Theonomy, an Epistemological Matter

Back in March of 2000 Greenville Theological Seminary hosted a conference on the sufficiency of Scripture at which time consideration was given to the subject of Theonomy. The appointed antagonist to the theonomic thesis remarked that the often quipped slogan “either theonomy or autonomy” commits the informal fallacy of a false dichotomy. It was argued that there is another option that is overlooked by theonomists, namely that of general revelation. It was contended that with the passing of the Old Covenant civil magistrates are to govern themselves by the light of nature, or God’s general revelation that is communicated to all men apart from Scripture. I have found this line of reasoning most troublesome on many accounts. At the very least, if general revelation is binding upon civil magistrates then it is because it is God’s law – in which case any possible appeal to general revelation would be theonomic in nature!

Man knows many things through general revelation. He knows God exists and that His wrath abides upon him. Man knows through conscience that it is wrong to murder, just as he knows it is wrong to tell a lie. Consequently, general revelation makes all men culpable before God because through general revelation men have warrant for their true beliefs regarding their sin against the moral law written on their hearts. Notwithstanding, general revelation is as impotent as it is powerful. Although general revelation communicates truth that is known by all men everywhere, leaving them without excuse, it cannot equip or enable men to justify what is known through that revelation. Although all men everywhere know it is wrong to murder, it is impossible to justify that knowledge apart from Scripture. Apart from Scripture man’s formal justification for what he knows reduces to subjectivism and ultimately skepticism. Added to this, civil magistrates are not only to be concerned with a sound justification for their ethical paradigms, they must also concern themselves with a justification to punish certain wrong doings and not others.

Theonomy is concerned with three irreducible questions, which anti-theonomists cannot answer in an epistemologically satisfactory manner:

• Which sins should civil magistrates punish?
• What should those punishments be?
• How does one justify the answers to the first two questions?

If we are left to govern ourselves by general revelation, then civil laws must be ultimately a matter of opinion, yet laws by their very nature are to reflect what ought to be. Moreover, apart from Scripture inductive inference cannot be justified. Therefore, apart from Scripture it cannot be proven that all persons are endowed by nature with the same moral code. Accordingly, it would be tyrannical to impose unjustifiable codes of conduct, let alone sanctions for violations of those codes, without a revelatory authority to appeal to for such impositions.

Finally, if Theonomy ought to be exchanged for general revelation, then the necessary implication is that God’s general revelation has changed over time or else God’s revelation has contradicted itself over time. After all, if general revelation today tells us that rapists are no longer to be put to death, then either general revelation has changed over time or else it contradicted special revelation under Moses! However, if general revelation has not changed over time and God's two forms of revelation have never contradicted themselves, then why discard the Old Testament case laws? In fact, why not rely on the more explicit form of law, which is contained in the only form of revelation to which we may appeal to justify laws in general and ethical laws in particular.

General revelation was never intended to inform mankind of the transgressions that are to fall under the jurisdiction of civil magistrates. Consequently, general revelation under Moses did not inform mankind that convicted rapists should be put to death anymore than it informs mankind today that convicted rapists should live. The role of general revelation has always been complementary to that of Scripture's revelation, in that general revelation is "general" - for it convicts mankind of sin that violates the moral law; whereas special revelation, as contained in Scripture, informs us of the sins that are punishable by civil magistrates and to what degree.

The non-theonomic thesis cannot justify any civil laws in any concrete fashion let alone the sanctions, if any, that are to accompany sins. At the very least, the non-theonomic thesis cannot prove that it is wrong to employ theonomic laws without implying either that God’s revelation has changed over time or that God’s revelation contradicted itself at least for a time. Consequently, the anti-theonomist’s appeal to general revelation at the expense of written revelation contradicts God’s immutability and truthfulness.

Theonomy is most often construed as harsh. However, apart from theonomy, no argument with defensible premises can be levied to combat too harsh of punishments in a fallen world! For instance, how would the anti-theonomist combat a civil magistrate that determined stealing a loaf of bread was a crime worthy of death? The epistemologically conscious theonomist has an answer for too strict of laws in a fallen world; whereas the anti-theonomist is left to appeal to an idiosyncratic sense of justice, which reduces to subjectivism, arbitrariness and knowledge falsely called.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006





Hit Counters

Another Kind of Mutual Indwelling

When we are baptized into Christ, we are baptized into his life, death, resurrection and ascension to the Father’s right hand. In Christ, we are robed in God’s righteousness (Philippians 3:9) and accepted in the beloved (Ephesians 1:6). There is, however, a mutual indwelling between the Son of God and those who are adopted in him; for we are not only in Christ but He resides in us. By our being in Him, we are seen as righteous in the Father’s sight, for he sees the righteousness of his only begotten Son, who is our righteousness. With Christ in us, we are enabled to walk in good works, for which we have been ordained (Ephesians 2:10). The mutual indwelling occurs at the same moment. For there is nobody in Christ who is not indwelt by His Spirit, and there is nobody indwelt by Christ’s Spirit who is not, also, in Christ. Being in union with Christ entails a mutual indwelling, which is the grounds for our forgiveness and Christian life.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006




Hit Counters

Is Faith "Belief?"

In Chapter 14 of the Westminster Confession of Faith, saving faith is distinguished from believing. Through the grace of faith, the elect are enabled to believe to the saving of their souls (paragraph 14.1). “By this faith, a Christian believes to be true whatsoever is revealed in the word…” (14.2.). The Confession does not teach that by this faith a Christian is enabled to have faith, for that would be unintelligible. Rather, the Confession teaches that by this faith – saving faith – God enables his elect to believe. In other words, by distinguishing faith and belief the Confession teaches that God effects the grace of faith by the Spirit of Christ in the hearts of His elect, whereby those with true faith, when confronted with the propositions of Scripture whereby they are understood, exercise this faith unto “obedience to the commands...” and many other “acts” of faith such as “accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life…” Notwithstanding, these “acts” of faith - even the principle act of faith - are not to be confused with the essence of faith, for as we have shown – by faith one believes, which in its principle act is accepting, receiving and resting upon Christ alone for the whole of salvation. So, when a person is converted he is granted the gift of faith. In time that faith will grow to believe in x,y and z, and not just a, b, and c.

{In the like manner, repentance in the Westminster standards is distinguished from the acts of repentance. "Repentance unto life is an evangelical grace, the doctrine whereof is to be preached by every minister of the Gospel, as well as that of faith in Christ. By it [i.e. By repentance], a sinner, out of the sight and sense not only of the danger, but also of the filthiness and odiousness of his sins, as contrary to the holy nature, and righteous law of God; and upon the apprehension of His mercy in Christ to such as are penitent, so grieves for, and hates his sins, as to turn from them all unto God, purposing and endeavouring to walk with Him in all the ways of His commandments." In other words, by the grace of repentance, men repent. Accordingly, like faith, repentance can also be granted to infants prior to their having the ability to exercise their wills in response to the warnings of God.}

Because faith is distinguished from believing in the Confession’s chapter on saving faith, it is most reasonable to read 11.1 of the same Confession with that in mind. “Those who God effectually calls, He also freely justifies, not by infusing righteousness in to them…nor by imputing faith itself, the act of believing, or any other evangelical obedience to them, as their righteousness…” In other words, it is most reasonable to interpret the Confession as not defining "faith itself" as “the act of believing" (let in contradicts chapter 14!), but rather again distinguishing faith from the act of believing, just as it distinguishes faith from "evangelical obedience." In other words, the Confession teaches that God does not credit either (a) faith, (b) the act of believing, or (c) any other evangelical obedience to the sinner when he is pardoned, accepted and accounted as righteous.

Given such a distinction between faith and belief, it is easy to understand how a regenerate infant who is united to Christ can be justified by grace through faith alone – apart from understanding, believing and willfully embracing gospel propositions. However, if justification is through faith alone and the three “classic” elements of faith are necessary conditions for justification, then infants (and those incapable of being called) cannot be pardoned for their sin! However, if infants can be justified, yet cannot have faith, then justification is by regeneration alone, apart from faith. At the very least, those who wish to maintain both that God may be merciful to infants and that justification is through a cognizant-faith alone have some theological reconciling to do. The simply solution is that those three elements (even if they are in some sense redundant or even tautological) pertain to belief and not to faith narrowly considered in seed form. After all, what about one who comes to Christ and then slips into a coma? He isn't believing in Christ (nor likely assenting, etc. to anything for that matter), but certainly he possesses the irrevocable gift of faith (though not being exercised). We must keep in mind that we are saved through faith so that our salvation might be of grace. Faith is the immediate result of regeneration, even prior to it being exercised by believing in Christ! Again, "by this faith one believes."

Now someone might say, isn't faith "the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen - and isn't 'conviction' the very heart of assenus (or the "emotional element of faith)?" Well, one good question deserves another. Is the essence of "love" laying down one's life for his friends, or is laying down one's life for his friends a demonstration or evidence of love?









Hit Counters

Prayer in Light of Causality and Sufficient Conditions...

If I were to stand before a child and yell in an angry voice the child would most likely cry and become afraid. Given such a state of affairs it could be rationally inferred that I would have caused the non-volitional action and emotion of another. In the like manner, the actions of one person can even cause another person’s will to be inclined to choose contrary to how he would.

It is often said by Calvinists that prayer cannot change things (or cause things to occur) but rather that prayer can only change the person praying, bringing him into submission to what God has decreed. Those who say such things are willing to call prayer a “means” to an end, yet they deny the causal “power” of prayer. They are reluctant, in other words, to say that prayer can actually cause things to occur (or cause things not to occur). Yet these same Calvinists are quick to maintain that had the gunman been wrestled to the ground the innocent person would not have been killed. What distinction are they drawing between "means" and "cause" after all?

Obviously we cannot know with certainty anything that is inferred by inductive inference. Consequently, we cannot know with the highest degree of warrant that one actually caused a child to cry; for such is believed by inference not deduction and certainly not by revelation. How much more the case with prayer given that it is increasingly more difficult to duplicate states of affairs in order to rationally infer seemingly causal relationships between prayer and what might be inferred to be a necessary consequence of prayer! Notwithstanding, the question is not whether we can know that prayer causes some things to occur (or not to occur) but rather whether prayer can indeed change things. In other words, the question is not whether we can know whether prayer actually changed a course of events but rather whether prayer can effect change.

It can be said that one event is caused by another when one event is either logically or temporally prior as well as a sufficient condition for another event. As we’ve seen on a previous entry, sufficient conditions are not always causes since logical conditions (whether sufficient or necessary) are only concerned with states of affairs and not order, whether logical or temporal. With that in mind, is it not true that prayer precedes future events and that it is biblical to maintain that prayer can bring to pass deliverance (Philippians 1:19)?

If we are to maintain that causality is in view whenever a sufficient condition that is introduced into a relevant state of affairs is logically or temporally prior to a consequent of that same sufficient condition and state of affairs, then we must also maintain that God ordains prayer to change the apparent direction of things. Prayer stands in stark contrast to other causes of change since with prayer the immediate effect of the action is upon God not men. Effectual prayer, as a cause, immediately precedes God’s action of acting due to prayer. Effectual prayer does not immediately act upon the person for whom the prayer is offered. Rather, when effectual prayer is offered God, the mediator of prayer, in turn acts upon a state of affairs causing men to act. Therefore, it can be properly maintained that prayer often "moves" the hand of God but always according to God’s will, which precedes and transcends prayer. Prayer changes things indeed. God has entered into time and has seen fit to allow prayer to change the direction things were previously going. God is sometimes pleased not to act unless his action is beseeched.{Maybe we should consider how men are culpable for not praying, since we know that men are often culpable for not physically preventing certain acts.}

Lastly, with respect to normal providence without prayer, we need to be careful not to take God out of the equation. It is God who ultimately causes the reaction to any action. He is the one who gives intelligiblilty to sequence. It seems to me that those who claim that prayer doesn't change things are most likely leaning toward a view of autonomous providence with respect to natural causality. Something to think about.

Ron





Hit Counters

Yeah for Jimmy (and Lisa)

Our newest member of the family made it through the night without soiling his space. Jimmy's faithful master, Lisa, was able to get a good night's sleep for a change, as was I. My love for Jimmy is certainly conditional - but now that he has met one of the "necessary pre-conditions" for my good favor, my love might soon "obtain." There's little grace bestowed in this relationship but Jimmy is somehow meriting his way into my heart, kinda-sorta.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006





Hit Counters

Insight Brings Great Hope

The Phillies are off to an 0-2 start this year. No worries though - manager Charlie Manuel has profound insights into the situation: "It's hard because how you start is how you start... We could have won, but ended up losing. 0-2 is 0-2..."

Not one contradictory statement! But the "could have won" statement might indicate that Manuel is not Reformed in his theology.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006



Hit Counters

More Confusion over the "Covenant of Grace" and "Conditions and Causes"

In the article here, Michael Horton makes two statements that trouble me:

"God did not make the covenant of Grace with the Elect, but with believers and their children."
"Faithfulness in the Christian life is in no way a condition of justification. Sinners are justified 'apart from works,' without any reference whatsoever to their regeneration or new life."
Regarding the first quote, does Professor Horton appreciate that he has taken exception to Q & A #31 of the Westminster Larger Catechism?

Question 31: With whom was the covenant of grace made?

Answer: The covenant of grace was made with Christ as the second Adam, and in him with all the elect as his seed.
Regarding the second quote, Professor Horton, like so many others in the Reformed tradition, does not allow for a distinction between a cause and a necessary condition. {Sadly, such a lack of appreciation actually caused an unnecessary church split in my own denomination!} In fact he seems to underscore this problem by rightly stating: "But if they are not regenerated and therefore bear fruit, they have not been justified." Professor Horton is correct here in that if one does not bear fruit, then he is not justified. But this is to say (applying modus tollens) that if one is not not-justified (i.e. is justified), then he will not not-bear-fruit (i.e. will bear fruit) - which is to say, fruit is a necessary condition for justification(!) - which is the very thing Dr. Horton denies when he writes: "Faithfulness in the Christian life is in no way a condition of justification." Again, Professor Horton is thinking in causal terms, which must not be confused with terms for condition that contemplate states of affairs and not logical priority.

p1. If no fruit, then no justification is present
p2. ~ no justification is present (i.e. negation of no justification... --> justification is present)
Therefore: ~ no fruit (i.e. negation of no fruit --> fruit is present)

In any true if-then proposition, the consequent is always a necessary condition for the antecedent (and the antecedent is a sufficient condition for the consequent). Notwithstanding, the necessary condition for the antecedent need not be a cause: If faith, then justification; but it can be: If justification, then faith. {In passing we might note that this distinction gets to the heart of why presuppositional apologists must concern themselves with necessary pre-conditions as opposed to mere necessary conditions for intelligible experience.}

Finally, I would think that Professor Horton is lamenting over Protestants who believe that works are a cause, therefore, a pre-condition for justification. If so, then who are these Protestants who believe that good works precede and cause justification? I'm not sure what all the problems are about.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006









Hit Counters

Arminianism in Light of Future Tense Truth Propositions and God's Sole Eternality

Orthodox Christianity has always affirmed God’s sole eternality, exhaustive and eternal foreknowledge, and omnipotence. Accordingly, orthodox Christian doctrine is necessarily Calvinistic in what it implies, yet most Christian traditions do not affirm such implications. In fact, many if not most Christians that affirm orthodox doctrine vehemently deny the implication of such beliefs, that God has determined the future choices of men without any input of anything foreseen.

Something false cannot be known:

If something is known, it must then be true. Which is to say, something false cannot be known. What this means is that one cannot know that 1 + 1 = 3. One may believe it wrongly but it cannot be known. One can know, however, that Dover is the capital of Delaware since it is in fact true that this is the case. Although it is not necessary that one know whether Dover is the capital of Delaware, we can be certain that if one does know the capital of the First State, then he knows it as Dover and not Wilmington.

Obviously not all truths are known by men. Even those truths that are indeed knowable are not always known. A question we might ask is whether all truths are known by God. In particular, has God always known the future choices of men? Even more specifically, did God always know that I would begin to write this blog entry at the time that I did? All orthodox Christians will answer the same, that God has always known the future choices of men. If God has eternal, exhaustive foreknowledge, then God has always known that Ronald W. DiGiacomo would post these thoughts on his blog. Since one cannot know something false, then for God to have always known that I would make this entry must entail that it was always true that I would. The question we must now ask ourselves is: If it was always true that I would write this entry, then could I have chosen not to have written this entry? Which is to ask, was it possible that I would not write this entry given that I would? In order to do justice to this question, we must first turn our attention to the relationship that foreknowledge has to possibility.

Does foreknowledge presuppose necessity of choice?

Foreknowledge itself does not necessitate the occurrence of what is foreknown. Foreknowledge is receptive, not creative or causal. It presupposes but does not cause what will occur. This is easily recognized by the fact that Christians know that Christ will return to earth one day. The Christian’s knowledge of this fact does not ensure the fruition of what the fact contemplates. Although foreknowledge does not necessitate an event or ensure its occurrence, foreknowledge is only possible if the choices that are foreknown are determined and necessary.

Non-Calvinists and Calvinists agree that it is necessary that if God foreknows that Jones will choose X, then Jones will choose X. Only Calvinists believe that foreknown choices will occur by necessity as opposed to freely, which is to say purely contingently. Furthermore, non-Calvinists are quick to point out that it can be fallacious to argue from the premise of God’s foreknowledge of outcomes to the necessity of those outcomes. The fallacy in view is that of transferring the necessity of the inference to the conclusion. That Jones will necessarily choose X is not implied by the premise that necessarily if God foreknows that Jones will choose X, then Jones will choose X. Although it is fallacious to transfer the necessity of the inference to the conclusion, it would be equally fallacious to conclude that it can be established on a lack of deterministic argumentation that God can foreknow purely contingent choices or even that there are any. In other words, the fallacious argument no sooner establishes the validity of the Arminian notion of undetermined contingent choices than it affirms that all choices are necessary. The fallacy only suggests that a relationship of foreknowledge to necessity of choice has not been established by the argument in view. Indeed, when the form of an argument is invalid the conclusion is unreliable but it still may be true. Accordingly, the Calvinist must establish that purely contingent choices are not possible and that necessary choices do not destroy human accountability but are in fact the grounds for it. It is quite valid to argue: Necessarily, if God foreknows that Jones will choose X, then Jones will necessarily choose X; God foreknows that Jones will choose X; therefore, Jones will necessarily choose X. In other words, we may validly argue to the conclusion that Jones’ choices are necessary and not free, if the necessity of Jones’ choices is a necessary condition for God’s foreknowledge of them!

Non-Calvinists wish to maintain two distinct premises: (1) Necessarily, if God knows that X will occur, then X will occur; and (2) it is possible that Jones will not choose X when it is known that he will. The disagreement between schools of thought is over the second premise, not the first. If it is possible that X will not occur when it is known that it will, then it cannot be necessary that X will occur and Calvinism is false. Arminians defend the second premise by way of axiom. They assume that the power of contrary choice (i.e. free will) is a necessary condition for moral accountability: If men are morally accountable, then it is possible for them to choose contrary to how they will.

All that needs to be established to refute the philosophy of free will and vindicate determinism, given that exhaustive foreknowledge is biblical, is that God cannot foreknow a choice that is purely contingent. If Jones will choose X, then Jones will choose X necessarily, must be proved. Which is to argue that if God is to foreknow Jones’ choice, the Jones’ choice must indeed be necessary. If this can be shown, then non-Calvinist Christians should either go all the way and forgo the doctrine of God’s omniscience and become Open Theists or else abandon the notion of free will and become Calvinists. Sadly, many have taken the former option and denied an essential attribute of God, his omniscience. In one respect they have moved toward more consistency but at an enormous price.

What does it mean that something "might not" occur?

In common parlance people often will say that something might or might not happen. Such a statement communicates a lack of certainty with respect the outcome of some future occurrence. Such uncertainty does not imply that the outcome is truly possible or probable; it only implies that from a particular vantage point the outcome is unknowable and, therefore, not yet known to be true. If something is deemed possible, then it is believed that it might or might not occur, which suggests that there is no perceivable constraint that would absolutely prohibit or cause such an action from occurring; what is also implied is that there is no conclusive evidence that the outcome will truly occur. An example might be helpful. If I were to somehow know with infallible assurance that I would not serve my children ice cream after dinner, then it would not just be misleading for me to say that I might, but rather it would be philosophically false.

Can anything be probably true?

If it is truly possible that I will choose X, which is to say that if I truly might or might not choose X, then there must be some probability less than 1 that choosing X will actually occur. However, probability only applies to human uncertainty and, therefore, cannot apply to what is known by God. God’s foreknowledge presupposes that he knows outcomes as not merely possibly true or probably true but as absolutely true. What will occur is without question for God. God is 100% certain of what is true. Accordingly, God cannot know with 100% certainty that X will occur while also “knowing” with 100% certainty that X might not occur; which is to say that God cannot know as true that which is false; which is to say, something true cannot be false; which is to say, that if something will occur, then it is not possible that it not occur; which is to say that which will occur must occur necessarily.

If it is true that Jesus will return to earth one day, then it is false that Jesus might freely choose not to return. It is necessary that he choose to return since God cannot know that he might while knowing full well that he will. The reason that God’s knowledge of future choices presupposes the necessity of those choices is because something that might occur is contradictory to something that will occur and contradictions are not knowable. For if God could know both that a choice might not be made while knowing it will be made, then things that might occur would require a probability equal to that of things that will occur, which would require that might mean will! If it is true that X might not occur then the current state of affairs that entails this truth cannot also entail either contradictory truth that X will or will not occur. What does it mean after all to say that something will happen that might not happen? As we noted, if something is properly deemed possible, then it is believed that it might or might not occur. Are there any possibilities from God’s perspective? Are there any true possibilities after all?

What about the past is necessary and how does that apply to the future?

It was true five hundred years before the crucifixion of our Lord that God knew 700 years before the crucifixion of the Lord that Jesus would be crucified at the hands of morally responsible persons. Consequently, it is not hard to understand that there exist future tense, truth propositions that are past yet refer to something still future. The propositions themselves being true in the past must be necessary since all that is past is now necessary. Accordingly, that which the proposition contemplates must too be necessary. Another example of this might be helpful. Assume that it was true in eternity that on April 25, 2023 I will go to Italy with my wife. Accordingly, the truth that I would go to Italy on that date would be true prior to that date. Being true yesterday that I would go to Italy at a still future date, yesterday’s truth about the future would have to be necessary. If the truth proposition is necessary, then that which the proposition contemplates, namely my choice, is also necessary. It cannot be simultaneously true that I might go to Italy if it is necessary that I will since the truth that I will is past and, therefore, necessary.

Where can eternal, future tense truth propositions be grounded?

At this juncture it has been established that if God has exhaustive foreknowledge, then choices must be necessary. God cannot know a choice that might or might not occur. The question that is now before us is what makes Jones’ future actions factual in eternity. For God to know that Jones will choose X three things must be true. God must believe that Jones will choose X; it must be true that Jones will choose X; and God must have warrant for believing that Jones will choose X. The reason that God believes Jones will choose X is because it is true that Jones will choose X. The reason it is true that Jones will choose X is because God has decided that Jones will choose X. To say that it is true that Jones will choose X because Jones will choose X is to say that something will happen because it will happen. Is this why Jesus will return, because he will return? No, it is now true that he will return later because his return has been predetermined not by fate but by God. What else can be the source of the truth of the proposition that Jones will choose X? Certainly not Jones, since it was true that Jones would choose X prior to Jones’s existence. We can't ground the eternal truth of what Jones will do in the non-eternal person of Jones. In other words, Jones not being around to establish the truth of what he would do cannot, therefore, be the source of such a truth proposition. If such truth exists outside of God and his determination, then something other than God and his decree is eternal and informs God, which is heretical. God would be constrained by something(s) true that proceed from other than his being and his desires. In a word, if such future tense truth propositions such as Jones will choose X are not according to God’s determination, then God must be informed, if he is to foreknow, by some entity other than his own determination. For the Arminian such truths are not determined, so they must exist in and of themselves. They must be ontologically necessary and, therefore, exist externally apart from God's attributes and eternal determination, which undermines the sole eternality of God and, therefore, the uniqueness of the ontological Trinity.

To sum this up, if Jones’ choice of X is free, then it is possible that Jones choose X or not choose X. If it is true that Jones will choose X, then it is not possible that Jones will not choose X. Consequently, if it is true that Jones will choose X, then Jones’ choice of X will not be free. If Jones chooses not X (or X) freely, then it was not true that Jones would choose X, in which case God would not have known Jones’ choice. To refute the Arminian notion of free will all that needs to be established is that if it is true that Jones would choose X, then it must be false that he might not choose X. That’s a piece of cake due to the antithetical semantic relationship between would and might and the necessity of future tense truth propositions that are past yet contemplate choices still future.

Ron

Future blog entries related to this subject:

• A word or two about "free will"
• The notion of free will and how it would destroy moral accountability, not save it...
• Liberty -- the ability to choose as one wants, the very seat of moral accountability...
• The necessity of the divine will...
• The first sin -- not a choice but a divinely appointed fallen nature...
  
  Counter since: 9/6/2006
  
  
  
  
  Hit Counters