Theonomy & The Woman Caught in Adultery

Anti-theonomists are often quick to point to the woman caught in adultery (recorded for us in John 8) as “proof” that the civil case law for adultery (if not by extension all civil case law) is no longer applicable. Before inferring whether Jesus’ handling of the situation abrogated the civil penalty for adultery, it might be appropriate to take a look at: (a) the implications of the law in this regard, (b) the Bible’s teaching regarding our responsibility to submit to the divinely appointed laws of anti-God government and (c) Jesus’ modus operandi when dealing with what he believed to be the more critical issue that was before him, even at the expense of ignoring what was being asked of him while knowing full well that some would infer erroneous conclusions that cannot be deduced.

A word or two about the law:

Leviticus 20:10 and Deuteronomy 22:22 require that both guilty parties are to receive the same civil sanction for adultery. That is the requirement of the law. Yet for some reason the mob was uninterested in following the law of God even to that small degree, but rather they replaced God’s law with a manipulation of it (one that suited their own personal gain), not having brought to Jesus the man who sinned. Coupled with this concealment of the whole truth, John 8 explicitly states that the mob’s intention was to test Jesus in order to accuse him. Accordingly, not only was the report false by Christian standards (because of the concealment of truth), it was also malicious toward Jesus and not accompanied by a godly desire for justice because it aimed to get Jesus to follow the masses in a perversion of justice. Accordingly, had Jesus the Savior acquiesced to the masses and partaken of their misuse of the law, he himself would have been in violation of God’s law! Exodus 23:1-4 teaches: “you shall not bear a false report”, nor “join your hand with a wicked man to be a malicious witness”, nor “follow the masses in doing evil” nor “pervert justice.” (Note: I do not say that it is necessary that both parties be brought forward for either one to receive their just penalty. What if one escaped, or even died? Such an interpretation that would require both parties to be brought forward is not needed to vindicate the perpetual validity of the law and Jesus' suspension of it in this case on other grounds as mentioned above and below. In this particular case, that only the woman was brought forward can only at best corroborate the ill-intention of the mob, which was explicitly noted in the text and is no mere inference.)

In passing we might also observe that since the woman was caught in the act, it is very probable that her habits were well known, making her an easy prey for entrapment. Such would only lend credence to the malicious quality of the scheme while also implicating the mob for not being concerned with the woman’s licentious behavior until such time that it could be used for evil rather than good. Yes, penalties can and are to be used for good but the design of good too often loses its effect when the law is not carried out by those lawfully called who possess a lowly servant’s heart. (These servants are not individual mavericks of society but civil servants appointed to such service who in the end serve God and men.)

Submission to God’s providential infliction of unruly government:

Romans 13 teaches that we are not to take the law into our own hands but rather submit to God’s providentially ordained government, even when that government is pluralistic. This principle was to be followed during Jesus’ earthly ministry and the Jews knew it all too well: “So Pilate said to them, ‘Take Him yourselves, and judge Him according to your law.’ The Jews said to him, ‘We are not permitted to put anyone to death’” John 18:31 Yet the Jews conveniently were not interested in obeying that precept of submitting to God ordained Roman rule when it did not suit them: “Is it lawful to pay a poll-tax to Caesar, or not? Shall we pay or shall we not pay?’ But He, knowing their hypocrisy, said to them, ‘Why are you testing Me? Bring Me a denarius to look at.’ They brought one. And He said to them, ‘Whose likeness and inscription is this?’ And they said to Him, ‘Caesar's.’ And Jesus said to them, ‘Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's.’ And they were amazed at Him.” Mark 12: 15-17 With respect to the John 8, it must be deemed that it was unlawful under those circumstances for the law of Moses to be implemented; yet that would not seem to be the main impetus behind Jesus' behavior.

Jesus’ modus operandi for dealing with the point that he wanted to deal with, even at the expense of ignoring what was being asked of him and even sometimes at the expense of having that which was false assumed true by his hearers:

John 3:1-3: When Nicodemus stated his inference to Jesus that he was a teacher sent from God, Jesus neither affirmed nor denied the assumption. Rather, he turned the tables by telling Nicodemus he must be born again. Depending upon one’s pre-commitment it might be inferred that Jesus was or was not who Nicodemus thought, a teacher sent from God. Yet we cannot deduce anything in that regard from the text.

Mark 10:17-18: When a rich young ruler called Jesus good, he neither affirmed nor denied that he possessed that quality of person but instead said nobody is good but God. Depending upon one’s pre-commitment it might be inferred that Jesus was not good and, therefore, not God; yet the text neither affirms nor denies either conclusion.

Acts 1:6, 7: When the apostles asked Jesus whether he was at that time going to restore the kingdom to Israel, he neither affirmed nor denied such an intention but instead said that it was not for them to know the times or epochs that the Father has fixed by his own authority. Dispensationalists, given their pre-commitment to a restored national Israel, infer from the answer a confirmation of their theology, that the kingdom will be restored. Notwithstanding, no logical conclusion can be deduced from the text with respect to the restoration Israel’s kingdom.

John 21:20-22: When Peter asked Jesus whether John would be alive at the time of Jesus’ return Jesus told him that if he wanted John to remain until such time it was no business of Peter’s. Jesus then put to Peter his task, which was to follow Jesus. Jesus’ answer did not logically imply that John would remain or not, let alone whether Jesus would even return one day! The answer even caused a rumor among the brethren that John would not die (John 21:23). John in this very epistle (same verse: 23) remarked on the unjustified inference that caused the rumor: “Jesus did not say to him that he would not die, but only, ‘If I want him to remain until I come, what is that to you?’”

There are many more examples but the point should be obvious. We cannot logically deduce that which is not deducible! And when it comes to Jesus, the master of making the point he wants to make regardless of what precedes it, we must be doubly careful when assuming what is not said. In the final analyses, if we could deduce that John 8 demands the repudiation of theonomy, then I would think that a syllogism to that end, comprised of premises that don't beg crucial questions, could be constructed rather readily from the text.

At the end of the day, the use of the text to refute theonomy is on par with concluding that (a) Jesus was not a teacher sent from God; (b) Jesus was not good and, therefore, not God; (c) Jesus intended to establish Israel as a political power but failed with the passing of John.

That Jesus did not condemn the woman caught in adultery does not logically imply that she did not deserve death at the hands of godly men, let alone that any laws, rightly interpreted, have been abrogated.

In Summary (and this is the best part...):

The sole intent of the mob was the entrapment of Jesus and whether a life was callously taken in the process, without regard for godly motive, was of no consequence to these wicked men. Accordingly, had Jesus acquiesced to their plea by condoning the woman’s death on their terms, he would have partaken in their scheming and wickedness according to Exodus 23:1-4. Moreover, had Jesus allowed for the penalty under Moses to be enacted in this particular case, he would have implied that men need not submit to God’s ordained government, a clear violation of the general equity of God’s lawful principle of rendering unto Cesar that which is Cesar’s (which equity is also affirmed later in Romans 13).

Jesus was in a predicament. He did not want to condone the woman’s execution given the motivation of the witnesses and accusers, lest he himself could be guilty of paving the way for their sin and become an accomplice with them according to Exodus 23:1-4. Nor did Jesus want to suggest that the woman did not deserve immediate punishment for her sin as prescribed by Leviticus 20:10 and Deuteronomy 22:22.

Her action was indeed worthy of death, (lest the law which he authored had been abolished; yet he had already stated most unambiguously that he had not come to abolish the law. Matthew 5:17) Let there be no mistake about it, Jesus was for the death penalty when his law required the death penalty. He also required that such penalties be carried out not by perfect men but rather by those who had removed the plank from their own eye. Execution was to be carried out in a spirit of godly humility. Anything less than that was to do God’s bidding with a murderous heart, which would reduce to self-serving vengeance as opposed to righteous justice. We are God’s servants, and we not our own. Indeed, Jesus was concerned not only with the letter of the law but also the spirit in which it was to be followed. This must be appreciated by all Christians, especially theonomists.

Let there be no mistake - the people of God should at all times desire that the civil Law of Moses be upheld. What Jesus opposed was not his law (how ridiculous is that?!) but rather the Pharisees’ desire to substitute for it their traditions: “Jesus replied, ‘And why do you break the command of God for the sake of your tradition? For God said, Honor your father and mother and Anyone who curses his father or mother must be put to death.’” Now did Jesus contradict himself? Did Jesus want laws carried out that were not in accordance with the Roman law that was placed into authority by divine providence? Clearly Jesus did not contradict himself by requiring that the Pharisees uphold civil laws that would have conflicted with God-ordained Roman law. Consequently, Jesus’ question of “why” cannot logically imply that they ought to have carried out the penalties prescribed by Moses at that time. Rather, the question is looking for the reason behind their motivation not to carry out the Law of Moses, which in the case of the Pharisees was that they preferred the traditions of men - hence Jesus’ leading question and rebuke. In other words, although the law was not to be carried out at that time (lest God contradicted himself), there should have been a desire to do so that was in submission to the greater principle of obeying Roman law per God’s precept. Accordingly, no answer would have been solicited by Jesus and no rebuke required had they desired in godly submission to carry out lawful executions yet were constrained only by another principle of Scripture - that of obeying God ordained government. Such was not the case, not by a long shot. The same hardness of heart and misguided motivations apply to the mob in John 8.

The dilemma solved:

Given the circumstances of no witness-accuser who possessed a heart for righteous judgment - the only one who could have put the woman to death and satisfied the full intention of the law both in letter and spirit would have been God himself. Accordingly, Jesus, unwilling to exercise his divine prerogative, invited anyone without sin to throw the first stone. By handling the difficult providence as he did, Jesus upheld Moses’ intention pertaining to a godly accuser's spirit, yet without compromising the deserved, temporal penalty for the woman. We might say that the case was thrown out of court due to the greater sin of the witness-accusers (and the priority of Roman rule, which I believe was secondary). Yet by couching the invitation as Jesus did, the Lord acknowledged both the rightful penalty and the unworthiness of anyone within that mob that day to carry out God’s law as in the manner God would have it - as God’s servant.

God is concerned with the spirit of the law but not at the cost of abrogation. Now if anyone wants to make more of the passage as it pertains to theonomy and suggest that Moses has been abrogated because nobody is without sin, then in turn they prove too much by relegating all temporal justice to the Final Day, a most absurd and unworkable principle. The only question I have at this juncture is whether the anti-theonomists will go out one by one in shame for butchering the logical implications of the text. Or will the angry mob of Jesus' day prove themselves more worthy than these?

As Calvin keenly observes:

"Christ appears to take out of the world all judicial decisions, so that no man shall dare to say that he has a right to punish crimes. For shall a single judge be found, who is not conscious of having something that is wrong? Shall a single witness be produced who is not chargeable with some fault? He appears, therefore, to forbid all witnesses to give public testimony, and all judges to occupy the judgment-seat. I reply: this is not an absolute and unlimited prohibition, by which Christ forbids sinners to do their duty in correcting the sins of others; but by this word he only reproves hypocrites, who mildly flatter themselves and their vices, but are excessively severe, and even act the part of felons, in censuring others. No man, therefore, shall be prevented by his own sins from correcting the sins of others, and even from punishing them, when it may be found necessary, provided that both in himself and in others he hate what ought to be condemned; and in addition to all this, every man ought to begin by interrogating his own conscience, and by acting both as witness and judge against himself, before he come to others. In this manner shall we, without hating men, make war with sins…

Neither do I condemn thee:

We are not told that Christ absolutely acquitted the woman, but that he allowed her to go at liberty. Nor is this wonderful, for he did not wish to undertake any thing that did not belong to his office. He had been sent by the Father to gather the lost sheep, (Matthew10:6;) and, therefore, mindful of his calling, he exhorts the woman to repentance, and comforts her by a promise of grace. They who infer from this that adultery ought not to be punished with death, must, for the same reason, admit that inheritances ought not to be divided, because Christ refused to arbitrate in that matter between two brothers, (Luke12:13.) Indeed, there will be no crime whatever that shall not be exempted from the penalties of the law, if adultery be not punished; for then the door will be thrown open for any kind of treachery, and for poisoning, and murder, and robbery. Besides, the adulteress, when she bears an unlawful child, not only robs the name of the family, but violently takes away the right of inheritance from the lawful offspring, and conveys it to strangers. But what is worst of all, the wife not only dishonors the husband to whom she had been united, but prostitutes herself to shameful wickedness, and likewise violates the sacred covenant of God, without which no holiness can continue to exist in the world."

Ron

Epistemology and Quasi-Gettier Considerations

"And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing."
1 Corinthians 13:2

In discussions over what constitutes knowledge there are some obvious axioms that have occurred to my mind. For instance, a person can know only that which is true. Furthermore, for something to be known it must be believed.  Although true belief is necessary for knowledge, with little effort it can been seen that it is not sufficient for knowledge to entail.  An example might prove useful. Say someone held the true belief that the President of the United States for most of the 1980’s had the initials R.R. yet thought him to have been Roy Rogers (and not Ronald Reagan). The belief would correspond to the truth merely by coincidence thereby not qualifying as knowledge.  But can such a belief be justified? Imagine, for instance, that the true belief was held by the child of a truthful parent who had in undetected jest told the child that Roy Rogers was the 40th president. In such an instance the child having not detected, say, a rare moment of dry wit in his parent could have been justified in believing that the 40^th president was Roy Rogers and, therefore, had the initials R.R. After all, it’s not so strange that an American cowboy actor born in the Midwest in 1911 and dying in California (which is true of both R.R.s) could become President of the United States.

Maybe we should consider a scenario that includes a true belief that is less controversial with respect to its justification – a belief that would be warranted for an intelligent adult. By looking at a clock on the wall one can believe it is noon when actually it is noon, but what if the clock had stopped running at exactly midnight the night before? The true belief that it was noon would be justified, but would such a belief constitute knowledge? It seems rather intuitive that such a true belief would not constitute knowledge given the faulty clock. Accordingly, we must distinguish (a) a person being justified in believing a proposition from (b) the justification of the proposition itself. In other words, it can be most rational and even incumbent upon a person to believe a proposition (entailing justified belief) even though that which should be believed is not verified let alone true (entailing lack of justification for the proposition itself).

Certainly in the pursuit of defining the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge we may properly include in the mix a condition that would prohibit a justification that entails false beliefs, like believing the clock is working when it is not. Not only must the person be justified in his true belief, there can be no existing true proposition (e.g. the clock is broken) that if known would undermine the person’s reliance upon reasons for the belief. After all, if such were not the case – if one actually can know the time based upon a broken clock, then upon learning the clock is broken one would lose his justification for his belief and thereby any knowledge he was thought to have had. Therefore, we must maintain that a robust theory of knowledge cannot make room for a loss of knowledge due to at least some type or classification of acquired truth. Succinctly, one cannot know p if there exists at least some class of undermining evidence that if acquired would result in a loss of justification for the belief.  In such cases, that which defeats the justification for knowledge is not a believed proposition (that is internal to the subject) but rather an existing one that is external to the mind. What sort of existing propositions that would qualify as a type or class that would undermine knowledge needs further examination.

Feasibility of an undermining proposition

Now what if the clock was not broken? If the clock was not broken, then the conditions for knowledge that would be met are justified true belief (JTB) plus no existing propositional defeater of the justification. The question that immediately comes to my mind is whether the possibility of a broken clock should come into play. In order to have knowledge that it is twelve noon must the believer have positive verification of the accurate workings of the clock in question (as opposed to clocks in general), or is the mere absence of an existing defeater proposition (as opposed to the potential of one existing) enough for knowledge to obtain?  Should the possibility of the clock being broken, even when it’s not broken, be enough to relegate such  JTB to something less thank knowledge? In other words, must the defeater actually exist or can it feasibly exist in order to undermine one’s knowledge of the time?

For argument sake, let’s call such true belief “knowledge” when the clock is functioning properly. Without having verified the clock the person’s justification for his true belief of the time would be the same whether the clock was broken or not. Accordingly, when the clock is functioning properly the certainty of the time is no greater than when the time is not known (due to a faulty clock) yet possibly thought to be known. Accordingly, to tag such a non-defeated JTB as “knowledge” is not to be less skeptical than one who wouldn’t do so, but rather it is to define knowledge more inclusively. (It is often charged that not to call such inferences knowledge is to consign oneself to skepticism.)

Under such terms one can know the time while rationally believing that the time might not be known let alone true. In other words, the person could know the time while also believing with the utmost consistency within such an epistemic framework that the time could be other than what is believed. Such need not be the case with other sorts of knowledge, like knowledge of Scripture propositions for instance. It is not incumbent upon the subject to rationally question whether what is known from Scripture is actually true for the Holy Spirit provides the warrant for such true beliefs. But where "knowledge" is attainable without having positive verification of the source, then it is most rational to believe that something might be false yet while knowing it is true.

Statistics

Given a functioning clock, what if there existed a publication of accurate statistical evidence unrealized by the subject that clocks made by that particular manufacturer were faulty most of the time? Would such existing evidence be a defeater? The question presents no problem to one who would consider the mere possibility of a faulty clock as undermining the possibility of knowledge. It does, however, pertain to one with a more inclusive understanding of knowledge. Can one know the time because of a lack of relevant evidence that most clocks from the manufacturer are not reliable?

It would seem somewhat intuitive that one would not be justified in believing the time if he also believed the true proposition that most of the clocks from the manufacturer were faulty. It is widely held by those with a more inclusive view of knowledge that such known statistics, even when not known by all, would undermine knowledge in such instances for all people, even for those who were ignorant of the statistic.  (see: Alvin Goldman, fake barns)

A problem with such probability?

Now of course probability is useful because mere humans cannot capture all the causal factors that go into any event. Notwithstanding, whether a clock will function or not is a binary consideration – it either will or it won’t. Whether it functions or not is causally determined and if we could know all the determining factors then we could know with a probability of 100% the outcome with nothing left to chance. Given that it is impossible that a functioning clock would not have functioned (due to causal necessity), the obvious (or not so obvious) question is whether an unknown, unpublished statistical probability of a particular functioning clock (which proves to be 100% by the nature of the case) should override  statistically rational inference about any given particular clock that is drawn from a lot of many clocks that yields less than a 50% success rate. Indeed, Jones would not be justified in believing it is twelve noon if he were also to believe most clocks from this manufacturer are defective. That Jones happened to look at a functioning clock would be a matter of chance. Yet if the clock was working properly then there exists some statistical affirmation that the particular clock would necessarily have worked properly. Would the existence of such a true statistic about a particular clock override another true statistic that reported most clocks from the manufacturer were faulty?

It seems to me that most that hold to an inclusive view of knowledge would negate the possibility of knowledge obtaining through the means of a functioning clock manufactured by a disfunctional manufacturer. The reason being that had the subject known about the manufacturer he would not be rationally justified in believing the time based upon such a clock. But if we're talking about statistics not known by the subject-knower, then why is the manufacturer's track record for clocks more relevant than the statistics pertaining to the particular, functioning clock in question? Maybe that clock was made during a shift where the clocks never have failed. Again, if the clock works properly then there exists, whether known or not, some statistical reflection of that reality. Again, this presents no problem for those who have a less inclusive view of knowledge.

This leads to many other questions, not the least of which are: What is the scope of relevant defeaters? Are they statistical in nature? Must they be true, or does a well promulgaged lie yet not heard by the subject-knower come into play? Might they only be feasible, even if not spoken actually, let alone true? Must they be humanly knowable or merely true? Again, these do not come into play for those with a less inclusive view of knowledge, which of course does not undermine subjective certainty of what is rational to believe.

Other actual existing propositions

Other sorts of information, defeaters of a different variety than external propositions, can impinge upon warrant for beliefs. Beliefs that are actually acquired, as opposed to propositions not known yet true, are now in view. An acquired strong belief can prevent someone from believing something newly introduced and contrary to an earlier belief, but new evidence can also cast doubt on older beliefs. Indeed, new evidence can reduce even override previously held beliefs depending upon the epistemic or psychological commitment to them. Such defeaters are internal to the mind, already acquired and not only external.

Now then, say a mother is informed that her son has stolen money from one of his teacher’s desk. Until then she has been thoroughly justified in believing her son is truthful – and count it is true that he never has stolen property.  Yet she has recently noticed that her son has been wearing a lot of new clothes and that some of her loose change has been disappearing. In realty the son has not stolen; he has been working after school and buying clothes with money he has earned. Moreover, it is false that he stole from his teacher’s desk. At this juncture we can at least appreciate that even strong justification for beliefs can be diminished by contrary evidence. It is possible that the mother would not be as justified as before in believing in the integrity of her son. To some degree, even if minimally, the integrity of the son might become to some degree suspect in the mother’s mind; so it’s not hard to see that experiences can serve not only to bolster but also downgrade one’s justification for a given or set of beliefs, if not also render beliefs that were once justifiable no longer such.

Continued later, Deo volente

Paul Manata: Free Will for Reformed Dummies

“I don't know how many times I have asked candidates for licensure and ordination whether we are free from God's decree, and they have replied ‘No, because we are fallen.’ That is to confuse libertarianism (freedom from God's decree, ability to act without cause) with freedom from sin. In the former case, the fall is entirely irrelevant. Neither before nor after the fall did Adam have freedom in the libertarian sense. But freedom from sin is something different. Adam had that before the fall, but lost it as a result of the fall.” John Frame

Plain and simple, Reformed folk, especially pastors and professors, need to wrap their minds around a Reformed understanding of the workings of the human will and how it relates to God’s decree and moral responsibility. Confusion abounds, or as Paul Manata puts it, there is no “unified message” among Reformed thinkers and many prominent ones are “apparently at odds with each other.” I agree, which is why I am exceedingly well pleased to see that Paul has put his mind and skill to this important matter and provide the Reformed community with a timely primer on free will and moral responsibility.

If one is looking for a polemical defense of Reformed Theology (RT) as it relates to determinism, freedom and moral culpability, Paul’s paper is probably not for you. Paul aims at a different target and hits it in the bullseye. He aims to lay the groundwork for fruitful reflection and discussion while showing that RT is inherently a kind of determinism, and that RT entails harmonious compatibility between determinism, man’s freedom and moral accountability. Paul defends his general thesis by concise appeals to the Westminster Confession of Faith, with reference to its teachings on God’s eternal decree, divine providence and exhaustive omniscience, which includes foreknowledge. Again, Paul is not setting out to defend RT per se as it relates to these matters, but rather define RT as it relates to them, as well as establish some suitable boundaries or fence posts from within intramural discussions can take place. That is not to say that his paper is void of any defense of RT in this regard, but that is not his primary focus. In fact, Paul spends considerable time walking his readers through the thought process of non-Reformed positions.

Paul, playing off John Feinberg’s classifications of necessity, draws a distinction between what he calls “nature determinism” and “act determinism." That man acts according to his nature is not an argument against libertarian freedom, nor is it an adequate defense of a Reformed stripe of determinism. Although Reformed thinkers confuse the two and often strictly argue in accordance with nature determinism, in doing so they beg most crucial questions and in the process look foolish in front of skilled Molinists.This distinction also plays into the erroneous idea that by establishing irresistible grace, libertarian freedom is refuted.

After setting the stage by showing that Reformed theology is clearly a type of determinism, Paul takes up the task of showing that if RT is consistent, then determinism must be compatible with man’s moral accountability and freedom, because RT, following Scripture, affirms both. Paul then waltzes his readers through classical compatiblism and the main objection against it (the "consequence argument", which is that there is no possibility of freedom given determinism). It is alleged that if we are not in control of all determining factors, then we cannot be free – a premise that has been affirmed (and denied) from within opposing camps. The lack of agreement is mostly due to ambiguity within the complaint.

Paul then moves to a discussion on semi-compatiblism, which strongly denies the freedom to do otherwise; it doesn’t posit hypothetical freedom, as do classical compatiblists. The position focuses on necessary conditions for moral accountability, which do not include an ability to choose between alternative possibilities, but do require “control,” which Paul later refines in light of man’s ability to be responsive to reason and innate understanding of moral responsibility.

Paul then takes on libertarian free will and its associated axiom that “ought” implies “can.” Within a deterministic framework we cannot do otherwise, but if “ought” implies “can," then determinism must undermine moral responsibility. He then addresses those libertarians who posit that what is required for moral responsibility is not libertarian freedom but rather that man himself is the ultimate source of his actions. A supporting argument would be that if an agent could be physically prevented from acting in any other way but one (such as with a Frankfurt counter example, or FCE) so as to ensure that no other choice is made, then no other choice could be made. If one can be kept from a contrary choice, then he could not act except but one way - yet he’d be responsible for acting when left to his own deliberation, which suggests that one need not have alternate possibilities in order to be morally responsible. FCEs help show that moral responsibility is not conditioned upon alternate possibilities. This illustrative theory is often used to support the premise that when man is the ultimate source of his action he has met the sufficient condition for moral accountability. Accordingly, it is maintained by "narrow source" incompatibilists that one can be responsible apart from alternate possibilities, if he is the ultimate source of his actions. (FCEs are useful for the determinist too.)Then Paul segues into agent-causality, a position which reduces to man being sovereign not just over his actions but his will too. 

(Digression: I can see how a Calvinist can make fair use of Frankfurt counterexamples but not libertarians. For within Molinism, for instance, "will choose x" does not imply "must choose x", a non-issue for determinists (for will implies must for a determinist). Naturally, a Calvinist would not be establishing ultimate sourcehood by the employment of FCEs, but he could defeat an objection against the ability to choose otherwise as being necessary for moral accountability, but such a defeater presupposes a deterministic metaphysic, which of course would not be persuasive to a Molinist; yet the argument would be valid (even sound) just the same. In other words, given a Molinist's metaphysic, a physical constraint to choose otherwise does not imply a metaphysical constraint to choose otherwise. So, for the Molinist, although the agent would be prevented from choosing other than x, he would still be metaphysically free to choose other than x. FCE's are a powerful tool in the right hands but not in the hands of libertarians, and I've digressed enough.)  

Eventually Paul's paper gets into synchronic tendencies in the Reformed tradition, where Paul is constrained to underscore that although there is liberty within the Reformed tradition to work out models of determinism (as long as they don’t get outside certain Reformed fence posts) there is no place to eradicate determinism from RT, as some seem to want to do. Paul interacts with quotes by contemporary Reformed professors, which demonstrate that confusion does abound over the matter of pure contingency and necessity. Paul interacts with Duns Scotus' view that is apparently being appropriated by some Reformed thinkers. Paul then gets a bit more polemical and employs a foreknowledge argument that incorporates an accidental necessity argument, which simply states that in the past are future tense truth propositions regarding creaturely choices. If it was true yesterday that Alice would choose x, then Alice's future choice of x is as necessary as the past.

Finally, Paul distinguishes between overcoming libertarian objections in the realm of conversion and overcoming them in the realm of most choices, "mundane" ones. That is a distinction that must be maintained, for there has been an argument floated out there at a renowned Reformed seminary that libertarian freedom is refuted by the doctrine of irresistible grace.

Paul’s desire in producing this work is to provoke thoughtful reflection and discussion within the Reformed community. I don't know of a better topic for him to have selected for the main objection to RT is its inherently deterministic doctrine. The confusion that abounds must first be cleared up within the camp if we’re to attract outsiders to RT. If more professors dumb down determinism, or exchange it for something else, then those attracted to the name RT will not be attracted to actual RT.

May God be pleased to grant increase to Paul Manata's most excellent work. 

R.S. Clark on the Free-Offer of the Gospel

R.S. Clark writes here:

Those predestinarians who deny the free offer usually do so because of some form of rationalism, i.e. they’ve set up things so that, unless they can provide a comprehensive explanation of how something works, it can’t be. Thus, because they can’t see how God can both predestine the elect and the reprobate and freely offer salvation to all, they conclude that it cannot be. They reject mystery. In contrast, the mainstream of orthodox Calvinism, including Calvin, has always embraced the mystery and paradox of the free offer. The Synod of Dort (whence the so-called “Five Points of Calvinism”) embraced this mystery: 

Moreover, the promise of the gospel is that whosoever believes in Christ crucified shall not perish, but have eternal life. This promise, together with the command to repent and believe, ought to be declared and published to all nations, and to all persons promiscuously and without distinction, to whom God out of His good pleasure sends the gospel (Canons of Dort, 2.5).

I posted on Clark’s site but he elected not to publish my post but rather email me.  I wrote:

What does it mean when a Calvinist says that God desires the salvation of the non-elect? Are we to believe that God desires men to regenerate and unite themselves to Christ? That’s what Arminians believe – that regeneration follows self-willed saving faith. The Calvinist who wants to argue for the free-offer should do so not like the Arminian but rather by arguing that God desires that He Himself would sovereignly regenerate the “reprobate” unto union with Christ and salvation. The question for the Calvinist is not whether God desires the reprobate to turn and live (Arminianism) but whether God desires to turn the reprobate so that he can live. I think the error of the free-offer should become clearer to the Calvinist when cast in that light. Cast in the light of “salvation is of God” – is it reasonable to think that the Holy Spirit desires to turn the reprobate toward himself when the Father did not choose the reprobate in Christ? Moreover, Christ did not die for the reprobate, let alone does he pray that the efficacy of the cross would be applied to the reprobate. Consequently, it is not available for the Holy Spirit to unite the reprobate to the finished work of Christ, lest the Trinity works at cross purposes.

In a word, not only can God not save the reprobate - 2000 years ago He punctuated that inability. For God to desire the salvation of the reprobate is to say that God – today – desires that Jesus would have died for the reprobate 2000 years ago. What can God desire in this regard other than the past be different? Does God live with any sense of regret?

It’s not rationalistic (but it is rational) to abandon a theological viewpoint when it undermines cardinal tenets of one’s theology – as does the free-offer as it stands in relationship to the soteriology of Calvinism and the internal consistency and coherence of the Godhead. No amount of mystery can resolve a blatant contradiction.

In response, Clark informed me by email that Calvinists have taught the free-offer. (He means well meant offer!) Correction, he informed me that Calvinists "HAVE" taught the free offer. He even assured me this was true by asserting it was “a fact.” Maybe that sort of thing settles matters in Dr. Clarks's classroom but bald, un-argued assertions don’t get far with me (even if they're shouted and proclaimed as "fact"). Let alone, in this case, Clark’s assertions did not address my post to him, which was not aimed at disputing what I believe to be a dubious account of Reformed history on this matter but rather the theological inconsistency between the free-offer and those tenets of Reformed theology that Clark and all Calvinists do confess.

Clark then added to his rhetoric by talking down to me, which too might gain him an edge in his classroom but not here. He suggested that I might not understand what is meant by the free-offer of the gospel.  

Moreoever, it's remarkable that a professor of theology thinks that this doctrinal statement is not compatible with the denial of the well meant offer (and that it actually supports it): “Moreover, the promise of the gospel is that whosoever believes in Christ crucified shall not perish, but have eternal life. This promise, together with the command to repent and believe, ought to be declared and published to all nations, and to all persons promiscuously and without distinction, to whom God out of His good pleasure sends the gospel (Canons of Dort, 2.5).”

What’s equally interesting is that Clark has recently written this on his site:

Rather, when our theologians spoke of the “evangellium oblatum,” i.e., “gospel offered” in preaching, they believed that it entailed a well and sincerely meant revealed divine intention that whoever believes should be saved.

Seems to me that the target just moved, or else Clark doesn't understand what the well meant offer entails! Certainly no Reformed person who denies the well meant offer would take issue with the sincerity of “whoever believes should be saved.” The point of contention, which Clark the historian has missed, is whether God desires salvation for those not elected unto salvation (and not whether God sincerely desires salvation for all who believe).

As noted elsewhere on this site, my primary concern with WSC is not their error per se but their proud and erroneous insistence that their view is the Reformed one.

Hit Counters

Confusion Over The Transcendental Argument For The Existence Of God

Generally speaking TAG is a deductive argument, but it is unlike all other deductive arguments. What sets TAG apart from garden variety deduction is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others – but unlike transcendental arguments that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience (or its denial). For instance, “If causality then God” merely means that causality is a sufficient condition for God and that God is a necessary condition for causality. Which is to say: if causality exists then it is logically necessary that God exists. However, such a premise does not delve into the question of how God and causality relate to each other. It does not tell us whether God exists because of causality or whether causality exists because of God. Causality presupposes God says more than causality is a sufficient condition for God and that God is a necessary condition for causality. If causality presupposes God then God must be logically prior to causality.

The transcendental argument for the existence of God is an argument that has as its conclusion God exists.

Prove A: The Christian God exists.
Step 1 ~A: (Assume the opposite of what we are trying to prove): The Christian God does not exist.
Step 2 (~A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience since God is the precondition of intelligibility
Step 3 (~B): There is intelligible experience (Contradiction)
Step 4 (~ ~A): It is not the case that God does not exist (Modus Tollens on 2 and 3)
Step 5 (A): --> God does exist (Law of negation.)
Q.E.D.

Whereas professing atheists are willing to concede the validity of the above argument Christians should happily concede that the argument is not only not fallacious (i.e. valid) but also sound. In other words, although professing atheists and Christians alike agree that the above argument has a valid form – i.e. the conclusion follows from the premises – Christians should agree that since the premises are all true and the form is valid the conclusion is true. But unfortunately Christians don't always grasp this point.

Christians often say that TAG does not achieve its goal because not every worldview is refuted in the argument. Such a claim simply demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope of TAG. The above argument is aimed to prove that God exists, which it does. To deny that it does is to reject logic and / or biblical truths. Again, the argument above has a specific conclusion, God exists. The conclusion of the argument is not that if God does not exist, then there could be no intelligible experience. In other words, the above transcendental argument does not aim to prove that God is the precondition for intelligible experience, though that is a premise used in the argument which is why the argument is transcendental. That is where Christians who oppose TAG get tripped up. They don’t appreciate what is being argued.

So what about step 2 of the argument? We can defend the premise of step 2 deductively by appealing to the absolute authority of Scripture. Of course the unbeliever rejects that authority; nonetheless that the unbeliever is dysfunctional does not mean that an appeal to Scripture is fallacious! After all, if a skeptic rejects logic should we then argue apart from logic? Since when does the dullness of an opponent dictate which tools of argumentation may be used? Of course, given the unbeliever’s suppression of the truth the Christian does well to defend step 2 inductively by performing internal critiques of opposing worldviews, which of course can only corroborate the veracity of step 2. It would be fallacious, however, to conclude because of such condescension toward the unbeliever that the conclusion of TAG (God exists) and the justification for its step 2 (God is the precondition of intelligibility) rest upon inductive inference. By the use of induction the Christian is merely acknowledging that the unbeliever refuses to bend the knee to the self-attesting Word from which step 2 can be deduced by sound argumentation. Since unbelievers will not accept the truth claims of the Bible and, therefore, a deductive defense of step 2 the only thing the Christian can do is refute the hypothetical competitors, but that hardly implies that step 2 cannot be proved by deduction.

Finally, it has been noted by some and popularized by Don Collet in the Westminster Theological Journal that the only way a transcendental argument may be formalized is thusly (TAG*):

C presupposes G if and only if both 1 & 2:
1. If C then God exists
2. If ~C then God exists

Given such a construct, we are no longer negating the metaphysicality of causality but rather the truth value of the predication of the metaphysicality of causality. In other words: ~causality (which is chaos) does not presuppose God so for the construct to make sense it must pertain only to prediction about causality. In other words, since non-causality is an impossible entity that defies creation, providence and intelligibility, such a formulation of TAG (TAG*) limits itself to predication only. Does the apologist really want to do that? Do we want to give up arguing that God is the precondition for the intelligible experience of actual causality? I think not. TAG* (as opposed to TAG) is indeed powerful but it does not pertain to anything other than predication; whereas TAG may pertain to predication and the reality that the predication contemplates.

Ron

A Letham Footnote on Adoption in Christ

"The current tendency, influenced by the pressure of gender-inclusive language, to refer to believers as "sons and daughters" of God is misleading, blurs this vital truth, and has the effect of blunting the church's appreciation of what union with Christ entails. Jesus Christ is the Son of the Father, and is so eternally; that is his name and that is his status. It is not a sexual term, for God is not a sexual being. By referring to Christian believers as "sons," the NT is not, under the influence of patriarchal culture, bypassing half the human race. Instead, it is pointing to our shared status with the Son of the Father, in and by the Holy Spirit. The introduction of talk of "daughters" obscures this point, placed at the hub of the Christian life." Robert Letham, Union with Christ (In Scripture, History and Theology), P&R Publishing, 2011, p. 54, fn 19

John Piper on God and Fathers

"The children will have years of exposure to what the universe is like before they know there is a universe. They will experience the kind of authority there is in  the universe and the kind of justice there is in the universe and the kind of love there is in the universe before they meet the God of authority and justice and love who created and rules the universe.

Children are absorbing from dad his strength and leadership and protection and justice and love…

And all this is happening before the child knows anything about God, but it is profoundly all about God. Will the child be able to recognize God for who He really is in His authority and love and justice because mom and dad have together shown the child what God is like?"

I recently read those thoughts, which were attributed to John Piper. I’m informed they came from This Momentary Marriage (Wheaton: Crossway, 2009) 143-144.

It’s hard to believe that anyone who claims to be Reformed could write such things. Thankfully, children have a priori knowledge of God through which they encounter him in every intelligible experience. Unfortunately, the author has not encountered Calvin’s Institutes, Book 1, at least in any lasting, impressionable way, let alone Bavinck, Van Til or Romans 1.

I appreciate the author's desire to see fathers reflect God's character. Notwithstanding, who is the father to teach his son about, a god who can be encountered only after the child is exposed to his earthly father's love (or hate)? Thankfully, children are spared this sort of thinking because they don't read the author, but father's who drink him in are not so fortunate.They are told they must teach the child about God before God can reveal himself to the child. The undiscerning father can get a warped impression of the magnitude of his influence upon the child, which can (i) put undue pressure upon the father (ii) cause the father not to rely upon God to do what only God must do and (iii) cause the father to think that the child has no innate knowledge of the Divine and that the child can only know what God is like through knowing what his father is like.

Regarding iii, by these calculations a child cannot be culpable for his sin because his sin would be against a god who is thought to be (at no fault to the child) imperfect just like his father, which implies no true God at all. Accordingly, No God => No Transgression...And, No Transgression => No Culpability. Moreover, this type of thinking suggests that a child cannot know his father is sinful because the child supposedly has no innate understanding of righteousness by which to assess his father's love.

The Piper quote above fits quite well with his view of invincible ignorance, which I touch on here.

More Leithart, Confession and the SJC

It is being argued by some that a tactical error was made by the prosecution, that they argued from the Confession more than Scripture. I think arguing from the Confession was the right move.

Peter Leithart vowed to uphold the system of doctrine taught in the Confession. Accordingly, in many ways it is much more efficient (and effective) to argue from the Confession and not Scripture.
Consider, not all who embrace the Confession use the same verses as proof-texts to demonstrate particular confessional doctrines. Yet those doctrines the Confession teaches are to be upheld regardless how one arrives at them. Yet if one arrives at them in an unsatisfactory manner, it weakens his case. Consequently, tactically speaking it’s safer to reference the clear statements found in the Confession.

What became a slightly more tricky part of the case is that although the WLC Q&A 68 mentions common operations of the Spirit that unbelievers may have, the Confession does not say too much about it; yet the writings of the Federal Vision, including Leithart’s, use this slice of doctrine as a kind of launching pad for their confusion over union with Christ. Their tactic has been to weave into the Federal Vision fabric (i) equivocal statements regarding baptism, (ii) the blurring of the visible and invisible church distinction and (iii) the common operations of the Spirit in the life of unbelievers. Yet even with all that to deal with, the Confession is sufficient to argue against such sophistry because the Confession not only does not affirm what Leithart has written it unambiguously denies his writings on these matters. That’s why I think using the Confession as a primary standard in the case was not only acceptable but even the best course of action.

That brings me full circle. I think it’s disgraceful, this Monday morning quarterbacking regarding what the prosecution did not do. The reason being is that it's most of the same people who are blaming the SJC for not upholding for the prosecution. Yes, the whiners want to have it both ways. They want to find fault with the prosecution's case and with the SJC for not agreeing with the case the prosecution delivered. What's even worse is the SJC is not only being faulted for the outcome of the case, but in the process the committee members are being accused for not being confessional and even worse being dishonest for not siding with the prosecution.

I can only wonder if the SJC would have responded differently to another approach, one that didn’t put Leithart’s beliefs on trial (whether intentionally or unintentionally), but instead ended up prosecuting him for his writings. When Leithart interpreted his writings in a very selective way that was more agreeable with the Confession, it should have been argued that the literal interpretation of his writings do not comport with his exegesis of them. That, of course, would have led to an impasse of sorts, unless something extraordinary happened. Then it might have been established that his writings both presupposed and implied that he thought he had discovered or rediscovered something novel for the church, but given that he really hadn’t it could have been proved that he was, therefore, unaware what Reformed theology has affirmed all along, that the visible church is to be regarded as God’s people. So, either Peter Leithart never understood the Reformed faith to begin with or else his writings were not intended to have been in concert with the Reformed faith in the first place (yet he now interprets them as such.) Again, I only mention this Monday-morning approach to the case because I don’t think the SJC was handed Leithart on a silver platter by any stretch, but they are being accused as though he had been.

Finally, after reading the transcripts I can say that I would not have wanted to have been in Jason’s shoes (or on the stand either). I thought some of Jason’s statements were very good and downright clever at times. I have no hard feelings over how the case was prosecuted and I have nothing but respect for the SJC and all those who poured their hearts into this matter these past several years.

How The Leithart Case Might Have Been Argued

Here I first wrote these thoughts (below) on Federal Vision back in June of 2010 on Greenbaggins. I have inserted recent comments in [ ]. Everything else is from June of 2010. Every bit of what is below applies to the Peter Leithart trial, but this sort emphasis and pursuit was for some reason not employed by the prosecution. Rather, witnesses for the prosecution were allowed to get distracted, yielding to hobby horses like the nature of grace and works in the prelapsarian covenant; law-gospel confusion promulgated by Escondido;and the imputation of the "active obedience of Christ" verses Christ's (perfect) righteousness. Now for what might have been basic to the trial, all of which, again, applies to Peter Leithart's theology:

1. FV affirms “that God formally unites a person to Christ and to His covenant people through baptism into the triune Name” and that “Baptism formally engrafts a person into the Church”

2. FV affirms “ that through our union with Him we partake of the benefits of His death, burial, resurrection, ascension, and enthronement at the right hand of God the Father.”

From 1 and 2 we can discern that Baptism automatically yields in at least a “formal” sense all the benefits of Christ’s work through a union that automatically is transmitted through the washing of water.

3. Yet FV also denies “that baptism automatically guarantees that the baptized will share in the eschatological Church.”

Those statements might seem to imply that existential union occurs at baptism (by the working of the works) yet that existential union can be lost since baptism does not guarantee a place in the “eschatological Church”.

4.However, FV also denies “the common misunderstanding of baptismal regeneration—i.e. that an “effectual call” or rebirth is automatically wrought in the one baptized.”

Accordingly, for me to make sense of all of this (1, 2, 3 and 4), I might be inclined to think that what FV means by 1 and 2 is that through water baptism one is united to the visible Church (this being the “formal” union and engrafting to which they speak), but because baptism does not automatically bring forth the new birth (4), there can be those who only share in the outward administration of the covenant as portrayed in 1 and 2, and consequently not end up saved in this life (4) and the life after (3). [Those sentiments are what Peter Leithart basically affirmed on the stand.] If that is all the FV means, then why not say, as the WLC Q&A 31 teaches, that the CoG was made only with Christ as the second Adam and with all the elect who would be united to him in the new birth? In other words, why not conceive the promise of the covenant of grace as pertaining ONLY to the elect, although administered to the entire visible church? If that is what FV means, then what have they brought to the Reformed church other than confusion (at best)? If that is not what they mean, then what are they trying to say? [The prosecution indicated a sense of this when WCF expert Robert Letham was on the stand. Yet the prosecution never pursued the matter with Leithart, the man on trial.]

I think they mean more because (a) Federal Visionists believe they have more to offer the church beyond the confessions, and (b) they make much to do about the identical union that all have through baptism. One prominent Federal Visionist says that the “same sap” runs through all the branches of the Vine, whether elected unto final salvation or not.

[A key point that remained absent from the prosecution's questioning is that Peter Leithart along with Federal Vision thought they had new insights. After all, Reformed is not enough. Accordingly, if nothing in Leithart's testimony was new to Reformed thought, then either he was not being truthful or he did not understand basic Reformation, confessional-theology in the first place. Either way he his credentials would be suspect. Furthermore, the prosecution applied statements of Leithart's to the invisible church when Leithart claimed they applied to how we are to regard members of the visible church. (Such was even done  as late as yesterday on Greenbaggins by the prosecutor in the case.) Yet the incongruity of the plain meaning of words was not pressed to the point of two possible conclusions, perjury or unclear communication, again both unbecoming of officers in the church.

Yet the real point of contention in the case was the quality of "faith" the reprobate can have even though its "duration" was admittedly not unto glory. Leithart drew a proper distinction, teased out by a lawyer on his side of the case, but the workings of that theology and how it relates to other points of theology was left uncovered by the prosecution. The "common operations of the Spirit," the real crux of the matter, was not thoroughly dealt with. It wasn't even superficially dealth with, which I found odd given that the case boiled down to the manner or degree in which the unbeliever can be united to Christ and participate in kingdom life.]

Case in point – a pastor now associated with Confederation of Reformed Evangelical Churches candidated at my church prior to our considering and calling our existing pastor. While enjoying a cigar with this man on my porch on the Lord’s Day he preached to our congregation, I challenged him on some of his FV leanings. His position at that time was that there are those who are engrafted into Christ that share in the same operations of the Spirit as the elect. I challenged this man, asking him to elaborate on the elect’s assurance (even infallible assurance) of salvation given his view that some with the same measure of the Spirit can and will fall away from Christ. In other words, if those with the witness of the Spirit can fall away, then how can assurance of final salvation be obtained in this life? His response was concise and without ambiguity. Without pause he said that he took exception to the Confession’s chapter on assurance of grace and salvation. Although we finished the cigar and went back to evening service, I was confident at that very moment that this man would not receive the call. When I emailed the pastor to tell him my verdict and what my recommendation to the search committee and session would be, he responded by saying that he misspoke, went back and re-read the Confession and actually can affirm that men can be assured of their salvation. I was thrilled to hear that he came around on the matter but disheartened that he had such a fragile handle on the matter. That is just ONE reason why I don’t find most Federal Visionsists heretical but rather simply muddled. That man, BTW, was ordained in the OPC and actually at one time had pastored a church in the denomination.

“We affirm that there is only one true Church, and that this Church can legitimately be considered under various descriptions, including the aspects of visible and invisible."

This is one of the most troubling statements of the FV. [Though even that has been met with disagreement of late at Greenbaggins by two non-FV people citing Berkhof and Hodge. See recent post of mind of days ago, which addresses the matter.] The statement communicates that there is only one church, which can be described in terms of its being visible and invisible. The implication of such a construct is that the invisible church and the visible church are the same church. From that false premise comes much confusion and outright error. To make the point more clearly, consider the following modification of the statement: We affirm that there is only one true God, and that this God can legitimately be considered under various descriptions, including the aspects of transcendence and immanence. The modified statement, which uses the same construct of the FV statement, clearly communicates that the one transcendent God is the same God as the immanent God. That is true. Transcendence and immanence are simply two aspects of the one God. Is the FV statement true in this way? Is the visible church the same church as invisible church? The FV statement clearly implies that they are one and the same; for it states that there is “only one true Church” that can be described in various ways, like visible and invisible. How can they claim such a theology and also claim to be Reformed?

In contrast to FV theology, now consider Reformed theology: “The catholic or universal Church, which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect, that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one, under Christ the Head thereof; and is the spouse, the body, the fullness of Him that fills all in all…The visible Church, which is also catholic or universal under the Gospel (not confined to one nation, as before under the law), consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion; and of their children: and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation.”

Note the difference. Within Reformed theology the invisible and visible churches are not the same church. The invisible church consists of the elect who will all possess Christ, whereas the visible church consists of those who profess Christ. On that basis alone, the FV may not be considered “Reformed” in any sense of the word.

It is not a matter of whether these men are muddled or ravenous wolves; their doctrines are at best confusing and at worst damnable. I also agree with Lane ["Greenbaggins"] when he intimated that this matter would not beep nearly as much on the reformed radar screen if the proponents of FV confined themselves to one locale, say the CREC. In the end, I do believe the fire has been well contained and that the ones who remain within the confines of the PCA are on a very short leash, under close watch and at best smoldering. They have been given a fair hearing in many quarters and consistently have been found wanting. For that we can all be grateful. June, 2010

The SJC, Whiners and Moving Targets

There are sundry complaints floating about regarding the SJC's decision regarding the Peter Leithart case. (i) The SJC should have overruled the presbytery’s decision. (ii) By not doing so the PCA condones or will be perceived as condoning Federal Vision. (iii) The BCO needs to be amended.

Those three complaints seem to be a progression of thought. Once it became apparent that the SJC might have exercised good principles in not overturning the Presbytery’s decision the unhappy crowd turned to a pragmatic argument, the ramifications of the SJC’s decision not to overrule the Presbytery’s decision. Now that those assertions are being challenged and debunked, the flavor of the day seems to be the supposed weakness in the BCO.

Regarding (i), we must keep in mind that the SJC was not permitted to take into account any evidence other than those things pertaining to the trial itself. Imagine, for instance, the SJC basing a guilty verdict on evidence not argued at the trial. To have done so would have been to find a man guilty without him having an opportunity to defend himself.

 

Regarding the trial itself two thoughts come to mind regarding Peter Leithart’s testimony. First off, nobody seemed to rejoice that Leithart affirmed Reformed theology under oath. That alone tells me that those going after him (before, at and after the trial) were doing so with a vengeance. It’s a sad day when people would sooner see a man censured than confess orthodoxy. (I saw the same thing with the Kinnaird trial.)

Secondly, a link I was sent included this quote from the Aquila Report.

“Leithart’s tactic in defending himself in trials has been to deny that the language he uses means what everyone for hundreds of years has agreed that it means...”

If that is indeed Leithart’s modus operandi, or at the least his reputation (whether true or not), then why wasn’t it anticipated by the prosecution? Even if not anticipated, if Leithart's testimony was at odds with his writings, then shouldn't he have been pursued at the trial on the basis that if he has not violated the ninth commandment under oath, then he is not fit for the office of teaching elder due to equivocal language on crucial points of theology? Yet that conclusion was not argued at the trial. Given that reality, on what basis could the SJC overturn the verdict? The trial testimony showed Leithart to be Reformed in all his dealings and based upon (i) the SJC was not in a position to try the prosecution's case for them.

Regarding (ii), the PCA does not condone Federal Vision. Their study report was superior and appropriately more nuanced than even the OPC’s, and it spoke out against the theology of Federal Vision. Now I suppose it’s possible for one to sincerely infer that the PCA condones Federal Vision, but I don’t think for a moment that those who are saying such things today really believe it. In any case, let someone bring forth an actual argument that the PCA condones Federal Vision; or that the implication is they do; or that it might be rationally inferred that they do. (One problem is, the ones asserting such things also don’t realize that there were no actual arguments presented to indict Mr. Leithart. Secondly, a movement wasn't on trial, a man because of his theology was.)

Regarding (iii), how is the BCO to be amended without becoming Episcopalian? Do we really want to see Presbyteries rely on the SJC more than it should?

I see all this as a fine providence and outright victory for Presbyterian government. If a man is guilty of something, the presbytery better do its job.