony with respect to election, redemption and application, then that premise could be false. If God does not by grace cause people to persevere in their sanctification (which too was purchased at the cross), then that premise could be false.

In the final analyses: (1) God’s revelation pertaining to the fullness of grace and the unity of the Godhead as it pertains to the divine redemptive intention is what informs us of the truth or falsity of P*. It's not enough simply to assert P*. (2) Given the truth of P* (in light of all revelation), the often alleged logical necessity of the consequent in P* needs to be demonstrated as a part-and-parcel with the concept of penal substitution.

Now let me really put the cookies on the table. If penal substitution alone requires that another be set free, then why the need for existential union with the substitute in order for sinners to be forgiven? Why aren't the elect free from condemnation apart from being baptized into Christ - i.e. while outside Christ, if substitution alone requires justification? Accordingly, Owenites must at least argue that substitution logically requires that God regenerate sinners, a tall order to prove indeed from the doctrine of substitution.

I can't die for a serial killer and justice be served. In the like manner, substitution alone is not enough for redemption otherwise I would have been set free while unconverted, a clear violation of Ephesians 2. Regarding the serial killer example I would somehow have to be united to the killer (or rather he to me) in perfect union if we are to glean anything from Scripture in this regard. No doubt, the Trinity's harmonious intention as revealed in Scripture results in the gracious particular application of redemption. Moreover, for the intention of the substitution not to become effectual is of course impossible because limited atonement is biblical but that's the issue of debate and, therefore, may not be assumed in the definition of substitutionary atonement! We must deal with Arminians with intellectual honestly. What must be grasped is that the substitutionary death of Christ and particular redemption are not the same thing! The latter has to do with intention or design of the substitionary death and how it relates to redemption-applied i.e. with a view toward efficacy and application, which being the issue of debate may not be infused into the definition of substitution.

Lastly, that the Holy Spirit converts all that Jesus died for speaks to the harmonious plan of redemption as revealed in Scripture but says nothing about some supposed double jeopardy that would have occurred had Christ died for men who remained unconverted men. Double jeopardy occurs when the same man pays twice for the same sin and it would occur if one in existential union with Christ went to hell. One cannot pay for his sins once the sacrifice for his sins is his made his own or appropriated, which occurs upon union and not at the time of propitiation! Accordingly, baptism into Christ's work is what makes Christ's sacrifice the sinner's sacrifice. Consequently, it's only upon existential union with Christ that there is no condemnation. And it is only upon union that double jeopardy could come into view.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

To Whom Did Mary Give Birth & Who Died Upon The Cross?

I won’t bother to get into the historical debate that surrounds these two topics but a word or two will be offered as “food for thought” regarding Mary giving birth to God the Son and a divine person dying upon the cross.

Did Mary give birth to a divine person, or just a human nature? If birth implies the origin of someone new, then only humanity came forth in the virgin birth since the person born of the virgin always existed. However, Mary carried a person (and not just an embodied nature) in her womb, and after her water broke, she then labored to bring forth the person she had carried. In common parlance we call that giving birth. Since a divine person was born, we must let that reality inform our understanding of birth (rather then let our understanding of birth redefine what occurred in that manger in Bethlehem). Birth need not precede the origin of a new person, precisely because the eternal Son of God, a person, was born of a virgin. It's really quite easy when we start with Scripture. Question 37 of the Westminster Shorter Catechism puts it this way, or rather it simply assumes the point when making another:

“How did Christ, being the Son of God, become man? Answer: Christ the Son of God
became man, by taking to himself a true body, and a reasonable soul, being
conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the virgin Mary, of her
substance, and born of her, yet without sin.” (emphasis mine)

Who was born of of the virgin Mary is the question we should be asking, not what was born. Sure, Jesus became man by taking to himself body and soul but it was Christ who was born of Mary. Accordingly, Mary giving birth to her Savior-son is not ground for Protestant objection. Aside from that, no unbiblical Marian dogma can be rationally inferred from such teaching.

Now for the 2nd condundrum. Did God the Son die on the cross, or just his humanity? A divine person took upon a human body and soul in the incarnation. That body is now glorified but before that, it lay in the grave – dead, awaiting resurrection life. Accordingly, a divine person's body lay in the grave. The body died in the death of a person, which is what happens when any person dies. Yet does the soul ever die, whether divine or human? We are not annihilationists after all. Are things getting a bit clearer? What's the problem that a divine person died? When we die our bodies will lie in the grave but the soul will remain operative in the intermediate state. So then, how does the death of the Second Person impinge upon the doctrine of the Trinity? Was the death of the body sufficient to do away with Jesus’ sovereign rule over the universe anymore than his being born of a woman? Is death even sufficient to stop the Rich Man (from Luke 16) from trying to correct God? One would have to ask how the Lord managed prior to the incarnation if we may not say that the Second Person of the Trinity, at least in some sense, died upon the cross and his body lay in the grave.

The same person who was born, died - and is now risen and ascended to God's right hand.

Happy Easter!

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Truth, Delivery and Imperfect Ministers

"Have I now become your enemy by telling you the truth?" Saint Paul

Imagine a man caught in the act of adultery by his wife and then responding more severely to the manner in which she reacted to his infidelity than to his own guilt. Even if the wife’s knee-jerk reaction were not to have taken into account her own sinfulness - is there a place for a husband to turn the tables on his wife without first dealing with the wretchedness of his own premeditated behavior? If the husband were to deal with the plank in his own eye, wouldn’t any perceived speck in his wife’s eye disappear, at least from his sight? Now imagine people “caught” in sin through the ordained preaching of the word and then becoming more disturbed, even outraged, by the manner in which the pastor delivered the message than their personal guilt before God. It seems to me that what is at work in both such cases is an avoidance of truth through a conveniently cultivated seared conscience. When feeling good about oneself (or at least the desire not to feel bad about oneself) takes precedence over a longing to be sanctified, there can be little chance of experiencing true contrition, the sine qua non of God-sent repentance. I have found that all too often mortification through the gospel-means of heart-felt, Spirit-wrought remorse is replaced by focusing on perceived imperfections in the messenger. One must question whether the evangelical graces of repentance, spiritual cleansing and biblical restoration can be present in such cases.

When subjective self-esteem becomes more important than developing objective Christian character, the crucified life becomes purely theoretical, an abstraction if you will. After all, wouldn’t one with a conscience that was laid bare before God be exceedingly more consumed with dealing truthfully and biblically with his own objective guilt than making an issue of any perceived flaw in the messenger’s bedside manner? Should not our first and greatest desire be to deal with our own sin before contemplating the imperfect instrument God is so often pleased to use to point it out? Indeed, would the manner in which the message was delivered be of any consequence whatsoever if we were in agreement with God and saw ourselves as we truly are, guilty before him? Not to belabor the point, but if the judge in the courtroom were even rude in the manner in which he interrogated a serial rapist, would we say the rapist "deserved" better? And assuming he did in some horizontal sense (i.e. creature to creature), would it not be true that if he were truly contrite he would not even notice - let alone complain about (!), the civility of the judge’s address? Of course not! If the guilty party were even in close proximity to thinking rightly about his sin, which is to say if he were dealing in reality, would he even notice any harshness at all, and if he did, would he not receive it as a divinely appointed, providential tempering of the justice deserved? If there were God-sent sorrow, would there even be any chance that the guilty party would become the messenger’s accuser? Sadly, in the church today this sort of thing has become all too common. When the Christian cloaks his guilt in the face of correction, the concealment is usually accompanied by the guilty party going on the offensive against God’s anointed; all in an effort try to extricate one’s own shame.

As David Wells rightly observes:

“To feel embarrassed because we were caught… deceiving, or (shamelessly)
self-promoting is an entirely good and healthy emotion! To argue, then, that we
need to be liberated from these uncomfortable feelings, that the ultimate
liberation is to become entirely shameless, is to sever our connection with the
moral law entirely.”

Unfortunately, all too often Christians are more concerned – even consumed, with ridding themselves - apart from any semblance of gospel formulation - of feeling shame. The objective reality of guilt is something that Christians are often pleased to live with as long as they don’t feel soiled. When shame is due to being found out by others, as opposed to agreeing with God’s objective verdict with a contrite heart, the cause of shame in the mind of the sinner is indexed to the messenger rather than to the holy demands of the Law-Giver. When one feels embarrassed and cloaks his guilt, the simple and obviously less painful solution becomes “kill the messenger!” The goal is to rid oneself from feeling bad. Contrition, something that is too often wrongly perceived as more Catholic than Protestant, is missing - otherwise the messenger would not be in danger!

I am aware of a pastor who (merely) stopped congregational singing in order to admonish the saints to sing out more loudly unto the Lord, as they were to have been engaged in the worship of the triune God. Yet sadly, there were some within the congregation who took great umbrage with the pastoral admonishment. Why was that? For those who were singing out as they ought, the correction obviously did not apply to them (other than being organically part of the whole congregation). However, for those who were not singing out, the correction was indeed appropriate. (I suppose if you throw a rock at a pack of dogs, the one who yelps the loudest is the one who gets hit most squarely.) Any number of examples could be cited. The general point is shouldn’t the guilty party be more concerned with receiving correction (and in this casing repenting of apathetic worship) than with the manner in which the pastor discharges correction? If a minister of God’s word dares to dare to speak the unvarnished truth, he better sugar-coat it and make sure to put the accent on his own need for grace. For a minister to reprove, rebuke or exhort without ensuring both in word and demeanor an acute understanding that he is the chief sinner, the one standing in need of admonishment might very well conjure up vain images (and assert them as dogma) of how far short the messenger falls from Jesus’ manner of conduct. Offense taken ends up being equated with an offense given, a monstrosity indeed. However, the ultimate deception results when the tables get turned, wherein the dismissal of guilt is exchanged for an attack on the messenger.

May God be pleased to protect his ministers and not allow them to cave into the pressures that would keep them from that part of their job description that requires them to be ready in season and out of season.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Good Works in Christ, Imitation or Transformation?

Mark Garcia’s book Life in Christ has afforded me occasion to reflect more upon “union with Christ” in particular with respect to good works.

Scripture is clear that we are to be imitators of Paul (as he is of Christ), and of God. (1 Corinthians 11:1; Ephesians 5:1) Yet for the believer it is not only true that we are to imitate Christ - we are indeed destined to do so. Moreover, not only is our imitation of Christ unavoidable (Ephesians 2:10) - it is no mere imitation but rather an actual fellowship in Christ’s suffering granted to all believers virtue of their spiritual union with Christ. As Mike Horton rightly noted (over ten years ago in his timely book “In The Face Of God”), “Christ’s cross was more than God’s method of saving us; it is our own cross, our own death, burial, and resurrection. We are united to Christ… Not only are we identified with his victory but are also destined to share in the ‘fellowship of his suffering.’”

We have an inheritance that is unshakable, which in a real sense serves as an impetus in the believer’s life toward the faithful reception of what the promise of final adoption contemplates. It is our unalterable union with Christ that not only ensures the eschatological reality that awaits all believers - it also defines the very path by which we must enter into that glory. That foreordained path is none other than Christ’s path of faith-wrought works and suffering. Just as we have been foreordained unto good works (Ephesians 2:10), we have also been predestined to become conformed to the image of Christ. (Romans 8:29) However, being an imitator and becoming like must be distinguished but can never be separated in the life of the believer. For one thing, the former can be the product of hypocrisy whereas the latter is unique to the believer and in one sense the very telos of our salvation. The believer’s obedience, which will be evidenced in this life and openly acknowledged on the last day in all who love the Lord, is not merely an imitation of Christ’s obedience but rather a divinely appointed fruit of being baptized into the once suffering - now glorified - Savior of men. It is part of our salvation and as such should be embraced through faith and certainly not avoided (not that it can be). Moreover, just as the believer’s alien righteousness is more near than far (to paraphrase Richard Gaffin), our obedience through suffering is granted within the orbit of a reality of intimate union with Christ’s "historical-experience", as opposed to being experienced in the context of mere imitation through vastly different circumstances that have little or nothing to do with the righteousness of Christ's gospel.

As we received Christ, so too are we to walk in him, and so we shall. We did not find Christ but rather he us. So too will our trials come in Christ, when we least expect them. We need not seek them out, let alone work for them. Our task, as we try to live peaceable lives in Christ, is to receive such trials and in turn respond in the strength and power of the Holy Spirit in a manner well pleasing to the Father through Christ.

To be saved from our sin is not only to follow Christ’s example by walking in his steps (1 Peter 2:21), it also entails a true participation in Christ’s sufferings to the end that we might be “overjoyed when his glory is revealed.” (1 Peter 4:13) From the believer’s vantage point we imitate Christ by grace because he first loved us. But we have another perspective that we do well to reckon as fact, especially if we are to think Christ’s thoughts after him as we endeavor to imitate him as we ought: All things are divinely appointed and working together in order to conform believers not into mere imitators of Christ but into the very image of him in whom they are united so that he might be the firstborn of many brethren who share not only in his suffering but through that union-suffering, his glory. This suffering, which to our shame we too often so desperately try to avoid, is no less a gift than the faith through which our God-appointed suffering is to be interpreted. (Philippians 1:29) Being a gift, it is not something to be shunned but rather accepted in its proper season - if we are to desire and experience a more intimate fellowship with Christ.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006