Paul Manata: Free Will for Reformed Dummies

“I don't know how many times I have asked candidates for licensure and ordination whether we are free from God's decree, and they have replied ‘No, because we are fallen.’ That is to confuse libertarianism (freedom from God's decree, ability to act without cause) with freedom from sin. In the former case, the fall is entirely irrelevant. Neither before nor after the fall did Adam have freedom in the libertarian sense. But freedom from sin is something different. Adam had that before the fall, but lost it as a result of the fall.” John Frame

Plain and simple, Reformed folk, especially pastors and professors, need to wrap their minds around a Reformed understanding of the workings of the human will and how it relates to God’s decree and moral responsibility. Confusion abounds, or as Paul Manata puts it, there is no “unified message” among Reformed thinkers and many prominent ones are “apparently at odds with each other.” I agree, which is why I am exceedingly well pleased to see that Paul has put his mind and skill to this important matter and provide the Reformed community with a timely primer on free will and moral responsibility.

If one is looking for a polemical defense of Reformed Theology (RT) as it relates to determinism, freedom and moral culpability, Paul’s paper is probably not for you. Paul aims at a different target and hits it in the bullseye. He aims to lay the groundwork for fruitful reflection and discussion while showing that RT is inherently a kind of determinism, and that RT entails harmonious compatibility between determinism, man’s freedom and moral accountability. Paul defends his general thesis by concise appeals to the Westminster Confession of Faith, with reference to its teachings on God’s eternal decree, divine providence and exhaustive omniscience, which includes foreknowledge. Again, Paul is not setting out to defend RT per se as it relates to these matters, but rather define RT as it relates to them, as well as establish some suitable boundaries or fence posts from within intramural discussions can take place. That is not to say that his paper is void of any defense of RT in this regard, but that is not his primary focus. In fact, Paul spends considerable time walking his readers through the thought process of non-Reformed positions.

Paul, playing off John Feinberg’s classifications of necessity, draws a distinction between what he calls “nature determinism” and “act determinism." That man acts according to his nature is not an argument against libertarian freedom, nor is it an adequate defense of a Reformed stripe of determinism. Although Reformed thinkers confuse the two and often strictly argue in accordance with nature determinism, in doing so they beg most crucial questions and in the process look foolish in front of skilled Molinists.This distinction also plays into the erroneous idea that by establishing irresistible grace, libertarian freedom is refuted.

After setting the stage by showing that Reformed theology is clearly a type of determinism, Paul takes up the task of showing that if RT is consistent, then determinism must be compatible with man’s moral accountability and freedom, because RT, following Scripture, affirms both. Paul then waltzes his readers through classical compatiblism and the main objection against it (the "consequence argument", which is that there is no possibility of freedom given determinism). It is alleged that if we are not in control of all determining factors, then we cannot be free – a premise that has been affirmed (and denied) from within opposing camps. The lack of agreement is mostly due to ambiguity within the complaint.

Paul then moves to a discussion on semi-compatiblism, which strongly denies the freedom to do otherwise; it doesn’t posit hypothetical freedom, as do classical compatiblists. The position focuses on necessary conditions for moral accountability, which do not include an ability to choose between alternative possibilities, but do require “control,” which Paul later refines in light of man’s ability to be responsive to reason and innate understanding of moral responsibility.

Paul then takes on libertarian free will and its associated axiom that “ought” implies “can.” Within a deterministic framework we cannot do otherwise, but if “ought” implies “can," then determinism must undermine moral responsibility. He then addresses those libertarians who posit that what is required for moral responsibility is not libertarian freedom but rather that man himself is the ultimate source of his actions. A supporting argument would be that if an agent could be physically prevented from acting in any other way but one (such as with a Frankfurt counter example, or FCE) so as to ensure that no other choice is made, then no other choice could be made. If one can be kept from a contrary choice, then he could not act except but one way - yet he’d be responsible for acting when left to his own deliberation, which suggests that one need not have alternate possibilities in order to be morally responsible. FCEs help show that moral responsibility is not conditioned upon alternate possibilities. This illustrative theory is often used to support the premise that when man is the ultimate source of his action he has met the sufficient condition for moral accountability. Accordingly, it is maintained by "narrow source" incompatibilists that one can be responsible apart from alternate possibilities, if he is the ultimate source of his actions. (FCEs are useful for the determinist too.)Then Paul segues into agent-causality, a position which reduces to man being sovereign not just over his actions but his will too. 

(Digression: I can see how a Calvinist can make fair use of Frankfurt counterexamples but not libertarians. For within Molinism, for instance, "will choose x" does not imply "must choose x", a non-issue for determinists (for will implies must for a determinist). Naturally, a Calvinist would not be establishing ultimate sourcehood by the employment of FCEs, but he could defeat an objection against the ability to choose otherwise as being necessary for moral accountability, but such a defeater presupposes a deterministic metaphysic, which of course would not be persuasive to a Molinist; yet the argument would be valid (even sound) just the same. In other words, given a Molinist's metaphysic, a physical constraint to choose otherwise does not imply a metaphysical constraint to choose otherwise. So, for the Molinist, although the agent would be prevented from choosing other than x, he would still be metaphysically free to choose other than x. FCE's are a powerful tool in the right hands but not in the hands of libertarians, and I've digressed enough.)  

Eventually Paul's paper gets into synchronic tendencies in the Reformed tradition, where Paul is constrained to underscore that although there is liberty within the Reformed tradition to work out models of determinism (as long as they don’t get outside certain Reformed fence posts) there is no place to eradicate determinism from RT, as some seem to want to do. Paul interacts with quotes by contemporary Reformed professors, which demonstrate that confusion does abound over the matter of pure contingency and necessity. Paul interacts with Duns Scotus' view that is apparently being appropriated by some Reformed thinkers. Paul then gets a bit more polemical and employs a foreknowledge argument that incorporates an accidental necessity argument, which simply states that in the past are future tense truth propositions regarding creaturely choices. If it was true yesterday that Alice would choose x, then Alice's future choice of x is as necessary as the past.

Finally, Paul distinguishes between overcoming libertarian objections in the realm of conversion and overcoming them in the realm of most choices, "mundane" ones. That is a distinction that must be maintained, for there has been an argument floated out there at a renowned Reformed seminary that libertarian freedom is refuted by the doctrine of irresistible grace.

Paul’s desire in producing this work is to provoke thoughtful reflection and discussion within the Reformed community. I don't know of a better topic for him to have selected for the main objection to RT is its inherently deterministic doctrine. The confusion that abounds must first be cleared up within the camp if we’re to attract outsiders to RT. If more professors dumb down determinism, or exchange it for something else, then those attracted to the name RT will not be attracted to actual RT.

May God be pleased to grant increase to Paul Manata's most excellent work. 

The Necessity of the Divine Will (by way of a polemic against man's free will)

Arminians are strange birds at times (but maybe so are we Calvinists). They hold to something that has commonly been referred to as libertarian free will (LFW), which is basically the ability to choose between alternatives with equal ease. It’s also been referred to as the power of contrary choice. They argue (or just assert) that without LFW man cannot be morally accountable for his choices. If they argue, it goes something like this. If man is morally accountable, then he can choose contrary to how he will. Man is morally accountable, therefore, he can  choose contrary to how he will. (Principle of Alternative Possibilities - PAP)

Here is a very user-friendly refutation against LFW:

1. Choices are either caused or uncaused.
2. If a choice is uncaused, then it comes from nothing and is, therefore, morally irrelevant.
3. Choices are morally relevant.
4. Therefore, choices are caused (and, therefore, necessary by definition).
5. The causes of choices are chosen or not chosen.
6. If causes of choices are chosen, then an infinite regress of choices and antecedent-causes precede any choice.
7. An infinite regress of causes and choices is impossible, therefore, the causes of choices are not chosen.
8. Choices are causally necessitated by something not chosen. (4 & 7)
9. LFW is false because choices are caused by something other than the agent's choice.

Now where many Calvinists get a bit uncomfortable is when the tables are turned back on them. Does God have LFW? Well, most Calvinists will say no, God does not have LFW. Yet what they give with one hand, they take away with the other. They don’t want to say that God has LFW, but they don’t want to say that God is unable to choose contrary to how he chooses.  

Again using the proof, though with some modification, let’s see if God could have not chosen to create:

1. Choices are either caused or uncaused.
2. If a choice is uncaused, then it comes from nothing and is, therefore, morally irrelevant.
3. Choices are morally relevant.
4. Therefore, choices are caused (and, therefore, necessary by definition).
5. The causes of choices are chosen or not chosen.
6. If causes of choices are chosen, then an infinite regress of choices and antecedent-causes precede any choice.
7. An infinite regress of causes and choices is impossible, therefore, the causes of choices are not chosen.
8. Choices are causally necessitated by something not chosen. (4 & 7)
9. Creation is caused by choice.
10. Creation is a caused by something causally necessitated and not chosen. (8 & 9)
11. Something caused by something that is causally necessitated would itself be equally causally necessitated (and therefore could not be otherwise by definition).
12. Creation is something
13. Creation could not be otherwise. (10 – 12)

Calvinists will sometimes say things like “If creation was necessary, then creation has claim on God.” That was actually said to me several years ago by John Frame. My reply was simply that creation does not have a claim on God but his eternal intentions do. Why should it seem strange that God cannot act contrary to what he wants most to do? After all, if it is actually true that agent A will do X in state of affairs S, then it is also true that agent A must be inclined to X in S in order for X to obtain, lest pure contingency (i.e. something from nothing) obtains. Yet if it is true that A can refrain from X in S, then it is false that A must be inclined to X in S (for the possibility of of refraining from X implies that A need not be inclined to X); yet the truth of X presupposes that A must be inclined to X in S. Therefore, since inclination is necessary for X, then X is caused.

Calvinists can introduce mystery into the mix along with the creator-creature distinction and even paradox if they like, but nothing can change the fact that LFW is a philosophical surd and no amount of mystery, creator-creature distinction, or paradox (whatever that might mean to someone) can undermine what is patently false. The only thing left to say, as Frame said to me, is "Well, maybe God has an unrevealed attribute that is somewhere between pure contingency and necessity, something like LFW but not really LFW." (I paraphrase but that's pretty close to it.)

Finally, in common parlance someone even like myself might say without contradiction something like "I could have chosen differently," but that simply underscores that the choice in view was made according to liberty, a freedom to choose as as one likes, which is nothing akin to the radical "freedom" that LFW contemplates.

John Frame on Michael Horton's "Christless Christianity"

I have thought for quite some time that Westminster Seminary California (WSC) is not only theologically incorrect on many issues, but often historically mistaken as well. WSC is wrong on Natural Law; wrong on Two Kingdom theology; wrong on the Covenant of Works; wrong on Redemptive Historical preaching; wrong on Molinism; wrong on Law-Gospel; wrong on John Frame – yet had they got Frame right, they probably would not be so wrong on so many things. They would probably draw finer distinctions than they do. (NOTE: Natural Law, Two Kingdoms and Covenant of Works are all biblical ideas. WSC simply misunderstands them. Redemptive Historical is an excellent manner of preaching. WSC simply places undo emphasis upon it. Molinism implies heresy. WSC simply has little appreciation for what distinguishes it from Open Theism, let alone the metaphysics implied by libertarian freedom. Law should be distinguished from gospel regarding the way of salvation, but not dichotomized into mutually exclusive messages. In a word, WSC knows enough to be dangerous about many things.)

That WSC is wrong on so many issues wouldn’t be as bad if the seminary didn’t fancy itself as the keeper of the Reformed faith, another thing they’re wrong about.

In any case, in 2009 John Frame reviewed Michael Horton’s book: Christless Christianity: The Alternative Gospel of the American Church. Although I have not read the book and, therefore, cannot comment on truthfulness of the review, I provide the link as information. My only hope is that those young, impressionables out there who have placed their trust (if not also their tuition dollars) in any institution, whether in Moscow, Idaho, Escondido, California or Glenside, Pennsylvania would consider all they are taught with a critical mind.

In summary, Frame contends that Horton’s criticisms of the American church presuppose more than ten major principles that although he says Horton does not maintain with utter consistency, they are necessary for Horton’s case. Not only does Frame observe that Horton does not maintain with consistency his own critical strictures, Frame also asserts that “Horton’s argument depends on ideas that cannot be justified by Scripture, or by the classic Protestant confessions.” In short, “Horton measures the American church with a defective theology” says Frame. Frame concludes that “Christless Christianity is essentially an evaluation of the American church, not from the standpoint of a generic Protestant theology, but from what I must regard as a narrow, factional, even sectarian perspective.”

Below are the unvarnished “ten points” that Frame argues are foundational to Horton’s thesis:

1. Attention to ourselves necessarily detracts from attention to Christ.

2. We should not give attention to the way we communicate the gospel, or to making it relevant to its hearers.

3. God’s sovereignty and human responsibility are a zero-sum game. The idea that man must do something compromises the absolute sovereignty of God.

4. God’s work of salvation is completely objective, external to us, and not at all subjective, internal to us. (Here he backtracks some.)

5. God promises us no earthly blessings, only heavenly ones, and to desire earthly blessings is a “theology of glory,” deserving condemnation.

6. Law and gospel should be utterly separate. There should be no good news in the bad news and no bad news in the good news.

7. Preaching of the gospel must never use biblical characters as moral or spiritual examples. Nor must it address practical ethical issues in the Christian life.

8. A focus on redemption excludes a focus on anything else.

9. In worship and in the general ministry of the church, God gives and does not receive; the congregation receives and does not give.

10. Analysts of the church must compare the Church’s focus on Christ with its focus on other things, rather than considering that many of these other things are in fact applications of Christ’s own person and work.

Libertarianism by any other name...

... is libertarianism. But non-libertarianism by the same name is of course something different. Confusion abounds...

Most libertarians hold to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). Yet a growing number of libertarians are abandoning their libertarian roots and embracing a Frankfurt version of libertarianism, which is no libertarianism at all. These “libertarians” don’t think they need to hold to PAP. These Frankfurt-libertarians hold to Frankfurt Counterexamples (FCE), which are aimed at bringing to naught the view that a moral agent is responsible for an action only if he could have acted contrary. The aim is to bring reconciliation between responsibility and determinism by arguing that responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise. The counterexamples can get quite creative, involving demons and chemicals and all sorts of will-altering stimuli.

With regard to all these scenarios that posit chips in brains and the like (certain FCE's), they can be refuted thusly with respect to their usefulness: Either determinism is true or it isn’t. There is no third option. If determinism is true, then these illustrations of demons, drugs and chips are all moot; for all would be determined and responsibility would become a non-entity for the libertarian incompatibilist. Accordingly, if determinism is true, then these silly scenarios (FCE’s) do not achieve their intended usefulness, which is to show that responsibility need not be accompanied by alternative possibilities. Without responsibility (due to the assumption of determinism), one cannot show that responsibility can be upheld at all, let alone apart from alternative possibilities (AP). In other words, FCE’s don’t save the day by providing an alternative source of responsibility if determinism is indeed true. There simply would be no responsibility to be found (anywhere) in the face of determinism given a commitment to LFW as a necessary condition for responsibility.

A Reformed “grounding objection” refutation:

Now if determinism is false, then of course the demon who would operate the chip could not know whether he actually would need to operate the chip in order to achieve his desired end until after the critical point of choice; there would be no grounding of the truth value of what the agent with the implanted chip would do under any set of circumstances. (Obviously such an argument should not be palatable to Molinists but strangely enough it’s employed by more than just Open Theists and Calvinists.) If the demon wants the agent to choose X, then the only way in which he could ensure that he does choose X is to externally cause him to choose X necessarily, which of course does not protect moral responsibility (in such cases) from a libertarian perspective. If the demon sees that it is very probable that the agent will choose X, then the demon might roll the dice and leave the agent alone in order that he choose X “freely”. Obviously in such cases given the contingent nature of LFW the desired end might not obtain, but the choice would be free and in accordance with libertarianism. Consequently, given libertarian freedom as a necessary condition for moral accountability, AP must therefore always apply in such instances of choosing with moral relevance since the demon, in order to ensure his desired outcome, would always have to preempt the unknowable choice with a short-sharp-shock. Pure contingency defies truth values that can be foreknown, therefore, the only way that AP can be taken away is to eliminate them entirely by external causality (simultaneously undermining libertarian moral accountability). It is impossible to ensure a desired outcome in this hands-off Frankfurter manner given radical free agency.

Desperation even more - will formation:

In a last ditch effort a wannabe libertarian might posit that the foreknowledge required to pull off this mad-scientist routine is bound up in the insights into an agent’s will-forming, which is to say that the a future creaturely choice can be known with certainty due to the predictability of a will that has been formed over time. The problem with such an idea is that will forming theorists don’t explain the sufficient condition(s) that must be met in order for a choice to no longer be purely contingent. Why do certain constraints upon the will that are brought to bear from prior (alleged) libertarian choices have more determining power over future choices, to the point of making those future choices metaphysically necessary (i.e. having no feasible alternative possibility), than other types of constraints? And if there can be no distinction made, then why should we believe that there are any?

An internal critique using Molinistic premises:

Finally, there is a subtle equivocation with these scenarios that utilize FCE’s. By addressing the equivocation we can attack the absurdity of the position more powerfully (on Molinistic terms!), while granting exhaustive omniscience for the demon and also allowing for the pure contingency of choice that libertarian freedom requires. In those cases where the agent chooses without outside chip-influence, he must do so (for the libertarian) from a metaphysical posture that is free. Accordingly, metaphysically speaking he in fact could choose contrary in no less a sense than if he was not wired to an implanted chip. It is only in those cases that he is actually externally prevented from choosing what he would that he could not choose contrary to how he would. What is relevant is that when he chooses freely he does so in a metaphysical sense, which presupposes true alternative possibilities of the metaphysical kind. The impossibility of choosing otherwise is only a logical one, constrained by the fact that it is true that the action will be physically prevented if it would occur: If the agent would choose ~X feely, then he’d be externally caused to choose X necessarily. Yet notwithstanding, when he would choose X freely, he indeed could (metaphysically speaking) choose ~X, otherwise he would not be able to choose X freely! {It boggles the mind why Molinists would undermine their own hard-fought distinctions between would-counterfactuals and might-counterfactuals by employing such novel attempts to move toward certain deterministic tendencies.}

This all reminds me of certain movements within Romanism. At one time (before 1994 and certainly 1965) it meant something to be a Romanist. Now one thinks he can deny Trent and still be Romanist.

Happy Christmas!

Ron


Counter since: 9/6/2006

True-Counterfactuals?

“Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! for if the mighty works, which were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.”

The verse above is often used as a proof-text to defend the philosophical notion of true-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Calvinists, however, should never make such appeals.

First it should be noted that Calvinists do not draw a distinction between possible and feasible worlds. They are the same in number for the Calvinist because creaturely choices, which are always necessary and never free in the libertarian free will sense of the word, do not violate human responsibility. Accordingly, any possible world would have been feasible for God to actualize had he wanted; whereas within Molinism feasible worlds are considered a subset of possible worlds – the former being distinguished from the latter in that within the system of Molinism God could have actualized any feasible world without violating human responsibility yet he could not have actualized any non-feasible possible world (where men are responsible for all their choices) due to the non-cooperative intentions of the alleged free moral agent.

The Calvinist appreciates that repentance is an evangelical grace and not something that can be self-generated through agent-causation even in the presence of miracles. After all, if the reprobate will not believe Moses, then neither will he believe one who is raised from the dead! So – if Jesus was speaking in terms of true-counterfactuals, then at most all that he could have meant was that had he performed the same miracles in Tyre and Sidon, then God would have accompanied those miracles with the grace of repentance. What would then become of the Lord’s rebuke?!

If we are to take Jesus literally by allowing his words to support the existence of true-counterfactuals, then it would be arbitrary not to be equally rigorous in our literal interpretation by allowing the verse to be considered in light of man’s moral inability. Accordingly, we would be constrained to interpret the verse as teaching that had God actualized a world wherein similar miracles had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, then God would have also chosen to effect by his sovereign grace repentance in Tyre and Sidon in that world. But such a literal interpretation would negate the prima facie rebuke Jesus obviously intended. After all, what sort of rebuke is it to say that God would have granted unmerited favor to a group of unworthy sinners had he performed miracles before them that were performed before another group that did not respond to such miracles in repentance and faith?

Jesus’ simple point was that the people of his day were even more hardened than those in Tyre and Sidon. To make this point he must suspend the doctrines of total depravity and effectual calling, but never does he establish a philosophy of true-counterfactuals and human autonomy. To suggest a philosophy of true-counterfactuals can be erected upon such a verse is to open the verse up to many problems, including a denial of sovereign grace, which happens to be consistent with the Molinist’s manipulation of the verse in view.

If there are true-counterfactuals of this sort, this verse certainly does not support such a claim.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Molinism, Dualism & the Nicene Creed

Possible world discussions involve modal claims regarding the way reality might have been. Yet not all possible worlds are feasible worlds. (Thomas Flint coined the terms possible / feasible world, though the ideas preceded him.) In layman terms, a possible world is one that is internally consistent though might include actions individuals would never freely perform. Accordingly, it would not be feasible for God to actualize possible worlds in which moral agents will not freely cooperate to bring about the realities those worlds contemplate. For the Calvinist, possible worlds are identical in number with feasible worlds because within Calvinism, actions of choice are not according to libertarian freedom; therefore, whatever is possible for Jones to do is feasible for God to bring to pass – should God so desire. The reason being, God causes men to cooperate.

Obviously possible worlds are not God, nor his will, yet they are eternal. They are, however, a reflection of his logic, which is why it is not dualistic for there to be such abstract entities. Possible worlds are necessary and find their origin in God’s attribute(s). We can rightly say, therefore, that God’s necessary (or "natural") knowledge requires knowledge of such worlds. This is a far cry from Molinism's use of middle-knowledge, whereby God somehow knows contingently true conditional propositions about creaturely free actions couched in the subjunctive mood; such as, if Jones were in state of affairs y, he would freely choose x. Such an alleged truth cannot come from God’s necessary knowledge since the truth is alleged to be contingently true, making its truth-maker itself, nothing or some mystical entity residing outside of God and his control. Yet God, somehow, eternally acquires the knowledge of how creatures would freely behave in various circumstances. Christian or pagan?

Consider Plantinga: "It seems to me much clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than that the truth of propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way."

Plantinga, as brilliant as he is, since he is not moved by the arbitrariness and inconsistencies of Molinism, would do well to put down the pagan philosophers for a time and pick up some orthodox creeds and confessions. If the unreasonableness of Molinism doesn't constrain men such as Plantinga, maybe a greater appreciation for the heretical implications of the system might. Molinists need to come to terms with the fact that any ungrounded truth implies dualism and, therefore, results in an outright denial of the historic Christian faith, which affirms that "the Father, the Almighty, [is the] maker of heaven and earth, of all that is, seen and unseen, [which would include any contingently true-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (not that there are any)].

Molinism is riddled with many theological and philosophical problems (e.g. ungrounded truth; God being informed by entities outside himself; all the problems pertaining to LFW, etc.) because the system is an avoidance of truth. It was invented in order to get out from under the complete and total sovereignty of God; so we should expect it to reduce to absurdity in obvious ways. Molinists confess pagan ideas that oppose orthodox Christianity.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006