Conceptual Necessity Not Enough!

Although Christianity as a posited conceptual scheme can offer a justification for intelligible experience, apart from Scriptural revelation one cannot justify that Christianity as a conceptual scheme reflects the truth of how things are or must be. As Michael Butler has succinctly stated, "Conceptual necessity does not guarantee ontological necessity..." (p. 88 of Festschrift For Greg Bahnsen), And "...the necessity of a conceptual scheme cannot guarantee anything about the way the world must be... This God is... a speaking God who reveals truths to us about Himself and the world... On the Basis of His revelation, therefore, which is itself the necessary precondition of experience, we can know truths about the world and God." (p. 123 Festschrift...)

It is possible for man unaided by Scripture to construct a sound transcendental argument for God's existence by the use of general revelation alone, simply on the basis of a conceptual necessity that would "make sense" of experience. Although man can construct a sound argument (i.e. an argument with a valid form and true premises), apart from Scripture it is impossible to justify the truth values of those premises, let alone argumentation in general. Again, "Conceptual necessity does not guarantee ontological necessity...." For "the necessity of a conceptual scheme cannot guarentee anything about the way the world must be..." After all, did Kant save science or simply psychologize it?!

Ron

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The Neccessity of Scripture in Justifying (even) Logic

Since no man has observed every instance of the law of non-contradiction no man can justify an a priori knowledge of the universal, invariant nature of the law of non-contradiction; we need special revelation from the Divine Mind that the law of non-contradictoin applies in all circumstances. Accordingly, if a universal is not revealed by an ominiscient God who knows with certainty the universality of all universals, man - unaided by special revelation - cannot deduce that the law of non-contradiction is indeed a law. The justification of all tools of reason reduce to rational inferences if God has not revealed them to man through special revelation; yet rational inferences are unjustifiable apart from a true doctrine of creation and providence, which too must be grounded in special revelation. Moreover, the law of non-contradiction presupposes truth, which too cannot be justified apart from special revelation. This is not to say that man being made in the image of God does not know the law of non-contradiction a priori. He does (and because of that he can be found guilty of bearing false witness to the truth). Yet notwithstanding, man cannot ground even that essential and basic transcendental apart from special revelation, which today is found in Scripture alone.

Ron

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More on Induction and Knowledge

If knowledge is so broad as to include things believed by inductive inference, then either one can know something on faulty justification (e.g., my clock scenario in the previous blog-entry), or one cannot be 100% certain of the truth of that which is alleged to be "known" by way of induction. In other words, since inductive inference can be based upon rational yet faulty justification, then it follows that one cannot be 100% certain of what he “knows" by induction even if what is believed were true. Accordingly, in common parlance we’d have to distinguish between knowing something “for sure” and knowing something that we’re not 100% sure about. Why not then define "knowledge" as including only that which we can be 100% sure about? Imagine the judge saying: “Do you know that Mr. Smith killed his wife?” “Yes” says Mr. Jones, "I’m nearly 90% certain that it is true!" What is it to “know” something without certainty after all? At what point does one truly “know” anything through induction?

Given inductive-knowledge, either we can know things that are false, or else we can know things that we cannot be 100% certain about. If the latter is true – that we can know things that we cannot be 100% certain about - then we cannot know for certain that which we "know" when that which we "know" comes by way of induction. If that is true, then what does it really mean that we “know” things by way of induction?!

I often hear people say that they appreciate the limitations of induction as it stands in contrast to revelation and deduction, which would suggest that the only difference between philosophers is simply the semantic tagging of words. However, there is better reason to believe that this is not the case and that these people do not grasp the limits of induction. These misguided fellows are quick to argue that one could not even know he is saved apart from induction. They reason thereby that since they can know they are saved that, therefore, induction must be able to yield absolute knowledge. What they acknowledge with one hand they take away with the other! A recent response on this site stated this very sentiment with even a broader brush: “So my point is that if you are going to claim we can't know we know anything through induction, you then have to say the same thing about language and therefore God's Word. And thus knowledge is demolished.”

It is remarkable that so many Reformed thinkers are willing to redefine knowledge so as to include inductive inference in order that they can “know” more things, such as that they are saved! If it is true that induction cannot yield absolute certainty and if it, also, true (as some would have us believe) that we come to embrace God’s word through induction, then we must concede that we cannot know with absolute certainty the truth of the gospel! Yet we can know with 100% certainty the truth of the gospel. Accordingly, either induction can yield 100% certainty or else understanding God’s word is not based on induction. Thankfully, the latter is true. Induction cannot yield 100% certainty, but it is also false that we know the gospel by way of induction. {To introduce “psychological” certainty is simply to muddy the waters. The question is not whether I have a feeling of certainty, but what degree of warrant I have for my beliefs.} A belief in my existence or that Jesus died for me is not obtained through induction, which is precisely why one can know with infallible certainty he has eternal life.

A word or two about Clarkian axioms might be in order at this time. Axioms in geometry cannot be proved as long as they are not deducible or revealed by God. What can one appeal to after all to justify such an axiom? They’re not known as true-transcendentals for they are only posited in order to maintain a rational conceptual scheme. In other words, they are not revealed to men as ontological necessities but rather assumed by men for conceptual necessity. However, the axiom of God’s revelation can be proved since a sound deductive argument can be constructed based upon God’s say so.

What needs to be appreciated is that an argument is sound given true premises and a valid form, which is available to us in Scripture. Even the following is a sound proof for God's existence:

p1. God exists or nothing exists

p.2 Not nothing exists (something exists)

C. Therefore, God exists.

The above proof is not transcendental in nature because it is not concerned with what must be true in order for some other human experience to be intelligible. Notwithstanding, it does demonstrate that proof is child's play since sound arguments are concerned with truth and form, not persuasion. {Such proofs of mathematical axioms cannot be derived since there can be only an inductive appeal for the truth value of any such axiom.}

What is Clark's axiom – but that God exists! Well, I just proved that axiom with a valid form and true premises. Since Clarkians must affirm the form and the premises of the above argument, then why not the proof? The problem is that most Clarkians do not know what is entailed by a sound argument. Accordingly, they typically reduce themselves to skepticism since they can never justify any ultimate truth claim. Without a justification for their truth claims, their arguments are equally unjustified and arbitrary. Now if more Van Tillians would appreciate that TAG is a type of deductive argument http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2006/03/formal-blunder-on-van-til-by-wtj-no.html and that induction can NEVER prove an absolute truth value, I might sleep better…


Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006





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Induction and Knowledge

Does one know that the President of the United States in the 1980’s had the initials R.R. if he thinks that Roy Rogers was President then?
Let’s talk about time.

1. Justification: Inductive inference that the clock is working based upon history

2. Belief: Believe as true the time the clock indicates, which is 12:00

3. Truth: It is 12:00

Someone might say that since all the criteria for knowledege have been met, one can know it is 12:00 given inductive-knowledge. However, the 3 criteria justify the belief that it is 12:00 even when relying upon a broken clock! Shouldn't this intuitively bother us? Can we "know" things based upon false information? The problem with induction is that inferences that are rational to maintain can always be false. Let me try to make this even more glaring. Let’s say there is another man in the room who has strong reason to believe that the clock is broken. Accordingly, this man will not rely upon the clock. In fact, this man believes that any justification of the time based upon the clock will be unwarranted. The point should be obvious. The man who is most informed about the clock is not able to know the time, whereas the man with less information about the clock would be able to “know” the time if inductive inference allows for knowledge! If anyone is looking for a reductio, then here it is. Given and inductive-knowledge, having less information can be the source of more knowledge, and having more information can cause one to rationally lose the knowledge he once had. Ignorance truly would be bliss! It is one thing to have a justification for a belief and quite another thing to justify the truth value of what is believed. The latter can only come through revelation and deduction.

Now let me sum this up. The first man’s inference about the clock was rational because based upon history the clock had an extremely high probability of working; say 99.9%. The second man had an entirely different rational inference based upon his history with broken clocks. He believed that there was less than 1% chance of the clock working the day after he observed it not working. Both men were making rational inferences based upon their finite perspectives and information. At the very least, given inductive-knowledge, deductive or revelatory knowledge becomes something of a different order and not merely a difference of degree. We need to distinguish the two. I prefer applying the term knowledge to more than inductive inference.

Does anybody really know what time it is? Does anybody really care?

Let’s say that there is one clock in the world that is the standard of time. In other words, let’s assume that it indicates the “true time.” Now let’s say we were to hook up a digital transmitter to the clock that would output the time to a series of data acquisition systems all running in parallel. Would all of the systems record the same time at any exact instance? No. How can we arrive at the true time then? Some might take the median time of all the times recorded and call it the true time. Someone else might take the arithmetic mean, whereas someone else the mode. Let’s say we were to conclude that at a particular instance the true time was 12:00 noon +/.000000000000000000000000001 milliseconds. How many points of time can fit between the variance? Well an infinite number of course. Accordingly, what is the probability of one knowing the true time? Well 1/infinity of course. Well, what is 1/infinity? Well zero of course. Consequently, no matter what the time is, nobody knows it!

Finally, induction always operates under the formal fallacy of asserting the consequent. It would be misleading, however, to say that inductive reasoning is always fallacious. Rather, by repeated tests through asserting the consequent a veracity of belief can be obtained. “If A, then B; B therefore, A” is of course fallacious. However: “If A, then B; B therefore, A would appear to have more veracity...” is of course the basis for science and indeed valid. To say that science cannot yield specific truth has great shock value but all such a statement really reduces to is that induction is not deduction, which is no great discovery - or at least it ought not be. Some have argued that induction can "prove" a truth value of a projection with some true degree of variance. This however is false, since to "prove" the truth value of any variance would require one to first "assert the consequent!" For instance: "If the variance of any projection has been proved by certain means, then by implementing those means to this set of circumstances I prove the truth of the variance. I have implemented those means to this set of circumstances, therefore, I have proved the truth of the variance." The fallacy is obvious. Again, science can only show how things might appear; we may not say that it is "true" that things will appear as they have in the past. And to say that it is true that things "might" appear a certain way, is to say that it is true that they might not. As for variances, all we can say is that it would appear, based upon the past, that variances are rational to maintain when arrived at inductively. However, we cannot even arrive at a truth value for the variance without asserting the consequent. Nonetheless, a variance can have veracity just as that which it surrounds can have veracity.

I’m sympathetic to the idea that we might actually know things through induction. However, I would say that we cannot know that we know things through induction. If we do know things through induction it is because God has granted a necessary, causal relationship to those things that appear to us as necessary. God would also have to grant us some warrant to believe that things must be the way they are. Does He do this? I don’t know nor do I think we can know.

What’s the beauty in all of this? Well, for one thing - I am more certain that Jesus lives than I am that toothpaste will squirt out of the tube in the morning!

Ron

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Adam's First Sin Not A Choice

Obviously Adam needed something additional to sustain him because given the circumstances presented to the soul he fell. Could Adam have defied the eternal decree anymore than Pilate? For Adam not to have fallen he would have needed to possess libertarian free will. Adam certainly possessed liberty, which is simply the ability to act according to one’s intention; he also possessed moral ability, which is the natural propensity or moral nature to act in a manner consistent with what is pleasing to God.

To choose is to act according to one’s intention or strongest inclination at the moment of choice. All choices, being rational, are intended; but intentions are not chosen. If intentions were chosen then each choice of an intention would require a more primitive intention that would also need to be chosen ad infinitum. Consequently, Adam’s action to choose contrary to God’s law was preceded by a sinful intention to act that was not chosen. Adam did not choose this (sinful) intention to act contrary to God’s law; for if he had, then that supposed choice of the first sinful intention would have required an even more primitive sinful intention.

Adam’s first sin was his un-chosen fallen nature, from which a specific intention to act sinfully proceeded. To deny this is to argue that Adam acted sinfully with a propensity and inclination to act uprightly! If Adam acted sinfully when his strongest inclination at the moment of choice was to act uprightly, then he could not be held responsible for his action of sin. It would have been a purely contingent act and, therefore, not one that he intended.

Options were presented to a man who was upright. The action was made in accordance to an intention, as all actions are if they are real choices made in accordance with liberty, the ability to choose as one wants. The choice was sinful. The question is whether a sinful action of choice can proceed from a pure intention. Can a choice to sin proceed from a strongest inclination that is not sinful? Can morally relevant choices be contrary to the strongest inclination at the moment of choice? If not, then the choice to sin must have proceeded from an inclination to choose contrary to God's precepts; and a sinful inclination toward a particular sinful choice can only come from a nature that is already fallen. There’s no mystery here. There are only two possibilities. Either the strongest inclination to act sinfully was a sinful inclination or it wasn’t. If it wasn’t, then the strongest inclination to act uprightly was followed by a sinful action, which would destroy the moral relevancy of the action since it would not have been according to what was intended at the moment of choice. If the strongest inclination was sinful, then the first sin was Adam’s inclination to act sinfully and not the action that followed from the sinful inclination. It’s not any harder than that folks. In sum, Adam was no less a slave to his strongest inclination at the moment of choice than an unconverted man. The issue is not whether Adam was created upright, which he was, but whether Adam possessed a radical freedom of the will that would have enabled him to choose contrary to how he intended. Such freedom, however, would destroy moral accountability for with such "freedom" one could end up intending to praise and end up cursing instead.

Ron

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Theonomy, an Epistemological Matter

Back in March of 2000 Greenville Theological Seminary hosted a conference on the sufficiency of Scripture at which time consideration was given to the subject of Theonomy. The appointed antagonist to the theonomic thesis remarked that the often quipped slogan “either theonomy or autonomy” commits the informal fallacy of a false dichotomy. It was argued that there is another option that is overlooked by theonomists, namely that of general revelation. It was contended that with the passing of the Old Covenant civil magistrates are to govern themselves by the light of nature, or God’s general revelation that is communicated to all men apart from Scripture. I have found this line of reasoning most troublesome on many accounts. At the very least, if general revelation is binding upon civil magistrates then it is because it is God’s law – in which case any possible appeal to general revelation would be theonomic in nature!

Man knows many things through general revelation. He knows God exists and that His wrath abides upon him. Man knows through conscience that it is wrong to murder, just as he knows it is wrong to tell a lie. Consequently, general revelation makes all men culpable before God because through general revelation men have warrant for their true beliefs regarding their sin against the moral law written on their hearts. Notwithstanding, general revelation is as impotent as it is powerful. Although general revelation communicates truth that is known by all men everywhere, leaving them without excuse, it cannot equip or enable men to justify what is known through that revelation. Although all men everywhere know it is wrong to murder, it is impossible to justify that knowledge apart from Scripture. Apart from Scripture man’s formal justification for what he knows reduces to subjectivism and ultimately skepticism. Added to this, civil magistrates are not only to be concerned with a sound justification for their ethical paradigms, they must also concern themselves with a justification to punish certain wrong doings and not others.

Theonomy is concerned with three irreducible questions, which anti-theonomists cannot answer in an epistemologically satisfactory manner:

• Which sins should civil magistrates punish?
• What should those punishments be?
• How does one justify the answers to the first two questions?

If we are left to govern ourselves by general revelation, then civil laws must be ultimately a matter of opinion, yet laws by their very nature are to reflect what ought to be. Moreover, apart from Scripture inductive inference cannot be justified. Therefore, apart from Scripture it cannot be proven that all persons are endowed by nature with the same moral code. Accordingly, it would be tyrannical to impose unjustifiable codes of conduct, let alone sanctions for violations of those codes, without a revelatory authority to appeal to for such impositions.

Finally, if Theonomy ought to be exchanged for general revelation, then the necessary implication is that God’s general revelation has changed over time or else God’s revelation has contradicted itself over time. After all, if general revelation today tells us that rapists are no longer to be put to death, then either general revelation has changed over time or else it contradicted special revelation under Moses! However, if general revelation has not changed over time and God's two forms of revelation have never contradicted themselves, then why discard the Old Testament case laws? In fact, why not rely on the more explicit form of law, which is contained in the only form of revelation to which we may appeal to justify laws in general and ethical laws in particular.

General revelation was never intended to inform mankind of the transgressions that are to fall under the jurisdiction of civil magistrates. Consequently, general revelation under Moses did not inform mankind that convicted rapists should be put to death anymore than it informs mankind today that convicted rapists should live. The role of general revelation has always been complementary to that of Scripture's revelation, in that general revelation is "general" - for it convicts mankind of sin that violates the moral law; whereas special revelation, as contained in Scripture, informs us of the sins that are punishable by civil magistrates and to what degree.

The non-theonomic thesis cannot justify any civil laws in any concrete fashion let alone the sanctions, if any, that are to accompany sins. At the very least, the non-theonomic thesis cannot prove that it is wrong to employ theonomic laws without implying either that God’s revelation has changed over time or that God’s revelation contradicted itself at least for a time. Consequently, the anti-theonomist’s appeal to general revelation at the expense of written revelation contradicts God’s immutability and truthfulness.

Theonomy is most often construed as harsh. However, apart from theonomy, no argument with defensible premises can be levied to combat too harsh of punishments in a fallen world! For instance, how would the anti-theonomist combat a civil magistrate that determined stealing a loaf of bread was a crime worthy of death? The epistemologically conscious theonomist has an answer for too strict of laws in a fallen world; whereas the anti-theonomist is left to appeal to an idiosyncratic sense of justice, which reduces to subjectivism, arbitrariness and knowledge falsely called.

Ron

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Another Kind of Mutual Indwelling

When we are baptized into Christ, we are baptized into his life, death, resurrection and ascension to the Father’s right hand. In Christ, we are robed in God’s righteousness (Philippians 3:9) and accepted in the beloved (Ephesians 1:6). There is, however, a mutual indwelling between the Son of God and those who are adopted in him; for we are not only in Christ but He resides in us. By our being in Him, we are seen as righteous in the Father’s sight, for he sees the righteousness of his only begotten Son, who is our righteousness. With Christ in us, we are enabled to walk in good works, for which we have been ordained (Ephesians 2:10). The mutual indwelling occurs at the same moment. For there is nobody in Christ who is not indwelt by His Spirit, and there is nobody indwelt by Christ’s Spirit who is not, also, in Christ. Being in union with Christ entails a mutual indwelling, which is the grounds for our forgiveness and Christian life.

Ron

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Is Faith "Belief?"

In Chapter 14 of the Westminster Confession of Faith, saving faith is distinguished from believing. Through the grace of faith, the elect are enabled to believe to the saving of their souls (paragraph 14.1). “By this faith, a Christian believes to be true whatsoever is revealed in the word…” (14.2.). The Confession does not teach that by this faith a Christian is enabled to have faith, for that would be unintelligible. Rather, the Confession teaches that by this faith – saving faith – God enables his elect to believe. In other words, by distinguishing faith and belief the Confession teaches that God effects the grace of faith by the Spirit of Christ in the hearts of His elect, whereby those with true faith, when confronted with the propositions of Scripture whereby they are understood, exercise this faith unto “obedience to the commands...” and many other “acts” of faith such as “accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life…” Notwithstanding, these “acts” of faith - even the principle act of faith - are not to be confused with the essence of faith, for as we have shown – by faith one believes, which in its principle act is accepting, receiving and resting upon Christ alone for the whole of salvation. So, when a person is converted he is granted the gift of faith. In time that faith will grow to believe in x,y and z, and not just a, b, and c.

{In the like manner, repentance in the Westminster standards is distinguished from the acts of repentance. "Repentance unto life is an evangelical grace, the doctrine whereof is to be preached by every minister of the Gospel, as well as that of faith in Christ. By it [i.e. By repentance], a sinner, out of the sight and sense not only of the danger, but also of the filthiness and odiousness of his sins, as contrary to the holy nature, and righteous law of God; and upon the apprehension of His mercy in Christ to such as are penitent, so grieves for, and hates his sins, as to turn from them all unto God, purposing and endeavouring to walk with Him in all the ways of His commandments." In other words, by the grace of repentance, men repent. Accordingly, like faith, repentance can also be granted to infants prior to their having the ability to exercise their wills in response to the warnings of God.}

Because faith is distinguished from believing in the Confession’s chapter on saving faith, it is most reasonable to read 11.1 of the same Confession with that in mind. “Those who God effectually calls, He also freely justifies, not by infusing righteousness in to them…nor by imputing faith itself, the act of believing, or any other evangelical obedience to them, as their righteousness…” In other words, it is most reasonable to interpret the Confession as not defining "faith itself" as “the act of believing" (let in contradicts chapter 14!), but rather again distinguishing faith from the act of believing, just as it distinguishes faith from "evangelical obedience." In other words, the Confession teaches that God does not credit either (a) faith, (b) the act of believing, or (c) any other evangelical obedience to the sinner when he is pardoned, accepted and accounted as righteous.

Given such a distinction between faith and belief, it is easy to understand how a regenerate infant who is united to Christ can be justified by grace through faith alone – apart from understanding, believing and willfully embracing gospel propositions. However, if justification is through faith alone and the three “classic” elements of faith are necessary conditions for justification, then infants (and those incapable of being called) cannot be pardoned for their sin! However, if infants can be justified, yet cannot have faith, then justification is by regeneration alone, apart from faith. At the very least, those who wish to maintain both that God may be merciful to infants and that justification is through a cognizant-faith alone have some theological reconciling to do. The simply solution is that those three elements (even if they are in some sense redundant or even tautological) pertain to belief and not to faith narrowly considered in seed form. After all, what about one who comes to Christ and then slips into a coma? He isn't believing in Christ (nor likely assenting, etc. to anything for that matter), but certainly he possesses the irrevocable gift of faith (though not being exercised). We must keep in mind that we are saved through faith so that our salvation might be of grace. Faith is the immediate result of regeneration, even prior to it being exercised by believing in Christ! Again, "by this faith one believes."

Now someone might say, isn't faith "the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen - and isn't 'conviction' the very heart of assenus (or the "emotional element of faith)?" Well, one good question deserves another. Is the essence of "love" laying down one's life for his friends, or is laying down one's life for his friends a demonstration or evidence of love?









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Prayer in Light of Causality and Sufficient Conditions...

If I were to stand before a child and yell in an angry voice the child would most likely cry and become afraid. Given such a state of affairs it could be rationally inferred that I would have caused the non-volitional action and emotion of another. In the like manner, the actions of one person can even cause another person’s will to be inclined to choose contrary to how he would.

It is often said by Calvinists that prayer cannot change things (or cause things to occur) but rather that prayer can only change the person praying, bringing him into submission to what God has decreed. Those who say such things are willing to call prayer a “means” to an end, yet they deny the causal “power” of prayer. They are reluctant, in other words, to say that prayer can actually cause things to occur (or cause things not to occur). Yet these same Calvinists are quick to maintain that had the gunman been wrestled to the ground the innocent person would not have been killed. What distinction are they drawing between "means" and "cause" after all?

Obviously we cannot know with certainty anything that is inferred by inductive inference. Consequently, we cannot know with the highest degree of warrant that one actually caused a child to cry; for such is believed by inference not deduction and certainly not by revelation. How much more the case with prayer given that it is increasingly more difficult to duplicate states of affairs in order to rationally infer seemingly causal relationships between prayer and what might be inferred to be a necessary consequence of prayer! Notwithstanding, the question is not whether we can know that prayer causes some things to occur (or not to occur) but rather whether prayer can indeed change things. In other words, the question is not whether we can know whether prayer actually changed a course of events but rather whether prayer can effect change.

It can be said that one event is caused by another when one event is either logically or temporally prior as well as a sufficient condition for another event. As we’ve seen on a previous entry, sufficient conditions are not always causes since logical conditions (whether sufficient or necessary) are only concerned with states of affairs and not order, whether logical or temporal. With that in mind, is it not true that prayer precedes future events and that it is biblical to maintain that prayer can bring to pass deliverance (Philippians 1:19)?

If we are to maintain that causality is in view whenever a sufficient condition that is introduced into a relevant state of affairs is logically or temporally prior to a consequent of that same sufficient condition and state of affairs, then we must also maintain that God ordains prayer to change the apparent direction of things. Prayer stands in stark contrast to other causes of change since with prayer the immediate effect of the action is upon God not men. Effectual prayer, as a cause, immediately precedes God’s action of acting due to prayer. Effectual prayer does not immediately act upon the person for whom the prayer is offered. Rather, when effectual prayer is offered God, the mediator of prayer, in turn acts upon a state of affairs causing men to act. Therefore, it can be properly maintained that prayer often "moves" the hand of God but always according to God’s will, which precedes and transcends prayer. Prayer changes things indeed. God has entered into time and has seen fit to allow prayer to change the direction things were previously going. God is sometimes pleased not to act unless his action is beseeched.{Maybe we should consider how men are culpable for not praying, since we know that men are often culpable for not physically preventing certain acts.}

Lastly, with respect to normal providence without prayer, we need to be careful not to take God out of the equation. It is God who ultimately causes the reaction to any action. He is the one who gives intelligiblilty to sequence. It seems to me that those who claim that prayer doesn't change things are most likely leaning toward a view of autonomous providence with respect to natural causality. Something to think about.

Ron





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Yeah for Jimmy (and Lisa)

Our newest member of the family made it through the night without soiling his space. Jimmy's faithful master, Lisa, was able to get a good night's sleep for a change, as was I. My love for Jimmy is certainly conditional - but now that he has met one of the "necessary pre-conditions" for my good favor, my love might soon "obtain." There's little grace bestowed in this relationship but Jimmy is somehow meriting his way into my heart, kinda-sorta.

Ron

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