Keith Mathison on Theonomy

Keith Mathison of Ligonier Ministries reviewed David VanDrunen’s Living in Two Kingdoms. In that review Mathison demonstrated his ability to reaon fallaciously by drawing a gross and obvious hasty generalization. Mathison impugns a class of people, theonomists, of having a tendency of being guilty of a practice that is not integral to theonomy, nor a trajectory of theonomy. What's worse, most theonomists, being Reformed, actually confess a doctrine (liberty of conscience) that opposes that which Mathison hastily indexes to theonomists (conscience-binding tendencies).

Mathison writes:

Van Drunen’s emphasis on Christian liberty is also to be appreciated. Many transformationists, particularly of the theonomic stripe, have a tendency to bind Christians’ consciences on a whole host of matters that the Word of God does not clearly address. I remember to this day one of the first debates I heard in a student break room after transferring to Reformed Theological Seminary. Two students, one of whom was strongly influenced by theonomy, were having a lengthy and heated debate over infant feeding practices: demand feeding vs. schedule feeding. The theonomist participant insisted that schedule feeding was the biblical view and required of all Christians. But does the Bible really give us a clear answer to this question? No, but there are some who would love to bind our consciences with a Christian Mishnah.

That one theonomist in the hearing of Mathison defended scheduled feeding for babies is hardly evidence for the erratic assertion that theonomists have a tendency to bind Christians’ consciences, let alone on a whole host of matters. Now, of course, I trust that Mathison might be able to reach back into his experience and find another such dubious example, but is it at all rational (or charitable) to index a tendency to a position that nicely comports with the opposite tendency, in this case liberty of consicence? At the very least, if the conscience-binding theonomist was debating a Muslim, wouldn't it be equally irrational for a Buddhist to attribute such legalism to Trinitarians?

Theonomists are generally Reformed in their theology and without contradiction affirm a robust doctrine of liberty of conscience as found in the Westminster Confession of Faith. Amusingly enough, probably the furthest Christian “stripe” from theonomy is dispensationalism and as far as I know, the greatest emphasis on scheduled feeding that has come forth in the evangelical church was brought to us by the “Growing Kids God’s Way” curriculum created by dispensationalists Gary and Anne Marie Ezzo while attending Grace Community Church, whose pastor is Dr. John MacArthur. Since I have known several dispensationalists that would passionately defend “scheduled feeding” as the biblical position and since we can trace the roots of this idea to a dispensationalist, maybe we should attribute this one theonomist's tendency to his living within a kingdom that is filled with dispensationlists. No, that would not be right. In fact, it's always wrong to arbitrarily pin sinful tendencies on groups of people with whom we have some apparent axe to grind. Shame on you, Keith Mathison.

Mathison also writes:

VanDrunen is right in his rejection of theonomy and in his rejection of the misguided practice of confusing Christianity with civil religion (American or otherwise).

Mathison describes “civil religion” thusly:

There are far too many Christians who are confusing biblical Christianity with civil religion. The Patriot’s Bible is merely one of the more recent and disturbing (if not blasphemous) examples of this kind of confusion. I have been in church services where the American flag surrounded the pulpit, the Pledge of Allegiance rather than the Creed was recited, the National Anthem rather than a Psalm or hymn was sung, and a political platform rather than the Word of God was preached. I love my country, but this kind of thing is a serious problem. I appreciate the insistence of two kingdoms proponents that these things should not be confused.

Mathison is at best uninformed and is not being truthful. Theonomy does not embrace what Mathison calls “civil religion”. Nor does the theonomic thesis lend itself to any tendency of substituting man's opinions for God's; though I can understand such a tendency of substituting man's opinions for God's word springing from a radical 2K theology given its emphasis on the wax nose of natural law.

In the final analyses, Mathison has simply demonstrated himself to be careless if not also uncharitable, but it would be hasty of me to conclude that all non-theonomists are as muddled as Mathison has demonstrated himself to be, at least on this particular matter.

On a somewhat related matter:

For a more thoroughly presuppositional treatment of natural law as it relates to culture, see John Frame’s article. I’d also recommend John Frame’s critique of Van Drunen’s work on natural law.

It remains a mystery to me how this natural law craze can attract mature Christians, but it has always been mysterious to me how a mature believer could favor an outright autonomous approach to apologetics as opposed to the nuclear strength approach that entails a revelational epistemology and presuppositional defense of the faith. I'm convinced that these matters cannot be ones of pure intellect, but rather I find them to have grave spiritual implications.

Radical 2K & Theonomy

In Reformed circles there is a growing infatuation with “natural law” and radical two kingdom (R2K) theology. The soil from which this weed grows is in my estimation Escondido, California, but like the kudzu, it's growing everywhere.

There's a discussion on 2K and civil law on GreenBaggins, which can be found here. My contributions to that discussion are contained below. I have bowed out of the discussion. Dr. Darryl Hart is one of the persons I interact with in the thread. I also interact a fair amount with someone who for all intents and purposes seems to share the typical R2K thinking that is infecting portions of the Reformed church. The comments of those I interact with are indented.

For example, it is worth considering that the 2k position is more consistent with our (biblical) doctrine of justification by faith.

David, would you mind, or anybody for that matter, fleshing that out a bit more. Darryl wrote me something that sounds very similar to that today if I may say.

Ron, Doug’s last couple of entries I think help make a point. On the one hand, you re-produced (#813) what was evidently a response to me in September which rightly lamented the Christian Nation stuff that eminated from Coral Ridge. On the other, you’re getting plaudits from Doug who seems to sound pretty Christian Nation-y in a Coral Ridge-ish sort of way. So it becomes hard to see how the outlook you basically champion doesn’t give rise to that which you also lament. I trust you see the conundrum from a pc-2k point of view.

Zrim,

I’m glad I went back and saw that post of yours on the other thread. I trust I’m to try to address it here rather than there.

I’ll begin with an analogy. If it doesn’t work for you, please let it go. It’s only meant to help clarify a point; I’m not trying to build a case upon it. There are 5-point Calvinists out there that believe witnessing is a waste of time and that when a believer receives Christ he is merely bringing his eternal justification to his consciousness, but I wouldn’t want to impugn TULIP with such silliness and neither would you. People run head strong into error though they begin with true doctrine. In the like manner, the Coral Ridge Christian-nationalism does not represent my position on the civil law as it relates with the rest of Scripture. Frankly, it infuriates me to put it mildly. I don’t see that as a conundrum though, at least not for me. It might be something that must be explained a bit more, but how many times have we Calvinists had to explain why we pray and witness in light of God’s eternal, unchangeable decree? Enough with the analogy.

I believe these are compatible theologies, (a) our Kingdom is not of this world and (b) rapists ought to be put to death. Mind you, I’m not defending theonomy here. I’m merely pointing out that upholding the equity of the case law is not at odds with the primacy of the gospel, the mission of the church.

More about me.. In brief, I take great comfort that our kingdom is not of this world. I live in the re-creation, the church, and by God’s grace enjoy with you the inaugurated kingdom that awaits consummation. In that context, in the church that is (and hopefully in our respective homes too!), we see and enjoy God’s display of unity and plurality (i.e. harmony) progressively maturing and reflecting the Trinity and our ultimate Sabbath rest. This realty is fact, not fancy. It needs to be reckoned as fact and seen through the eye of faith, but it is there to behold for all whom God is pleased to illuminate. Naturally then, I am deeply saddened (you have no idea how much so) when Christians think and even try to usher in the kingdom through a concerted effort to restrain evil and reconstruct Washington. I’m saddened along with you that the pure message of the church is at sundry times and in various places at best hidden and at worst exchanged for another, which is not another but no message at all. What is equally sad to me (and I hope for you too) is that these Christians are not enjoying the wonders of the kingdom. As a Christian and elder, that breaks my heart.

Moving on… yes evil is to be restrained and although some evils can be curbed, I suppose, through the Falwell, Robertson and Kennedy types, these sorts of ministries clearly jettison the Christian message in their efforts. Consequently, ministries such as these do more harm than good. Let me repeat that. They do more harm than good! By the nature of the case they mislead, because in a very real sense they are promoting another gospel. My defense of that assertion is that if the church is to preach the gospel, then their message is to be perceived as the gospel; so when it’s not the gospel that is being preached – then naturally they mislead those who would look to them for the gospel message. Make sense?

Wrapping this up… in an effort to make disciples of all nations, we aren’t to lead with the civil law but with the moral law (as a backdrop) and the gospel (as the solution). That doesn’t mean we ought not to vote for candidates that will govern according to biblical principles so that we can live peaceable lives in the Kingdom. Indeed we should, but that’s very secondary and it is certainly not the church’s place to stand behind any candidate or party, as if any candidate or party could represent the Christian church. With all that as absolute bedrock for me, when it comes to the question of what types of laws I think ought to be legislated, my views are clear and need not be rehearsed here. Yet notwithstanding, my convictions on what ought to be the case has little bearing on my day-to-day life as a husband, father, elder, friend, or business man. (It doesn’t even dictate my eschatology, for “ought” does not imply “will”.) The only reason I speak up on these matters (and on matters having to do with apologetics) is not because these are high on my fun / priority list (they’re far from it in fact), but rather it is because I believe that the church is in need of spokespeople who love and embrace the general equity of the civil case laws while also realizing that those doctrinal distinctives pale insignificant to the already-not-yet reality that pertains to the Kingdom from which the gospel of reconciliation and forgiveness is to go forth. The two views are compatible, but unfortunately they are not always regarded as such.

Finally, I don’t believe that Coral Ridge shares my view of the civil case laws. Not in the least. I think they’re arbitrary nationalists that would never dare justify civil code with OT precepts. I do believe that there are many Christians out there that do agree with me on the place for the case laws, but should they choose to lead with reconstruction over gospel transformation I will run for cover just like you. Again, our Kingdom is not of this world and that’s where I live my life (my family, ministry and fellowship). That being said, if someone asks me should a rapist get ten years (or 180 years!) and a chance for parole, I’ll say no. I’ll plead with such a criminal to be saved and labor with him in his cell, but at the end of the day I’ll be the first to call for his execution. Strange – maybe, conundrum – I don’t think so. I believe God’s precepts require death for such a transgression and that settles it for me. I, also, believe such sanctions will deter other would-be rapists. Finally, I believe such a penality is a means to protect other would-be victims. But again, my sole reason is not the good I believe might come from it, though that can be a comfort, rather it is because with all my heart I believe that God’s precepts require that a rapist be put to death, just like his precepts require that we try to win such a one to the Savior before throwing the switch. My brother, I’m tired and not inclined to discuss this too much further, but I wanted to give a more exhaustive answer to what I think is a confusing point for so many Christian brothers (and sisters).

I’ll end with this… I witnessed to this man in prison; with my wife visited and prayed with his wife and children; and I attended his funeral. My love for Mr. Miller was, I believe, consistent with what I believe he deserved. I’m quite certain that serving a 180 year prison sentence was not God’ revealed will.

Grace and peace,

Ron

The fact is that we have to do this work of promoting justice with those who do not recognize special revelation.

Zrim,

My point is that all men are to desire such laws because they reflect the thinking, precepts and wisdom of God. You find a logistical problem at work, but that problem pertains to the implementation of such laws, which is not germane to the question of whether such laws ought to be desired by the Christian and legislated by congress. You’re saying with that particular rejoinder that the laws are no good because they aren’t feasible, whereas I’m arguing that they should be our desire whether they’re feasible or not. It’s not a question of whether we think such ideas can make it into law but whether individuals should desire to be governed by such a standard.

And, again, as I’ve argued in the other thread, this isn’t at all to say that special revelation mayn’t be referenced. But it does seem to me that God has provided sufficient material in general revelation to do this work without having to pull out special revelation.

Your point, to quote you from the other thread, is that general revelation offers enough revelation in order for us to live in a “non-chaotic” world, which I’m afraid misses the point of the theonomist. For one thing, your standard of what is non-chaotic and mine are different, so degree of chaos can never answer the dispute over whether general revelation relieves chaos. In passing I’ll note that there will be chaotic government in hell but won’t there be a general revelation of God? Consequently, general revelation doesn’t relieve chaos so let’s not attribute non-chaos to general revelation. For what it’s worth, what deters chaos is not general revelation but providence. In any case, even if everyone agreed on what defines chaos, it is irrelevant to the question of how things ought to be. It’s not a question of what one thinks can be pulled off, or whether the degree or lack of chaos suits our subjective sense of balance. Rather, it’s a question of what men are to aspire to with respect to God’s precepts. You keep speaking of what is sufficient to meet your subjective view of “good enough”, but the question we’re to be asking is not what our opinion is but rather what is God’s opinion on the matter.

Don’t you think you can get the sort of justice you think is in keeping with godliness by appealing to natural law?

I find the justice in this world quite ungodly, but that’s irrelevant too. Even if all the laws on the books mysteriously reflected the code I have in mind, without an appeal to special revelation they’d be unjustifiable in an ultimate sense and arguably tyrannical by the nature of the case. It would just be one man (or group of men) inflicting subjective opinions upon others without divine permission or justification. Moreover, the Author of the code would not be receiving the homage He deserves in the matter and that should be no small concern for the Christian. Even human authors get footnoted from time to time.

If so, I don’t see how you’ll persuade anybody who isn’t implicitly convinced that rapists should be executed by simply writing it explicitly on the board.

There are many laws on the books that I don’t agree with but I must live under them. That’s because persuasion of every person is not a necessary condition for laws to be implemented. In any case, persuasion is God’s business not mine. My business is to desire laws that are pleasing in God’s sight and to affect my sphere of influence regarding the implementation of such laws. If and when we get such laws on the books – it will be on God’s time table, not ours.

That’s like a Muslim trying to tell me that he thinks thieves should have their right hands sliced off, and when I am unconvinced he pulls out the Koran. Yeah, so?

Correct, you should not be persuaded by such a defense, but that’s because the Koran is not God’s word. But a Muslim is responsible to be persuaded by the word of God. God’s word and not the Koran is a true justification for laws whether people are persuaded or not. If righteous laws are rejected in the face of God’s testimony, then so be it. If the code of which I speak is received into law and only the Christians see the beauty of it, that’s even better. Our task is to desire and influence change. We are not to use as our justification only those things the other person will accept as valid. Because some people suppress the self-attesting God-breathed Word is not a reason to forgo an appeal to it in the civil realm. Are we to forgo absolute logic when dealing with a relativistic skeptic? (I’m a presuppositionalist, not an evidentialist as you can well guess.)

If you were not discussing the civil code but rather the final judgment with a Muslim, would you appeal to the Sermon on the Mount to show the Muslim he has violated the meaning of God’s holy law? If yes, then why not use the Word to refute the idea that thieves ought not to lose their hand for steeling a loaf of bread? However, if you would limit yourself to general revelation, you would be constrained to say that steeling a loaf of bread deserves eternal damnation. In which case, the Muslim can turn to you and say, “Well, since we can’t cast men into hell, we might as well cut their hands off now!” You see Zrim, general revelation is impotent with respect to governing ourselves in a fallen world because general revelation communicates judgment for all transgressions. Ironically to some, theonomy enables us to justify lesser penalties for lesser crimes.

Spiritually, the Bible is concerned for exact justice, and that is what all the OT laws and prophets were about, and Jesus was the fulfillment of all of it.

Jesus said he came not to abolish the law but to fulfill the law. Whatever you want to interpret “fulfill” as meaning, please don’t let the statement contradict itself. It would seem that your interpretation is that Jesus did not come to abolish the law but to abolish the law, which is a contradiction. Fulfill can mean many things, such as give us the fuller meaning of the law; or it could have to do with obeying the law perfectly. It could, also, mean that the law points to Christ. I have my view on the matter but in any case, fulfilling cannot mean abolish for the simple reason that Jesus said he did not come to abolish the law. Moreover, if you wish to take fulfill as abolish, then that would mean he abolished the moral law as well, in which case you prove too much.

Why use a text that is concerned for spiritual exactness for a task that is about civil approximation? Doesn’t pressing the Bible so defined into a civil cause so defined actually do harm to the plight of the Bible? That is, doesn’t it obscure what the Bible is all about?… Again, I affirm what I think is your concern for justice, but I oppose your method since it is a way that obscures the very heart of the gospel.

These laws were on the books for 1500 years before Christ. Did the law during that time “obscure what the Bible [was] all about?” If the equity of the civil code obscures the gospel, then it obscured the gospel under Moses. Accordingly, if you’re right that a theonomic civil code obscures the gospel, then you have a greater desire not to obscure the gospel than God did when he gave the law. That should give you reason to pause I would think. It should tell you that the desire for implementation of such laws cannot be argued away by the primacy of the gospel.

Since your point is a pragmatic one I’ll continue with some pragmatism of my own. What I think is that the gospel as a solution works best against the problem men have, which is accentuated by the moral law, out of which the civil law comes. Moreover, to justify a civil code with God’s word is to remind all men everywhere that there is an ultimate law giver who is the Judge over all. From there we may best show how God is just and the justifier – the one who judges and acquits in Christ.

You think that the law obscures the main message of the Bible, but certainly the main message of the Bible under Moses wasn’t civil law but rather it was God’s works of creation, providence and grace, was it not? Accordingly, this particular reason you raise for not wanting such laws today should by your standard be a sound reason to have not wanted the same laws under Moses. I also hear anti-theonomists argue against the laws in this manner: “So you would have such and such a person put to death…” All that tells me is that the person saying such a thing finds the law too harsh if not obscene, but I don’t see a reason why such a one would not also find the same laws equally obscene under Moses. How do satisfaction, propitiation, expiation and reconciliation turn wisdom into foolishness? In other words, how does the cross make the civil laws given to Israel (over night no less) repulsive to some, or are these laws intrinsically repulsive to some? I pray not. Accordingly, it is never under good regulation to argue against such laws because they appear harsh to our ears.

Jesus’ own hermeneutic here is to say that the Bible is all about him, all about the fulfillment of the law and prophets. To reach back into the law and prophets to do anything but point us to Jesus is to point us away from Jesus.

Ah, but to desire to have ourselves governed by the standards put forth by the King of Kings who is the Word become flesh is to think Christ’s thoughts after him and to yield to his epistemic Lordship. I do well not to desire anything in the realm of civil rule than the standard God desired for those who would follow him.

I know you affirm that Jesus is the fulfillment of all the law and prophets, but it seems to me that your left hand doesn’t realize what the right is doing. There are times when that’s a good thing, but in this instance it’s actually a way to say that you’re getting in the way of your own good confession.

I grasp your opinion on the matter now please receive mine. It would seem to me that you are placing your wisdom with respect to what is good for the gospel above God’s. Your arguments seem to be that the implementation of such laws don’t seem feasible to you, and that they eclipse the main message of Scripture. I hope I dealt with those objections at least in some measure.

I don’t know what more there is to say other than,

Best wishes,

Ron

My main concern about “theonomic” as a label is that people have associated that term with things like re-instituting the dietary laws, which someone like Calvin would never have assented to.

TF,

Real quick – I don’t want to take you away from what you’re doing on this thread. Just one point though… These people that associate dietary laws with theonomy are simply uninformed. Given the magnitude of their misunderstanding, I wouldn’t be too concerned with accepting the label in fear of being thought of as adhering to dietary laws. Theonmists appreciate that the separation from clean and unclean meats (for instance) was symbolic and pointed to the principle to separate from the gentiles, which is a principle that has been abrogated and with it the dietary symbolism. (Lev. 20; Acts 10; Romans 14:17) The NT application is separation from unbelief and compromise (2 Cor. 6) in the realm of spiritual yoking, whether in worship or marriage.

Best,

Ron

When it is pointed out to them that Jesus and the Apostles did not speak out against Roman policies, did not give the church a mandate to bring the OT law to bear on governments, etc… it is called an argument from silence.

Todd,

Both sides argue from silence. Theonomists say that the NT in no way abrogates the principles that are to govern civil life for a godly nation and non-theonomists argue that the NT in no away affirms the precepts for nations that we find in the OT. Neither side has from the NT an explict instruction or good and necessary inference for their position. If you have such evidence for your position, then please produce it.

A word or two about arguments from silence is in order. A Reformed hermeneutic advises that God’s word is binding in precept until he determines otherwise either by explicit instruction or good and necessary inference. Accordingly, I don’t need to look in the NT for an affirmation of the justification that beastiality is sin. It’s never been abrogated so my justification for this assertion is to be found in the OT.

Finally, it’s a bit vague to say that the church was not mandated to bring the OT civil laws to bear upon civil magistrates. I’m not sure what you mean by bringing such instruction to bear, but I do know that the church is to preach the whole counsel of God with a proper balance. If there is a continued validity for the OT civil case laws, then the church is to preach that message in its proper place, yet without majoring on minors.

So you don’t put up another post like the one I just referenced, I hope you will respond with some contraints. When I ask you to produce evidence for good and necessary inference or explicit instruction for abrogation of the relevance of the case laws, I’m expecting something quite different from you than simply your opinion that if Jesus and the apostles wanted such laws to be observed today they would have said so.

For you to get from the observations that you already voiced to the grand conclusion that the civil case laws are not to be observed today in their general equity you will have to assume, just as you have, that Jesus and the apostles have to repeat principles and precepts for them to remain binding, which makes beastiality acceptable and infant baptism unacceptable. Yet such an hermeneutic is unworkable, and not one that you live under with any consistency. At the very least, 2 Timothy 3:16 is pretty broad in its application. It teaches us that all Scripture does not need to be repeated for it to remain profitable. It teaches us that all Scripture…. is profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness. That would include the OT case laws.

From Darryl Hart:

Ron, the NT does talk about the magistrate and it says nothing like what the OT says. Rom 13 is obviously a place to go. If Paul were expecting the magistrate to enforce laws like Israel was called to do, don’t you think he would have said it?

No, I don’t think he needed to address it in Romans 13. That he didn’t doesn’t afford you good and necessary inference, as I’ve argued with Todd. There was already a lot said in the OT and as I also noted to Todd, Paul stated that all Scripture is profitable…Gotta board the plane…

Ron, I’ll say it again, since Paul spent so much time addressing the differences between Jews and Gentiles, and also said that Gentile were not bound by Israelite norms, then his instruction in Rom 13 is hardly a reaffirmation of OT civil laws.

Hi Darryl,

You continue to presuppose that Romans 13 must affirm theonomy in order for theonomy to be a biblical paradigm, but that’s an arbitrary assertion you have yet to defend. We need to be careful in requiring, if not demanding, that God reveal his precepts in a way that satisfies us. I would urge you to consider just a few passages of Scripture that speak to this very point.

Mark 10:17-18: When a rich young ruler called Jesus good, he neither affirmed nor denied that he possessed that quality of person but instead said nobody is good but God. Depending upon one’s pre-commitment it might be inferred that Jesus was not good and, therefore, not God; yet the text neither affirms nor denies either conclusion.

Acts 1:6, 7: When the apostles asked Jesus whether he was at that time going to restore the kingdom to Israel, he neither affirmed nor denied such an intention but instead said that it was not for them to know the times or epochs that the Father has fixed by his own authority. Dispensationalists, given their pre-commitment to a restored national Israel, infer from the answer a confirmation of their theology, that the kingdom will be restored. Notwithstanding, no logical conclusion can be deduced from the text with respect to the restoration Israel’s kingdom.

John 21:20-22: When Peter asked Jesus whether John would be alive at the time of Jesus’ return Jesus told him that if he wanted John to remain until such time it was no business of Peter’s. Jesus then put to Peter his task, which was to follow Jesus. Jesus’ answer did not logically imply that John would remain or not, let alone whether Jesus would even return one day! The answer even caused a rumor among the brethren that John would not die (John 21:23). John in this very epistle (same verse: 23) remarked on the unjustified inference that caused the rumor: “Jesus did not say to him that he would not die, but only, ‘If I want him to remain until I come, what is that to you?’”

There are many more examples but the point should be obvious. We cannot logically deduce that which is not deducible. But more importantly, we may not require that God give us answers in the places we want to find them. That is to put God to the test.

In the final analyses, if we could deduce that Romans 13 demands the repudiation of theonomy, then I would think that a syllogism to that end, comprised of premises that don’t beg crucial questions, could be constructed rather readily from the text. At the end of the day, using Romans 13 to refute theonomy is on par with concluding that (a) Jesus was not a teacher sent from God; (b) Jesus was not good and, therefore, not God; (c) Jesus intended to establish Israel as a political power but failed with the passing of John. It’s not only irrational to make such leaps in reason, it’s reckless.

The destruction of Israel and Jerusalem which Christ foretold and which the apostles witnessed certainly did not lead to revelations of how to re-institute Israel and Jerusalem, as if Constantinople is the capital city in exile.

God is done with Israel as the only nation under God. Now all nations are to receive King Jesus as their sovereign, which is consistent with the Abrahamic covenant and the great commission. The Lord Jesus is not merely head of the church but Lord over the nations; so just as elders are to rule on his behalf according to his word, so are kings. There need not be additional revelation on this matter of the law for all Scripture (and that would include the civil case laws) are profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness.

So I don’t see in your view how you recognize what the confession says that the gospel under the church is administered with more simplicity and less outward glory than in Israel (WCF 7.6).

It’s remarkable to me that you don’t see how I can reconcile the simplicity of the outward administration of the covenant under the gospel dispensation with an objective standard by which rulers should govern. Maybe you might show a logical contradiction between less outward glory in the administration of the covenant of grace and civil laws that reflect the thinking of God.

Best regards,

Ron

Ron (#143), then what is the point of Romans 13:1-7? This is the question you never really seem to address. Your point seems to be, “Whatever it means, it doesn’t mean the magistrate shouldn’t utilize the OT case laws to do his job.”

Zrim,

The passage you cite instructs believers how they are to live in a fallen world and consequently in subjection to fallible leaders.

Maybe you’re right. But it seems to me the plain reading is that the magistrate God appoints is our source for political and legislative arrangements—not the OT case laws.

I don’t know. This seems terribly simplistic to me. Indeed, the magistrate is in place “for political and legislative arrangements” but that only defines whose job it is to make laws, policy etc. The ordination of rulers, however, does not inform us (or them) of the standard by which they should govern, but some standard must be presupposed if they are accountable to God to rule well. If the standard is general revelation, then they could not distinguish which transgressions are worthy of punishment. Are we to believe that God gives the awesome power to execute creatures made in his image without also making available a revelation of which type crimes warrant the death penalty? It’s hard for me to imagine that if you were King of your own nation you would you presume to look outside God’s civil law to determine who should be put to death, but maybe you would. At the very least, if kings were not required to rule according to the case laws, why wouldn’t it be a good desire, pleasing to God, to turn to that alleged obsolete word of wisdom anyway?

The question of by what standard magistrates are to govern is not in view in Romans 13. So neither you nor I may build a case for or against theonomy from Romans 13. Note well, however, that there is nothing in the text that suggests that magistrates are free before God to govern any which way they please. Certainly God has some opinion on which transgressions are to be punished by civil magistrates and what those sanctions should be. The burden of proof would seem to be on you to show that such a detailed provision should be found in the NT, let alone in Romans 13 since the NT tells us that all Scripture including the case laws are profitable for instruction etc.

Thanks,

Ron

My dear Brothers,

I’m going to stop posting on this matter for various reasons. 1) I don’t think I can add anything more to the discussion. 2) Although this matter is somewhat important, it always seems to generate more heat than light. 3) When we focus on any matter with such intensity, we begin to lose perspective on what is most important, God’s glory in the gospel.

Yours in Him,

Ron

Darryl Hart's last post to me:

Ron, I know you’ve pulled out, but I don’t think you caught part of my point. The Jewish Christians knew the OT code for the magistrate. But Paul was the apostle to the Gentiles. And since he had to do a lot of explaining about whether or not circumcision still applied, you’d think he’d supply a little political theology to those new to the covenant. But he did not.

And the Reformed hermeneutic is let the clear passages interpret the less clear. Rom. 13 is fairly clear about what believers may or may not expect from a ruler — a pretty nefarious ruler at that. And since much of what Paul writes to Christians about observing the OT is that it has passed away, I don’t see how the civil polity of Israel is exempt.

But if your point is simply that the magistrate should enforce both tables, then that would fit more with the difference I am arguing for here. At the same time, since you are arguing for theonomy, that seems to bite off a lot more of the OT than the decalogue can chew — so to speak

.
I didn't bother to respond to Darryl Hart on GreenBaggins. Had he said something new, or at least interacted with my objection of his demands of God, maybe I would have. I'll simply say here that it's remarkable to me that Dr. Hart's arguments are based upon things like:

"you’d think" it would have been this way...

"Rom 13 is obviously a place to go."

"If Paul were expecting the magistrate to enforce laws like Israel was called to do, don’t you think he would have said it?"

"...his instruction in Rom 13 is hardly a reaffirmation of OT civil laws..."

God, One or Three Persons, or Both?

A well regarded professor at a prominent Reformed seminary has been quoted as saying this:

“This is one of Van Til’s most original contributions to theology proper. As he said at the beginning of the chapter, to speak of God as one is to speak of God as a person. This fits our ordinary experience, as, for instance, when we pray, we pray to one person. It also fits biblical data that constantly refers to God as a person. By this reminder Van Til avoids two errors. The first is the tendency, found mostly in Western theology, of separating God’s essence, which becomes a remote inaccessible being, from the persons. The other is the neoorthodox error of reducing personality to relationship, rather than regarding it as the foundation of ontological consciousness.”

To pray “Our great God in Heaven – Father, Son and Holy Ghost” is to address one God in three persons. It is consistent with oneness and plurality being equally ultimate in the Godhead. It is not a prayer to three Gods let alone a prayer to individuals stripped from their intra-Trinitarian relationship. Most of all, it is not a prayer to a one person trinity.

God’s revelation of himself was progressive, not instantaneous. To Abraham God revealed himself as God Almighty, and to Moses as I Am. In the fullness of time the Second Person of the Trinity revealed God as Father, Son and Holy Ghost. When we worship God according to God’s full revelation, we worship the Trinity – one God in three persons; not one God in one person. To think of one God as one person is at least to blur if not utterly eclipse the doctrine of "God in three persons." We may not strip the one God from the plurality of persons in the Godhead, nor may the distinct persons of the Trinity be stripped from their intra-Trinitarian relationships, which is an all too common occurrence in the evangelical church. When we know any person of the Trinity aright, we know him in relation to the other two divine persons. For each person of the Trinity is to be worshipped and adored in accordance to his intra-Trinitarian relationship, for the Trinity is to be worship as the undivided Trinity. Accordingly, we worship the Father who chose us in Christ and glorified him. We worship the Christ who was obedient to the Father and glorified him. We worship the Sprit who baptizes us into existential union with Christ. (We do not worship a Holy Spirit, as is so common today, that has so little to do with Christ and his cross.) This is not to say that personality equates to relationship, for there is of course an ontological aspect of personality, but notwithstanding that ontological aspect cannot be understood apart from the ontological relationship. It does not exist without it.

If we worship the one true God at all, we do so with at least some understanding of the unity and diversity of divine persons in the Godhead. And if we worship any particular person of the Trinity at all, we do so with at least some understanding of His relationship to the other divine persons in the Godhead for that is how God is revealed because that his how God is God is three in a different sense than he is one, and one in a different sense than he his three. God is not one in the same sense that he is three.

So, when the WCF 1.1 and 1.2 speak of God as “he” I see no problem interpreting the personal pronoun in light of oneness of “God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost” which is consistent with the doctrine found in the very next paragraph, WCF 1.3, which addresses the three distinct persons in the Godhead. At the very least, we need not allow the standards to contradict themselves by allowing God to be one person in the same sense that he is three persons. So for instance, the triune God who is “God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost” is “infinite in being and perfection,” etc. So again, I disagree with this professor. When we address the Trinity as “You” in our prayers we should not be ignoring the other aspects of God’s revelation; we should as best we can, in our finitude, appreciate that we are addressing the triune God as one. By rejecting the notion that God should be perceived as one person we don't deny that God is personal and relational. In fact, by appreciating that God is three persons and one, we can begin to appreciate that God is the ultimate - personal and relational.

We need not at every moment elaborate upon every aspect of orthodox Trinitarian doctrine, but what we say about the Trinity should be consistent with the rest of what we don’t say that is in accordance with Scripture. (Just like there is no need to always mention human responsibility when speaking about divine providence, yet our doctrine of divine providence should look nothing like that of blind fate.) When we address God has “You” – we should be thinking that we are addressing the one single God who eternally exists as Father Son and Holy Ghost (in three distinct persons). By “You” we should not be thinking that we are addressing the triune God as one person in particular – for the triune God is not one person in particular; nor should we think we are addressing three distinct persons separately. Rather, in our finitude we should be striving to address God as Scripture reveals God – as the one true God that eternally exists in relation as three persons all of Whom are harmoniously working to apply the accomplished redemption to the world. It seems to me that by introducing the concept that the Trinity may be perceived as a person, the person we would end up addressing in such a construct would be a fourth person. It would be much better to simply pray to the first person of the Trinity, through the Son by the Holy Spirit.

In sum, we are not denying the divine essence or distinct persons with such a construct but rather through acknowledging the equal ultimacy that God has revealed about the Godhead, we can find a personal God without thinking of him in terms of one person. To err on the matter of equal ultimacy must always be at the expense of something. To err toward the side of one being, at the expense of persons, is a move toward modalism; whereas to err on the side of persons, at the expense of being, is a move toward tri-theism. By thinking in terms of a one person Godhead is not a solution to the problem, as the professor suggests, but rather is to eclipse God's revelation of being three persons, which is to emphasize being at the expense of persons. In this case, that error would seem to stem from the desire to find a single person with which to relate, yet in doing so undermining the ultimate reality found in the unity of a plurality of persons. And I suspect that the need to define God in that way, as one person, stems from the fundamental error of considering personality the "foundation" for "ontological consciousness" without reference to relationship, a sine qua non for God's ontology! That is not to suggest that any person derives his divinity from another, but by downplaying the intra-Trinitarian relationship in favor of abstracting ontological consciousness from that relationship leaves one seeking elsewhere (outside the Trinity - even to a fourth person) for that which was desired in the first place, a personal and relational God who is love.

Added 6/10/11 Finally, to address one person, we may say "you" (singular). When we address three persons at once, we may say "you" (plural). But what if we wanted to address the three not as plural (i.e. not by saying "you" as shorthand for: you-1, you-2 and you-3), but as an organic one comprised of three? We have no such English word to my knowledge, but maybe context dictates the meaning. Or do southerners have a singular-plural word for "you" - that being, "y'all"?

Infallibility & The Canon

Certainly Romanists should agree that God is at least capable of bringing to pass his eternal plan and purpose without making his volitional creatures infallible. Judas and the Satan serve as prime examples of fallible beings that always did as God has decreed. However, their actions were not morally right but rather terribly wrong; so not to confuse matters we won’t use them as examples of fallible creatures that always did as God determined. How about when Johnny is ordained from the foundation of the world to get 100% on his fifth grade math final, does he do so infallibly? No, but he does so impeccably.

What is it to be infallible after all? For the Romanist it has to do with immunity to error. The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church defines infallibility as 'Inability to err in teaching revealed truth'. With respect to Johnny, if it was impossible for him to err on his test, then would he have earned 100% infallibly? Now in one sense, given that God decreed that Johnny would earn 100% on his test, there is a sense in which it was impossible for him to err. Notwithstanding, such a description is misleading because it makes infallibility a vacuous term; for even Judas and the Satan would be infallible on such terms. (Certainly they have done some things formally right.) Although Johnny’s choices are never metaphysically free, there are certainly “possible worlds” where Johnny fails to earn 100% given the same state of affairs in which he earns 100%. At the moment of choice, God brings to pass a distraction for instance, causing Johnny to shade in the wrong oval on the exam. All this to say, although Johnny is naturally capable of error (i.e. fallible by nature), God brought to pass according to his predetermination Johnny’s perfect score. So to call Johnny infallible would be a misnomer. (Now of course Charles Hodge was wrong when he said that Jesus could have sinned. Not only had God decreed that the Second Person of the Trinity would not sin – more the point, a divine person cannot sin in any possible world. Johnny could err and still be Johnny - so error is compatible with Johnny’s person. Jesus could not have sinned and remained God; so there is no possible world in which he sins. The impossibility goes beyond a matter of decree. It’s an ontological consideration.)

Now then, is there a possible world in which the church does not receive the canon aright? Well, let me rephrase that question. Is there a possible world in which Jesus promises that the church receives the canon and she does not receive it? I would say ABSOLUTELY NOT. Does that make the Romanist position correct? After all, isn’t it true that because Johnny errs in possible worlds, Johnny must be fallible even when God decrees that he act impeccably correct? Yet because Jesus errs in no world, he therefore cannot err and is, therefore, infallible. So what about the church? If there is no world in which she errs on the reception of the canon given the promise to receive the canon, mustn’t the church have been infallible when she received the canon? NO – and here is why. Up until now we’ve only been talking about possible worlds in which one errs or does not err given the same state of affairs. So, when Johnny is merely decreed to get 100% on his test without an accompanying divine promise, there are possible worlds in which he doesn’t earn the grade he ends up getting in this world, corroborating that he is fallible. Yet once a promise is made from God, it is impossible for what the promise contemplates not to come to pass in any possible world wherein the state of affairs includes the divine promise. In a word, there are no possible worlds in which Johnny is promised a grade of 100% by God and does not receive it, lest it is possible for God’s promise not to come to pass. I hope we can see more clearly that infallibility is not a necessary condition for the impossibility of acting incorrectly. If Johnny were promised 100% by God, Johnny does not become infallible in order to earn the mark, but rather fallible-Johnny is preserved from error according to the promise. Given the promise there is no world in which Johnny fails to earn 100%, even in those worlds in which he simply guesses the answers. Maybe a less hypothetical example might be of use. There is a promise from God that all true believers will be glorified. That means there is no possible world in which a justified soul perishes, given the golden chain of redemption. Does that make justified sinners infallible in their perseverance in faith? No – but it certainly demonstrates God’s preservation of his adopted sons in Christ. (Obviously, no sinner is perfect in sanctification and that is not the inference that should be drawn here, or used against this short polemic. The point is that the justified will believe the truth until the end, which can be for one of two reasons - their infallibility or God's infallible preserving of them. Again, to act correctly is not a sufficient condition for infallibility - i.e. infallibility is not necessary for correctness.)

In summary, to say that all men are infallible because they always act according to what God determines would make “infallibility” a vacuous term. Nobody is doing that. A subset of that consideration is that when morally responsible agents get the correct answer, they are not behaving infallibly lest we all have seasons of infallibility. When a divine promise is made, which must come to fruition being a divine promise, infallibility is not a necessary condition for the result to obtain lest sinners justified by grace become infallible in their perseverance.

Proof for the reception of the canon:

Jesus promised to build his church. (Matt. 16:18) Jesus also told his apostles that those who received them received Him. (Matt. 10:40) The implication is that the building project of the Lord was to be founded upon the apostles and prophets with Christ Jesus being the chief cornerstone. (Eph. 2:20) Consequently, the words of the apostles and Christ had to be received without error because Jesus promised to build his church upon them, which is now a matter of history given the passing of the apostles. Therefore, the canon is closed, lest the church has no foundation. The apostolic tradition was both oral and written (II Thess. 2:15) but only the written apostolic tradition has been providentially preserved. Accordingly, Scripture alone is what the church is built upon, which must have been God’s intention since Scripture alone is all he left us in keeping with Christ Jesus’ promise to build his church.

This simple argument has recently been met by Romanists from "Called to Communion" with resistance for two primary reasons. The claim is that the apostolic office in view in Ephesians 2:20 includes both the perpetual seat of the papacy and the oral tradition of the church. Let’s assume then that the unwritten tradition still exists even though it has never been produced. Jesus promised to build his church and we’ll say that he promised to build it upon both Scripture and unwritten tradition. (I of course would say that if Jesus promised to build his church on the unwritten tradition then he failed since there is no preserved unwritten tradition that the church has been built upon; yet for argument sake let’s assume the tradition is intact.) Whether we have the unwritten tradition or not has zero impact on the argument from “intent and providence” for the reception of the written tradition. Any preservation of the unwritten tradition does not undermine the reception of the written tradition. Now in a last ditch desperation Romanists will resort to saying that the texts in view are not just speaking about the teachings of Christ and his apostles (even oral traditions) as being the foundation of the church, but rather the texts mean that we are to receive for the foundation of the church the teachings of their alleged successors (the popes) both written and oral. In passing I’ll note that to have to receive the teaching of a pope 2,000 years after the teachings of the apostles and Christ would clearly deny the import of “foundation of the church.” But aside from the obvious, even if we grant the point, the reception of the written tradition through divine intent and providence is not affected by the Gnostic “exegesis” of Ephesians 2:20 regarding popes because a papal apostolic succession and the reception of the canon are not mutually exclusive premises. To “refute”” the Protestant position on the canon in a non-arbitrary, non-ad hoc fashion the Roman apologist will have to deny that Jesus had any intent whatsoever for the church to be at least partially built upon his written words and the written words of the apostles. To introduce Gnostic dogmas regarding unwritten traditions and the succession of bishops is simply to throw up Red Herrings in a sophist manner.

In sum, the Roman apologist needs to avoid the divine intent at all cost; for as soon as he acknowledges Christ Jesus’ intent to build His church “at least in part” on Scripture, he is then constrained to show why God’s intent could not have come to pass without an infallible magisterium (according to the same divine providence by which the rest of the eternal decree comes to pass). Since Romanists cannot possibly succeed in showing that God could not bring to pass the reception of the canon without an infallible magisterium, they are left no other choice (short of becoming Protestant on this matter) than to bring into question the divine intent. The Romanist does this through arguing by false-disjunction, introducing non-mutually exclusive premises to the promise of building the church “at least in part” on the canon; these Red Herring premises are intended to (a) establish a need for an apostolic oral tradition, and (b) establish a succession of infallible bishops. Yet neither a nor b undermine the divine intent to bring to pass the reception of the canon for the establishment of the NT church. Yet even allowing for those unjustified premises, the Romanist still cannot with any valid argumentation undermine the divine intent, which presuppose the necessity of bringing to pass the reception of the canon. They with the Satan can only say, “Has God said?”

Bahnsen's Use of Modus Tollens and Modus Ponens

It was recently asked of me why Greg Bahnsen argued transcendentally using Modus Tollens (MT) as opposed to Modus Ponens (MP), which I suppose is a fair question since even John Frame, it would seem to me, did not seem to see any persuasive reason why Bahnsen was a stickler about using one formulation rather than the other.

To argue by way of negation as opposed to affirmation is much more powerful because it reduces the opposing worldview to absurdity. There’s a reason, after all, why MT is referred to as a reductio ad absurdum argument. Both forms (MT and MP) are valid forms of argumentation; can be converted to the other; and argue to the same narrow conclusion – in this case that God exists. But it is one thing to say that causality logically implies God, which is what MP achieves, and quite another to argue that without God there could be no causality. The latter, of course, employs MT. At the very least, there is a tactical difference between: “Ccausality, therefore, God” and “No God, therefore, no causality”.

Consider the major premise: “If logic (predication, induction, or whatever), then God.” I’ll now try to show where we might use MP and where we should use MT to be most affective given that one major premise, with which both MP and MT may begin. First I’ll address MT.

The reason Bahnsen argued by way of negation (MT) in all his formal debates and in his classroom lectures on transcendental arguments is because he appreciated that no other formal construct illustrated more clearly and powerfully the point he wanted to make, that intelligible experience has no rational grounding given the negation of God’s existence. Bahnsen, following Van Til, wanted to argue that to predicate anything God must first exist (i.e. predication presupposes God). The way he chose to demonstrate that was by assuming for argument’s sake the opponents position that God does not exist, which required the negation of the consequent of the major premise, as opposed to the affirmation of the antecedent. By assuming the atheist’s worldview, Bahnsen for argument’s sake would negate the consequent of the major premise, “God”, which forced the conclusion that there is no logic (for instance). The reductio was apparent since logic was being presupposed by the one arguing the opposing position. By negating the consequent of the major premise the opponent is left to deal with the force of the conclusion: no predication – yet while all the time predicating! Bahnsen’s mantra was that to argue against God one must first presuppose God in his reasoning. Accordingly, he would argue by way of reductio: “No God”, which affectively led to the absurd conclusion of “no possibility of argumentation.” Bahnsen said over and over again that “the proof of God’s existence is that without him one could not prove anything.” That is precisely why he negated “God exists” in the minor premise - to show the absurd conclusion that there is no logic, etc.

Where MP might be found useful is in the apologist’s follow-up, which is to offer the solution to the quandary. Once one has been left with the absurd conclusion of “no logic” and cannot make logic comport with his unbelieving worldview, then by all means it is under good regulation to reformulate the argument with a new minor premise, that being the assertion of the antecedent – “Logic” (or causality, or prediction, or induction, etc.) In other words, once one is left with the conclusion of the reductio, which is the conclusion that his unbelieving worldview leaves him with(!) - it might be a good idea to assert the antecedent of the major premise (logic) in order to arrive at the conclusion: “God exists”: If logic, then God; ~God, therefore, ~logic (reductio). Ah, but there is logic (assert antecedent of major premise), therefore, God (MP). That is the only use of MP one will probably ever find in Bahnsen’s lectures, debates or writings with respect to this particular matter. MP is employed to give the solution to the dilemma. But even that can be done by MT! In other words, the conclusion of the argument is essentially "~God, therefore, logic". Accordingly, by treating that as a premise, we can simply add to the argument by negating logic in order to affirm God, which is to continue the argument with a form of MT rather than applying MP to the original major premise. In other words: If logic, then God. No God, then no logic. Logic, therefore, God.

With his debate against Dr. Stein, Dr. Bahnsen argued as his major premise: “If the uniformity of nature, then God” – (which was to posit the assertion that the uniformity of nature presupposed God’s existence.) The negation of God’s existence led to the absurd conclusion that there could be no possibility of the basis for all scientific inference, induction. Dr. Stein, a scientist and professing atheist, had no answer to his own dilemma. His scientific endeavors were all based upon the borrowed capital of God’s providence. The absurd conclusion of “no induction” left Stein with the task of proving how induction was indeed possible without the God of providence whom Scripture has revealed. With attorney Edward Tabash, although Bahnsen argued briefly that induction presupposes God (with his “toothpaste proof for God’s existence”), I would say that Bahnsen’s emphasis was on the necessary preconditions for morality (given that Tabash had Jewish relatives who suffered under Hitler). With the negation of God's existence, Awschwitz was morally irrelevant. (Doug Wilson employed the same sort of reductio with Dan Barker at the University of Delaware about a decade ago.) In both cases, “the toothpaste proof for God’s existence” and the “morality” argument, Bahnsen demonstrated through MT that morality and induction have their only grounding in God.

In a word, arguing by reductio is the most powerful way of demonstrating that the very tools of argumentation presuppose that which the unbelieving worldview does not afford, God’s existence. That is done, as Bahsnen so often said, by “assuming for argument’s sake that God does not exist”, which is the very conclusion the professing atheist wants to lead us to in his argument. In summary then, the reason we first argue by negation and not affirmation is that negation allows us to assume the opponent’s conclusion. In other words, it allows us to better lead the opponent by the hand by starting with his presupposition in the minor premise.

Now, of course, if we apply MT as I do immediately below, in which case it is posited “no intelligible experience” in the consequent of the major premise, then we conclude with the existence of God (i.e. it is not the case that God does not exist). Accordingly, what was demonstrated before in Bahnsen’s coupling of the minor premise and the conclusion (i.e. no God, therefore, no intelligible experience) is now located in what the major premise posits. Such an argument is not as readily accessible in my estimation - first because of the two negatives that are used in the major premise, plus the double negative found in the conclusion. Notwithstanding, I have employed that very argument on this site when I was not so much interested in concluding the ramifications of the reductio (no intelligible experience), but rather when my intention was to lead to the conclusion that God exists (by using MT).

Step 1 (A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience (since God is the precondition of intelligibility)
Step 2 (~B): There is intelligible experience
Step 3 (~A): It is not the case that God does not exist

Let’s now see what happens if we utilize MP rather than MT given the same major premise.

Step 1 (A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience
Step 2 (A): God does not exist
Step 3 (B): Therefore, there is no intelligible experience

Unlike the argument that concludes God’s existence, this argument leads to the same conclusion as Bahnsen’s use of MT, but by using MP instead. I find this terribly cumbersome, however, because in the major premise “no intelligible experience” is posited as the necessary condition for no God, rather than God being positively posited as the necessary precondition for intelligible experience: “If intelligible experience, then God” (because God is the necessary precondition for intelligible experience). Accordingly, in this argument MP needs some reworking to make the point more clearly that intelligible experience presupposes God (as its necessary condition). In other words, although the conclusion is the same as Bahnsen’s, the opposing worldview is not reduced to absurdity because a reductio form is not employed. Also, this argument gives way to the five negatives employed in the two premises and conclusion.

Finally, Frame finds no problem with the following use of MP.

If causality, then God
Causality
Therefore, God

The reason Frame’s use of MP is not as affective as Bahnsen’s use of MT is similar to a reason stated before. Although all the negatives are done away with in this formulation, Frame’s argument does not conclude with the absurdity that there is no causality (or science, or ethics, etc.), which is the very thing the unbeliever would otherwise be challenged to overcome. In other words, because Bahnsen’s use of MT concludes the negation of that which the unbeliever affirms, the unbeliever is more abruptly confronted with the challenge to prove how intelligible experience can possibly comport with the minor premise of no God. Also, MT no less than MP can be formulated with additional commentary to address necessary preconditions (as opposed to mere necessary conditions). Therefore, MT can offer both, the transcendental challenge and the reductio in one short, sharp, shock. Bahnsen wins outright – point, set, match. (Also, Frame until late did not seem to fully appreciate that an argument from presupposition requires that God be the precondition for both the denial and the affirmation of the intelligible experience under consideration. He now acknowledges the point.)

Finally, Bahnsen once wrote:

“A transcendental argument begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds, by critical analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful, or be intelligible to us. Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501-502.)

What Dr. Bahnsen meant was that whether we argue for or against morality (for instance) we arrive at the same transcendental conclusion, God exists. Accordingly, to make sense out of the belief that there is no morality (or that there is morality) one must presuppose God’s existence in that investigation. It should be obvious that Bahnsen did not commit this fallacy:

If morality, then God
No morality
Therefore, no God

Rather, he simply meant that whether one claims to believe or not to believe X, then God. The reason being, God is the necessary precondition for all beliefs, true of false.

Ron


Counter since: 9/6/2006

Federal Vision Teachers - Worthy to be Abhorred or Simply Dunces?

http://www.federal-vision.com/joint_statement.html

“We affirm that there is only one true Church, and that this Church can legitimately be considered under various descriptions, including the aspects of visible and invisible.”

This is one of the most troubling statements of the FV. The statement communicates that there is only one church, which can be described in terms of its being visible and invisible. The implication of such a construct is that the invisible church and the visible church are the same church. From that false premise comes much confusion and outright error. To make the point more clearly, consider the following modification of the statement: We affirm that there is only one true God, and that this God can legitimately be considered under various descriptions, including the aspects of transcendence and immanence. The modified statement, which uses the same construct of the FV statement, clearly communicates that the one transcendent God is the same God as the immanent God. That is true. Transcendence and immanence are simply two aspects of the one God. Is the FV statement true in this way? Is the visible church the same church as the invisible church? The FV statement clearly implies that they are one and the same; for it states that there is “only one true Church” that can be described in various ways, like visible and invisible. How can they claim such a theology and also claim to be Reformed?

In contrast to FV theology, now consider Reformed theology: “The catholic or universal Church, which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect, that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one, under Christ the Head thereof; and is the spouse, the body, the fullness of Him that fills all in all…The visible Church, which is also catholic or universal under the Gospel (not confined to one nation, as before under the law), consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion; and of their children: and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation.”

Note the difference. Within Reformed theology the invisible and visible churches are not the same church. The invisible church consists of the elect who will all possess Christ, whereas the visible church consists of those who profess Christ. On that basis alone, the FV may not be considered “Reformed” in any sense of the word. The FV is comprised of a bunch of muddled thinking men.

The Federal Vision blurs the visible-invisible church distinction and has a faulty view of the Covenant of Grace. Accordingly, they imagine that through water baptism one is united to the very life of Christ. Consequently, if one who was baptized with water were to deny the faith, he would in Federal Vision terms truly fall from grace and lose the life he had in Christ.

Federal Vision theology does affirm that all who have been justified will be glorified. Notwithstanding, how can one who has been justified be assured of his final state of salvation, glorification, if he can in fact fall from grace and lose the life in Christ he supposedly had? It is no wonder that assurance of salvation in the Federal Vision is limited only to the objective truth that those God has justified will be glorified. Federal Vision theology makes no room for personal, subjective assurance of one’s final salvation; indeed how can it if one can truly fall from grace and lose his life in Christ that is alleged to be given to all in the church?

The Federal Vision is correct that the “the decretally elect cannot apostatize”. But by blurring the visible-invisible church distinction and attributing a former life in Christ to those who outwardly deny the faith, the truly justified that will one day prove themselves elected unto glory is left no place to ground his assurance of his justification. After all, both those elected unto glory and those who deny the faith allegedly share in the same life in Christ and consequently must have the same grounds for assurance of perseverance, which becomes no grounds at all since some with life will not persevere.

Federal Vision proponents would do well to learn that the Covenant of Grace was established only with Christ as the Second Adam and in Him, with the elect. Consequently, the promises the covenant contemplates are restricted to the same, the elect – the invisible church, which comes from a systematic theology the Federal Vision abhors.

Any system of theology that would make such claims and create such confusion for God's people is abhorrent, but the teachers of the Federal Vision are not in my estimation so much to be abhorred but simply regarded for what they are, dunces. Note well, I would never use such language to describe those who are walking in the ways of the Federal Vision or even standing in the way. It is only the ones who have taken a seat in order to teach Federal Vision do I consider dunces. After all, it is they who have studied hard and still haven't a clue about the doctrines of church, salvation and covenant. For that they are to sit in the corner in shame.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Van Til, Bahnsen, Logic and TAG

“To us the only thing of great significance in this connection is that it is often found to be more difficult to distinguish our method from the deductive method than from the inductive method. But the favorite charge against us is that we are still bound to the past and are therefore employing the deductive method. Our opponents are thoughtlessly identifying our method with the Greek method of deduction. For this reason it is necessary for us to make the difference between these two methods as clear as we can.” (Van Til, Survey of Christian Epistemology, 9.)

“To put it simply, in the case of ‘direct’ arguments (whether rational or empirical), the negation of one of their premises changes the truth or reliability of their conclusion. But this is not true of transcendental arguments, and that sets them off from the other kinds of proof or analysis. A transcendental argument begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds, by critical analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful, or be intelligible to us. Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501-502.)

“Years ago Van Til realized that opponents of presuppositionalism tend to think that there are only two kinds of reasoning: inductive and deductive. Deductive reasoning stands opposed to inductive. However, there is also transcendental reasoning, in which the preconditions for the intelligibility of what is experienced, asserted, or argued are posed or sought. It, too, stands opposed to a purely inductive approach to knowledge. Critics seem to think that, since presuppositionalism does not endorse pure inductivism, it must favor deductivism instead. This logical fallacy is known as false antithesis.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 176, n. 55.)

The above three quotes were recently forwarded to me for comment because these sentiments of Van Til and Bahnsen are often (sadly so) misconstrued as affirmation of their denying the place of deduction and induction in the realm of presuppositional apologetics. (Having the books, I have verified the accuracy of the quotes.)

The beauty of the transcendental argument for the existence of God (TAG) as a special kind of deductive argument is not in the reductio but in the transcendental challenge, which demonstrates that to argue against God one must first presuppose that which only Christianity affords. In other words, TAG is certainly a deductive argument, but it's a unique kind of deductive argument, not in its form per se but rather in what it seeks to demonstrate. Transcendental arguments are concerned with the preconditions of any fact of experience – what must be true in order for any fact of experience to be that which it is. Van Til was careful to note that “the Christian method uses neither the inductive nor the deductive method as understood by the opponents of Christianity, but that it has elements of both induction and of deduction in it, if these terms are understood in a Christian sense.” (Van Til, page 10 - emphasis mine.) Why the qualifier "as it is understood by the opponents of Christianity" if Van Til did not believe that TAG incorporated deduction? Why not just say that the Christian method does not use deduction, end of statement? The reason is, TAG has aspects of not just deduction but induction too, as Van Til states with no ambiguity. TAG has a distinctly inductive aspect to it because with TAG the Christian investigates what must be true in order for some experience to be intelligible. Such explorations are inductive in emphasis. Notwithstanding, the manner of the investigation is not open ended because the premises within TAG do not merely support the conclusion, they ensure it. That aspect is unique to deduction. Moreover, the conclusion from TAG is not a mere hypothesis, but rather a sound conclusion derived through a deductive process. Finally, TAG falls short of being fully inductive because there is no asserting the consequent with TAG, as there is with all scientific inference, the playground for induction.

Van Til goes on to critique what he qualified as “exclusively” deductive arguments and “purely” inductive arguments that do not presuppose God. It was the anti-Christian Greek method of logic that Van Til and Bahnsen opposed but not logical apologetics. In other words, they never opposed deduction and induction but rather qualified these disciplines in reference to strictly secular uses of reason and inference. Even a careless reading of Van Til and Bahnsen bears this out, but one must first read the authors and not just read about them. And reading the authors would require reading past page 9 in Van Til, at least up through page 10. (Many perceived problems regarding Gordon H. Clark would also vanish if one would only simply go to the original source, rather than choosing sides in a partisan manner.)

Bahnsen typically employed modus tollens (MT) in his formal argument, yet he distinguished his employment of TAG from garden variety deduction. Mike Butler (at one time Bahnsen’s assistant) to my knowledge, also, has never pitted transcendental arguments against deduction. Butler has written TAG out, which is indeed deductive in form "For x (some aspect of human experience) to be the case, y must also be the case since y is the precondition of x. Since x is the case, y is the case." (Butler, The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence, 91 The Standard Bearer.)
Van Til and Bahnsen fully appreciated that TAG is a deductive argument strictly speaking (lest they contradicted themselves in practice). However, their focus in this regard was on what distinguishes TAG from the usual kind of deductive (and inductive) arguments. The unique quality of TAG that sets it apart from all other standard deductive arguments is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others - but that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience. In other words, with standard deductive arguments we try to deduce from a fact, or series of facts, other facts; no more, no less. If it's Sunday I'm with a congregation of saints from 9:30-12 in the morning. If I’m not with a congregation of saints at 10:00 a.m., then it’s not Sunday. That it’s not Sunday can be a standard deduction, yet my being with the saints at a certain time does not make Sundays possible. Kant's genius was that TA's are concerned with what must be true in order for something else to be possible. God’s revelation makes intelligible experience possible, whereas my being with the saints at a particular time does not make Sunday between 9:30 and noon possible.

Clearly, Bahnsen applied deduction in his demonstration of TAG. Accordingly, he was either inconsistent with himself, or we should interpret his statements as meaning something other than TAG is not strictly speaking deductive. With little effort we can reconcile Bahnsen's practice of TAG with his description of it. TAG is not like any other deductive argument because it does not reason from fact to fact in the standard Greek sense but rather reasons from fact to the preconditions of fact, which is Kantian, yet when in the hands of a Christian a very powerful tool.

Ron

John Piper on Infants Dying in Infancy

John Piper believes that all infants dying in infancy go to heaven but it would seem that faulty reasoning has caused him to ignore basic evangelical tenets. (Click on title to go to link.)

"I think they're all saved. In other words, I don't buy the principle that says that children born into "covenant families" are secure, and children born into "non covenant families" aren't. I don't go there."

He rejects the notion that the only saved infants dying in infancy are those born into covenant homes. He also rejects the idea that some born within covenant homes that die in infancy can be lost. Rather, he affirms that God saves all who die in infancy. Piper is not alone in these speculations. Presbyterian A.A. Hodge and Dispensationalist John MacArthur assert the same. I appreciate Piper much more on this matter for he speaks more tentatively regarding what he thinks; whereas Hodge and MacArthur are dogmatic in their claims. Hodge even went so far as to suggest the Westminster standards teach this form of universalism, which it does not.

"My reason for thinking they're all saved is because of the principle in Romans 1 where Paul argues that all people know God, and they are "without excuse" because they do not honor him or glorify him as God. His argument is that they are without excuse because they know things, as though accountability in the presence of God at the Last Judgment will be based, at least partly, on whether they had access to necessary knowledge."

Piper’s reasoning is terribly flawed. Piper reasons that if a person knows God, then he’s without excuse. Fine so far… until he deduces from that premise: If a person does not know God, then he needs no excuse. It is certainly true that if a man knows God, then he his culpable. However, it does not logically follow from that premise that those who do not know God are not culpable. That is fallaciously to deny the consequent based upon a denial of the antecedent. In other words, from if P then Q, we may not reason to not P, therefore, not Q. Even if Piper’s final conclusion were true, it would not follow from his premises. Simply put, that one is culpable for having knowledge of God does not imply that he is not culpable for something else apart from such knowledge, such as the inherited corrupt nature and imputation of Adam’s sin. Rather than deal with these, Piper seems to presuppose that sins proceeding from the corrupt nature either are not present in infants, or simply do not warrant damnation. In either case, the forensic and genetic aspects of sin are simply ignored in his treatment of the subject. (In passing we might note that it is a bit dubious to assert that infants do not know God. A defense of that premise might have been in order.)

"I think babies and imbeciles—that is, those with profound mental disabilities—don't have access to the knowledge that they will be called to account for. Therefore, somehow in some way, God, through Christ, covers these people."

"In some way, God, through Christ, covers these people?" What needs to be covered? Certainly not their sin, for Piper has already conceded that what these infants need is not a covering for sin but rather their just and deserved place in the kingdom. Moreover, why would Piper say that humans such as these are saved in death? Saved from what? Would he at least concede that elect infants dying in infancy are united to Christ through the monergistic work of regeneration, or would that smack of the need for too much grace? In the final analyses, either Piper has affirmed that the “salvation” of infants dying in infancy is a matter of justice alone, or he has implied that infants deserve mercy and grace.


Ron
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Libertarianism by any other name...

... is libertarianism. But non-libertarianism by the same name is of course something different. Confusion abounds...

Most libertarians hold to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). Yet a growing number of libertarians are abandoning their libertarian roots and embracing a Frankfurt version of libertarianism, which is no libertarianism at all. These “libertarians” don’t think they need to hold to PAP. These Frankfurt-libertarians hold to Frankfurt Counterexamples (FCE), which are aimed at bringing to naught the view that a moral agent is responsible for an action only if he could have acted contrary. The aim is to bring reconciliation between responsibility and determinism by arguing that responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise. The counterexamples can get quite creative, involving demons and chemicals and all sorts of will-altering stimuli.

With regard to all these scenarios that posit chips in brains and the like (certain FCE's), they can be refuted thusly with respect to their usefulness: Either determinism is true or it isn’t. There is no third option. If determinism is true, then these illustrations of demons, drugs and chips are all moot; for all would be determined and responsibility would become a non-entity for the libertarian incompatibilist. Accordingly, if determinism is true, then these silly scenarios (FCE’s) do not achieve their intended usefulness, which is to show that responsibility need not be accompanied by alternative possibilities. Without responsibility (due to the assumption of determinism), one cannot show that responsibility can be upheld at all, let alone apart from alternative possibilities (AP). In other words, FCE’s don’t save the day by providing an alternative source of responsibility if determinism is indeed true. There simply would be no responsibility to be found (anywhere) in the face of determinism given a commitment to LFW as a necessary condition for responsibility.

A Reformed “grounding objection” refutation:

Now if determinism is false, then of course the demon who would operate the chip could not know whether he actually would need to operate the chip in order to achieve his desired end until after the critical point of choice; there would be no grounding of the truth value of what the agent with the implanted chip would do under any set of circumstances. (Obviously such an argument should not be palatable to Molinists but strangely enough it’s employed by more than just Open Theists and Calvinists.) If the demon wants the agent to choose X, then the only way in which he could ensure that he does choose X is to externally cause him to choose X necessarily, which of course does not protect moral responsibility (in such cases) from a libertarian perspective. If the demon sees that it is very probable that the agent will choose X, then the demon might roll the dice and leave the agent alone in order that he choose X “freely”. Obviously in such cases given the contingent nature of LFW the desired end might not obtain, but the choice would be free and in accordance with libertarianism. Consequently, given libertarian freedom as a necessary condition for moral accountability, AP must therefore always apply in such instances of choosing with moral relevance since the demon, in order to ensure his desired outcome, would always have to preempt the unknowable choice with a short-sharp-shock. Pure contingency defies truth values that can be foreknown, therefore, the only way that AP can be taken away is to eliminate them entirely by external causality (simultaneously undermining libertarian moral accountability). It is impossible to ensure a desired outcome in this hands-off Frankfurter manner given radical free agency.

Desperation even more - will formation:

In a last ditch effort a wannabe libertarian might posit that the foreknowledge required to pull off this mad-scientist routine is bound up in the insights into an agent’s will-forming, which is to say that the a future creaturely choice can be known with certainty due to the predictability of a will that has been formed over time. The problem with such an idea is that will forming theorists don’t explain the sufficient condition(s) that must be met in order for a choice to no longer be purely contingent. Why do certain constraints upon the will that are brought to bear from prior (alleged) libertarian choices have more determining power over future choices, to the point of making those future choices metaphysically necessary (i.e. having no feasible alternative possibility), than other types of constraints? And if there can be no distinction made, then why should we believe that there are any?

An internal critique using Molinistic premises:

Finally, there is a subtle equivocation with these scenarios that utilize FCE’s. By addressing the equivocation we can attack the absurdity of the position more powerfully (on Molinistic terms!), while granting exhaustive omniscience for the demon and also allowing for the pure contingency of choice that libertarian freedom requires. In those cases where the agent chooses without outside chip-influence, he must do so (for the libertarian) from a metaphysical posture that is free. Accordingly, metaphysically speaking he in fact could choose contrary in no less a sense than if he was not wired to an implanted chip. It is only in those cases that he is actually externally prevented from choosing what he would that he could not choose contrary to how he would. What is relevant is that when he chooses freely he does so in a metaphysical sense, which presupposes true alternative possibilities of the metaphysical kind. The impossibility of choosing otherwise is only a logical one, constrained by the fact that it is true that the action will be physically prevented if it would occur: If the agent would choose ~X feely, then he’d be externally caused to choose X necessarily. Yet notwithstanding, when he would choose X freely, he indeed could (metaphysically speaking) choose ~X, otherwise he would not be able to choose X freely! {It boggles the mind why Molinists would undermine their own hard-fought distinctions between would-counterfactuals and might-counterfactuals by employing such novel attempts to move toward certain deterministic tendencies.}

This all reminds me of certain movements within Romanism. At one time (before 1994 and certainly 1965) it meant something to be a Romanist. Now one thinks he can deny Trent and still be Romanist.

Happy Christmas!

Ron


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