Reformed Apologist

A Couple of Oldies But Goodies by Michael Butler

2012-01-06T15:05:00.003-05:00

Here is a very accessible introduction to Presuppostional Apologetics, written by Michael Butler (Greg Bahnsen's protégé).

Also, here is a more detailed explication of the Transcendental Argument for God's Existence, also by Michael Butler.

No True Agnostics or Atheists

2011-12-26T04:43:00.001-05:00

The professing agnostic's claim is not that God does not exist but that God's existence is unknown or unknowable. Therefore, the professing agnostic presupposes a god who has at best concealed himself, which is an outright rejection of the God who has revealed himself (and must be known if anything is to be known), making the professing agnostic a non-confessing "atheist."

Lastly, there are no true atheists, though there are people who suppress the truth in unrighteousness and profess what they know is not true.

The Escondido Theology

2011-12-22T23:39:00.005-05:00

The Escondido Theology - A Reformed Response to Two Kingdom Theology By John Frame

Book Description: "This book is a critical analysis of a theological movement John Frame calls The Escondido Theology. The name is chosen because this movement developed mainly among faculty members of Westminster Seminary California
which is located in the city of Escondido, California. Some members of this school of thought, such as Michael Horton, Meredith Kline, and Darryl Hart, are well-known to students of Reformed theology. But these figures have never before been discussed as composing a distinctive school of thought. More often they have been discussed as individual theologians, or simply as representatives of the orthodox Reformed theological tradition. But they are not simply Reformed; they hold views that are quite distinctive, unusual and controversial. In Dr. Frame s view, these positions are not standard Reformed theology. None of their distinctive positions is taught in any of the Reformed confessions. These positions are an idiosyncratic kind of teaching peculiar to the Escondido school. Those who teach them are a faction, even a sect. Taken in the plain sense of the terms, their positions are all unbiblical. Dr. John Frame's The Escondido Theology is a needed corrective to the rapidly growing advocacy and acceptance of a two-kingdom approach to theology and culture. It is not only timely, considering the popularity of Two Kingdom Theology , but also because he is the right individual to address the issues, having previously served as a Professor at both Westminster in Philadelphia and then as a founding faculty member at Escondido. Dr. Frame personally witnessed the inception and development of this doctrinal view in Escondido. Dr. Frame s insight and analysis clearly represents my Christian World and Life View because it is historically rooted in Calvinistic theology."

Endorsements

Dr. John Frame has taken up the theological issue of Two Kingdom Theology and demonstrated his qualifications in addressing this popular view currently being advocated by various Reformed professors at Westminster Seminary in California. Dr. Frame provides critical insight and analysis of each Professor s published views advocating this doctrinal teaching. The tone and attitude of Dr. Frame is distinctively Christian and his response is clearly Reformed. Whether you advocate for or against Two Kingdom Theology, this book must be read prior to making any final determination as to the biblical and Reformed teaching on the subject. --Dr. Kenneth Gary Talbot President, Whitefield Theological Seminary

Frame has lived to see a vocal segment of the robust, rich tradition in which he was educated transformed into a narrow sectarianism that anathematizes other orthodox, Bible-believing Christians; elevates theological and church tradition to near equal status with God s Word; and diminishes that Word as the norm for all of life and thought. This book is the agonizing jeremiad of an older prophet who sadly diagnoses a desiccating illness of a friend and offers a prescription for a wholesome healing. Dr. P. Andrew Sandlin President, Center for Cultural Leadership --Dr. P. Andrew Sandlin President, Center for Cultural Leadership

In these pages John M. Frame clarifies in rather crystal clear terms what many of us have suspected for years: that the Escondido theologians, though claiming the Reformed heritage, are nonetheless out of accord with many of its most fundamental tenets. Broad in treatment, penetrating in scholarly analysis, and avoiding ad hominem, Frame builds a persuasive case the entire Protestant church should take the time to investigate. The sections that scrutinize the two kingdoms perspective of the Escondido teachers show especially the extent to which they have compromised a staple of Calvin s thought: the Lordship of God over all things." Dr. John Barber Pastor, Cornerstone Presbyterian Church --Dr. John Barber Pastor, Cornerstone Presbyterian Church

About the Author

John Frame is presently Professor of Systematic Theology and Philosophy at Reformed Theological Seminary in Orlando, Florida. He previously served as a Professor at both Westminster Seminary in Philadelphia and then as a founding faculty member at Westminster Seminary in Escondido, California.

Robert Letham: Union with Christ: In Scripture, History, and Theology

2011-11-24T23:12:00.003-05:00

Book Review: Robert Letham, Union with Christ: In Scripture, History, and Theology

Excerpt from review:

The second insight is Letham’s much-appreciated stress on the soteriological import of the incarnation of the Word of God, reminding us that the very theo-logic of salvation is wrapped up in the mystery of the incarnate God-man. The incarnation shows us in the clearest possible way that God’s redemptive intention is to join us to himself through the life-giving humanity of Jesus Christ. The incarnation, in Letham’s words, “is the indispensable basis for our union with Christ. Since Christ has united himself to us in the incarnation, we can be united to him by the Holy Spirit” (40). When evangelical theology loses sight of the saving significance of the incarnation, it is bound to myopically stress forensic, substitutionary understandings of salvation at the expense of the personal, participatory reality that undergirds them. Marcus Johnson (Ph.D. St. Michaels College, University of Toronto) is assistant professor of theology at Moody Bible Institute, Chicago, IL.

Created Time?

2011-11-20T12:52:00.002-05:00

It is argued from “time to time” that if time was not created then history could never have reached any point in time. In other words, if there has always been time then an infinite amount of time must elapse in order to reach any point in time, which is seemingly impossible to us. Defenders of the Cosmological argument often use this argument to avoid a problem of infinite regress. Apologists who don’t employ Thomistic arguments do so as well.

Although I believe time is part of creation, I think such a defense of the creation of time could possibly undermine God’s infinite attributes, such as omniscience, or at the very least require that we think about omniscience a bit differently. After all, isn’t such a defense for the creation of time predicated upon the premise that nothing infinite can be exhausted by God? Yet wouldn’t that mean God has not thought every number? Does omniscience imply that he has and if so, then can’t God place creation in “the middle” of time, which would imply that infinite time has elapsed?

I don’t believe that time is self-existent nor do I believe it to be a divine attribute. Also, I have no reason to believe that God has eternally willed that he always be accompanied by time (i.e. “prior” to the first day). I believe time is created, but I’m not terribly comfortable with the argument that is used from “time to time."

My books are all in boxes because I'm relocating my study, but if memory serves John Frame in "The Doctrine of God" makes a passing comment on this created-time argument to which I refer and although he finds it somewhat persuasive, I believe he had a reservation or two, maybe that the argument goes beyond the bounds of Scripture alone. If someone reading along can locate the quote, please post what you find.

Stephen Michaud Sermons in Ephesians & Drumming from Erfurt, Germany

2011-11-11T17:59:00.002-05:00

Reverend Stephen (Steve) Michaud, pastor of First Reformed Presbyterian Church in Cambridge, Massachusetts is currently taking his congregation through Ephesians.

Steve, a dear friend and relation by marriage, not to mention a man of fine taste, is not only a theologian par excellence, he is a fusion monster drummer to boot. Steve, no doubt, passed up a career in music and probable fame in order to serve the Lord another way, as a minister of the gospel.

The "message" in the video is at 3:12, when a difficult providence "works together for the good" of an already spectacular solo.

Martin Luther received theological degrees in Erfurt, Germany.

A most excellent wife...

2011-11-09T10:17:00.004-05:00

An excellent wife who can find? She is far more precious than jewels.The heart of her husband trusts in her, and he will have no lack of gain.She does him good, and not harm, all the days of her life. She seeks wool and flax, and works with willing hands. She is like the ships of the merchant; she brings her food from afar. She rises while it is yet night and provides food for her household and portions for her maidens. She considers a field and buys it; with the fruit of her hands she plants a vineyard. She dresses herself with strength and makes her arms strong. She perceives that her merchandise is profitable. Her lamp does not go out at night. She puts her hands to the distaff, and her hands hold the spindle. She opens her hand to the poor and reaches out her hands to the needy. She is not afraid of snow for her household, for all her household are clothed in scarlet. She makes bed coverings for herself; her clothing is fine linen and purple. Her husband is known in the gates when he sits among the elders of the land. She makes linen garments and sells them; she delivers sashes to the merchant. Strength and dignity are her clothing, and she laughs at the time to come. She opens her mouth with wisdom, and the teaching of kindness is on her tongue. She looks well to the ways of her household and does not eat the bread of idleness. Her children rise up and call her blessed; her husband also, and he praises her: "Many women have done excellently, but you surpass them all.” Charm is deceitful, and beauty is vain, but a woman who fears the LORD is to be praised. Give her of the fruit of her hands, and let her works praise her in the gates. Proverbs 31:10-31

Federal Vision and Its Use of the Objective (A Road to Rome)

2011-11-09T00:18:00.007-05:00

It would seem that Federal Vision has a view of common operations of the Spirit that allows for an unbeliever's existential union with Christ, which of course gets them into trouble should they ever try to ground assurance for the converted-elect in the Spirit’s testimony. Why, in other words, can’t the non-elect have assurance of pardon and final adoption if they indeed receive the Spirit in such measure? What ends up happening is that there becomes no place to ground assurance for the converted if any person with that measure of the Spirit can fall away from the faith.

At the very least, if one can have assurance of final salvation, then those texts pertaining to common operations of the Spirit must imply something less than what FV suggests. If one can know that he will make it in the end, then the assuring witness of the Holy Spirit must not accompany those sorts of operations of the Spirit in the non-elect. Will FV proponents at least agree on that, that the Spirit does not confirm present salvation in such instances since the divine granted assurance of final adoption, which the non-elect cannot have, is predicated upon assurance of present salvation? If so, then what work of the Spirit do they suppose is lacking in those of whom those texts speak? Do they have union, just not assurance of union?

I find it most curious why FV has gotten themselves into this obvious bind. What I think FV might have done in part is taken the objective criteria that the church must employ to regard one as God’s child and has collapsed it into the individual’s criteria to judge himself whether he is truly in Christ, leaving the individual needing more for assurance – God’s internal witness of adoption granted by the Spirit to the individual, which FV cannot affirm as something to look to given their view of Spirit-wrought union that can be supposedly received by the non-elect.

Sadly, the truly converted under FV standards is left with zero assurance of salvation (not unlike Rome's doctrine of assurance) because (i) those with the Spirit may fall away and (ii) the objective standard the church must work with to judge one’s salvation status is not enough for someone to gain personal assurance of actual salvation, for the church is to regard closet case unbelievers as saved as long as (for instance) they have received Christian baptism and if old enough have improved upon it with a credible testimony, {which of course may not be denied (i.e. found incongruous) by personal doctrine or lifestyle}. In other words, people who rightly should be on church roles by sound ecclesiastical standards can prove themselves in time as not being truly of us, but given no clear theological distinction between the visible and the invisible church that is consistent with an internal witness by the Spirit of adoption that only comes to the converted, the implications are (i) some people actually lose their salvation and (ii) nobody can know they will arrive at final salvation, which in turn presents another problem for FV, this time regarding salvation by works, the very thing they would like to avoid...read on...

It seems to me that FV makes persevering faith a work that distinguishes one man from another – i.e., one will persevere if he keeps himself in the faith. In other words, it seems as though FV allows for elect and non-elect persons to receive the same measure of the Spirit and union, which seems to suggest that what distinguishes one man from another must be man, not God. Again, if both receive the Spirit, then man is deciding factor on final adoption, hence the lack of assurance available to those who are actually decreed to final adoption. Under FV, those decreed to final adoption have no more of Christ than those who are supposedly regenerate but not decreed to final adoption.

At the end of the day, collapsing ecclesiology into soteriology like the FV does is in my opinion no worse than Rome’s error of confounding justification with sanctification.

Vatican Calls for "Central World Bank" to Be Set Up

2011-10-26T10:15:00.002-04:00

Dispensationalists should like this.

Question Begging From Another Radical 2 Kingdom Proponent

2011-10-20T09:46:00.025-04:00

More question begging from the Radical 2 Kingdom camp, this time by Darryl Hart.

Indeed, one can have a justification for x while not being able to offer it. So, to use Darryl Hart’s example, one can have a justification for discerning curves from fastballs while being incapable of articulating that justification. In such cases what one lacks is the ability to articulate a justification - he does not lack having a justification. Notwithstanding, we ought not to think that because one can know something apart from being able to articulate a justification that, therefore, giving a justification is superfluous, or that those true beliefs that are not self-consciously justified must be as credible as those that are self-consciously justified. Let's not pretend that the ability to justify a belief is morally irrelevant, or that a robust justification lends no force to a rational defense of a belief.

The article leaps from (a) the premise that people do know things they aren't prepared to justify to (b) the grand implication that offering a robust justification for beliefs is of little use if only we can muddle through without having to give one. In the final analysis, the article begs the question of whether there actually exists an epistemic justification for laws in general and civil laws in particular and whether that justification is available to us, let alone useful for society. So, once again, R2K confounds the ability of societies to function apart from Scripture with the question of whether there is a moral imperative to apply Scripture to society whenever possible. In essence, R2Kers reason in the same fashion we see in the comic above. They have a preconceived conclusion that they'll arrive at any which way they can.

I might as well mention here that the Bahnsen reference employed by Darryl Hart is terribly misapplied. Bahnsen (with Van Til) thought that men know things that they are unwilling, even incapable of justifying. Accordingly, the reference with respect to one being reduced to absurdity does not speak to the question of whether men know how to count, or whether men know there should be degrees of punishment for transgressions. Nor does it pertain to the reasonableness of men holding to such beliefs they aren't prepared to justify. Certainly Bahnsen did not count it foolish for secular governments to dish out harsher punishments for rape than driving five miles over the speed limit. Not at all, for there is nothing contained in Bahnsen's theonomic thesis that would have prevented him from appreciating that societies can and do function apart from any sort of self-conscious epistemic warrant. What Bahnsen deemed foolish was not the implementation of law by unbelievers but rather the mindset that would abandon any hope in the only ultimate justification of such abstract entities. His issue was with the arbitrary and inconsistent manner in which unbelievers oppose themselves in their reasoning. The Bahnsen reference pertains to men not giving an account (an articulated justification) for their counting - it does not imply that men, unaided by Scripture, do not know how to count or aren't justified in their counting.

R2K might be the most unifying movement today within the Reformed tradition. Non-theonomists and theonomists alike oppose R2K. It reminds me of Dwarves and Elves uniting against Orcs.

Dr. Robert Letham on Union with Christ

2011-08-15T13:23:00.004-04:00

Robert Letham's new book, Union with Christ: In Scripture, History, and Theology can be ordered here.

Also, to get a taste of this subject, listen to Lane Tipton here.

A Word or Two About Apologies

2011-08-07T17:50:00.003-04:00

A four point household policy on apologies:

1. On the heels of an apology one may not make an excuse.

2. On the heels of an apology one may not seek an apology. It may be sought later, but not immediately after acknowledging one's own guilt for if one is truly sorry, he will be focused on the hurt he or she has caused. Delay also allows time for the first person's humbled state to lead the other person to the same state of contrition. Also, requesting the apology on the heels of asking forgiveness can be occasion for hardening the other person who has not yet owned his or her need to apologize and has not yet internalized the apology that was just given only moments ago.

3. Household members should strive to appreciate that to reject an apology is serious business, for all our apologies to the Lord are meager given who He is, and we are to be mindful that in the Lord's Prayer we are asking to be forgiven in the manner in which we forgive. Accordingly, it should be with fear and trembling that one rejects an apology.

4. There may be no if-then apologies: "If I sinned, then I'm sorry." Such an apology actually implies that one doesn't believe he sinned, and that he or she is not sorry. For had the person thought he sinned, then the apology wouldn't be conditional. And given that the "if-then" in this case really means "if and only if I sinned, then I'm sorry,” then it stands to reason that the person is not sorry at all.

Paul Manata: Free Will for Reformed Dummies

2011-07-28T12:57:00.018-04:00

“I don't know how many times I have asked candidates for licensure and ordination whether we are free from God's decree, and they have replied ‘No, because we are fallen.’ That is to confuse libertarianism (freedom from God's decree, ability to act without cause) with freedom from sin. In the former case, the fall is entirely irrelevant. Neither before nor after the fall did Adam have freedom in the libertarian sense. But freedom from sin is something different. Adam had that before the fall, but lost it as a result of the fall.” John Frame

Plain and simple, Reformed folk, especially pastors and professors, need to wrap their minds around a Reformed understanding of the workings of the human will and how it relates to God’s decree and moral responsibility. Confusion abounds, or as Paul Manata puts it, there is no “unified message” among Reformed thinkers and many prominent ones are “apparently at odds with each other.” I agree, which is why I am exceedingly well pleased to see that Paul has put his mind and skill to this important matter and provide the Reformed community with a timely primer on free will and moral responsibility.

If one is looking for a polemical defense of Reformed Theology (RT) as it relates to determinism, freedom and moral culpability, Paul’s paper is probably not for you. Paul aims at a different target and hits it in the bullseye. He aims to lay the groundwork for fruitful reflection and discussion while showing that RT is inherently a kind of determinism, and that RT entails harmonious compatibility between determinism, man’s freedom and moral accountability. Paul defends his general thesis by concise appeals to the Westminster Confession of Faith, with reference to its teachings on God’s eternal decree, divine providence and exhaustive omniscience, which includes foreknowledge. Again, Paul is not setting out to defend RT per se as it relates to these matters, but rather define RT as it relates to them, as well as establish some suitable boundaries or fence posts from within intramural discussions can take place. That is not to say that his paper is void of any defense of RT in this regard, but that is not his primary focus. In fact, Paul spends considerable time walking his readers through the thought process of non-Reformed positions.

Paul, playing off John Feinberg’s classifications of necessity, draws a distinction between what he calls “nature determinism” and “act determinism." That man acts according to his nature is not an argument against libertarian freedom, nor is it an adequate defense of a Reformed stripe of determinism. Although Reformed thinkers confuse the two and often strictly argue in accordance with nature determinism, in doing so they beg most crucial questions and in the process look foolish in front of skilled Molinists.This distinction also plays into the erroneous idea that by establishing irresistible grace, libertarian freedom is refuted.

After setting the stage by showing that Reformed theology is clearly a type of determinism, Paul takes up the task of showing that if RT is consistent, then determinism must be compatible with man’s moral accountability and freedom, because RT, following Scripture, affirms both. Paul then waltzes his readers through classical compatiblism and the main objection against it (the "consequence argument", which is that there is no possibility of freedom given determinism). It is alleged that if we are not in control of all determining factors, then we cannot be free – a premise that has been affirmed (and denied) from within opposing camps. The lack of agreement is mostly due to ambiguity within the complaint.

Paul then moves to a discussion on semi-compatiblism, which strongly denies the freedom to do otherwise; it doesn’t posit hypothetical freedom, as do classical compatiblists. The position focuses on necessary conditions for moral accountability, which do not include an ability to choose between alternative possibilities, but do require “control,” which Paul later refines in light of man’s ability to be responsive to reason and innate understanding of moral responsibility.

Paul then takes on libertarian free will and its associated axiom that “ought” implies “can.” Within a deterministic framework we cannot do otherwise, but if “ought” implies “can," then determinism must undermine moral responsibility. He then addresses those libertarians who posit that what is required for moral responsibility is not libertarian freedom but rather that man himself is the ultimate source of his actions. A supporting argument would be that if an agent could be physically prevented from acting in any other way but one (such as with a Frankfurt counter example, or FCE) so as to ensure that no other choice is made, then no other choice could be made. If one can be kept from a contrary choice, then he could not act except but one way - yet he’d be responsible for acting when left to his own deliberation, which suggests that one need not have alternate possibilities in order to be morally responsible. FCEs help show that moral responsibility is not conditioned upon alternate possibilities. This illustrative theory is often used to support the premise that when man is the ultimate source of his action he has met the sufficient condition for moral accountability. Accordingly, it is maintained by "narrow source" incompatibilists that one can be responsible apart from alternate possibilities, if he is the ultimate source of his actions. (FCEs are useful for the determinist too.)Then Paul segues into agent-causality, a position which reduces to man being sovereign not just over his actions but his will too.

(Digression: I can see how a Calvinist can make fair use of Frankfurt counterexamples but not libertarians. For within Molinism, for instance, "will choose x" does not imply "must choose x", a non-issue for determinists (for will implies must for a determinist). Naturally, a Calvinist would not be establishing ultimate sourcehood by the employment of FCEs, but he could defeat an objection against the ability to choose otherwise as being necessary for moral accountability, but such a defeater presupposes a deterministic metaphysic, which of course would not be persuasive to a Molinist; yet the argument would be valid (even sound) just the same. In other words, given a Molinist's metaphysic, a physical constraint to choose otherwise does not imply a metaphysical constraint to choose otherwise. So, for the Molinist, although the agent would be prevented from choosing other than x, he would still be metaphysically free to choose other than x. FCE's are a powerful tool in the right hands but not in the hands of libertarians, and I've digressed enough.)

Eventually Paul's paper gets into synchronic tendencies in the Reformed tradition, where Paul is constrained to underscore that although there is liberty within the Reformed tradition to work out models of determinism (as long as they don’t get outside certain Reformed fence posts) there is no place to eradicate determinism from RT, as some seem to want to do. Paul interacts with quotes by contemporary Reformed professors, which demonstrate that confusion does abound over the matter of pure contingency and necessity. Paul interacts with Duns Scotus' view that is apparently being appropriated by some Reformed thinkers. Paul then gets a bit more polemical and employs a foreknowledge argument that incorporates an accidental necessity argument, which simply states that in the past are future tense truth propositions regarding creaturely choices. If it was true yesterday that Alice would choose x, then Alice's future choice of x is as necessary as the past.

Finally, Paul distinguishes between overcoming libertarian objections in the realm of conversion and overcoming them in the realm of most choices, "mundane" ones. That is a distinction that must be maintained, for there has been an argument floated out there at a renowned Reformed seminary that libertarian freedom is refuted by the doctrine of irresistible grace.

I suppose I could go on and on (in fact I know I could), but time simply does not permit. Paul’s desire in producing this work is to provoke thoughtful reflection and discussion within the Reformed community. I don't know of a better topic for him to have selected for the main objection to RT is its inherently deterministic doctrine. The confusion that abounds must first be cleared up within the camp if we’re to attract outsiders to RT. If more professors dumb down determinism, or exchange it for something else, then those attracted to the name RT will not be attracted to actual RT.

May God be pleased to grant increase to Paul Manata's most excellent work.

The Necessity of the Divine Will (by way of a polemic against man's free will)

2011-07-21T18:04:00.014-04:00

Arminians are strange birds at times (but maybe so are we Calvinists). They hold to something that has commonly been referred to as libertarian free will (LFW), which is basically the ability to choose between alternatives with equal ease. It’s also been referred to as the power of contrary choice. They argue (or just assert) that without LFW man cannot be morally accountable for his choices. If they argue, it goes something like this. If man is morally accountable, then he can choose contrary to how he will. Man is morally accountable, therefore, he can choose contrary to how he will. (Principle of Alternative Possibilities - PAP)

Here is a very user-friendly refutation against LFW:

Now where many Calvinists get a bit uncomfortable is when the tables are turned back on them. Does God have LFW? Well, most Calvinists will say no, God does not have LFW. Yet what they give with one hand, they take away with the other. They don’t want to say that God has LFW, but they don’t want to say that God is unable to choose contrary to how he chooses.

Again using the proof, though with some modification, let’s see if God could have not chosen to create:

1. Choices are either caused or uncaused.
2. If a choice is uncaused, then it comes from nothing and is, therefore, morally irrelevant.
3. Choices are morally relevant.
4. Therefore, choices are caused (and, therefore, necessary by definition).
5. The causes of choices are chosen or not chosen.
6. If causes of choices are chosen, then an infinite regress of choices and antecedent-causes precede any choice.
7. An infinite regress of causes and choices is impossible, therefore, the causes of choices are not chosen.
8. Choices are causally necessitated by something not chosen. (4 & 7)
9. Creation is caused by choice.
10. Creation is a caused by something causally necessitated and not chosen. (8 & 9)
11. Something caused by something that is causally necessitated would itself be equally causally necessitated (and therefore could not be otherwise by definition).
12. Creation is something
13. Creation could not be otherwise. (10 – 12)

Calvinists will sometimes say things like “If creation was necessary, then creation has claim on God.” That was actually said to me several years ago by John Frame. My reply was simply that creation does not have a claim on God but his eternal intentions do. Why should it seem strange that God cannot act contrary to what he wants most to do? After all, if it is actually true that agent A will do X in state of affairs S, then it is also true that agent A must be inclined to X in S in order for X to obtain, lest pure contingency (i.e. something from nothing) obtains. Yet if it is true that A can refrain from X in S, then it is false that A must be inclined to X in S (for the possibility of of refraining from X implies that A need not be inclined to X); yet the truth of X presupposes that A must be inclined to X in S. Therefore, since inclination is necessary for X, then X is caused.

Calvinists can introduce mystery into the mix along with the creator-creature distinction and even paradox if they like, but nothing can change the fact that LFW is a philosophical surd and no amount of mystery, creator-creature distinction, or paradox (whatever that might mean to someone) can undermine what is patently false. The only thing left to say, as Frame said to me, is "Well, maybe God has an unrevealed attribute that is somewhere between pure contingency and necessity, something like LFW but not really LFW." (I paraphrase but that's pretty close to it.)

Finally, in common parlance someone even like myself might say without contradiction something like "I could have chosen differently," but that simply underscores that the choice in view was made according to liberty, a freedom to choose as as one likes, which is nothing akin to the radical "freedom" that LFW contemplates.

Christian Cruises - What Say You?

2011-07-17T14:49:00.000-04:00

Taken from here

This means, too, that God did not create a separation between "secular" and "sacred," as many Christians today often do. Christians were meant to participate alongside non-Christians in every aspect of life. Reformed theology has no place for "Christian cruises" and "Christian media," "Christian books" and "Christian music." There is no "full-time Christian ministry" and "secular work," but vocations or callings for everyone. In creation, too, there is the gift of "common grace." "The rain falls on the just and the unjust alike," Jesus told the disciples. Michael Horton, 1993

Taken from here

I’m so excited to share this news with you: on January 30, 2012, the White Horse Inn is setting sail on our very first conference at sea! This Caribbean cruise will be unlike anything you have ever experienced and now is your chance to join us for what we’re calling “Conversations for a Modern Reformation.” White Horse Inn, 2011

Two non-theonomic reviews of David VanDrunen's "A Biblical Case for Natural Law"

2011-07-17T12:47:00.001-04:00

Nelson D. Kloosterman’s review of A Biblical Case for Natural Law, by David VanDrunen

John Frame’s review of the same.

Radical 2 Kingdom & The "General Equity" of the Law

2011-06-27T22:06:00.004-04:00

The Westminster standards teach that the general equity of the civil code given to ancient Israel is still binding upon civil magistrates today. When it comes to the execution of blasphemers radical 2 Kingdom (R2K) proponents will assert that the general equity for the death penalty under Moses is now excommunication from the church. A popular proponent of the R2K movement posted me a while back saying:

"Since you continue to insist on general equity, what is the general equity of executing blasphemers (Deut, 7 Deut; 13)? I haven’t heard where you go with that or how it might apply to the Christian magistrates treatment of Mormons and Jews. I believe that the general equity is excommunication."

It’s hard to imagine that such thinking has received a place within the Reformed community and even on some Reformed sessions.

That the church has a responsibility to deal with sin does not imply that the state does not. In fact, it is a common fallacy to argue for a repeal of directives that pertain to the state from directives that pertain to the church. One could just as well argue that the state should not discipline professing-Christian rapists because the church should censure them. It's rather apparent, is it not (?), that under the guise of preserving the general equity of civil sanctions, R2K proponents would prefer to see them replaced without remainder.

Maybe R2K proponents would like to distinguish for the rest of us how their view of applying the general equity of the civil case laws differs from an outright abrogation of those laws. If their view of "general equity" is for all intents and purposes no different than abrogation, then why should their interpretation of " general equity" seam plausible and confessional? The church doesn't need the "general equity" of the civil case laws to know it should censure blasphemers. Consequently, since the church apart from the case laws already has exhaustive instructions on spiritual matters pertaining to censure - how can it be maintained that the case laws are not indeed abrogated given that they are rendered useless under such an R2K interpretation of the Westminster standards? If the case laws no longer apply to the civil magistrates and are no longer to resemble the original penal sanctions in any respect, how can it be maintained that they are to be preserved in their general equity? R2K is not an affirmation of the preservation of the general equity of the civil case laws but a blatant denial of it.

It is simply arbitrary (and hazardous) to operate under the principle that one is not accountable to the state because he is accountable to the church. There was excommunication under the older economy, a “cutting off” (an exile of sorts), that was not accompanied by OT execution. Yet in God’s wisdom both were operative, presumably with distinct purposes. Accordingly, it seems a bit dubious that excommunication is equitable to execution, if for no other reason than the translation does not preserve the general equity of the civil sanction! The two aren’t even close to being equitable because, at the very least, repentance lifts the penalty of excommunication, which was not the case for capital crimes under the older economy.

Let’s not pretend any longer, shall we? By collapsing execution into excommunication the general equity of the sanction is not preserved but rather obliterated. But R2K proponents cannot admit that because in their autonomous thinking and quest for civil pluralism they also fancy themselves as the keepers of the Confession, while too often being historically inaccurate and theologically incorrect.

Now I have not argued here that public blasphemy is a crime punishable by death (though I am certain it is). The point I am making here is not that blasphemers should be put to death (for treason in God’s universe), but that it is a farce (and serious falsehood) to suggest that one may harmoniously affirm R2K and the Westminster standards. It is one thing to take exception to the Westminster standards and quite another thing to promote a misinterpretation of those standards. My Baptist and Arminian brethren do so all the time, take exception to the Reformed standards. However, their practice pales insignificant to those who would take exception to the Confession while claiming they don’t.

Letham Messages

2011-06-19T22:24:00.005-04:00

Here is a link to select sermons and lectures by Dr. Robert Letham.

Jonathan Edwards, A Gross Misrepresentation

2011-06-16T15:15:00.011-04:00

In Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, edited by Paul Helm and Oliver Crisp we find the following quote:

On Edwards understanding, a conditional analysis is in the offering here. “I can A” is always “I can A, if I choose,” which in turn goes to “If I choose to A, I will A.” So to say I can lift this rock is to say that if I choose or will to lift it, I will lift it. So far, so good, perhaps. But if responsible freedom belongs to the operations of will as well as to overt action it must also be the case that I can choose to A, and – to turn Edwards’s own argument against him – there the analysis clearly doesn’t work. We get, “If I choose to choose to lift this rock, then I will choose to lift it,” which is completely implausible, and leads to a regress. We can improve things somewhat if we ignore Edwards’ failure to distinguish choice from prevailing desire, so that “I can choose to lift this rock” becomes, “If my strongest desire is to lift this rock, then I will choose to do so.” But this really isn’t plausible either. For one thing, there are many situations in which we think the exercise is actually impaired by the strongest desire – for example, when the agent suffers addiction or psychological compulsion, or is affected by post-hypnotic suggestion. Such cases deserve special treatment, but surely if determinism were true we should not consider the freedom of such agents to be impaired, since certainly their decisions would be different if they were not afflicted by compelling motives. So it doesn’t work in this case to submit the concept of freedom to conditional analysis. And why should it, after all? This analysis treats the will as thought it were imprisoned in the natural order – as thought its operations were no more spontaneous, and finally of no greater moral interest, than those of our house pets. Why should we expect this to be our concept of freedom, if the phenomenology of willing is entirely opposite?

I'll interact with the post in small bites.

What, then, shall we say about the formula according to which such freedom comes to nothing more than the ability to act differently if we please, or if we will? On Edwards understanding, a conditional analysis is in the offering here. “I can A” is always “I can A, if I choose,”

Edwards does not utter a word such as “can” without enormous qualification, for one reason because of the vulgar-language baggage that comes with such a word. These qualifications that are embedded throughout Edwards’s writings are a deterrent for most people to try to muscle through Edwards’s view of the will, or any other treatment of his, which spanned a vast multitude of subjects. But in any case, given such a broad-brush portrayal of Edwards view of the will in light of conditional analysis, it can safely be said that “I can A, if I choose” can only mean for Edwards that “I can A, only if my strongest inclination at the moment of choice is to A.” Also, “I can” must presuppose no external prohibitor, for “can” in this discussion is not a matter of natural ability (a common use of the term, hence Edwards’s qualifications) but rather must be thought of as metaphysical claim that also implies “I cannot A, unless I’m inclined to A.” (I can grab a taco, only if my strongest inclination at the moment of choice is to grab a taco.)

“I can A, if I choose,” which in turn goes to “If I choose to A, I will A.” So to say I can lift this rock is to say that if I choose or will to lift it, I will lift it. So far, so good, perhaps.

Given the terms being employed, the statement, again - if it is to reflect Edwards’s thought, must mean “If my strongest inclination at the moment of choice is to lift the rock, then I will lift the rock.” It is most equivocal to use “will” in two different ways in the same sentence, and to equate “choose” with “will”, especially without explication, is hazardous. It’s doubly criminal to do so when trying to critique another person’s view, especially one who was hyper-careful in this regard.

But if responsible freedom belongs to the operations of will as well as to overt action it must also be the case that I can choose to A, and – to turn Edwards’s own argument against him – there the analysis clearly doesn’t work. We get, “If I choose to choose to lift this rock, then I will choose to lift it,” which is completely implausible, and leads to a regress.

The interpretation of Edwards that leads to “If I choose to choose to lift this rock, then I will choose to lift it,” is based upon a gross imprecision having to do with the tagging of terms. Anyone even half-way acquainted with Edwards appreciates that he denies that one ever chooses his inclinations, and that his argument against such an Arminian implication took the form of a reductio that led his opponent into that very problem of regress. So only a reckless (or malicious) interpretation of Edwards can construe that Edwards's arguments implied such a thing. In fact had his arguments been so blatantly flawed, one would expect such gross inconsistency to have been observed and exposed even moments after he penned such notions. But the reason that didn't happen is not because the philosophers of his day didn't see the inconsistency; rather, the inconsistency was not there to be seen, for the inconsistency is based upon a formulation that is not Edwards's. At the very least, I know of no person who claims to be Edwardsian that holds to that supposed formulation of Edwards's view of the will, which in turn leads to inconsistency. The contributors for JEPT have erected a classic straw man by employing equivocal terms, and then knocked it down. Again though, given the terms being employed, the statement, if it is to reflect Edwards’s thought at all, may only be taken to mean, “If my strongest desire / inclination at the moment of choice is to lift the rock, then I will lift the rock,” which does not imply a position that under analysis implies regress, let alone an internal contradiction within Edwards's own view.

We can improve things somewhat if we ignore Edwards’ failure to distinguish choice from prevailing desire, so that “I can choose to lift this rock” becomes, “If my strongest desire is to lift this rock, then I will choose to do so.”

Edwards’s failure to distinguish choice from prevailing desire?! Is there anyone in the history of the world who spent more time defining and distinguishing ideas such as desire and choice? Not only did Edwards do so; he did so ad nauseum.

But this really isn’t plausible either. For one thing, there are many situations in which we think the exercise is actually impaired by the strongest desire – for example, when the agent suffers addiction or psychological compulsion, or is affected by post-hypnotic suggestion.

That remark is even more obviously confused. Granting any one or combination of such effects on inclination, the simple response is that when one’s inclination is altered, the consequent-action still follows an antecedental inclination. Indeed, the inclination that might have otherwise been present apart from such factors is no longer present, but that does not undermine the plausibility of the thesis as it narrowly pertains to the mechanics of the will. It can only lend implausibilty to the question of responsibility, though it doesn't.

Now we’ll turn to the driving emotive force behind the attempt to make much out of impaired thinking.

Such cases deserve special treatment, but surely if determinism were true we should not consider the freedom of such agents to be impaired, since certainly their decisions would be different if they were not afflicted by compelling motives.

Determinism does not rule out an impaired mind, let alone inclinations that can be altered to something other than what they might have been apart from alteration.

So it doesn’t work in this case to submit the concept of freedom to conditional analysis. And why should it, after all? This analysis treats the will as thought it were imprisoned in the natural order – as thought its operations were no more spontaneous, and finally of no greater moral interest, than those of our house pets. Why should we expect this to be our concept of freedom, if the phenomenology of willing is entirely opposite?

Spontaneity, properly understood, is not undermined by conditional analysis that is true to the position in question. Emotive phrases such as “imprisoned in the natural order” have little value in a discussion such as this, but I suppose they can be deemed necessary when there's not much more to be said. Regarding mind-alteration as it applies to moral responsibility, maybe the contributors hadn't considered that responsibility need not imply potential for guilt, though it usually does.

Trinity & Paradox

2011-06-07T23:24:00.042-04:00

It has been rightly argued by some that we can distill these claims from the Athanasian creed:

1. The Father is God.
2. The Son is God.
3. The Spirit is God.
4. The Father is not the Son.
5. The Father is not the Spirit.
6. The Son is not the Spirit.
and,
7. There is only one God.

An apparent contradiction in view is:
A. f = g (premise)
B. s = g (premise)
C. f ≠ s (premise)
D. f = s (from 1, 2, by transitivity of identity)
Contradiction or Paradox?

It seems to me that these conundrums can be dealt with in many ways by adding additional biblically informed propositions to the incomplete ones. Simply replace some of the abbreviated premises with premises that contain more biblical truth and paradox disappears, yet without being able to uncover the mysteries of the Trinity. (i.e. The solution is rational but ought not to be considered rationalistic.)

Equivocal terms lead to unreliable conclusions:

It should be noted up front that there is a semantic difference between is and =, for x is y does not imply y is x; yet x = y is equivalent to y = x. (Please don't read on without digesting that.) The leap from what x is (found in 1-7) to what x equals (the complaint in the "apparent contradiction" i.e., A-D) is fallacious, which I trust will become apparent. (Even the popular diagram to the top right is misleading. For on thing it does not imply that the Son and Holy Spirit are both God.)

Points 1-7 (which utilize "is") imply that three distinct persons all share in the one divine nature and occupy what can be called "the same divine space". So far, so good. Points A-D that follow (which utilize "=" instead of "is") leads to confusion (and supposed paradox). Points 1-7 and A-D must be nuanced, for 1-7 does not imply the conclusion of A-D, which is not only an apparent contradictory but rather a real contradictory.

First, with respect to the confusing four points (A-D), the only way Jesus equals God is if Jesus and God are numerically identical - exactly the same without remainder. Yet God can mean Trinity, which Jesus is not. God can also mean the person of the Holy Spirit, which Jesus is not. Finally, God can mean the person of the Father, which Jesus is not. Accordingly, to say that "Jesus equals God" and the "Father equals God" is equivocal at best and if taken literally leads to modalism because identity is transitive, which would mean that Jesus and the Father are the same person.

With respect to points 1-7, indeed, we should rightly say that Jesus is God because Jesus shares the divine essence: he is very God of very God, but that is not what is implied in points A-D when things such as "Jesus = God" are stated. In other words, if what is meant by "Jesus is God" is that that Jesus equals God, then of course that would be incorrect. But that is not what is typically meant by "Jesus is God", which makes reference to his divine nature, one in being with the Father.

Jesus is a specific person. Accordingly, if Jesus equals God, then God must equal Jesus and, therefore, must be a specific person (the same as Jesus), which would preclude any other person from sharing in the divine nature such as the Father, which in turn would undermine the doctrine of the Trinity. So yes, Jesus is God because Jesus is divine, but Jesus and God are not synonymous terms - for if they were synonymous terms, then "Jesus is God" could be equated to "God is Jesus". (In simple terms of analogy, Jim is human does not imply Jim = human.)

Jesus does not equal God, for the Father and the Holy Spirit are also God yet are different persons than Jesus. There is more than one God-person in the Godhead, all of whom mutually indwell the other two. There is only one triune-God, that in three persons and oneness of being lives in perfect harmony.

More on the equally ultimate, unity and diversity:

The Father is God just as the Son is God, but an essential property of the Father’s deity is his relationship to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Being distinct persons, there are differences between the members of the Holy Trinity. The Father is not God apart from his intra-Trinitarian relationships. These relationships are essential properties of his personhood. Accordingly, f does not equal s because neither f nor s have the same intra-Trinitarian relationship with the other two divine persons in the Godhead. So, as we fill in what it means for f and s to be g, we do so not in a vacuum but with other biblical propositions in view, informing us of g as it pertains f and s. Indeed, it is true that f is g and s is g, and if that was the end of the story we might be in trouble. Without further elaboration, f is g plus s is g is consistent with modalism, so we needn’t be surprised that such constructs, though true, must be interpreted through a biblical lens in order to avoid heresy.

Although I don’t deny the prima facie intuitive notions surrounding 1-7 that can lead to a conundrum, it can be maintained on the consistency of God and his desire to communicate to his people that those intuitive notions that appear logically problematic can disappear when we presuppose additional revelation, which is not to say that mysteries can be solved. Logic cannot solve true mysteries, but biblically informed logical pursuit can demonstrate that certain doctrines are not actually seemingly-contradictory. It’s when we think intuitively, which is to say apart from Scripture, we can get in trouble. As I've noted elsewhere, that's an insight of Van Til's apologetic but not one that I think he carried into this thinking on paradox. (For instance, when we use only experience unaided by revelation we can think one essence necessarily implies one person; when we presuppose Scripture we can know that proposition is false.)

Finally, the original formulation if it is interpreted as allowing for f=s, (which is prior to the intra-Trinitarian elaboration that forbids such an interpretation), ends up implying that the sending of the Son was arbitrary, which means the Son could have sent the Father. The arbitrariness is not demanded by the original construct (1-7), rather it comes as a result of an interpretation of the original construct that does not consider other biblical truths, such as each divine person in his intra-Trinitarian relationship with the other two divine persons. In other words, without, for instance, an elaboration of how the Son relates to the Father, 1-7 might be wrongly inferred as implying an apparent contradiction, leaving it open that the Son could have sent the Father. In the final analyses, the original construct of 1-7 is true and it is fine as far as it goes; I believe it is most suitable for a creed, but it is not a full blown theology of the Trinity, which a creed ought not to be.

Finally, regarding the arbitrariness noted above (an idea I gleaned from Robert Letham's writings), there is good reason to believe that there is an actual appropriateness that the Son was sent in the incarnation and not the Holy Spirit, but the first construct is void of such implication.We may learn of the ontological relationship through the economic activity, as Dr. Letham rightly pointed out in his review of Dr. Robert Reymond’s Systematic Theology. So for example (and as Dr. Letham has written here) the submission to Father by the Son reveals something of who the Son is prior to his incarnation, which is consistent with the turning over of the kingdom to the Father by the Son in the eschatological consummation.

More on Paradox

2011-05-30T03:14:00.006-04:00

If God is good, then he cannot ordain evil. God ordains evil and is good. Therefore, I have to accept "by faith" that although what appears contradictory is not. I'm to believe what appears to me to be defeated. Some Reformed Christians actually say that we are to think that way. We are to believe what we think looks false.

Greg Bahnsen had a response to that problem had by so many, which is commonly called the problem of evil. His answer was simply that God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil he ordains. With Bahnsen, I find that response sufficient to remedy any apparent contradiction between God’s goodness and his determination of all things including evil, but I don’t find the additional premise to be a stroke of genius by any stretch. The apparent problem had by so many is that they judge goodness by carnal standards, forgetting that God defines goodness and what is acceptable behavior for himself. (Note: That God defines goodness does not imply that goodness is arbitrary.)

That God’s goodness and his sovereign determination of evil appears contradictory to some hardly implies that it should appear contradictory to all. It’s simply too grand a claim to suggest that if some perceive contradictions then others should.

One might even expect to have a better chance of alleviating apparent contradictions by beginning with a simple presupposition that says there need not be any apparent contradictions. The belief in apparent contradiction can make one not only lazy but also very unjustified in his theology, just like by not believing that the inverse operation of subtraction is always addition can make a child think his wrong answers could be correct though they don't check out just right by performing the inverse operation. The less partisan will find the analogy acceptable, whereas those who blindly follow Van Til will no doubt throw the rationalistic flag at this juncture. Notwithstanding, the point that can be received by the less fearful who are brave enough to be their own man is simply that once we become committed to our ability by grace to alleviate apparent contradictions within God’s word, we might end up working a bit harder at resolving them rather than letting the axiom of apparent contradiction cause us to accept things as true that really appear false to us. Now of course this comes at a price. There must be a willingness to accept the label rationalistic, but what’s the alternative, believing in something that appears false yet while hoping it is not?

Now some might say that we have reason to believe what appears false and that reason is the church teaches it, which reduces the belief to an inference short of knowledge if that's all the belief is based upon. There is a subtle distinction that must be teased out from such a theory. It pertains to the difference between a justification for believing something is true and a justification of the facts themselves that are believed to be true. I can believe a doctrine is true because the church teaches it, but it’s quite another thing to know those teachings are true. Such a justification of the truth of the church's teachings can only come from God. This is not to say that the God does not speak through the church, for he does. Notwithstanding, if one is basing a theological propositional belief on something other than God's testimony, then such a belief can hardly account as knowledge of the truth.

How can we know truth while it appears false? What would be the warrant for believing what appears to be a defeated proposition? If one says God's say-so, then why if I'm to believe what appears false ought I not disbelieve what appears true?

Not only do the following passages teach that we’re to hear from God and not men on these matters, the Confession's addresses cited below, in concert with Scripture, commend such a practice. (Matt. 16:13-17; John 4:39-42; Galatians 1:11, 12; I Thess. 2:13; WCF 1.5 and 1.10; WCF 14.2) Note well that Paul when battling the Judaizers did not even cite the apostles but rather Christ alone in his defense of the gospel he knew to be true, for he did not receive it by man but from God.

In a nutshell, contradictions take the form of p = ~p, so if a doctrine is to appear contradictory it must appear to take that form. Until one shows how any Christian doctrine appears to take that form, he fails to show that any doctrine actually appears contradictory. But it gets much worse than that. Until one shows that any doctrine takes a contradictory form, he fails to show how it appears contradictory even to himself! Consequently, not only have these people failed to show that Christian doctrines are apparently contradictory, a universal claim of theirs that applies to every person – they even fail to show that they appear contradictory to them personally.

The only contradictions I’m finding are in their reasoning. They assert apparent contradiction and fail to demonstrate any.

Christian Paradox

2011-05-27T16:39:00.010-04:00

Also, check TurretinFan on this matter.

Many well meaning Christians, even Reformed Christians, believe that many Bible doctrines must be embraced though they are seemingly contradictory. These Christians believe that many mysteries of the faith (if not all things ultimately) are really paradoxes, antinomies or apparent contradictions, same thing for our purposes. These apparent contradictions, though said not to be real, appear to imply a false orthodox proposition, since contradictions always contain a false proposition. For example, if God is one, then it would seem that God cannot be comprised of three persons who are all God, for one is not three. Consequently, one of the two orthodox horns appears false. Either there are three Gods or God is not one; yet since the Trinity is an orthodox doctrine, the antinomy must be embraced. Christianity ends up being apparently contradictory but not really. In other words, Christianity appears contradictory but it really isn't. Professing atheists have a field day with such lobs. Rather than the Christian’s apologetic appearing as aspirin tablets at the top of the knees low and away, we end up lobbing watermelons in the wheelhouse when we speak that way.

Does anybody really believe that we are to embrace as true both x and ~x at the same time, in the same sense? At the very least, I would hope that no Christian believes that we are to accept as true something that is actually false. But what about this – Are we to believe certain doctrines that appear false? Many Christians say “yes”. Some even say “YES!” It is believed by more than a few that some if not all doctrines must(!) appear contradictory - if we’re to remain humble and not let logic cloud our biblical reasoning. Accordingly, not only are we to accept doctrines that at first glance appear paradoxical to the rational mind, we simply cannot get around being subject to apparent contradictions. In other words, given our finitude and God’s infinitude, it is alleged that certain doctrines, even all doctrines, will always appear contradictory because of the “Creator-creature” distinction, a distinction I embrace with all my orthodox heart,soul and mind yet without letting it lead me down a dead end alley of skepiticism.

In order for two or more propositions to appear contradictory, I would think, in my creaturely finitude, that they must actually appear to take the form of a contradiction. After all, these supposed paradoxes are not claimed to be apparently consistent but rather apparently contradictory. So ask yourself, what is a set of propositions that looks like a contradiction and sounds like a contradiction but is not a contradiction? Clarkians will answer “A Van Tillian musing, of course!”

If the apparent contradiction imbedded in a particular doctrine cannot be made to disappear, then what rational hope is there that the apparent contradiction is not a real contradiction? How can an actual contradiction be distinguished from an apparent one if the apparent seems actual from a creaturely perspective? After all, is there an acid test to distinguish real contradictions from ones that aren’t real but look real?

Until one reconciles an apparent contradiction, I don’t think he has any business embracing both horns of the supposed contradiction. (I appreciate that there are transition periods in one’s thinking but we’re not to live in a perpetual state of transition over any given doctrine. We are to prayerfully wrestle with things and press on.) Now then, let’s say one embraces Jesus’ humanity, which entails a localized body, yet also embraces the real presence of the mass. He would embrace what appears to him to be an apparent contradiction, which in this case would be a real contradiction. He would embrace something he thinks appears false, and in this case is actually false. Not good.

Now let’s move to two orthodox horns of what is a conundrum for some. Let’s say one embraces a Reformed view of God’s foreordination of all things along with human moral accountability, yet finds those concepts contradictory. If those concepts are truly contradictory then one of the premises must be false. If one is willing to accept what appears false, then why not the real presence? What would be the basis of accepting one false looking doctrine over another? To simply say that we’re to embrace the seemingly false doctrines the Bible teaches and leave the other false interpretations alone isn’t a workable principle. It's a recipe for arbitrariness and inconsistency.

Moreover, I find it highly improper to call any particular pair of doctrines an “apparent contradiction” because of the universality of the claim. It’s not only an unjustified claim; it’s a false claim too. What is seemingly contradictory to one person can be perfectly harmonious to another since apparent contradictions are not objectively contradictory but rather only perceived as such. Actual contradictions are universal, whether anyone appreciates them or not; yet apparent contradictions are subjective and only apply to those who think, for example, that the eternal decree an human responsibility are seemingly incompatible. Accordingly, it’s simply a misnomer to call any particular doctrine an apparent contradiction because of the idiosyncratic nature of each person’s level of confusion. I find it even a bit arrogant when one asserts that this or that doctrine is paradoxical since the who would voice such a claim would be setting himself up as the measure of another man's capacities, as if he were saying, “I perceive these doctrines as seemingly contradictory, therefore they are apparently contradictory (to all humans), but of course these parallel lines meet in the mind of God.” Now that might be a big pill for some people to swallow, but certainly such people are not saying anything like: “I don’t believe these doctrines need to appear contradictory (if they are indeed orthodox doctrines), but at the moment I’m still working through some things and I believe they might not be contradictory to others. The problem must be with me.”

Some helpful hints moving forward

If someone wants to assert a paradox, it might be helpful to identify the contradictory premises and show why either must be false. As soon as he shows how either one must be false, then should abandon that one. If he can’t show that one must be false then he hasn’t come across an apparent contradiction, now has he? Confusion does not imply contradiction.

So for example, how would one go about proving that the existence of Paris does not conflict with the existence of New York to one who thinks it appears that these two cities cannot exist in harmony? It would be helpful for the one who thinks there is a conflict to put forth his perception of the conflict. The confused one should explain what he thinks is the contradictory nature of the supposed paradox. I’ve been waiting for years to hear why it is seemingly contradictory that God’s foreordination of my actions, which proceed from my intentions, somehow alleviates my responsibility for my actions. God has a morally sufficient reason for the good and evil he determines, and I am responsible for what I do. These two propositions aren’t on a collision course; they’re simply on different tracks. Accordingly, there's not a whole lot to be reconciled.

True humility (coupled with half a sense) appreciates that to embrace something that appears false is not spiritual but in fact foolish. Only someone who is confused would say it looks false but I must embrace it out of humble obedience to God. Whereas one with more understanding will say it looks false so I must be missing something either in my overall theology or on this particular point. I either need to change some governing presupposition(s) or else get a better handle on this new item of consideration.

Another example might be helpful. One might reason from common experience that persons have a beginning, but since the Second Person of the Trinity had no beginning, the eternal sonship of the Second Person is an apparent contradiction. Yet such a paradox disappears when we let God define for us the realm of possibility as it relates to persons, finitude and being. In other words, these propositions are seemingly contradictory to the carnal mind that is not subject to the word of God, but when we let God’s word inform our thinking the propositions do not appear at odds with each other in the least. With that example in mind, the astute reader might find a terrible irony in all of this. It seems to me that Van Tillians are to get their framework for the possible realm from Scripture, and if we begin with Scripture to inform our thinking on what defines reality etc., apparent contradictions, which always incorporate autonomous thought, go away. When Scripture informs us of truth and the realm of possibility, we get a whole host of new propositions to play with, which is something CVT grasped well yet did not incorporate into his thinking in the realm of paradox. With Scripture as our presupposition, we begin to see that three persons and one being (descriptive of God) is as coherent as one person and one being (descriptive of man). The latter in one sense is more common to our experience, but the former is no less revealed to our minds. (It can even be argued that the latter is more common to our experience given that we are bombarded with the one and the many every moment of every day.) Since both are revealed truths, we don’t have a contradiction of x and ~x, but rather we find a harmonious x and y. If we’re talking about x and y, then there was no apparent contradiction between two x’s to begin with but rather only imprecise terminology that needed to be fleshed out a bit more. It’s the person who reasons apart from Scripture that finds himself with x and ~x. It’s only when we think in terms of necessarily one being = one person, which is not a revealed truth, do we run into problems with the Trinity in this regard.

Does all that make me a non-Van Tillian? Well, what are the essential properties one must maintain to be called a Van Tillian, or a Calvinist for that matter? Regarding the former, is it enought to believe that the Triune God is the necessary precondition for intelligible experience, and that Scripture is the justification of all knowledge, and to predicate against God one must presuppose that a common creator provides a fruitful connection between my mind and the external, mind-independent world? Is it enough to believe that formally the believer and unbeliever have much in common but in principle they disagree on everything? Does one need to embrace Calvin’s Geneva to be a Calvinist? I remember Greg Bahnsen while lecturing on the Westminster Confession saying that God’s determination of creaturely choices and man’s responsibility are not seemingly contradictory doctrines but only mysterious. Was he not Van Tillian? Regarding the problem of evil, Bahnsen noted that God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil he ordains. To put it in Gordon Clark’s terms, God is not answerable to anyone but himself.

Finally, nobody is saying that Christian doctrine can be exhausted in our finitude. All that is being said is that seemingly logical contradictions can be removed from doctrines that are pure. If I cannot relieve the tension, then I’ll be constrained either to change my overall theology or dig harder to learn why a new proposition that confronts my old thinking is not at odds with my existing theology. That’s how I became a Calvinistic paedobaptist. It is just not available to earnest Christians to embrace what appears to be contradictory, which is not to say we can exhaust the depths of the doctrines we know in part, or that mystery must be denied. It’s not to raise logic above God’s word, nor is it to be too rational (whatever that means). When did irrationality become a virtue?

Indeed, there are many Christian tenets that remain mysterious to my mind, but I am unaware of any antinomies contained therein. Nor do I believe that because I’m incapable in my finitude of plumbing the depths of any proposition that I’m consigned to a world of incompatible propositions. Biblical faith does not call us to embrace what appears to be false, which is why I can reject the alleged transubstantiation of the mass in good conscience.

Camping Prediction More Probable Than Those of Most Evangelicals

2011-05-18T05:40:00.011-04:00

Harold Camping's prediction of a May 21 judgment day is more likely to come true than the predictions of most evangelical pastors. If Camping is right, then he made a lucky guess and consequently optimistic Amillenialism is based upon faulty exegesis, an unlikely scenario. On the other hand, all dispensational pastors are definitely wrong on their general description of the end times. Even if we allow dispensationalists to pick every date from now until the end of the age as their prediction for a pre-tribulation rapture, they’d still be wrong. No one will be left behind.

The ramifications are striking. Dispensationalists are wrong about a doctrine that is often more thoroughly explicated in their respective church covenants than the doctrine of Justification by Faith Alone, or the Holy Trinity for that matter. At the very least, I hope that all Reformed Christians believe it is more probable that (i) Jesus will return on May 21, 2011 than (ii) he will return in stages and unbelievers will occupy pilotless air craft. The former is highly unlikely whereas the latter is an absurd impossibility.

Obviously Camping is a heretic - given his ecclesiology if nothing else, but let's not lose perspective, shall we? Most of evangelicalism is confused on this matter of Jesus’ return, yet are sensible enough not to make date-predictions. Notwithstanding, their general predictions of how things will unfold are more disturbing than Camping’s predictions, at least for me. Camping has excommunicated himself from the Christian church, so his exegesis (or in this case his numerology) is of little or no concern to me. I am exceedingly more concerned about evangelicals like John MacArthur, for instance, who refuse to renounce such silly rapture teachings that bring reproach upon Christ’s church from the inside. Indeed, Camping is an embarrassment but not to the church, for Camping is not a member of the body of Christ. He's a fringe-fanatic and nothing more.

More on Merit

2011-05-14T01:13:00.001-04:00

Condign merit presupposes that the recipient of reward has claim upon it rooted in pure justice, which is not a factor in congruous merit, which presupposes that the giver of reward finds it appropriate or fitting to bestow reward upon a recipient. The latter entails a magnanimous posture of the giver, whereas the former entails moral obligation toward the recipient that is predicated upon actions that have intrinsic value worthy of honor and reward. Regarding what is known as the Covenant of Life, Reformed folk should appreciate that both condign merit and congruous merit have no biblical support.

Many Reformed thinkers posit a form of ex pacto merit, a reward that is due not out of what is fitting to bestow or out of intrinsic value of good performed that warrants reward but because of contractual terms. In other words, ex pacto merit implies meritorious reward that is due a recipient because the terms of a compact sanction blessings in exchange for something done. Specifically, an increasingly popular idea is that Adam would have merited a confirmation in righteousness, translating him into a glorified state, had he obeyed the terms of the Covenant of Life for the entire alleged probation period. Not only is that view widely held in Reformed circles, it is also thought that to deny it is to undermine the gospel.

Ex pacto merit is best considered from at least two vantage points. First, was there an offer of confirmation in righteousness in the prelapsarian covenant? And secondly, if Adam was offered a glorified state as part of the terms of that covenant, would it be equivocal to say he was in a position to have merited the outcome, eternal glory?

Regarding the first question, an affirmative answer is not deducible from Scripture. By drawing analogies to the Second Adam who entered into glory upon completion of his earthly work, it is often presupposed that Adam could have earned an eternal state, but that of course entails question-begging as it pertains to God’s covenant with Adam, as opposed to deducing an answer from premises found in Scripture. Such a notion of merit implicitly denies Sola Scriptura (and the laws of deduction). Turning to the second question, allowing for a moment the speculative notion that Adam was offered confirmation in righteousness and resultant glory (as opposed to perpetual communion with God without any prospect of ontological transformation), if one agrees that there is no place for condign merit, then he should agree that it would be equivocal at best to say that Adam could have “merited” glory. Even had the terms of the covenant prescribed such an outcome as wonderful as eternal glory, it is nonsensical that one can “merit” reward from another who receives zero benefit from the one being rewarded. Mustn't on some level the one issuing reward (in this case God) receive benefit from the one being rewarded if we're to call the outcome "merited" and not unmeritied favor bestowed? After all, when God discharges the wages of sin, it is because he is justly offended, is it not? Shouldn't the reverse hold true? If one is it to earn a reward from God, shouldn't God owe a debt that is a matter of justice deserved and not merely a matter of contractual terms that are not an essential property of God? At the very least, wasn't the entering into covenant a matter of divine condescension? Is God lacking in something that Adam could have filled-up? Secondly, I find it even more absurd to think that a creature could by good works merit something from God when such good works would require God to effect in the creature those works necessary to obtain the reward. What is it after all to merit something based upon a performance that requires the one who is to issue the reward to bring to pass the performance of the performer?! Yes, you have heard right, libertarian freedom is a metaphysical surd even for the prelapsarian era, something that escapes too many Reformed folk, even seminary professors. Wouldn't Adam even prior to the fall have owed his willing and doing of God's good pleasure to God alone? Or was Arminianism true before the fall and just not after? In the third case, in common parlance when one merits something the reward received is in accordance with the magnitude of work performed. So, in sum, how can good works for a finite period of time that are efficaciously wrought in man by God’s determination and providence (no less) wherein God gets nothing in return be the grounds for meriting such a disproportionate reward, relative to the work performed, such as an eternal state of not being able to sin, a state of non posse peccare?

For Adam to have performed sufficient works in order to have been confirmed in righteousness he would have needed that which only God could have supplied; the reward would have been greater than the work performed; and the work would have been of no benefit to the one bestowing the reward. Now if one is willing to admit all that, then he should also acknowledge that to call such work “meritorious” is to make "merit" a vacuous term. I'd simply prefer to consider such pure condescension on God’s part as unmerited favor toward a creature. Yet aside from tagging speculative ideas with inappropriate and misleading terms, it is an even greater monstrosity to pass such musings off as the Reformed position, let alone essential to the gospel.

Finally, it's interesting to me that the infralapsarian position seems to require such a prelapsarian compact, for in the infralapsarian construct creation must exceed redemption in glory and grandeur. That is not to say that I am pleased with the framing of the supra-infra debate. I am not, if for no other reason than God's purposes are multi-faceted and not just linear. Yet with that said I find the teleological supra schema of Hoeksema, Clark and Reymond most attractive in what it it aims to put forth (as opposed to Beza's construct for instance). For in the contemporary supra-schema, God's choice to redeem presupposes men as fallen. Damnation becomes not an end in itself but justice that presupposes sin, a very biblical concept indeed. Of course the infra position is simply a denial of true Calvinism.

Women Worship Leaders - Just a Few Thoughts

2011-04-27T17:20:00.004-04:00

May women lead in worship?(I am not talking about women assisting in the carrying of a new, unfamiliar tune.)

The answer to such a question should be obvious, but unfortunately the church has been influenced by the world and consequently the answer to what should be an easy question is no longer obvious to so many Christians.

Worship is often led by women even in churches that believe only men may be elders. Such a worship practice if consistent with the unique teaching role of elders presupposes that worship is not to be accompanied by biblical instruction. In other words, if women may lead worship yet not teach the congregation, then worship may be void of biblical instruction. Yet then how can women lead God’s people in biblical worship that engages the emotions through the mind? Is to lead worship simply a matter of hitting the right note? No, and women “worship leaders” appreciate that much, which is why they so often step out of their God-given comfort zone in order to exhort in their leading. Accordingly, when women lead in worship any adherence to the unique teaching role given to men is undermined.

The elders, if they do their job, will protect the congregation, including their women, from such an unnatural, demeaning practice. Yes, demeaning. It’s demeaning for a woman to do man’s calling, just like it would be demeaning for a man to submit to his wife in all things. Gender confusion is always ugly.

It is the pastor who is ultimately responsible for leading congregational worship. The pastor is the worship leader. It's an indicative. It comes with the job. A worship leader should be prepared to exegete hymns and Psalms for the congregation, which a woman simply may not do even if she can. A great worship leader can be tone deaf but that is because he is not merely to lead the music but rather is to direct the hearts and minds of the congregants to the triune God who receives congregational worship in Christ.

The answer to the question should be obvious. Women may not lead worship because women may not lead God’s people. Let's be loving to our sisters in Christ and in humble obedience lead them out of such roles.

A Resurrected Post - in the spirit of “Resurrection Sunday”

2011-04-12T17:30:00.009-04:00

Induction, the basis for all scientific inference, presupposes the uniformity of nature, which is to say it operates under the principle of the future being like the past; yet the resurrection of Christ from the dead is contra-uniform since it does not comport with past experience. Our experience is that people die and are not raised three days later. Also, we’ve all met plenty of liars and those deceived into embracing false beliefs (even dying for false beliefs!) but we have never observed a single resurrection of the body. Accordingly, the lives and martyrdom of zealots need not lead us to conclude that Christ has risen. Consequently, drawing an inference based upon past experience as it pertains to the question of the empty tomb is not very useful. Evidentialism indeed fails as an apologetic. After all, given only the uniformity of nature coupled with personal experience, a more probable explanation for the empty tomb is a hoax put on by liars rather than a miracle put on by God. The same reasoning applies all the more to the virgin birth I would think.

The fact of the matter is that we do not come to know that our Savior lives by examining the evidence according to some alleged neutral posture, for the facts do not demand the conclusion that Christ has risen. The facts are indeed consistent with the resurrection but the facts do not speak for themselves let alone lead us to the Christian conclusion. God speaks in order that we might interpret the facts aright. The fact of the empty tomb, therefore, is not what leads us to the "conclusion" of the resurrection but rather the empty tomb corroborates what we already know from God's word, that Christ is resurrected.

Similarly, we read in Scripture that a man named Saul who once opposed Christ became the chief apologist for the Christian faith. The way in which one will interpret the transformation of Saul to Paul will be consistent with one’s pre-commitment(s). Christians take the fanaticism of the apostle as corroborating what they already know to be true about the resurrection. The fanaticism of the apostle no more “proves” the resurrection of Christ than does the empty tomb. Moreover, neither the empty tomb nor the life of Paul proves the resurrection any more than it can disprove it by proving that a conspiracy to overthrow ancient Judaism took place evidenced by the hoax of the resurrection. The point is simply this. Naturalists will find their explanation for the apostle’s transformation and the empty tomb elsewhere, outside of the Christian resurrection interpretation. Similarly, the way in which one interprets the facts surrounding Joseph Smith will be according to one’s pre-commitment(s). If one is committed to a closed canon, then the claims of Mormonism found within the Book of Mormon will be deemed false.

Of course the tomb is empty, for Christ has risen. Of course the apostle Paul with zeal preached the resurrection of Christ with all his heart, soul and strength, for Christ has risen. Of course the book of Mormon is not inspired, for Jesus is God and the canon is closed. Do we come to believe these things by evaluating supposed brute particulars in an alleged neutral fashion or are our beliefs already marshaled according to our pre-commitment to God’s word in general and the resurrection in particular? Do the “facts” speak for themselves or has God exegeted the facts for us?

The reason one believes that Christ has risen from the grave is because God has revealed the truth of the resurrection. In fact, we don’t just believe God’s word on the matter, we actually know God is telling the truth. Yet, unwittingly, often times Christians do not speak the truth with respect to why they believe in the resurrection. Too often Christians will say that they believe in the resurrection because of such evidence, which if true would reduce one’s confidence in God’s say-so to speculation based upon supposed brute facts that (would) readily lend themselves to suspicion (when God’s word is not presupposed as reliable, true and one's ultimate authority). Christians need to lay hold of the fact that the “Word of God” is God’s word, and God cannot lie.

With the resurrection the former days of ignorance are gone (Acts 17:30); so our belief in the truth couldn’t be more justified since our justification comes from the self-attesting Christ of Scripture working in accordance with the internal witness of the Holy Ghost. We do not come to know Jesus lives by drawing inferences from uninterpreted facts in the light of past experiences but rather by believing with maximal warrant the word of truth. Indeed, we have a more sure word of knowledge. (2 Peter 1:19)

The Westminster Confession of Faith (chapter 1 paragraph 5) could not have been more on target in its reason for why Scripture's testimony should be believed:

"We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture. And the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is, to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it does abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God: yet notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts."

Manhattan Declaration (a very few thoughts)

2011-04-11T05:17:00.003-04:00

I noticed that Turretin Fan had provided a link to this post of mine on the Manhattan Declaration. When I clicked on the link from Turretin Fan's site I learned that it was a broken link. The broken link was due to my taking the post down shortly after having put it up. It was my intention then to modify the post, which I never ended up doing. What is below is the original. The post is old and in some respect yesterday's paper yet with abiding principles. Other responses to the declaration, including this one, can be found here. These include responses by Al Mohler, Alistair Begg and R.C. Sproul.
RD
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I was recently asked my opinion on the recent "Manhattan Declaration".

My "off the top of my head" response:

It is my understanding that individual Trinitarians have joined together across denominational lines to "affirm [their] right - and more importantly, to embrace [their] obligation - to speak and act in defense of these truths." (Emphasis theirs!)

I am grateful that men and woman are willing to speak their minds in times such as these. Notwithstanding, two less sanguine thoughts come to mind.

1. Now of course, I do believe that every Christian has a right to speak out against oppressive government. I also believe that individual Christians have the liberty to unite on such matters. However, I find it troubling when such people imply that it is obligatory for the Christian to speak out on these or any other particular political matter. One man's Christian liberty should not bind another man's conscience.

2. What we have here are three branches of Christendom: Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Evangelical. Why aren't all these branches "evangelical"? Well, I would suppose it is because they do not all affirm the gospel message of how a man can have peace with God and avoid an eternity in hell. Given the blurring of that truth, I choose to exercise my Christian liberty, which I find personally obligatory in my own conscience, not to participate in defending those truths in that unified manner; though I respect the liberty of those who feel led to do so. Fair enough?

Sundry observations:

1. I so appreciate the wisdom of the Divines. The Westminster standards teach that the organized church is not to intermeddle with civil affairs that concern the commonwealth unless dire circumstances prevail. I don't know whether the Manhattan Declaration has underscored the point, but they might do well to make clear that their declaration carries no ecclesiastical power and that the organized church's mission is first and foremost the gospel, which in turn will transform the world. (Of course most evangelicals are so rapture-ready that they have no expectation that Jesus will make all his enemies his footstool.)

2. It's interesting to me that there are some who disagreed with the Evangelicals and Catholics Together (ECT) dialogue and associated pronouncements yet have participated in the Manhattan Declaration. I think that is fine because ECT implicitly denied the gospel by affirming Rome's magical view of water baptism, whereas this new document does not try to bridge theological incongruities. For that we can be grateful, but I am still not comfortable with what is implied (and can be inferred) when such communions put aside their differences for some other cause, which all to often is seen as a "greater cause".

3. We may not let doctrinal purity be an excuse for us to do nothing!

4. Finally, doctrinal differences aside, I find it a bit passing strange that Rome can remain so vocal on the abortion front without giving equal time to the public acknowledgement of their abuses in the area of child molestation. May they be pleased to sound both trumpets.

5. "It is our duty to proclaim the Gospel of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ in its fullness, both in season and out of season. May God help us not to fail in that duty." That statement is very problematic. The gospel is not being proclaimed in the declaration, nor can it be because two of those communions are on a collision course where the gospel is concerned and the third group (Eastern Orthodoxy) hasn't been on the road course in about fifteen hundred years.

Carl Trueman & A Need For A Contemporary Polemic Against Romanism

2011-04-06T17:16:00.006-04:00

Carl Trueman (CT) in “Another thing needful” misses wide the mark. My issue with CT is three-fold. (a) I don't think there is any need whatsoever to engage Romanism further (at least not in any fresh way), or has something changed within their system of doctrine that I haven't heard about? There is already a preponderance of fine polemics out there against Romanism. We even find it in the Fathers as David T. King has nicely cataloged for the church. What about the plethora of Reformed dogmatics? Is CT complaining that Calvin, the Hodges, Hoeksema, Berkhof et al., weren't respectful enough? To borrow from Rhett toward Scarlet when she said he was no gentleman, I say a minor point at such a time. That CT says that Boettner is pre-V-2 would seem to suggest that Romanism has changed, which undermines her battle cry of Semper Eadem. At the very least, if Vatican ii contradicted the exhaustive dogmas of Vatican i and Trent, then Rome is no longer Rome and the discussion is over; they're false prophets. (This doesn't, of course, mean that we need not declare the gospel to those in the Roman communion or that we ought not to come along side Romanists and explain to them in love the teachings of their communion for what they are, heretical. Notwithstanding, there is simply no need to find new innovative ways to repudiate Rome because Rome is, well, always the same.) (b) Who does CT wish to engage? Certainly not the magisterium because they don't engage. CT could be confusing Rome with e-pologists who don't speak for Rome. Kung doesn't even speak for Rome; just ask Ratzinger! (c) CT thinks that Protestants are "converting to Rome" all the time, which simply is not true - not even close. Maybe CT has fallen into the spun web of the Called to Communion crowd that write across the sky each time they make a confused sinner possibly twice the child of hell as themselves. (Protestants do still censure those who embrace without reservation Roman dogma don't they? Accordingly, are there really a lot of Christians converting to Rome, or just apostates who have been purged from Christian roles?) The converts to Rome are few and far between and what CT might not be able to see (through what I suspect is a lense of doom-and-gloom eschatology) is that it is the Protestant pulpits, sessions and pews that are filled with ex-Romanists. It is the church that is growing. But more to the point, although Rome could, at least by her own statistical standards, be beating population growth by a nose - when one considers her laws regarding contraception - which all Romanists being obedient to the pope of course obey (ha!) or else they wouldn't be numbered among true "Catholics" - one would think that Rome would be growing at an even higher rate than reported. If they were to be honest though and purge their roles from delinquent members, they'd have much less than that which they show as true "members", and they wouldn't be growing but even shrinking. (I'm still a member- just a separated one in their eyes.) Even if Romanism grows though, so what? Islam is growing too. When one is added to the roles of apostate or infidel communions all that is occurring is the relabeling of an unbeliever. There are only 2 kingdoms, light and darkness, are there not? It is the church that is growing in percentage, not the kingdom of darkness. In the final analyses, Rome has not changed. Rome does not engage. And Rome is not growing by converting Protestants.

Finally, and maybe I should have said this first, I do not take CT's observations as his complaining about what he perceives to be a need or about how bad things are, but rather, as he said, I simply see him voicing a perceived need so that someone out there might be stirred to take up the challenge. I'm fine with that sort of thing in principle and can even applaud the intention. That one's plate is full would not seem to preclude him from letting legitimate needs be known. No, my concerns run in another direction altogether. That CT is not able to recognize the already timeless polemics against the same old Roman heresies demonstrates to me that he doesn't quite understand the debate, but I'm hopeful that one day he will.

Confusion Over a Reformed View of Baptism

2011-03-12T12:49:00.008-05:00

Just as it is hazardous to build a doctrine of baptism from Scripture simply by examining verses having to do with water, it is equally dangerous to try to build a robust view of baptism by simply looking at one chapter in the Confession.

Whenever union with Christ is present, so is saving faith (and visa versa). The WCF teaches that saving faith is “ordinarily” wrought by the ministry of the Word. The Confession most unambiguously steps out and discloses a view on God’s ordinary means of conferring the instrumental cause of justification, which is always accompanied by all the benefits of Christ’s work of redemption. There is no mention of the sacraments in this chapter on saving faith, other than teaching that the sacraments (along with prayer) strengthen, but do not produce, that which we receive by faith (not baptism!). Even more significant is that in its chapter on effectual calling, the Confession also indexes effectually calling not to baptism, but to Word and Spirit. In effectual calling, wrought by Word and Spirit and not baptism, the Confession teaches that God replaces the unbelieving heart of stone with a regenerate heart of flesh, the very work that many want to attribute to the rite of baptism. In a word, the Confession attributes that which baptism signs and seals not to the sign and seal of baptism but to the effectual working of Word and Spirit. The sacraments along with prayer serve to strengthen these realities (that are effected by other means than baptism).

At the very least, those with FV tendencies have irreconcilable differences with the Westminster standards. That is because they will not make conscience of the Confession’s teaching that sacraments in general and baptism in particular are “efficacious” in that they “confirm(!)” our interest in Christ, which we inherit through the effectual working of Word and Spirit, which together unite us to Christ. The chapter on the sacraments plainly teaches that baptism is a confirmatory seal and not a converting ordinance. Baptism confirms that which Word promises and Word and Spirit effect. The role of the sacraments are not intended to effect that which the Confession teaches is offered in Word and effected by Word and Spirit, but rather they are to effect the confirmation of what is effected by Word and Spirit. In other words, the Confession teaches that together Word and Spirit effect the reality (union with Christ), and the sacraments effect the confirmation of that effectuated reality.

All of that is not to say that conversion cannot be accompanied by baptism or that baptism cannot be given increase by the intelligible Word, resulting in Word-Spirit conversion. Notwithstanding, the Confession explicitly states that the gift of saving faith is ordinarily wrought through the administration of the Word (as opposed to baptism) and that the precursor to faith, effectual calling (wherein a sinner is recreated in Christ) comes not by baptism but by Word and Spirit. The place of baptism in particular is that by Word and Spirit it “confirms” that which is granted to us in our effectual calling etc. So, in sum, when we read in chapter 28 of the Confession about the efficacy of baptism, we must interpret “efficacy” according to chapter 27 on the sacraments, which states that the role of baptism is to confirm our interest in the offered promise, and not to effect what the promise contemplates. We must interpret Confession by conmparing it with Confession, no less than we are to interpret Scripture by Scripture.

Sacraments effect confirmation, plain and simple. They are not given to make effectual the reality of what is confirmed in the sacrament. Sacraments don’t create; they by grace sustain. Again though, baptism may certainly accompany the converting work of Word and Spirit, but it need not even do that in the life of the believer.

John Frame on Michael Horton's "Christless Christianity"

2011-03-08T21:05:00.010-05:00

I have thought for quite some time that Westminster Seminary California (WSC) is not only theologically incorrect on many issues, but often historically mistaken as well. WSC is wrong on Natural Law; wrong on Two Kingdom theology; wrong on the Covenant of Works; wrong on Redemptive Historical preaching; wrong on Molinism; wrong on Law-Gospel; wrong on John Frame – yet had they got Frame right, they probably would not be so wrong on so many things. They would probably draw finer distinctions than they do. (NOTE: Natural Law, Two Kingdoms and Covenant of Works are all biblical ideas. WSC simply misunderstands them. Redemptive Historical is an excellent manner of preaching. WSC simply places undo emphasis upon it. Molinism implies heresy. WSC simply has little appreciation for what distinguishes it from Open Theism, let alone the metaphysics implied by libertarian freedom. Law should be distinguished from gospel regarding the way of salvation, but not dichotomized into mutually exclusive messages. In a word, WSC knows enough to be dangerous about many things.)

That WSC is wrong on so many issues wouldn’t be as bad if the seminary didn’t fancy itself as the keeper of the Reformed faith, another thing they’re wrong about.

In any case, in 2009 John Frame reviewed Michael Horton’s book: Christless Christianity: The Alternative Gospel of the American Church. Although I have not read the book and, therefore, cannot comment on truthfulness of the review, I provide the link as information. My only hope is that those young, impressionables out there who have placed their trust (if not also their tuition dollars) in any institution, whether in Moscow, Idaho, Escondido, California or Glenside, Pennsylvania would consider all they are taught with a critical mind.

In summary, Frame contends that Horton’s criticisms of the American church presuppose more than ten major principles that although he says Horton does not maintain with utter consistency, they are necessary for Horton’s case. Not only does Frame observe that Horton does not maintain with consistency his own critical strictures, Frame also asserts that “Horton’s argument depends on ideas that cannot be justified by Scripture, or by the classic Protestant confessions.” In short, “Horton measures the American church with a defective theology” says Frame. Frame concludes that “Christless Christianity is essentially an evaluation of the American church, not from the standpoint of a generic Protestant theology, but from what I must regard as a narrow, factional, even sectarian perspective.”

Below are the unvarnished “ten points” that Frame argues are foundational to Horton’s thesis:

1. Attention to ourselves necessarily detracts from attention to Christ.

2. We should not give attention to the way we communicate the gospel, or to making it relevant to its hearers.

3. God’s sovereignty and human responsibility are a zero-sum game. The idea that man must do something compromises the absolute sovereignty of God.

4. God’s work of salvation is completely objective, external to us, and not at all subjective, internal to us. (Here he backtracks some.)

5. God promises us no earthly blessings, only heavenly ones, and to desire earthly blessings is a “theology of glory,” deserving condemnation.

6. Law and gospel should be utterly separate. There should be no good news in the bad news and no bad news in the good news.

7. Preaching of the gospel must never use biblical characters as moral or spiritual examples. Nor must it address practical ethical issues in the Christian life.

8. A focus on redemption excludes a focus on anything else.

9. In worship and in the general ministry of the church, God gives and does not receive; the congregation receives and does not give.

10. Analysts of the church must compare the Church’s focus on Christ with its focus on other things, rather than considering that many of these other things are in fact applications of Christ’s own person and work.

Willful Desertion, Divorce & Ordained Servants

2011-02-06T23:21:00.031-05:00

Under the gospel of Christ there exist two permissible reasons for divorce: adultery and willful desertion. (Matt.19:8, 9; 1 Cor. 7:15) In the world we live in today elders often have to judge whether certain acts of the flesh constitute adultery. In the like manner, elders also have to ascertain whether certain manners of life constitute willful desertion. This blog entry is concerned with (a) the latter provision for dissolving the marriage contract, willful desertion, along with (b) an ecclesiastical abuse of the provision.

If a professing Christian were willfully to desert his or her spouse, the guilty party would be worthy of being declared an unbeliever. The declaration of unbelief that would accompany willful desertion would not be the innocent party’s ground for divorce, but rather ground for divorce would be willful desertion of a spouse. (1 Cor. 7:12, 13; 1 Cor. 7:15)

Willful desertion by an unbeliever cannot be accompanied by an ecclesiastical judgment on the unbeliever because God, not the church, will judge those outside the church. (1 Cor. 5:12) Accordingly, whenever a believer is loosed from the marriage bonds due to an unbeliever’s willful desertion, the believer is free to remarry even though the guilty party, by the nature of the case, is beyond the pale of ecclesiastical censure (being an unbeliever). Such should never be the case (under the willful desertion provision) when both parties are professing believers, though again, the ground for divorce is not that the guilty party has been declared an unbeliever but rather willful desertion is what may loose a spouse.

It has become increasingly more prevalent in the Reformed church today to approve of divorce between professing Christians for spousal abuse – particularly verbal abuse. The thinking is that verbal abuse can constitute “abandonment” [see footnote] of the marriage obligation, and abandonment is deemed sufficient ground for divorce. Although excommunication is never ground for divorce - in cases in which a professing believer willfully deserts a spouse we would expect to see the guilty party censured to the degree of unbeliever. Unfortunately, that is not what we always see, even within churches that practice biblical censures. Instead what we can find is an unbiblical accommodation for the offended party (usually the wife) who has suffered under verbal abuse, which ironically turns into a situation in which she deserts her husband without cause. (More on that point later.)

The thinking of many elder boards or sessions (same thing) is that an abused spouse is free to divorce without any ecclesiastical repercussion or future restraint, except possibly one – that being no privilege to remarry, which is an unbiblical restraint whenever there is biblical ground for divorce. (I will not address that point in this post.) Ordained servants are sometimes willing to tacitly approve the desire of an abused spouse (usually the wife) to divorce her husband yet without there being enough evidence to constitute the husband an unbeliever. Yet ground for divorce is to have been the husband's willful desertion of the wife, which is always a sufficient condition for the husband to be declared an unbeliever. Consequently, it stands to reason that if the husband cannot be constituted an unbeliever, then he has not yet willfully deserted his wife – in which case the wife has no biblical grounds for divorce.

If a spouse commits adultery and repents, it can be biblically consistent for the innocent party to "sue out" divorce without an accompanying pronouncement of unbelief upon the guilty party. The reason being, adultery is sufficient for divorce and repentance is sufficient to regain one’s standing in the church. Accordingly, one can truly repent prior to being excommunicated yet notwithstanding the transgression may allow the innocent party to sue out divorce “as if the offending party was dead”. (WCF 24.5) Yet in cases involving desertion, no husband is to be considered having willfully deserted his wife to the degree in which she may be loosed unless there is such “willful desertion as can in no way be remedied by the Church, or civil magistrate” (WCF 24.6) In other words, whether willful desertion comes in the form of verbal abuse or literal abandonment, it presupposes that the dissuasion of ecclesiastical and civil authorities has come to naught. Consequently, willful desertion presupposes that one is not in the church, for how is it possible that one in the church - a Christian, can be beyond remedy?!

(Assume the verbal abuse was toward Sally from Bill.) It was noted above that the accommodation often given to the verbally abused spouse, Sally, ironically ends up turning into her desertion of her huband, Bill, which if done in the face of direct ecclesiastical confrontation would entail willful desertion on the part of Sally, demanding a pronouncement of unbelief upon her, hence the irony.

What is most unfortunate is that when a session or elder board does not discharge its pastoral oversight properly by issuing warnings against willful desertion to women like Sally, such women either can be denied their privilege of sharing in Christ's sufferings as they progress in sanctification, or else all interested parties are denied the manifestation of the reality that the "faithful obedience" of the suffering spouse is not truly saving – for the abandonment of the marriage in the face of ecclesiastical warnings, even under hard providence, would be a sign of unbelief.

In the final analyses, the standards teach that the only non-adultery grounds for Sally to divorce Bill must entail Bill being beyond remedy, which may not be considered the case as long as Bill is to be regarded a believer, indwelt by the Spirit. If Bill is in the church receiving the means of grace, then he is no way to be considered "beyond remedy", which means that Bill may not be regarded has having willfully deserted the marriage, which in turn means that Sally has no biblical grounds for divorce and if she does divorce, then it is she who has abandoned her husband.

The only question now is whether ordained servants will be faithful to their ordination vows and challenge head-on those who would pursue unbiblical divorce. Indeed, God-appoints difficult providences for all who are in union with Christ, but we must expect God's grace to be sufficient for all his people to keep the marriage vow of "for better or for worse" unless one of the two exception clauses can be met (adultery or desertion). Elders are to be part of the solution and not part of the problem. They are to love their flock according to knowledge, which sometimes means they are to encourage the sheep under their care in the life of the cross to which we all are appointed for our profit and God's glory. We must come along suffering wives - labor with them if we must, but we must never allow them to pursue unbiblical divorce without first declaring to them the ecclesiastical woes that accompany sin with a high hand.

Robert Letham points out in his review of Andrew Cornes: "Divorce and Remarriage...", which was published in the Westminster Theological Journal (Spring 1995), that there are pitfalls for viewing marriage with an "individualistic slant" that ignores marriage as "structured by covenant" - in particular in light of "marriage and the covenant of grace" alongside the "relation between Yahweh and Israel, Christ and the church", which is an "indissoluble covenant bond of love." Letham notes that "Apostasy is thus cutting oneself off from covenant with God. In turn, willful desertion involves a person cutting himself off from the covenant bond of marriage." Finally, "desertion is itself an act of unbelief" is Letham's interpretation of Bucer on 1 Cor. 7 with respect to this particular matter. Letham translates Bucer:

"But some will say that this is spoken of an unbeliever deserting. But, I ask, has he not rejected the faith of Christ by what he has done?..."

Yes, willful desertion is sign of unbelief. The task of ordained servants is to discern who is the one deserting the marriage. Let us not be deceived, even by a suffering wife for whom me must have compassion.

Footnote: I think part of the confusion comes from the vague and subjective term “abandonment”, which has been substituted in the minds of ordained servants for the precise confessional phrase - “willful desertion” which connotes no remedy and presupposes a formal ecclesiastical standing of unbelief. May God be pleased to grant increase to this message.

Keith Mathison on Theonomy

2011-01-30T19:32:00.020-05:00

Keith Mathison of Ligonier Ministries reviewed David VanDrunen’s Living in Two Kingdoms. In that review Mathison demonstrated his ability to reaon fallaciously by drawing a gross and obvious hasty generalization. Mathison impugns a class of people, theonomists, of having a tendency of being guilty of a practice that is not integral to theonomy, nor a trajectory of theonomy. What's worse, most theonomists, being Reformed, actually confess a doctrine (liberty of conscience) that opposes that which Mathison hastily indexes to theonomists (conscience-binding tendencies).

Mathison writes:

Van Drunen’s emphasis on Christian liberty is also to be appreciated. Many transformationists, particularly of the theonomic stripe, have a tendency to bind Christians’ consciences on a whole host of matters that the Word of God does not clearly address. I remember to this day one of the first debates I heard in a student break room after transferring to Reformed Theological Seminary. Two students, one of whom was strongly influenced by theonomy, were having a lengthy and heated debate over infant feeding practices: demand feeding vs. schedule feeding. The theonomist participant insisted that schedule feeding was the biblical view and required of all Christians. But does the Bible really give us a clear answer to this question? No, but there are some who would love to bind our consciences with a Christian Mishnah.

That one theonomist in the hearing of Mathison defended scheduled feeding for babies is hardly evidence for the erratic assertion that theonomists have a tendency to bind Christians’ consciences, let alone on a whole host of matters. Now, of course, I trust that Mathison might be able to reach back into his experience and find another such dubious example, but is it at all rational (or charitable) to index a tendency to a position that nicely comports with the opposite tendency, in this case liberty of consicence? At the very least, if the conscience-binding theonomist was debating a Muslim, wouldn't it be equally irrational for a Buddhist to attribute such legalism to Trinitarians?

Theonomists are generally Reformed in their theology and without contradiction affirm a robust doctrine of liberty of conscience as found in the Westminster Confession of Faith. Amusingly enough, probably the furthest Christian “stripe” from theonomy is dispensationalism and as far as I know, the greatest emphasis on scheduled feeding that has come forth in the evangelical church was brought to us by the “Growing Kids God’s Way” curriculum created by dispensationalists Gary and Anne Marie Ezzo while attending Grace Community Church, whose pastor is Dr. John MacArthur. Since I have known several dispensationalists that would passionately defend “scheduled feeding” as the biblical position and since we can trace the roots of this idea to a dispensationalist, maybe we should attribute this one theonomist's tendency to his living within a kingdom that is filled with dispensationlists. No, that would not be right. In fact, it's always wrong to arbitrarily pin sinful tendencies on groups of people with whom we have some apparent axe to grind. Shame on you, Keith Mathison.

Mathison also writes:

VanDrunen is right in his rejection of theonomy and in his rejection of the misguided practice of confusing Christianity with civil religion (American or otherwise).

Mathison describes “civil religion” thusly:

There are far too many Christians who are confusing biblical Christianity with civil religion. The Patriot’s Bible is merely one of the more recent and disturbing (if not blasphemous) examples of this kind of confusion. I have been in church services where the American flag surrounded the pulpit, the Pledge of Allegiance rather than the Creed was recited, the National Anthem rather than a Psalm or hymn was sung, and a political platform rather than the Word of God was preached. I love my country, but this kind of thing is a serious problem. I appreciate the insistence of two kingdoms proponents that these things should not be confused.

Mathison is at best uninformed and is not being truthful. Theonomy does not embrace what Mathison calls “civil religion”. Nor does the theonomic thesis lend itself to any tendency of substituting man's opinions for God's; though I can understand such a tendency of substituting man's opinions for God's word springing from a radical 2K theology given its emphasis on the wax nose of natural law.

In the final analyses, Mathison has simply demonstrated himself to be careless if not also uncharitable, but it would be hasty of me to conclude that all non-theonomists are as muddled as Mathison has demonstrated himself to be, at least on this particular matter.

On a somewhat related matter:

For a more thoroughly presuppositional treatment of natural law as it relates to culture, see John Frame’s article. I’d also recommend John Frame’s critique of Van Drunen’s work on natural law.

It remains a mystery to me how this natural law craze can attract mature Christians, but it has always been mysterious to me how a mature believer could favor an outright autonomous approach to apologetics as opposed to the nuclear strength approach that entails a revelational epistemology and presuppositional defense of the faith. I'm convinced that these matters cannot be ones of pure intellect, but rather I find them to have grave spiritual implications.

Radical 2K & Theonomy

2011-01-29T12:46:00.009-05:00

In Reformed circles there is a growing infatuation with “natural law” and radical two kingdom (R2K) theology. The soil from which this weed grows is in my estimation Escondido, California, but like the kudzu, it's growing everywhere.

There's a discussion on 2K and civil law on GreenBaggins, which can be found here. My contributions to that discussion are contained below. I have bowed out of the discussion. Dr. Darryl Hart is one of the persons I interact with in the thread. I also interact a fair amount with someone who for all intents and purposes seems to share the typical R2K thinking that is infecting portions of the Reformed church. The comments of those I interact with are indented.

For example, it is worth considering that the 2k position is more consistent with our (biblical) doctrine of justification by faith.

David, would you mind, or anybody for that matter, fleshing that out a bit more. Darryl wrote me something that sounds very similar to that today if I may say.

Ron, Doug’s last couple of entries I think help make a point. On the one hand, you re-produced (#813) what was evidently a response to me in September which rightly lamented the Christian Nation stuff that eminated from Coral Ridge. On the other, you’re getting plaudits from Doug who seems to sound pretty Christian Nation-y in a Coral Ridge-ish sort of way. So it becomes hard to see how the outlook you basically champion doesn’t give rise to that which you also lament. I trust you see the conundrum from a pc-2k point of view.

Zrim,

I’m glad I went back and saw that post of yours on the other thread. I trust I’m to try to address it here rather than there.

I’ll begin with an analogy. If it doesn’t work for you, please let it go. It’s only meant to help clarify a point; I’m not trying to build a case upon it. There are 5-point Calvinists out there that believe witnessing is a waste of time and that when a believer receives Christ he is merely bringing his eternal justification to his consciousness, but I wouldn’t want to impugn TULIP with such silliness and neither would you. People run head strong into error though they begin with true doctrine. In the like manner, the Coral Ridge Christian-nationalism does not represent my position on the civil law as it relates with the rest of Scripture. Frankly, it infuriates me to put it mildly. I don’t see that as a conundrum though, at least not for me. It might be something that must be explained a bit more, but how many times have we Calvinists had to explain why we pray and witness in light of God’s eternal, unchangeable decree? Enough with the analogy.

I believe these are compatible theologies, (a) our Kingdom is not of this world and (b) rapists ought to be put to death. Mind you, I’m not defending theonomy here. I’m merely pointing out that upholding the equity of the case law is not at odds with the primacy of the gospel, the mission of the church.

More about me.. In brief, I take great comfort that our kingdom is not of this world. I live in the re-creation, the church, and by God’s grace enjoy with you the inaugurated kingdom that awaits consummation. In that context, in the church that is (and hopefully in our respective homes too!), we see and enjoy God’s display of unity and plurality (i.e. harmony) progressively maturing and reflecting the Trinity and our ultimate Sabbath rest. This realty is fact, not fancy. It needs to be reckoned as fact and seen through the eye of faith, but it is there to behold for all whom God is pleased to illuminate. Naturally then, I am deeply saddened (you have no idea how much so) when Christians think and even try to usher in the kingdom through a concerted effort to restrain evil and reconstruct Washington. I’m saddened along with you that the pure message of the church is at sundry times and in various places at best hidden and at worst exchanged for another, which is not another but no message at all. What is equally sad to me (and I hope for you too) is that these Christians are not enjoying the wonders of the kingdom. As a Christian and elder, that breaks my heart.

Moving on… yes evil is to be restrained and although some evils can be curbed, I suppose, through the Falwell, Robertson and Kennedy types, these sorts of ministries clearly jettison the Christian message in their efforts. Consequently, ministries such as these do more harm than good. Let me repeat that. They do more harm than good! By the nature of the case they mislead, because in a very real sense they are promoting another gospel. My defense of that assertion is that if the church is to preach the gospel, then their message is to be perceived as the gospel; so when it’s not the gospel that is being preached – then naturally they mislead those who would look to them for the gospel message. Make sense?

Wrapping this up… in an effort to make disciples of all nations, we aren’t to lead with the civil law but with the moral law (as a backdrop) and the gospel (as the solution). That doesn’t mean we ought not to vote for candidates that will govern according to biblical principles so that we can live peaceable lives in the Kingdom. Indeed we should, but that’s very secondary and it is certainly not the church’s place to stand behind any candidate or party, as if any candidate or party could represent the Christian church. With all that as absolute bedrock for me, when it comes to the question of what types of laws I think ought to be legislated, my views are clear and need not be rehearsed here. Yet notwithstanding, my convictions on what ought to be the case has little bearing on my day-to-day life as a husband, father, elder, friend, or business man. (It doesn’t even dictate my eschatology, for “ought” does not imply “will”.) The only reason I speak up on these matters (and on matters having to do with apologetics) is not because these are high on my fun / priority list (they’re far from it in fact), but rather it is because I believe that the church is in need of spokespeople who love and embrace the general equity of the civil case laws while also realizing that those doctrinal distinctives pale insignificant to the already-not-yet reality that pertains to the Kingdom from which the gospel of reconciliation and forgiveness is to go forth. The two views are compatible, but unfortunately they are not always regarded as such.

Finally, I don’t believe that Coral Ridge shares my view of the civil case laws. Not in the least. I think they’re arbitrary nationalists that would never dare justify civil code with OT precepts. I do believe that there are many Christians out there that do agree with me on the place for the case laws, but should they choose to lead with reconstruction over gospel transformation I will run for cover just like you. Again, our Kingdom is not of this world and that’s where I live my life (my family, ministry and fellowship). That being said, if someone asks me should a rapist get ten years (or 180 years!) and a chance for parole, I’ll say no. I’ll plead with such a criminal to be saved and labor with him in his cell, but at the end of the day I’ll be the first to call for his execution. Strange – maybe, conundrum – I don’t think so. I believe God’s precepts require death for such a transgression and that settles it for me. I, also, believe such sanctions will deter other would-be rapists. Finally, I believe such a penality is a means to protect other would-be victims. But again, my sole reason is not the good I believe might come from it, though that can be a comfort, rather it is because with all my heart I believe that God’s precepts require that a rapist be put to death, just like his precepts require that we try to win such a one to the Savior before throwing the switch. My brother, I’m tired and not inclined to discuss this too much further, but I wanted to give a more exhaustive answer to what I think is a confusing point for so many Christian brothers (and sisters).

I’ll end with this… I witnessed to this man in prison; with my wife visited and prayed with his wife and children; and I attended his funeral. My love for Mr. Miller was, I believe, consistent with what I believe he deserved. I’m quite certain that serving a 180 year prison sentence was not God’ revealed will.

Grace and peace,

Ron

The fact is that we have to do this work of promoting justice with those who do not recognize special revelation.

Zrim,

My point is that all men are to desire such laws because they reflect the thinking, precepts and wisdom of God. You find a logistical problem at work, but that problem pertains to the implementation of such laws, which is not germane to the question of whether such laws ought to be desired by the Christian and legislated by congress. You’re saying with that particular rejoinder that the laws are no good because they aren’t feasible, whereas I’m arguing that they should be our desire whether they’re feasible or not. It’s not a question of whether we think such ideas can make it into law but whether individuals should desire to be governed by such a standard.

And, again, as I’ve argued in the other thread, this isn’t at all to say that special revelation mayn’t be referenced. But it does seem to me that God has provided sufficient material in general revelation to do this work without having to pull out special revelation.

Your point, to quote you from the other thread, is that general revelation offers enough revelation in order for us to live in a “non-chaotic” world, which I’m afraid misses the point of the theonomist. For one thing, your standard of what is non-chaotic and mine are different, so degree of chaos can never answer the dispute over whether general revelation relieves chaos. In passing I’ll note that there will be chaotic government in hell but won’t there be a general revelation of God? Consequently, general revelation doesn’t relieve chaos so let’s not attribute non-chaos to general revelation. For what it’s worth, what deters chaos is not general revelation but providence. In any case, even if everyone agreed on what defines chaos, it is irrelevant to the question of how things ought to be. It’s not a question of what one thinks can be pulled off, or whether the degree or lack of chaos suits our subjective sense of balance. Rather, it’s a question of what men are to aspire to with respect to God’s precepts. You keep speaking of what is sufficient to meet your subjective view of “good enough”, but the question we’re to be asking is not what our opinion is but rather what is God’s opinion on the matter.

Don’t you think you can get the sort of justice you think is in keeping with godliness by appealing to natural law?

I find the justice in this world quite ungodly, but that’s irrelevant too. Even if all the laws on the books mysteriously reflected the code I have in mind, without an appeal to special revelation they’d be unjustifiable in an ultimate sense and arguably tyrannical by the nature of the case. It would just be one man (or group of men) inflicting subjective opinions upon others without divine permission or justification. Moreover, the Author of the code would not be receiving the homage He deserves in the matter and that should be no small concern for the Christian. Even human authors get footnoted from time to time.

If so, I don’t see how you’ll persuade anybody who isn’t implicitly convinced that rapists should be executed by simply writing it explicitly on the board.

There are many laws on the books that I don’t agree with but I must live under them. That’s because persuasion of every person is not a necessary condition for laws to be implemented. In any case, persuasion is God’s business not mine. My business is to desire laws that are pleasing in God’s sight and to affect my sphere of influence regarding the implementation of such laws. If and when we get such laws on the books – it will be on God’s time table, not ours.

That’s like a Muslim trying to tell me that he thinks thieves should have their right hands sliced off, and when I am unconvinced he pulls out the Koran. Yeah, so?

Correct, you should not be persuaded by such a defense, but that’s because the Koran is not God’s word. But a Muslim is responsible to be persuaded by the word of God. God’s word and not the Koran is a true justification for laws whether people are persuaded or not. If righteous laws are rejected in the face of God’s testimony, then so be it. If the code of which I speak is received into law and only the Christians see the beauty of it, that’s even better. Our task is to desire and influence change. We are not to use as our justification only those things the other person will accept as valid. Because some people suppress the self-attesting God-breathed Word is not a reason to forgo an appeal to it in the civil realm. Are we to forgo absolute logic when dealing with a relativistic skeptic? (I’m a presuppositionalist, not an evidentialist as you can well guess.)

If you were not discussing the civil code but rather the final judgment with a Muslim, would you appeal to the Sermon on the Mount to show the Muslim he has violated the meaning of God’s holy law? If yes, then why not use the Word to refute the idea that thieves ought not to lose their hand for steeling a loaf of bread? However, if you would limit yourself to general revelation, you would be constrained to say that steeling a loaf of bread deserves eternal damnation. In which case, the Muslim can turn to you and say, “Well, since we can’t cast men into hell, we might as well cut their hands off now!” You see Zrim, general revelation is impotent with respect to governing ourselves in a fallen world because general revelation communicates judgment for all transgressions. Ironically to some, theonomy enables us to justify lesser penalties for lesser crimes.

Spiritually, the Bible is concerned for exact justice, and that is what all the OT laws and prophets were about, and Jesus was the fulfillment of all of it.

Jesus said he came not to abolish the law but to fulfill the law. Whatever you want to interpret “fulfill” as meaning, please don’t let the statement contradict itself. It would seem that your interpretation is that Jesus did not come to abolish the law but to abolish the law, which is a contradiction. Fulfill can mean many things, such as give us the fuller meaning of the law; or it could have to do with obeying the law perfectly. It could, also, mean that the law points to Christ. I have my view on the matter but in any case, fulfilling cannot mean abolish for the simple reason that Jesus said he did not come to abolish the law. Moreover, if you wish to take fulfill as abolish, then that would mean he abolished the moral law as well, in which case you prove too much.

Why use a text that is concerned for spiritual exactness for a task that is about civil approximation? Doesn’t pressing the Bible so defined into a civil cause so defined actually do harm to the plight of the Bible? That is, doesn’t it obscure what the Bible is all about?… Again, I affirm what I think is your concern for justice, but I oppose your method since it is a way that obscures the very heart of the gospel.

These laws were on the books for 1500 years before Christ. Did the law during that time “obscure what the Bible [was] all about?” If the equity of the civil code obscures the gospel, then it obscured the gospel under Moses. Accordingly, if you’re right that a theonomic civil code obscures the gospel, then you have a greater desire not to obscure the gospel than God did when he gave the law. That should give you reason to pause I would think. It should tell you that the desire for implementation of such laws cannot be argued away by the primacy of the gospel.

Since your point is a pragmatic one I’ll continue with some pragmatism of my own. What I think is that the gospel as a solution works best against the problem men have, which is accentuated by the moral law, out of which the civil law comes. Moreover, to justify a civil code with God’s word is to remind all men everywhere that there is an ultimate law giver who is the Judge over all. From there we may best show how God is just and the justifier – the one who judges and acquits in Christ.

You think that the law obscures the main message of the Bible, but certainly the main message of the Bible under Moses wasn’t civil law but rather it was God’s works of creation, providence and grace, was it not? Accordingly, this particular reason you raise for not wanting such laws today should by your standard be a sound reason to have not wanted the same laws under Moses. I also hear anti-theonomists argue against the laws in this manner: “So you would have such and such a person put to death…” All that tells me is that the person saying such a thing finds the law too harsh if not obscene, but I don’t see a reason why such a one would not also find the same laws equally obscene under Moses. How do satisfaction, propitiation, expiation and reconciliation turn wisdom into foolishness? In other words, how does the cross make the civil laws given to Israel (over night no less) repulsive to some, or are these laws intrinsically repulsive to some? I pray not. Accordingly, it is never under good regulation to argue against such laws because they appear harsh to our ears.

Jesus’ own hermeneutic here is to say that the Bible is all about him, all about the fulfillment of the law and prophets. To reach back into the law and prophets to do anything but point us to Jesus is to point us away from Jesus.

Ah, but to desire to have ourselves governed by the standards put forth by the King of Kings who is the Word become flesh is to think Christ’s thoughts after him and to yield to his epistemic Lordship. I do well not to desire anything in the realm of civil rule than the standard God desired for those who would follow him.

I know you affirm that Jesus is the fulfillment of all the law and prophets, but it seems to me that your left hand doesn’t realize what the right is doing. There are times when that’s a good thing, but in this instance it’s actually a way to say that you’re getting in the way of your own good confession.

I grasp your opinion on the matter now please receive mine. It would seem to me that you are placing your wisdom with respect to what is good for the gospel above God’s. Your arguments seem to be that the implementation of such laws don’t seem feasible to you, and that they eclipse the main message of Scripture. I hope I dealt with those objections at least in some measure.

I don’t know what more there is to say other than,

Best wishes,

Ron

My main concern about “theonomic” as a label is that people have associated that term with things like re-instituting the dietary laws, which someone like Calvin would never have assented to.

TF,

Real quick – I don’t want to take you away from what you’re doing on this thread. Just one point though… These people that associate dietary laws with theonomy are simply uninformed. Given the magnitude of their misunderstanding, I wouldn’t be too concerned with accepting the label in fear of being thought of as adhering to dietary laws. Theonmists appreciate that the separation from clean and unclean meats (for instance) was symbolic and pointed to the principle to separate from the gentiles, which is a principle that has been abrogated and with it the dietary symbolism. (Lev. 20; Acts 10; Romans 14:17) The NT application is separation from unbelief and compromise (2 Cor. 6) in the realm of spiritual yoking, whether in worship or marriage.

Best,

Ron

When it is pointed out to them that Jesus and the Apostles did not speak out against Roman policies, did not give the church a mandate to bring the OT law to bear on governments, etc… it is called an argument from silence.

Todd,

Both sides argue from silence. Theonomists say that the NT in no way abrogates the principles that are to govern civil life for a godly nation and non-theonomists argue that the NT in no away affirms the precepts for nations that we find in the OT. Neither side has from the NT an explict instruction or good and necessary inference for their position. If you have such evidence for your position, then please produce it.

A word or two about arguments from silence is in order. A Reformed hermeneutic advises that God’s word is binding in precept until he determines otherwise either by explicit instruction or good and necessary inference. Accordingly, I don’t need to look in the NT for an affirmation of the justification that beastiality is sin. It’s never been abrogated so my justification for this assertion is to be found in the OT.

Finally, it’s a bit vague to say that the church was not mandated to bring the OT civil laws to bear upon civil magistrates. I’m not sure what you mean by bringing such instruction to bear, but I do know that the church is to preach the whole counsel of God with a proper balance. If there is a continued validity for the OT civil case laws, then the church is to preach that message in its proper place, yet without majoring on minors.

So you don’t put up another post like the one I just referenced, I hope you will respond with some contraints. When I ask you to produce evidence for good and necessary inference or explicit instruction for abrogation of the relevance of the case laws, I’m expecting something quite different from you than simply your opinion that if Jesus and the apostles wanted such laws to be observed today they would have said so.

For you to get from the observations that you already voiced to the grand conclusion that the civil case laws are not to be observed today in their general equity you will have to assume, just as you have, that Jesus and the apostles have to repeat principles and precepts for them to remain binding, which makes beastiality acceptable and infant baptism unacceptable. Yet such an hermeneutic is unworkable, and not one that you live under with any consistency. At the very least, 2 Timothy 3:16 is pretty broad in its application. It teaches us that all Scripture does not need to be repeated for it to remain profitable. It teaches us that all Scripture…. is profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness. That would include the OT case laws.

From Darryl Hart:

Ron, the NT does talk about the magistrate and it says nothing like what the OT says. Rom 13 is obviously a place to go. If Paul were expecting the magistrate to enforce laws like Israel was called to do, don’t you think he would have said it?

No, I don’t think he needed to address it in Romans 13. That he didn’t doesn’t afford you good and necessary inference, as I’ve argued with Todd. There was already a lot said in the OT and as I also noted to Todd, Paul stated that all Scripture is profitable…Gotta board the plane…

Ron, I’ll say it again, since Paul spent so much time addressing the differences between Jews and Gentiles, and also said that Gentile were not bound by Israelite norms, then his instruction in Rom 13 is hardly a reaffirmation of OT civil laws.

Hi Darryl,

You continue to presuppose that Romans 13 must affirm theonomy in order for theonomy to be a biblical paradigm, but that’s an arbitrary assertion you have yet to defend. We need to be careful in requiring, if not demanding, that God reveal his precepts in a way that satisfies us. I would urge you to consider just a few passages of Scripture that speak to this very point.

Mark 10:17-18: When a rich young ruler called Jesus good, he neither affirmed nor denied that he possessed that quality of person but instead said nobody is good but God. Depending upon one’s pre-commitment it might be inferred that Jesus was not good and, therefore, not God; yet the text neither affirms nor denies either conclusion.

Acts 1:6, 7: When the apostles asked Jesus whether he was at that time going to restore the kingdom to Israel, he neither affirmed nor denied such an intention but instead said that it was not for them to know the times or epochs that the Father has fixed by his own authority. Dispensationalists, given their pre-commitment to a restored national Israel, infer from the answer a confirmation of their theology, that the kingdom will be restored. Notwithstanding, no logical conclusion can be deduced from the text with respect to the restoration Israel’s kingdom.

John 21:20-22: When Peter asked Jesus whether John would be alive at the time of Jesus’ return Jesus told him that if he wanted John to remain until such time it was no business of Peter’s. Jesus then put to Peter his task, which was to follow Jesus. Jesus’ answer did not logically imply that John would remain or not, let alone whether Jesus would even return one day! The answer even caused a rumor among the brethren that John would not die (John 21:23). John in this very epistle (same verse: 23) remarked on the unjustified inference that caused the rumor: “Jesus did not say to him that he would not die, but only, ‘If I want him to remain until I come, what is that to you?’”

There are many more examples but the point should be obvious. We cannot logically deduce that which is not deducible. But more importantly, we may not require that God give us answers in the places we want to find them. That is to put God to the test.

In the final analyses, if we could deduce that Romans 13 demands the repudiation of theonomy, then I would think that a syllogism to that end, comprised of premises that don’t beg crucial questions, could be constructed rather readily from the text. At the end of the day, using Romans 13 to refute theonomy is on par with concluding that (a) Jesus was not a teacher sent from God; (b) Jesus was not good and, therefore, not God; (c) Jesus intended to establish Israel as a political power but failed with the passing of John. It’s not only irrational to make such leaps in reason, it’s reckless.

The destruction of Israel and Jerusalem which Christ foretold and which the apostles witnessed certainly did not lead to revelations of how to re-institute Israel and Jerusalem, as if Constantinople is the capital city in exile.

God is done with Israel as the only nation under God. Now all nations are to receive King Jesus as their sovereign, which is consistent with the Abrahamic covenant and the great commission. The Lord Jesus is not merely head of the church but Lord over the nations; so just as elders are to rule on his behalf according to his word, so are kings. There need not be additional revelation on this matter of the law for all Scripture (and that would include the civil case laws) are profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness.

So I don’t see in your view how you recognize what the confession says that the gospel under the church is administered with more simplicity and less outward glory than in Israel (WCF 7.6).

It’s remarkable to me that you don’t see how I can reconcile the simplicity of the outward administration of the covenant under the gospel dispensation with an objective standard by which rulers should govern. Maybe you might show a logical contradiction between less outward glory in the administration of the covenant of grace and civil laws that reflect the thinking of God.

Best regards,

Ron

Ron (#143), then what is the point of Romans 13:1-7? This is the question you never really seem to address. Your point seems to be, “Whatever it means, it doesn’t mean the magistrate shouldn’t utilize the OT case laws to do his job.”

Zrim,

The passage you cite instructs believers how they are to live in a fallen world and consequently in subjection to fallible leaders.

Maybe you’re right. But it seems to me the plain reading is that the magistrate God appoints is our source for political and legislative arrangements—not the OT case laws.

I don’t know. This seems terribly simplistic to me. Indeed, the magistrate is in place “for political and legislative arrangements” but that only defines whose job it is to make laws, policy etc. The ordination of rulers, however, does not inform us (or them) of the standard by which they should govern, but some standard must be presupposed if they are accountable to God to rule well. If the standard is general revelation, then they could not distinguish which transgressions are worthy of punishment. Are we to believe that God gives the awesome power to execute creatures made in his image without also making available a revelation of which type crimes warrant the death penalty? It’s hard for me to imagine that if you were King of your own nation you would you presume to look outside God’s civil law to determine who should be put to death, but maybe you would. At the very least, if kings were not required to rule according to the case laws, why wouldn’t it be a good desire, pleasing to God, to turn to that alleged obsolete word of wisdom anyway?

The question of by what standard magistrates are to govern is not in view in Romans 13. So neither you nor I may build a case for or against theonomy from Romans 13. Note well, however, that there is nothing in the text that suggests that magistrates are free before God to govern any which way they please. Certainly God has some opinion on which transgressions are to be punished by civil magistrates and what those sanctions should be. The burden of proof would seem to be on you to show that such a detailed provision should be found in the NT, let alone in Romans 13 since the NT tells us that all Scripture including the case laws are profitable for instruction etc.

Thanks,

Ron

My dear Brothers,

I’m going to stop posting on this matter for various reasons. 1) I don’t think I can add anything more to the discussion. 2) Although this matter is somewhat important, it always seems to generate more heat than light. 3) When we focus on any matter with such intensity, we begin to lose perspective on what is most important, God’s glory in the gospel.

Yours in Him,

Ron

Darryl Hart's last post to me:

Ron, I know you’ve pulled out, but I don’t think you caught part of my point. The Jewish Christians knew the OT code for the magistrate. But Paul was the apostle to the Gentiles. And since he had to do a lot of explaining about whether or not circumcision still applied, you’d think he’d supply a little political theology to those new to the covenant. But he did not.

And the Reformed hermeneutic is let the clear passages interpret the less clear. Rom. 13 is fairly clear about what believers may or may not expect from a ruler — a pretty nefarious ruler at that. And since much of what Paul writes to Christians about observing the OT is that it has passed away, I don’t see how the civil polity of Israel is exempt.

But if your point is simply that the magistrate should enforce both tables, then that would fit more with the difference I am arguing for here. At the same time, since you are arguing for theonomy, that seems to bite off a lot more of the OT than the decalogue can chew — so to speak

.
I didn't bother to respond to Darryl Hart on GreenBaggins. Had he said something new, or at least interacted with my objection of his demands of God, maybe I would have. I'll simply say here that it's remarkable to me that Dr. Hart's arguments are based upon things like:

"you’d think" it would have been this way...

"Rom 13 is obviously a place to go."

"If Paul were expecting the magistrate to enforce laws like Israel was called to do, don’t you think he would have said it?"

"...his instruction in Rom 13 is hardly a reaffirmation of OT civil laws..."

Confusion Over The Transcendental Argument For The Existence Of God

2010-12-23T12:02:00.014-05:00

Generally speaking TAG is a deductive argument, but it is unlike all other deductive arguments. What sets TAG apart from garden variety deduction is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others – but unlike transcendental arguments that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience (or its denial). For instance, “If causality then God” merely means that causality is a sufficient condition for God and that God is a necessary condition for causality. Which is to say: if causality exists then it is logically necessary that God exists. However, such a premise does not delve into the question of how God and causality relate to each other. It does not tell us whether God exists because of causality or whether causality exists because of God. Causality presupposes God says more than causality is a sufficient condition for God and that God is a necessary condition for causality. If causality presupposes God then God must be logically prior to causality.

The transcendental argument for the existence of God is an argument that has as its conclusion God exists.

Prove A: The Christian God exists.
Step 1 ~A: (Assume the opposite of what we are trying to prove): The Christian God does not exist.
Step 2 (~A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience since God is the precondition of intelligibility
Step 3 (~B): There is intelligible experience (Contradiction)
Step 4 (~ ~A): It is not the case that God does not exist (Modus Tollens on 2 and 3)
Step 5 (A): --> God does exist (Law of negation.)
Q.E.D.

Whereas professing atheists are willing to concede the validity of the above argument Christians should happily concede that the argument is not only not fallacious (i.e. valid) but also sound. In other words, although professing atheists and Christians alike agree that the above argument has a valid form – i.e. the conclusion follows from the premises – Christians should agree that since the premises are all true and the form is valid the conclusion is true. But unfortunately Christians are often muddled.

Christians often say that TAG does not achieve its goal because not every worldview is refuted in the argument. Such a claim simply demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope of TAG. The above argument is aimed to prove that God exists, which it does. To deny that it does is to reject logic and / or biblical truths. Again, the argument above has a specific conclusion, God exists. The conclusion of the argument is not that if God does not exist, then there could be no intelligible experience. In other words, the above transcendental argument does not aim to prove that God is the precondition for intelligible experience, though that is a premise used in the argument which is why the argument is transcendental. That is where Christians who oppose TAG get tripped up. They don’t appreciate what is being argued.

So what about step 2 of the argument? We can defend the premise of step 2 deductively by appealing to the absolute authority of Scripture. Of course the unbeliever rejects that authority; nonetheless that the unbeliever is dysfunctional does not mean that an appeal to Scripture is fallacious! After all, if a skeptic rejects logic should we then argue apart from logic? Since when does the dullness of an opponent dictate which tools of argumentation may be used? Of course, given the unbeliever’s suppression of the truth the Christian does well to defend step 2 inductively by performing internal critiques of opposing worldviews, which of course can only corroborate the veracity of step 2. It would be fallacious, however, to conclude because of such condescension toward the unbeliever that the conclusion of TAG (God exists) and the justification for its step 2 (God is the precondition of intelligibility) rest upon inductive inference. By the use of induction the Christian is merely acknowledging that the unbeliever refuses to bend the knee to the self-attesting Word from which step 2 can be deduced by sound argumentation. Since unbelievers will not accept the truth claims of the Bible and, therefore, a deductive defense of step 2 the only thing the Christian can do is refute the hypothetical competitors, but that hardly implies that step 2 cannot be proved by deduction.

Finally, it has been noted by some and popularized by Don Collet in the Westminster Theological Journal that the only way a transcendental argument may be formalized is thusly (TAG*):

C presupposes G if and only if both 1 & 2:
1. If C then God exists
2. If ~C then God exists

Given such a construct, we are no longer negating the metaphysicality of causality but rather the truth value of the predication of the metaphysicality of causality. In other words: ~causality (which is chaos) does not presuppose God so for the construct to make sense it must pertain only to prediction about causality. In other words, since non-causality is an impossible entity that defies creation, providence and intelligibility, such a formulation of TAG (TAG*) limits itself to predication only. Does the apologist really want to do that? Do we want to give up arguing that God is the precondition for the intelligible experience of actual causality? I think not. TAG* (as opposed to TAG) is indeed powerful but it does not pertain to anything other than predication; whereas TAG may pertain to predication and the reality that the predication contemplates.

Ron

God, One or Three Persons, or Both?

2010-12-05T12:34:00.018-05:00

A well regarded professor at a prominent Reformed seminary has been quoted as saying this:

“This is one of Van Til’s most original contributions to theology proper. As he said at the beginning of the chapter, to speak of God as one is to speak of God as a person. This fits our ordinary experience, as, for instance, when we pray, we pray to one person. It also fits biblical data that constantly refers to God as a person. By this reminder Van Til avoids two errors. The first is the tendency, found mostly in Western theology, of separating God’s essence, which becomes a remote inaccessible being, from the persons. The other is the neoorthodox error of reducing personality to relationship, rather than regarding it as the foundation of ontological consciousness.”

To pray “Our great God in Heaven – Father, Son and Holy Ghost” is to address one God in three persons. It is consistent with oneness and plurality being equally ultimate in the Godhead. It is not a prayer to three Gods let alone a prayer to individuals stripped from their intra-Trinitarian relationship. Most of all, it is not a prayer to a one person trinity.

God’s revelation of himself was progressive, not instantaneous. To Abraham God revealed himself as God Almighty, and to Moses as I Am. In the fullness of time the Second Person of the Trinity revealed God as Father, Son and Holy Ghost. When we worship God according to God’s full revelation, we worship the Trinity – one God in three persons; not one God in one person. To think of one God as one person is at least to blur if not utterly eclipse the doctrine of "God in three persons." We may not strip the one God from the plurality of persons in the Godhead, nor may the distinct persons of the Trinity be stripped from their intra-Trinitarian relationships, which is an all too common occurrence in the evangelical church. When we know any person of the Trinity aright, we know him in relation to the other two divine persons. For each person of the Trinity is to be worshipped and adored in accordance to his intra-Trinitarian relationship, for the Trinity is to be worship as the undivided Trinity. Accordingly, we worship the Father who chose us in Christ and glorified him. We worship the Christ who was obedient to the Father and glorified him. We worship the Sprit who baptizes us into existential union with Christ. (We do not worship a Holy Spirit, as is so common today, that has so little to do with Christ and his cross.) This is not to say that personality equates to relationship, for there is of course an ontological aspect of personality, but notwithstanding that ontological aspect cannot be understood apart from the ontological relationship. It does not exist without it.

If we worship the one true God at all, we do so with at least some understanding of the unity and diversity of divine persons in the Godhead. And if we worship any particular person of the Trinity at all, we do so with at least some understanding of His relationship to the other divine persons in the Godhead for that is how God is revealed because that his how God is God is three in a different sense than he is one, and one in a different sense than he his three. God is not one in the same sense that he is three.

So, when the WCF 1.1 and 1.2 speak of God as “he” I see no problem interpreting the personal pronoun in light of oneness of “God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost” which is consistent with the doctrine found in the very next paragraph, WCF 1.3, which addresses the three distinct persons in the Godhead. At the very least, we need not allow the standards to contradict themselves by allowing God to be one person in the same sense that he is three persons. So for instance, the triune God who is “God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost” is “infinite in being and perfection,” etc. So again, I disagree with this professor. When we address the Trinity as “You” in our prayers we should not be ignoring the other aspects of God’s revelation; we should as best we can, in our finitude, appreciate that we are addressing the triune God as one. By rejecting the notion that God should be perceived as one person we don't deny that God is personal and relational. In fact, by appreciating that God is three persons and one, we can begin to appreciate that God is the ultimate - personal and relational.

We need not at every moment elaborate upon every aspect of orthodox Trinitarian doctrine, but what we say about the Trinity should be consistent with the rest of what we don’t say that is in accordance with Scripture. (Just like there is no need to always mention human responsibility when speaking about divine providence, yet our doctrine of divine providence should look nothing like that of blind fate.) When we address God has “You” – we should be thinking that we are addressing the one single God who eternally exists as Father Son and Holy Ghost (in three distinct persons). By “You” we should not be thinking that we are addressing the triune God as one person in particular – for the triune God is not one person in particular; nor should we think we are addressing three distinct persons separately. Rather, in our finitude we should be striving to address God as Scripture reveals God – as the one true God that eternally exists in relation as three persons all of Whom are harmoniously working to apply the accomplished redemption to the world. It seems to me that by introducing the concept that the Trinity may be perceived as a person, the person we would end up addressing in such a construct would be a fourth person. It would be much better to simply pray to the first person of the Trinity, through the Son by the Holy Spirit.

In sum, we are not denying the divine essence or distinct persons with such a construct but rather through acknowledging the equal ultimacy that God has revealed about the Godhead, we can find a personal God without thinking of him in terms of one person. To err on the matter of equal ultimacy must always be at the expense of something. To err toward the side of one being, at the expense of persons, is a move toward modalism; whereas to err on the side of persons, at the expense of being, is a move toward tri-theism. By thinking in terms of a one person Godhead is not a solution to the problem, as the professor suggests, but rather is to eclipse God's revelation of being three persons, which is to emphasize being at the expense of persons. In this case, that error would seem to stem from the desire to find a single person with which to relate, yet in doing so undermining the ultimate reality found in the unity of a plurality of persons. And I suspect that the need to define God in that way, as one person, stems from the fundamental error of considering personality the "foundation" for "ontological consciousness" without reference to relationship, a sine qua non for God's ontology! That is not to suggest that any person derives his divinity from another, but by downplaying the intra-Trinitarian relationship in favor of abstracting ontological consciousness from that relationship leaves one seeking elsewhere (outside the Trinity - even to a fourth person) for that which was desired in the first place, a personal and relational God who is love.

Added 6/10/11 Finally, to address one person, we may say "you" (singular). When we address three persons at once, we may say "you" (plural). But what if we wanted to address the three not as plural (i.e. not by saying "you" as shorthand for: you-1, you-2 and you-3), but as an organic one comprised of three? We have no such English word to my knowledge, but maybe context dictates the meaning. Or do southerners have a singular-plural word for "you" - that being, "y'all"?

Infallibility & The Canon

2010-11-30T00:27:00.011-05:00

Certainly Romanists should agree that God is at least capable of bringing to pass his eternal plan and purpose without making his volitional creatures infallible. Judas and the Satan serve as prime examples of fallible beings that always did as God has decreed. However, their actions were not morally right but rather terribly wrong; so not to confuse matters we won’t use them as examples of fallible creatures that always did as God determined. How about when Johnny is ordained from the foundation of the world to get 100% on his fifth grade math final, does he do so infallibly? No, but he does so impeccably.

What is it to be infallible after all? For the Romanist it has to do with immunity to error. The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church defines infallibility as 'Inability to err in teaching revealed truth'. With respect to Johnny, if it was impossible for him to err on his test, then would he have earned 100% infallibly? Now in one sense, given that God decreed that Johnny would earn 100% on his test, there is a sense in which it was impossible for him to err. Notwithstanding, such a description is misleading because it makes infallibility a vacuous term; for even Judas and the Satan would be infallible on such terms. (Certainly they have done some things formally right.) Although Johnny’s choices are never metaphysically free, there are certainly “possible worlds” where Johnny fails to earn 100% given the same state of affairs in which he earns 100%. At the moment of choice, God brings to pass a distraction for instance, causing Johnny to shade in the wrong oval on the exam. All this to say, although Johnny is naturally capable of error (i.e. fallible by nature), God brought to pass according to his predetermination Johnny’s perfect score. So to call Johnny infallible would be a misnomer. (Now of course Charles Hodge was wrong when he said that Jesus could have sinned. Not only had God decreed that the Second Person of the Trinity would not sin – more the point, a divine person cannot sin in any possible world. Johnny could err and still be Johnny - so error is compatible with Johnny’s person. Jesus could not have sinned and remained God; so there is no possible world in which he sins. The impossibility goes beyond a matter of decree. It’s an ontological consideration.)

Now then, is there a possible world in which the church does not receive the canon aright? Well, let me rephrase that question. Is there a possible world in which Jesus promises that the church receives the canon and she does not receive it? I would say ABSOLUTELY NOT. Does that make the Romanist position correct? After all, isn’t it true that because Johnny errs in possible worlds, Johnny must be fallible even when God decrees that he act impeccably correct? Yet because Jesus errs in no world, he therefore cannot err and is, therefore, infallible. So what about the church? If there is no world in which she errs on the reception of the canon given the promise to receive the canon, mustn’t the church have been infallible when she received the canon? NO – and here is why. Up until now we’ve only been talking about possible worlds in which one errs or does not err given the same state of affairs. So, when Johnny is merely decreed to get 100% on his test without an accompanying divine promise, there are possible worlds in which he doesn’t earn the grade he ends up getting in this world, corroborating that he is fallible. Yet once a promise is made from God, it is impossible for what the promise contemplates not to come to pass in any possible world wherein the state of affairs includes the divine promise. In a word, there are no possible worlds in which Johnny is promised a grade of 100% by God and does not receive it, lest it is possible for God’s promise not to come to pass. I hope we can see more clearly that infallibility is not a necessary condition for the impossibility of acting incorrectly. If Johnny were promised 100% by God, Johnny does not become infallible in order to earn the mark, but rather fallible-Johnny is preserved from error according to the promise. Given the promise there is no world in which Johnny fails to earn 100%, even in those worlds in which he simply guesses the answers. Maybe a less hypothetical example might be of use. There is a promise from God that all true believers will be glorified. That means there is no possible world in which a justified soul perishes, given the golden chain of redemption. Does that make justified sinners infallible in their perseverance in faith? No – but it certainly demonstrates God’s preservation of his adopted sons in Christ. (Obviously, no sinner is perfect in sanctification and that is not the inference that should be drawn here, or used against this short polemic. The point is that the justified will believe the truth until the end, which can be for one of two reasons - their infallibility or God's infallible preserving of them. Again, to act correctly is not a sufficient condition for infallibility - i.e. infallibility is not necessary for correctness.)

In summary, to say that all men are infallible because they always act according to what God determines would make “infallibility” a vacuous term. Nobody is doing that. A subset of that consideration is that when morally responsible agents get the correct answer, they are not behaving infallibly lest we all have seasons of infallibility. When a divine promise is made, which must come to fruition being a divine promise, infallibility is not a necessary condition for the result to obtain lest sinners justified by grace become infallible in their perseverance.

Proof for the reception of the canon:

Jesus promised to build his church. (Matt. 16:18) Jesus also told his apostles that those who received them received Him. (Matt. 10:40) The implication is that the building project of the Lord was to be founded upon the apostles and prophets with Christ Jesus being the chief cornerstone. (Eph. 2:20) Consequently, the words of the apostles and Christ had to be received without error because Jesus promised to build his church upon them, which is now a matter of history given the passing of the apostles. Therefore, the canon is closed, lest the church has no foundation. The apostolic tradition was both oral and written (II Thess. 2:15) but only the written apostolic tradition has been providentially preserved. Accordingly, Scripture alone is what the church is built upon, which must have been God’s intention since Scripture alone is all he left us in keeping with Christ Jesus’ promise to build his church.

This simple argument has recently been met by Romanists from "Called to Communion" with resistance for two primary reasons. The claim is that the apostolic office in view in Ephesians 2:20 includes both the perpetual seat of the papacy and the oral tradition of the church. Let’s assume then that the unwritten tradition still exists even though it has never been produced. Jesus promised to build his church and we’ll say that he promised to build it upon both Scripture and unwritten tradition. (I of course would say that if Jesus promised to build his church on the unwritten tradition then he failed since there is no preserved unwritten tradition that the church has been built upon; yet for argument sake let’s assume the tradition is intact.) Whether we have the unwritten tradition or not has zero impact on the argument from “intent and providence” for the reception of the written tradition. Any preservation of the unwritten tradition does not undermine the reception of the written tradition. Now in a last ditch desperation Romanists will resort to saying that the texts in view are not just speaking about the teachings of Christ and his apostles (even oral traditions) as being the foundation of the church, but rather the texts mean that we are to receive for the foundation of the church the teachings of their alleged successors (the popes) both written and oral. In passing I’ll note that to have to receive the teaching of a pope 2,000 years after the teachings of the apostles and Christ would clearly deny the import of “foundation of the church.” But aside from the obvious, even if we grant the point, the reception of the written tradition through divine intent and providence is not affected by the Gnostic “exegesis” of Ephesians 2:20 regarding popes because a papal apostolic succession and the reception of the canon are not mutually exclusive premises. To “refute”” the Protestant position on the canon in a non-arbitrary, non-ad hoc fashion the Roman apologist will have to deny that Jesus had any intent whatsoever for the church to be at least partially built upon his written words and the written words of the apostles. To introduce Gnostic dogmas regarding unwritten traditions and the succession of bishops is simply to throw up Red Herrings in a sophist manner.

In sum, the Roman apologist needs to avoid the divine intent at all cost; for as soon as he acknowledges Christ Jesus’ intent to build His church “at least in part” on Scripture, he is then constrained to show why God’s intent could not have come to pass without an infallible magisterium (according to the same divine providence by which the rest of the eternal decree comes to pass). Since Romanists cannot possibly succeed in showing that God could not bring to pass the reception of the canon without an infallible magisterium, they are left no other choice (short of becoming Protestant on this matter) than to bring into question the divine intent. The Romanist does this through arguing by false-disjunction, introducing non-mutually exclusive premises to the promise of building the church “at least in part” on the canon; these Red Herring premises are intended to (a) establish a need for an apostolic oral tradition, and (b) establish a succession of infallible bishops. Yet neither a nor b undermine the divine intent to bring to pass the reception of the canon for the establishment of the NT church. Yet even allowing for those unjustified premises, the Romanist still cannot with any valid argumentation undermine the divine intent, which presuppose the necessity of bringing to pass the reception of the canon. They with the Satan can only say, “Has God said?”

Deduction, Induction, TAG and Certainty

2010-04-10T12:14:00.018-04:00

Deduction as a construct does not bring forth certainty any more than induction. Inductivists try to move from what might be thought to be known, or considered most probably the case, to what is not yet believed with the same veracity. Induction is “open ended” we might say, because induction as a process is never fully exhaustive. Rather, it comes to an end once one is satisfied with his personal pursuit. To put it another way, once cognitive satisfaction has been achieved the inductive pursuit is over, but it always stops short of philosophical certainty due to the nature of induction.

The deductive process on the other hand often leaves people with the impression that as a construct deduction brings forth knowledge. This would only be true, that deduction yields knowledge, if epistemic certainly was only a matter of construct, which it is not. Indeed, if the deductive process is valid, then the conclusion certainly follows from the premises. Whether the premises are reliable, however, is another matter altogether that requires further investigation having nothing to do with the deduction at hand. Deduction itself does not bring forth knowledge because for one to know the conclusion for what it truly is, he would first have to justify the premises that lead to the conclusion, which the immediate deduction in view does not achieve. That does not mean that deduction cannot aid in obtaining knowledge. The justification of many propositions that can be known comes by way of deduction.

Akin to those common errors, people often require a "philosophically certain" proof. I understand what epistemic certainty is, and appreciate what people mean by psychological certainty. I also understand what constitutes a valid and invalid argument, and what distinguishes those types of arguments from sound and unsound arguments. But what is a “philosophically certain argument”? People are certain, not arguments. Whether sound arguments will persuade someone to any degree of certainty is the job of the Holy Spirit, not the apologist.

Deduction is not a sufficient condition for knowledge. First, there is the "garbage in garbage out" consideration. The conclusion of a valid deduction need not be true; it only needs to follow from the premises. Accordingly, further investigation into the truth of the premises must occur for there to be the possibility of knowledge; yet that lies beyond the scope of the deduction at hand. Added to that, the Holy Spirit must grant justification for beliefs, which truth and structure alone cannot produce. Finally, the Holy Spirit must grant the knowledge that a valid deduction is reliable given true premises, which deduction cannot do. In short, God produces knowledge. He might even use weak inductive inferences in the process, but when knowledge is attained, the justification for what is believed to be true is through the illuminating power of God. Knowledge does not rely upon the induction or deduction that might have been employed in the process, but rather when one knows he has been taught by God.

A word or two might be in order regarding transcendental arguments (TAG in particular). TAG has a distinctly inductive aspect to it because with TAG the Christian investigates what must be true in order for some experience to be intelligible. Such explorations are inductive in emphasis. Notwithstanding, the manner of the investigation is not "open ended" because the premises within TAG do not merely support the conclusion, they ensure it. That point is missed by those who think TAG is inductive: http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2006/03/impropriety-of-trying-to-prove.html The aspect of "closure", where the premises ensure the conclusion, is unique to deduction, not induction. Moreover, the conclusion from TAG is not a mere hypothesis, but rather a sound conclusion derived through a deductive process that justifies its premises authoritatively. Finally, TAG falls short of being fully inductive because there is no asserting the consequent with TAG, as there is with all scientific inference, the playground for induction. Nonetheless, TAG has an inductive aspect to it because of the exploratory nature of TAG.

Of course TAG is deductive, but it is unlike all other deductive arguments. What sets TAG apart from garden variety deduction is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others - but that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience. More on that here: http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2010/03/to-us-only-thing-of-great-significance.html

As Bahnsen often quipped, "The proof of God's existence is that without Him one could not prove anything." That is nothing other than "Proof presupposes God" (or "If Proof, then God" since God is a necessary precondition for proof). Bahnsen's deduction and a defense of it can be found here:http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2010/04/bahnsen-misunderstood-servant-of-lord.html

(Given the inductive and deductive aspects of TAG, we shouldn't find it at all strange that Van Til said that in what he called the "Christian method" of apologetics, we find "elements of both induction and of deduction in it, if these terms are understood in a Christian sense.”)

Pastorally it should be said that we do not come to know the truth through cleverly devised proofs. Nothing could be further from the truth. We know God by nature (through revelation and conscience), and we must justify that knowledge by Scripture, the Christian's ultimate authority. I know my Savior lives because God has revealed that to me in His word. That is not my defense of the Christian worldview, but it's certainly a defensible fact. In other words, we don't "reason" ourselves to God, but our belief in God is indeed reasonable. In fact, it is not just reasonable; it is justifiable and true, which is to say it constitutes as knowledge.

Apologetically speaking, belief in God is the only reasonable position to hold if for no other reason, it is unreasonable to argue against God's existence because to do so one must first presuppose those tools of argumentation that only are defensible given God's existence. The precondition of intelligible experience is God. The justification for the precondition of intelligible experience is God’s word. An elaboration of that distinction is for another day.

Ron

Bahnsen, One Misunderstood Servant of The Lord

2010-04-09T02:13:00.019-04:00

“A transcendental argument begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds, by critical analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful, or be intelligible to us. Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501-502.)

That quote by Bahnsen has been misunderstood, abused and hijacked by those who would claim Bahnsen and those who would have nothing to do with his apologetic.
Let’s take this quote of Bahnsen’s step by step.

1. “A transcendental argument begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever”

Let’s assume as our belief that there is causality. That it is intelligible.

2. “…and proceeds, by critical analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful, or be intelligible to us.”

Let’s assume that what must be the necessary precondition needed to make sense of causality is God’s existence. We are now left with: If Causality, then God.

3. “Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.”

Now let’s do as Bahnsen suggests and “negate the statement of that original belief”. In other words, let’s negate causality (the statement of that original belief) and see if we reach the same conclusion.

At this juncture we have two choices. The first one is a bit strange but let’s run with it and see where it takes us. (A) We can first interpret the instruction in such a manner as to introduce a minor premise thereby denying the antecedent of the major premise while affirming the consequent in the conclusion. Does Bahnsen mean this?

If Causality, then God (because causality presupposes God)
~Causality
Therefore, God.

What is the problem with such a rendering of Bahnens’s words? To argue as above is to draw a conclusion that does not follow from the premises in any logical sense! The argument is invalid (and no appeal to transcendental arguments can save a formal fallacy.) Whenever possible, we should not interpret someone’s words in such a way that makes him out to look foolish or inept.

Therefore, let’s consider another way to heed the instruction to “negate the statement of that original belief”. (B) Let's interpret the instruction in such a manner as to deny the statement of that original belief not in the minor premise but in the major premise. Again, we are told to go back and negate the statement of that original belief in order to see if both the first belief and its denial lead to the same transcendental conclusion. When we do that, we are left with two different major premises that both are to lead to the same conclusion. We're left with the original premise (or belief): If Causality, then God; but also we’re left to consider the negation of that original belief with another premise: If ~Causality, then God. That rendering with respect to form is consistent with Don Collett's rendering of CVT and TAG in the WTJ:
C presupposes G if and only if both 1 & 2:
1. If C then God exists
2. If ~C then God exists
Whether we predicate: If Causality, then God (or) If ~Causality, then God the same conclusion, God, obtains. In other words, God is the necessary precondition for all predication. Or to put it in Bahnsen’s terms, whether we affirm or deny the original belief, the transcendental analysis nevertheless reaches the very same conclusion given both premises. {NOTE WELL: We are not negating the metaphysicality of causality but rather the truth value of the predication of the metaphysicality of causality! In other words: ~causality (which is chaos) does not presuppose God(!), but indeed the belief or assertion of ~causality does! In other words, the concept of non-causality presupposes God.}
The second way ought to be considered the most reasonable way in which we ought to interpret the instruction. There are two reasons for this. First, the second way is not an invalid argument as is the first way; and if we are able to interpret someone’s words in a way that is cogent rather than foolish, then we should. Secondly, it has not been shown that the author of the quote ever demonstrated in his many lectures and debates a single instance of fallaciously denying the antecedent while affirming the consequent. Yet on many occasions he labored the point that to argue against the Christian worldview, the Christian worldview must first be presupposed. And that is to argue both:

If sound argumentation, then God (since sound argumentation presupposes God)
and
If unsound argumentation, then God (since unsound argumentation... God)

When we work these arguments through, we find:

If sound arguments, then God...
~God
Therefore, no sound argument... but there are sound arguments, therefore, God

and

If unsound arguments, then God...
~God
Therefore, no unsound arguments... but there are unsound arguments, therefore, God
Accordingly, whether we affirm sound arguments "or go back and negate" sound arguments, the same transcendental conclusion obtains - God!

Therefore:

If sound or unsound arguments, then God
~God
Therefore, no sound or unsound arguments (but there as such arguments, therefore, God)

The deductive argument, which is transcendental in nature, establishes God as the necessary precondition for both sound and unsound arguments. TAG, however, must be distinguised from garden variety deduction, as I show here: http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2010/04/deduction-certainty.html

Finally, TAG and Bahnsen has nothing to do with anything so silly as:

If sound argument, then God
Not sound argument
Therefore, God

In the final analyses, Bahnsen’s statement need not lead us into fallacious reasoning. Added to that, it is only when we interpret Bahnen’s statement in such a manner as not to be fallacious are we able to reconcile his summary statement with his many demonstrations of what the statement contemplates. Why not, therefore, let Bahnsen not be fallacious, especially if it allows him to be consistent with himself?
Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Bahnsen's Use of Modus Tollens and Modus Ponens

2010-04-07T17:16:00.017-04:00

It was recently asked of me why Greg Bahnsen argued transcendentally using Modus Tollens (MT) as opposed to Modus Ponens (MP), which I suppose is a fair question since even John Frame, it would seem to me, did not seem to see any persuasive reason why Bahnsen was a stickler about using one formulation rather than the other.

To argue by way of negation as opposed to affirmation is much more powerful because it reduces the opposing worldview to absurdity. There’s a reason, after all, why MT is referred to as a reductio ad absurdum argument. Both forms (MT and MP) are valid forms of argumentation; can be converted to the other; and argue to the same narrow conclusion – in this case that God exists. But it is one thing to say that causality logically implies God, which is what MP achieves, and quite another to argue that without God there could be no causality. The latter, of course, employs MT. At the very least, there is a tactical difference between: “God, therefore, causality” and “No God, therefore, no causality”.

Consider the major premise: “If logic (predication, induction, or whatever), then God.” I’ll now try to show where we might use MP and where we should use MT to be most affective given that one major premise, with which both MP and MT may begin. First I’ll address MT.

The reason Bahnsen argued by way of negation (MT) in all his formal debates and in his classroom lectures on transcendental arguments is because he appreciated that no other formal construct illustrated more clearly and powerfully the point he wanted to make, that intelligible experience has no rational grounding given the negation of God’s existence. Bahnsen, following Van Til, wanted to argue that to predicate anything God must first exist (i.e. predication presupposes God). The way he chose to demonstrate that was by assuming for argument’s sake the opponents position that God does not exist, which required the negation of the consequent of the major premise, as opposed to the affirmation of the antecedent. By assuming the atheist’s worldview, Bahnsen for argument’s sake would negate the consequent of the major premise, “God”, which forced the conclusion that there is no logic (for instance). The reductio was apparent since logic was being presupposed by the one arguing the opposing position. By negating the consequent of the major premise the opponent is left to deal with the force of the conclusion: no predication – yet while all the time predicating! Bahnsen’s mantra was that to argue against God one must first presuppose God in his reasoning. Accordingly, he would argue by way of reductio: “No God”, which affectively led to the absurd conclusion of “no possibility of argumentation.” Bahnsen said over and over again that “the proof of God’s existence is that without him one could not prove anything.” That is precisely why he negated “God exists” in the minor premise - to show the absurd conclusion that there is no logic, etc.

Where MP might be found useful is in the apologist’s follow-up, which is to offer the solution to the quandary. Once one has been left with the absurd conclusion of “no logic” and cannot make logic comport with his unbelieving worldview, then by all means it is under good regulation to reformulate the argument with a new minor premise, that being the assertion of the antecedent – “Logic” (or causality, or prediction, or induction, etc.) In other words, once one is left with the conclusion of the reductio, which is the conclusion that his unbelieving worldview leaves him with(!) - it might be a good idea to assert the antecedent of the major premise (logic) in order to arrive at the conclusion: “God exists”: If logic, then God; ~God, therefore, ~logic (reductio). Ah, but there is logic (assert antecedent of major premise), therefore, God (MP). That is the only use of MP one will probably ever find in Bahnsen’s lectures, debates or writings with respect to this particular matter. MP is employed to give the solution to the dilemma. But even that can be done by MT! In other words, the conclusion of the argument is essentially "~God, therefore, logic". Accordingly, by treating that as a premise, we can simply add to the argument by negating logic in order to affirm God, which is to continue the argument with a form of MT rather than applying MP to the original major premise. In other words: If logic, then God. No God, then no logic. Logic, therefore, God.

With his debate against Dr. Stein, Dr. Bahnsen argued as his major premise: “If the uniformity of nature, then God” – (which was to posit the assertion that the uniformity of nature presupposed God’s existence.) The negation of God’s existence led to the absurd conclusion that there could be no possibility of the basis for all scientific inference, induction. Dr. Stein, a scientist and professing atheist, had no answer to his own dilemma. His scientific endeavors were all based upon the borrowed capital of God’s providence. The absurd conclusion of “no induction” left Stein with the task of proving how induction was indeed possible without the God of providence whom Scripture has revealed. With attorney Edward Tabash, although Bahnsen argued briefly that induction presupposes God (with his “toothpaste proof for God’s existence”), I would say that Bahnsen’s emphasis was on the necessary preconditions for morality (given that Tabash had Jewish relatives who suffered under Hitler). With the negation of God's existence, Awschwitz was morally irrelevant. (Doug Wilson employed the same sort of reductio with Dan Barker at the University of Delaware about a decade ago.) In both cases, “the toothpaste proof for God’s existence” and the “morality” argument, Bahnsen demonstrated through MT that morality and induction have their only grounding in God.

In a word, arguing by reductio is the most powerful way of demonstrating that the very tools of argumentation presuppose that which the unbelieving worldview does not afford, God’s existence. That is done, as Bahsnen so often said, by “assuming for argument’s sake that God does not exist”, which is the very conclusion the professing atheist wants to lead us to in his argument. In summary then, the reason we first argue by negation and not affirmation is that negation allows us to assume the opponent’s conclusion. In other words, it allows us to better lead the opponent by the hand by starting with his presupposition in the minor premise.

Now, of course, if we apply MT as I do immediately below, in which case it is posited “no intelligible experience” in the consequent of the major premise, then we conclude with the existence of God (i.e. it is not the case that God does not exist). Accordingly, what was demonstrated before in Bahnsen’s coupling of the minor premise and the conclusion (i.e. no God, therefore, no intelligible experience) is now located in what the major premise posits. Such an argument is not as readily accessible in my estimation - first because of the two negatives that are used in the major premise, plus the double negative found in the conclusion. Notwithstanding, I have employed that very argument on this site when I was not so much interested in concluding the ramifications of the reductio (no intelligible experience), but rather when my intention was to lead to the conclusion that God exists (by using MT).

Step 1 (A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience (since God is the precondition of intelligibility)
Step 2 (~B): There is intelligible experience
Step 3 (~A): It is not the case that God does not exist

Let’s now see what happens if we utilize MP rather than MT given the same major premise.

Step 1 (A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience
Step 2 (A): God does not exist
Step 3 (B): Therefore, there is no intelligible experience

Unlike the argument that concludes God’s existence, this argument leads to the same conclusion as Bahnsen’s use of MT, but by using MP instead. I find this terribly cumbersome, however, because in the major premise “no intelligible experience” is posited as the necessary condition for no God, rather than God being positively posited as the necessary precondition for intelligible experience: “If intelligible experience, then God” (because God is the necessary precondition for intelligible experience). Accordingly, in this argument MP needs some reworking to make the point more clearly that intelligible experience presupposes God (as its necessary condition). In other words, although the conclusion is the same as Bahnsen’s, the opposing worldview is not reduced to absurdity because a reductio form is not employed. Also, this argument gives way to the five negatives employed in the two premises and conclusion.

Finally, Frame finds no problem with the following use of MP.

If causality, then God
Causality
Therefore, God

The reason Frame’s use of MP is not as affective as Bahnsen’s use of MT is similar to a reason stated before. Although all the negatives are done away with in this formulation, Frame’s argument does not conclude with the absurdity that there is no causality (or science, or ethics, etc.), which is the very thing the unbeliever would otherwise be challenged to overcome. In other words, because Bahnsen’s use of MT concludes the negation of that which the unbeliever affirms, the unbeliever is more abruptly confronted with the challenge to prove how intelligible experience can possibly comport with the minor premise of no God. Also, MT no less than MP can be formulated with additional commentary to address necessary preconditions (as opposed to mere necessary conditions). Therefore, MT can offer both, the transcendental challenge and the reductio in one short, sharp, shock. Bahnsen wins outright – point, set, match. (Also, Frame until late did not seem to fully appreciate that an argument from presupposition requires that God be the precondition for both the denial and the affirmation of the intelligible experience under consideration. He now acknowledges the point.)

Finally, Bahnsen once wrote:

“A transcendental argument begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds, by critical analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful, or be intelligible to us. Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501-502.)

What Dr. Bahnsen meant was that whether we argue for or against morality (for instance) we arrive at the same transcendental conclusion, God exists. Accordingly, to make sense out of the belief that there is no morality (or that there is morality) one must presuppose God’s existence in that investigation. It should be obvious that Bahnsen did not commit this fallacy:

If morality, then God
No morality
Therefore, no God

Rather, he simply meant that whether one claims to believe or not to believe X, then God. The reason being, God is the necessary precondition for all beliefs, true of false.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Federal Vision Teachers - Worthy to be Abhorred or Simply Dunces?

2010-04-04T23:47:00.020-04:00

http://www.federal-vision.com/joint_statement.html

“We affirm that there is only one true Church, and that this Church can legitimately be considered under various descriptions, including the aspects of visible and invisible.”

This is one of the most troubling statements of the FV. The statement communicates that there is only one church, which can be described in terms of its being visible and invisible. The implication of such a construct is that the invisible church and the visible church are the same church. From that false premise comes much confusion and outright error. To make the point more clearly, consider the following modification of the statement: We affirm that there is only one true God, and that this God can legitimately be considered under various descriptions, including the aspects of transcendence and immanence. The modified statement, which uses the same construct of the FV statement, clearly communicates that the one transcendent God is the same God as the immanent God. That is true. Transcendence and immanence are simply two aspects of the one God. Is the FV statement true in this way? Is the visible church the same church as the invisible church? The FV statement clearly implies that they are one and the same; for it states that there is “only one true Church” that can be described in various ways, like visible and invisible. How can they claim such a theology and also claim to be Reformed?

In contrast to FV theology, now consider Reformed theology: “The catholic or universal Church, which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect, that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one, under Christ the Head thereof; and is the spouse, the body, the fullness of Him that fills all in all…The visible Church, which is also catholic or universal under the Gospel (not confined to one nation, as before under the law), consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion; and of their children: and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation.”

Note the difference. Within Reformed theology the invisible and visible churches are not the same church. The invisible church consists of the elect who will all possess Christ, whereas the visible church consists of those who profess Christ. On that basis alone, the FV may not be considered “Reformed” in any sense of the word. The FV is comprised of a bunch of muddled thinking men.

The Federal Vision blurs the visible-invisible church distinction and has a faulty view of the Covenant of Grace. Accordingly, they imagine that through water baptism one is united to the very life of Christ. Consequently, if one who was baptized with water were to deny the faith, he would in Federal Vision terms truly fall from grace and lose the life he had in Christ.

Federal Vision theology does affirm that all who have been justified will be glorified. Notwithstanding, how can one who has been justified be assured of his final state of salvation, glorification, if he can in fact fall from grace and lose the life in Christ he supposedly had? It is no wonder that assurance of salvation in the Federal Vision is limited only to the objective truth that those God has justified will be glorified. Federal Vision theology makes no room for personal, subjective assurance of one’s final salvation; indeed how can it if one can truly fall from grace and lose his life in Christ that is alleged to be given to all in the church?

The Federal Vision is correct that the “the decretally elect cannot apostatize”. But by blurring the visible-invisible church distinction and attributing a former life in Christ to those who outwardly deny the faith, the truly justified who will one day prove themselves elected unto glory is left no place to ground his assurance of his justification. After all, both those elected unto glory and those who deny the faith allegedly share in the same life in Christ and consequently must have the same grounds for assurance of perseverance, which becomes no grounds at all since some with life will not persevere.

Federal Vision proponents would do well to learn that the Covenant of Grace was established only with Christ as the Second Adam and in Him, with the elect. Consequently, the promises the covenant contemplates are restricted to the same, the elect – the invisible church, which comes from a systematic theology the Federal Vision abhors.

Any system of theology that would make such claims and create such confusion for God's people is abhorrent, but the teachers of the Federal Vision are not in my estimation so much to be abhorred but simply regarded for what they are, dunces. Note well, I would never use such language to describe those who are walking in the ways of the Federal Vision or even standing in the way. It is only the ones who have taken a seat in order to teach Federal Vision do I consider dunces. After all, it is they who have studied hard and still haven't a clue about the doctrines of church, salvation and covenant. For that they are to sit in the corner in shame.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

A Christian Reason for Celebrating Easter

2010-03-28T21:33:00.009-04:00

Induction, the basis for all scientific inference, presupposes the uniformity of nature, which is to say it operates under the principle of the future being like the past; yet the resurrection of Christ from the dead is contra-uniform since it does not comport with past experience. Our experience is that people die and are not raised three days later. Also, we’ve all met plenty of liars and those deceived into embracing false beliefs (even dying for false beliefs!) but we have never observed a single resurrection of the body. Accordingly, the lives and martyrdom of zealots need not lead us to conclude that Christ has risen. Consequently, drawing an inference based upon past experience as it pertains to the question of the empty tomb is not very useful. Evidentialism indeed fails as an apologetic. After all, given only the uniformity of nature coupled with personal experience, a more probable explanation for the empty tomb is a hoax put on by liars rather than a miracle put on by God. The same reasoning applies all the more to the virgin birth I would think.

The fact of the matter is that we do not come to know that our Savior lives by examining the evidence according to some alleged neutral posture, for the facts do not demand the conclusion that Christ has risen. The facts are indeed consistent with the resurrection but the facts do not speak for themselves let alone lead us to the Christian conclusion, which is no conclusion at all but rather a starting point for apologetical discourse and belief. God speaks in order that we might interpret the facts aright. The fact of the empty tomb, therefore, is not what leads us to the "conclusion" of the resurrection but rather the empty tomb corroborates what we already know from God, that Christ is resurrected.

Similarly, we read in Scripture that a man named Saul who once opposed Christ became the chief apologist for the Christian faith. The way in which one will interpret the transformation of Saul to Paul will be consistent with one’s pre-commitment(s). Christians take the fanaticism of the apostle as corroborating what they already know to be true about the resurrection. The fanaticism of the apostle no more “proves” the resurrection of Christ than does the empty tomb. Moreover, neither the empty tomb nor the life of Paul proves the resurrection any more than it can disprove it by proving that a conspiracy to overthrow ancient Judaism took place evidenced by the hoax of the resurrection. The point is simply this. Naturalists will find their explanation for the apostle’s transformation and the empty tomb elsewhere, outside of the Christian resurrection interpretation. Similarly, the way in which one interprets the facts surrounding Joseph Smith will be according to one’s pre-commitment(s). If one is committed to a closed canon, then the claims of Mormonism will be deemed false.

Of course the tomb is empty, for Christ has risen. Of course the apostle Paul preached the resurrection of Christ with all his heart, soul and strength, for Christ has risen. Of course the Mormon religion is a cult, for Jesus is God and the canon is closed. Do we come to believe these things by evaluating supposed brute particulars in an alleged neutral fashion or are our beliefs already marshaled according to our pre-commitment to God’s word in general and the resurrection in particular? Do the “facts” speak for themselves or has God already exegeted the facts for us?

The reason one believes that Christ has risen from the grave is because God has revealed the truth of the resurrection. In fact, we don’t just believe God’s word on the matter, we actually know God is telling the truth. Yet, unwittingly, often times Christians do not speak the truth with respect to why they believe in the resurrection. Too often Christians will say that they believe in the resurrection because of such evidence, which if true would reduce one’s confidence in God’s say-so to speculation based upon supposed brute facts that (would) readily lend themselves to suspicion (when God’s word is not presupposed as reliable, true and one's ultimate authority). Christians need to lay hold of the fact that the “Word of God” is God’s word, and God cannot lie.

With the resurrection the former days of ignorance are gone (Acts 17:30); so our belief in the truth couldn’t be more justified since our justification comes from the self-attesting Christ of Scripture working in accordance with the internal witness of the Holy Ghost. We do not come to know Jesus lives by drawing inferences from uninterpreted facts in the light of past experiences but rather by believing with maximal warrant the word of truth. Indeed, we have a more sure word of knowledge. (2 Peter 1:19)

The Westminster Confession of Faith (chapter 1 paragraph 5) could not have been more on target in its reason for why Scripture's testimony should be believed:

"We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture. And the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is, to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it does abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God: yet notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts."

Ron

Van Til, Bahnsen, Logic and TAG

2010-03-20T12:18:00.018-04:00

“To us the only thing of great significance in this connection is that it is often found to be more difficult to distinguish our method from the deductive method than from the inductive method. But the favorite charge against us is that we are still bound to the past and are therefore employing the deductive method. Our opponents are thoughtlessly identifying our method with the Greek method of deduction. For this reason it is necessary for us to make the difference between these two methods as clear as we can.” (Van Til, Survey of Christian Epistemology, 9.)

“To put it simply, in the case of ‘direct’ arguments (whether rational or empirical), the negation of one of their premises changes the truth or reliability of their conclusion. But this is not true of transcendental arguments, and that sets them off from the other kinds of proof or analysis. A transcendental argument begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds, by critical analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful, or be intelligible to us. Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501-502.)

“Years ago Van Til realized that opponents of presuppositionalism tend to think that there are only two kinds of reasoning: inductive and deductive. Deductive reasoning stands opposed to inductive. However, there is also transcendental reasoning, in which the preconditions for the intelligibility of what is experienced, asserted, or argued are posed or sought. It, too, stands opposed to a purely inductive approach to knowledge. Critics seem to think that, since presuppositionalism does not endorse pure inductivism, it must favor deductivism instead. This logical fallacy is known as false antithesis.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 176, n. 55.)

The above three quotes were recently forwarded to me for comment, in light of the fact that these sentiments of Van Til and Bahnsen are often (and sadly so) misconstrued as affirmation of their denying the place of deduction and induction in the realm of presuppositional apologetics. (Having the books, I have verified the accuracy of the quotes.)

The beauty of the transcendental argument for the existence of God (TAG) as a special kind of deductive argument is not in the reductio but in the transcendental challenge, which demonstrates that to argue against God one must first presuppose only that which Christianity affords. In other words, TAG is certainly a deductive argument, but it's a unique kind of deductive argument, not in its form per se but rather in what it seeks to demonstrate. Transcendental arguments are concerned with the preconditions of any fact of experience – what must be true in order for any fact of experience to be that which it is. Van Til was careful to note that “the Christian method uses neither the inductive nor the deductive method as understood by the opponents of Christianity, but that it has elements of both induction and of deduction in it, if these terms are understood in a Christian sense.” (Van Til, page 10 - emphasis mine.) Why the qualifier "as it is understood by the opponents of Christianity" if Van Til did not believe that TAG incorporated deduction? Why not just say that the Christian method does not use deduction, end of statement? The reason is, TAG has aspects of not just deduction but induction too, as Van Til states with no ambiguity. TAG has a distinctly inductive aspect to it because with TAG the Christian investigates what must be true in order for some experience to be intelligible. Such explorations are inductive in emphasis. Notwithstanding, the manner of the investigation is not open ended because the premises within TAG do not merely support the conclusion, they ensure it. That aspect is unique to deduction. Moreover, the conclusion from TAG is not a mere hypothesis, but rather a sound conclusion derived through a deductive process. Finally, TAG falls short of being fully inductive because there is no asserting the consequent with TAG, as there is with all scientific inference, the playground for induction.

Van Til goes on to critique what he qualified as “exclusively” deductive arguments and “purely” inductive arguments that do not presuppose God. It was the anti-Christian Greek method of logic that Van Til and Bahnsen opposed but not logical apologetics. In other words, they never opposed deduction and induction but rather qualified these disciplines in reference to strictly secular uses of reason and inference. Even a careless reading of Van Til and Bahnsen bears this out, but one must first read the authors and not just read about them. And reading the authors would require reading past page 9 in Van Til, at least up through page 10. (Many perceived problems regarding Gordon H. Clark would also vanish if one would only simply go to the original source, rather than choosing sides in a partisan manner.)

Bahnsen typically employed modus tollens (MT) in his formal argument, yet he distinguished his employment of TAG from garden variety deduction. Mike Butler (at one time Bahnsen’s assistant) to my knowledge, also, has never pitted transcendental arguments against deduction. Butler has written TAG out, which is indeed deductive in form "For x (some aspect of human experience) to be the case, y must also be the case since y is the precondition of x. Since x is the case, y is the case." (Butler, The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence, 91 The Standard Bearer.)

Van Til and Bahnsen fully appreciated that TAG is a deductive argument strictly speaking (lest they contradicted themselves in practice). However, their focus in this regard was on what distinguishes TAG from the usual kind of deductive (and inductive) arguments. The unique quality of TAG that sets it apart from all other standard deductive arguments is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others - but that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience. In other words, with standard deductive arguments we try to deduce from a fact, or series of facts, other facts; no more, no less. If it's Sunday I'm with a congregation of saints from 9:30-12 in the morning. If I’m not with a congregation of saints at 10:00 a.m., then it’s not Sunday. That it’s not Sunday can be a standard deduction, yet my being with the saints at a certain time does not make Sundays possible. Kant's genius was that TA's are concerned with what must be true in order for something else to be possible. God’s revelation makes intelligible experience possible, whereas my being with the saints at a particular time does not make Sunday between 9:30 and noon possible.

Clearly, Bahnsen applied deduction in his demonstration of TAG. Accordingly, he was either inconsistent with himself, or we should interpret his statements as meaning something other than TAG is not strictly speaking deductive. With little effort we can reconcile Bahnsen's practice of TAG with his description of it. TAG is not like any other deductive argument because it does not reason from fact to fact in the standard Greek sense but rather reasons from fact to the preconditions of fact, which is Kantian, yet when in the hands of a Christian a very powerful tool.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

John Piper on Infants Dying in Infancy

2010-03-10T13:11:00.015-05:00

John Piper believes that all infants dying in infancy go to heaven but it would seem that faulty reasoning has caused him to ignore basic evangelical tenets. (Click on title to go to link.)

"I think they're all saved. In other words, I don't buy the principle that says that children born into "covenant families" are secure, and children born into "non covenant families" aren't. I don't go there."

He rejects the notion that the only saved infants dying in infancy are those born into covenant homes. He also rejects the idea that some born within covenant homes that die in infancy can be lost. Rather, he affirms that God saves all who die in infancy. Piper is not alone in these speculations. Presbyterian A.A. Hodge and Dispensationalist John MacArthur assert the same. I appreciate Piper much more on this matter for he speaks more tentatively regarding what he thinks; whereas Hodge and MacArthur are dogmatic in their claims. Hodge even went so far as to suggest the Westminster standards teach this form of universalism, which it does not.

"My reason for thinking they're all saved is because of the principle in Romans 1 where Paul argues that all people know God, and they are "without excuse" because they do not honor him or glorify him as God. His argument is that they are without excuse because they know things, as though accountability in the presence of God at the Last Judgment will be based, at least partly, on whether they had access to necessary knowledge."

Piper’s reasoning is terribly flawed. Piper reasons that if a person knows God, then he’s without excuse. Fine so far… until he deduces from that premise: If a person does not know God, then he needs no excuse. It is certainly true that if a man knows God, then he his culpable. However, it does not logically follow from that premise that those who do not know God are not culpable. That is fallaciously to deny the consequent based upon a denial of the antecedent. In other words, from if P then Q, we may not reason to not P, therefore, not Q. Even if Piper’s final conclusion were true, it would not follow from his premises. Simply put, that one is culpable for having knowledge of God does not imply that he is not culpable for something else apart from such knowledge, such as the inherited corrupt nature and imputation of Adam’s sin. Rather than deal with these, Piper seems to presuppose that sins proceeding from the corrupt nature either are not present in infants, or simply do not warrant damnation. In either case, the forensic and genetic aspects of sin are simply ignored in his treatment of the subject. (In passing we might note that it is a bit dubious to assert that infants do not know God. A defense of that premise might have been in order.)

"I think babies and imbeciles—that is, those with profound mental disabilities—don't have access to the knowledge that they will be called to account for. Therefore, somehow in some way, God, through Christ, covers these people."

"In some way, God, through Christ, covers these people?" What needs to be covered? Certainly not their sin, for Piper has already conceded that what these infants need is not a covering for sin but rather their just and deserved place in the kingdom. Moreover, why would Piper say that humans such as these are saved in death? Saved from what? Would he at least concede that elect infants dying in infancy are united to Christ through the monergistic work of regeneration, or would that smack of the need for too much grace? In the final analyses, either Piper has affirmed that the “salvation” of infants dying in infancy is a matter of justice alone, or he has implied that infants deserve mercy and grace.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

Libertarianism by any other name...

2009-12-23T17:29:00.018-05:00

... is libertarianism. But non-libertarianism by the same name is of course something different. Confusion abounds...

Most libertarians hold to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). Yet a growing number of libertarians are abandoning their libertarian roots and embracing a Frankfurt version of libertarianism, which is no libertarianism at all. These “libertarians” don’t think they need to hold to PAP. These Frankfurt-libertarians hold to Frankfurt Counterexamples (FCE), which are aimed at bringing to naught the view that a moral agent is responsible for an action only if he could have acted contrary. The aim is to bring reconciliation between responsibility and determinism by arguing that responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise. The counterexamples can get quite creative, involving demons and chemicals and all sorts of will-altering stimuli.

With regard to all these scenarios that posit chips in brains and the like (certain FCE's), they can be refuted thusly with respect to their usefulness: Either determinism is true or it isn’t. There is no third option. If determinism is true, then these illustrations of demons, drugs and chips are all moot; for all would be determined and responsibility would become a non-entity for the libertarian incompatibilist. Accordingly, if determinism is true, then these silly scenarios (FCE’s) do not achieve their intended usefulness, which is to show that responsibility need not be accompanied by alternative possibilities. Without responsibility (due to the assumption of determinism), one cannot show that responsibility can be upheld at all, let alone apart from alternative possibilities (AP). In other words, FCE’s don’t save the day by providing an alternative source of responsibility if determinism is indeed true. There simply would be no responsibility to be found (anywhere) in the face of determinism given a commitment to LFW as a necessary condition for responsibility.

A Reformed “grounding objection” refutation:

Now if determinism is false, then of course the demon who would operate the chip could not know whether he actually would need to operate the chip in order to achieve his desired end until after the critical point of choice; there would be no grounding of the truth value of what the agent with the implanted chip would do under any set of circumstances. (Obviously such an argument should not be palatable to Molinists but strangely enough it’s employed by more than just Open Theists and Calvinists.) If the demon wants the agent to choose X, then the only way in which he could ensure that he does choose X is to externally cause him to choose X necessarily, which of course does not protect moral responsibility (in such cases) from a libertarian perspective. If the demon sees that it is very probable that the agent will choose X, then the demon might roll the dice and leave the agent alone in order that he choose X “freely”. Obviously in such cases given the contingent nature of LFW the desired end might not obtain, but the choice would be free and in accordance with libertarianism. Consequently, given libertarian freedom as a necessary condition for moral accountability, AP must therefore always apply in such instances of choosing with moral relevance since the demon, in order to ensure his desired outcome, would always have to preempt the unknowable choice with a short-sharp-shock. Pure contingency defies truth values that can be foreknown, therefore, the only way that AP can be taken away is to eliminate them entirely by external causality (simultaneously undermining libertarian moral accountability). It is impossible to ensure a desired outcome in this hands-off Frankfurter manner given radical free agency.

Desperation even more - will formation:

In a last ditch effort a wannabe libertarian might posit that the foreknowledge required to pull off this mad-scientist routine is bound up in the insights into an agent’s will-forming, which is to say that the a future creaturely choice can be known with certainty due to the predictability of a will that has been formed over time. The problem with such an idea is that will forming theorists don’t explain the sufficient condition(s) that must be met in order for a choice to no longer be purely contingent. Why do certain constraints upon the will that are brought to bear from prior (alleged) libertarian choices have more determining power over future choices, to the point of making those future choices metaphysically necessary (i.e. having no feasible alternative possibility), than other types of constraints? And if there can be no distinction made, then why should we believe that there are any?

An internal critique using Molinistic premises:

Finally, there is a subtle equivocation with these scenarios that utilize FCE’s. By addressing the equivocation we can attack the absurdity of the position more powerfully (on Molinistic terms!), while granting exhaustive omniscience for the demon and also allowing for the pure contingency of choice that libertarian freedom requires. In those cases where the agent chooses without outside chip-influence, he must do so (for the libertarian) from a metaphysical posture that is free. Accordingly, metaphysically speaking he in fact could choose contrary in no less a sense than if he was not wired to an implanted chip. It is only in those cases that he is actually externally prevented from choosing what he would that he could not choose contrary to how he would. What is relevant is that when he chooses freely he does so in a metaphysical sense, which presupposes true alternative possibilities of the metaphysical kind. The impossibility of choosing otherwise is only a logical one, constrained by the fact that it is true that the action will be physically prevented if it would occur: If the agent would choose ~X feely, then he’d be externally caused to choose X necessarily. Yet notwithstanding, when he would choose X freely, he indeed could (metaphysically speaking) choose ~X, otherwise he would not be able to choose X freely! {It boggles the mind why Molinists would undermine their own hard-fought distinctions between would-counterfactuals and might-counterfactuals by employing such novel attempts to move toward certain deterministic tendencies.}

This all reminds me of certain movements within Romanism. At one time (before 1994 and certainly 1965) it meant something to be a Romanist. Now one thinks he can deny Trent and still be Romanist.

Happy Christmas!

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Molinism & The "Five Points" - Reconcilable?

2009-12-16T23:02:00.006-05:00

I said many years ago that one of the biggest threats to Reformed theology is the high-Arminianism of Molinism. Many have been taken captive by its subtle charm, but in the final analyses it is nothing more than dressed-up (rank) Arminianism. There is really nothing new under the sun.

Below I have tried to address, although briefly, Libertarian free will (LFW) and its implications with respect to what is commonly called the "Five Points". LFW is the pillar upon which Molinism stands or falls; so if LFW is not compatible with the Five Points, then neither is Molinism.

To affirm libertarian freedom and all its implications is to deny the intentions of the “Five Points”. Yet, strangely enough, it is my experience that a growing number of Christians think that Molinism is compatible with Reformed thought in general and the "Five Points" in particular.

I found it easier to discuss LFW as it comes to bear upon the Five Points in an unusual order of ITPUL, which sounds more middle eastern than Dutch, I know. But do keep in mind that tulips, although associated with Holland, originated in the Persian Empire!

I
For libertarians, men can choose between alternatives with equal ease - according to their own agent-causation, from a posture of neutrality. Accordingly, to affirm LFW is to deny that irresistible grace is necessary for a dead man to repent and believe.

Moreover, libertarians affirm that the only choices men can be held morally responsible for are choices that are libertarian in nature. The reason being, it is held by libertarians that choices that are caused by something other than the agent (such as in the case of irresistible grace) are deemed as robotic puppetry and consequently not morally relevant with respect to human responsibility. However, when man chooses according to irresistible grace, the choice made is indeed morally relevant with respect to human responsibility, which is contrary to the libertarian tenet that only agent-caused choices are relevant in this way. Coming to Christ by irresistible grace is in fact the most morally relevant choice a man will ever make and one for which he will be held accountable to have made. Consequently, one may not affirm irresistible grace on the suppositions peculiar to LFW.

T
If man can come to Christ apart from irresistible grace then he cannot be totally depraved by definition.

P
Sophisticated libertarians may affirm “eternal security” but NOT the grace required for the perseverance of the saints, which is nothing other than God’s preservation of the saints. This is a bit nuanced (but not too bad) so bear with me. The bottom line is this: Perseverance of the saints entails God’s keeping of the saints throughout the Christian life by the sovereign and will-invading power of the Holy Spirit. The doctrine of perseverance, therefore, presupposes that our persevering faith is not according to a will that is so free as to be able to reject Christ, but rather our perseverance is according to a faith that is sovereignly sustained by the Holy Spirit.

The way in which some libertarians may hold onto "eternal security", which is not the same thing has upholding perseverance of the saints, is thusly:

For the libertarian, the reason God’s elect will not deny the faith is not because God will complete the work he has begun in men by causing them to truly believe until the end. Rather, the reason one will not lose his salvation is merely because God has chosen to actualize a world in which those that come to Christ according to their LFW will also choose by that same LFW not to depart from Christ. Although tricky-Molinists can “consistently” affirm eternal security in this way, they cannot do justice to the distinctly Calvinistic teaching that it is God who by his sovereign grace causes men to persevere. What must be grasped is that perseverance is not only concerned with the final result of bringing many saints to glory, but rather it is concerned with God’s part in how that end is achieved. Perseverance plainly teaches that man is kept by God. Whereas the tenets of LFW suggest that it is man - not God - who ultimately causes himself (through agent-causation) to (a) differ from another, (b) come to Christ and (c) remain in Christ. In sum, for the libertarian who affirms eternal security (not all do), it is accomplished this way: God chose to actualize a world in which those who come to Christ will cooperate according to their LFW and choose to remain in Christ, but it is possible that they won’t (due to their LFW) even though they will (by their LFW). They do not persevere by the Calvinistic notion of sovereign grace, but rather they persevere by cooperating with the quality of grace that God offers all men.

U
Unconditional election entails that God chooses men without any consideration for foreseen faith. For the libertarian, the proposition, “Ron would believe in such a circumstance if presented the gospel” is not grounded in God’s determination but in man’s free agency. For the libertarian, whether one is elect-able unto salvation is dependent upon whether the man would believe (according to the non-gift of LFW) if presented the gospel, which is conditional election. The doctrine of unconditional election presupposes that God could have elected unto salvation any fallen man had we wanted. Given LFW, it was only feasible that God could have chosen in Christ those who would cooperate with resistible grace.

L
The eternal design was that Christ's substitutionary and vicarious death was on behalf of only those who were (a) unconditionally elected in Christ, (b) totally depraved and (c & d) needed irresistible and persevering grace both to come to Christ and remain in him. Accordingly, a philosophy that damages any of the other four points also undermines particular redemption.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Sundry Matters - LFW, Omniscience, Temptation & Permissive Sin

2009-11-24T03:24:00.018-05:00

More and more people who consider themselves consistently Reformed Christians defend the tenets of libertarian free will (LFW), while not claiming the label “libertarian” for themselves. Nonetheless, they argue for the power of contrary choice, even while claiming it is compatible with divine omniscience. What is even worse is that if one dare defend the necessity of the will (especially in the context of the prelapsarian state), which is the only option aside from pure contingency, it is often alleged that he has denied the Reformed confessions while making God out to be the “the author of sin”, a term that is rarely defined by those who employ it most.

I will not provide here a refutation of LFW, nor will I go into any great detail regarding how it is incompatible with God’s omniscience. I have done that most extensively elsewhere on this Blog. I will, however, provide several quotations from past and present theologians that clearly indicate that this is not a new thought, that LFW is incompatible with divine omniscience. That is to say, LFW logically leads to Open Theism, which is simply a resurrection of sixteenth century Socinianism with respect to God’s knowledge. What this means is that the most distinguishing factor of Arminian theology, if taken to its logical end, leads to a rank heresy, the denial of God’s exhaustive omniscience.

“Ironically, the openness critique at this point strongly resembles the long-standing kind of criticism that many Calvinists have given to the classical Arminian model…Open Theists and these Calvinists agree... that classical Arminianism is seriously flawed in at least two of its major tenets: namely, that… exhaustive divine foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian freedom....” Bruce A. Ware (p. 41 God’s Lesser Glory)

“Hence, the Arminian should be driven by consistency to the conclusion of the Socinian, limiting God’s knowledge.” R.L. Dabney (p. 220 Systematic Theology)

“If [liberty of indifference] be the true theory of the will, God could not execute his decree without violating the liberty of the agent, and certain foreknowledge would be impossible.” A.A. Hodge (p. 210 Outlines of Theology)

“Libertarianism is inconsistent, not only with God’s foreordination of all things, but also with his knowledge of future events.” John Frame (p. 143 The Doctrine of God)

“Moreover, not only are such contingencies not knowable to God, but also such ‘future, free contingencies’ do not and cannot even exist because they do not exist in God’s mind as an aspect of the universe whose every event he certainly decreed, creatively caused and completely and providentially governs.” Robert L. Reymond (p. 189 A New Systematic Theology Of The Christian Faith)

“Actions that are in no way determined by God, directly or indirectly, but are wholly dependent on the arbitrary will of man, can hardly be the object of divine foreknowledge.” L. Berkhof (p. 68 Systematic Theology)

“But God’s omniscience is limited by what is knowable. If Jones is indeterministically free, then it is not knowable, either to God or to us or to any other observer, what Jones will do when, in a given set of circumstances, he is confronted with a choice.” Paul Helm (p. 61 The Providence of God)

“To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that God certainly knows them, and knows all things, is to suppose God’s knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so contingent that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one thing that he knows, is utterly inconsistent with another that he knows. It is the same thing as to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth." Jonathan Edwards (p. 137 Freedom of the Will)

The libertarian who wants to hold onto the orthodoxy of divine omniscience asserts that Corey will choose x, not necessarily but contingently. Of course a contingent x, by definition, truly might not occur. Accordingly, all Arminians are left with God knowing that x might not occur while knowing it will occur – but these are contradictory truths and, therefore, impossible for God to know; if x will occur, then it is philosophically false that it might occur. Consequently, God would have to know contradictory truths given LFW. He would have to know contingently true, conditional propositions about creaturely free actions couched in the subjunctive mood; such as, if Corey were in state of affairs y, he would freely choose x. Such an alleged truth cannot come from God’s necessary knowledge since the truth would be contingently true, making its truth-maker itself, nothing or some unknown entity residing outside of God and his control.

Why then would so many people who call themselves “Reformed” hold to a theory of the will that if consistently maintained would lead to a denial of God's omniscience? My guess is that they would like to protect God from being the “author of sin”, but in doing so they would have God not be God.

God is often pleased to lead his people into temptation:

The Lord Jesus Christ taught us to pray, “And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.” What does such a petition presuppose? It presupposes “that the most wise, righteous, and gracious God, for divers holy and just ends, may so order things, that we may be assaulted, foiled, and for a time led captive by temptations.” (Westminster Larger Catechism: answer 195)

God tempts no man:

Certainly the Catechism does not contradict Scripture where it states: “Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempts he any man: But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed.” James 1:13, 14

The biblical balance:

We must do justice to both truths. Although God is not a tempter, he nonetheless, according to the counsel of his own will, sovereignly upholds, directs and disposes all creatures, actions and things, to the end that even his people may be assaulted, foiled and even led captive by temptations, precisely as God has determined, for his own glory and our profit. Matthew 4:1 couldn't be more explicit: "Then Jesus was led by the Spirit into the desert to be tempted by the devil." (I'm thankful for Lisa bringing this to my attention.)

Does God merely "permit" sin?

"[Permits] is the preferred term in Arminian theology, in which it amounts to a denial that God causes sin. For the Arminian, God does not cause sin; he only permits it. Reformed theologians have also used the term, but they have insisted that God permission of sin is no less efficacious than his ordination of good." John Frame (p. 177 The Doctrine of God)

"But it is a quite frivolous refuge to say that God otiosely permits them, when Scripture shows Him not only willing but the author of them." John Calvin (p. 176 Concerning the Eternal Predestination)

“By calling it permissive… we mean that they are such acts as He efficiently brings about by simply leaving the spontaneity of other free agents, as upheld by His providence, to work of itself under incitements, occasions, bounds and limitations, which His wisdom and power throw around.” R.L. Dabney (p. 214 Systematic Theology)

John Frame dissents from the Arminian view, which is that God does not cause sin and that he only permits it. Rather, Frame acknowledges that God’s ordination of sin is as equally efficacious as his ordination of good. As for Dabney, he is pleased to acknowledge that the incitements of sin (which are no less than the provocations or urgings) come from God’s providential wisdom and power, which he is pleased to “throw around.” Many today (those whom I call the “keepers of the Confession”) would hold Calvin in contempt of the Westminster standards, even if he merely meant by “author” the determiner or author of history, within which sin abounds. However, when people have not internalized their doctrine, any theological statement that does not use the precise language of the Confession is considered ipso facto unorthodox theology, regardless of content or intent, which is all too rarely lost on the "keepers of the Confession." Did not the Divines, after all, have to in some measure deviate from biblical language in order to exegete biblical meaning? To merely parrot the same words as what is contained in a passage or doctrinal statement conveys no understanding of the meaning of what is under consideration. If I want someone to explain to me the book of Job, the last think I want is only to be read the book of Job.

Ron

“And the Lord said to Satan, ‘Behold, he is in your hand, but spare his life.’” Job 2:6

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Free Will - Confusion Abounds

2009-11-22T23:44:00.008-05:00

The nature of man, whether pre-fall, post-fall and unconverted, post fall and converted, or glorified, does not affect the discussion of whether any moral being can act contrary to how he does. No moral being can have libertarian free will (LFW).

LFW is simply the power of contrary choice. Put another way, it is the ability to choose with equal ease between alternatives out of pure contingency and no necessity. Consequently, if one is endowed with LFW, he can choose contrary to what God knows he will choose. (In fact, if God has LFW, then he too can choose contrary to what he knows he will choose!) My position on the matter is straightforward. LFW is a philosophical surd. If it is true that one can choose something different than he will choose, then the future God believes will come to pass might not come to pass; and even if the future does come to pass as God believes, he will not have been thoroughly justified in his belief. He would have just been lucky, or at best very insightful.

A brief word about the relationship between the truth of a future choice, God’s knowledge and the grounding of that truth is in order. God’s knowledge of a future choice does not ensure its fruition. Rather, it presupposes the deterministic nature of its fruition. Knowledge is receptive not causative. Accordingly, that a choice cannot be contrary to what it ends up being is not a matter of God’s foreknowledge but rather it is a matter that it is true that the choice will come to pass. God knows it because it is true, for God knows all truth. The grounding of that truth is of course God’s determination. In sum, God determines that it will be true that X chooses Y in circumstance Z, therefore, God knows it as true.

Confusion abounds, even in Reformed circles:

John Frame once noted:

“I don't know how many times I have asked candidates for licensure and ordination whether we are free from God's decree, and they have replied ‘No, because we are fallen.’ That is to confuse libertarianism (freedom from God's decree, ability to act without cause) with freedom from sin. In the former case, the fall is entirely irrelevant. Neither before nor after the fall did Adam have freedom in the libertarian sense. But freedom from sin is something different. Adam had that before the fall, but lost it as a result of the fall.”

I resonated with John’s observation the very first time I read his lament. This is a very serious matter. These men to whom John refers may have very well been ordained and licensed in Reformed denominations (or have gone on to teach other men at seminary; or if they've really arrived, have their own Blog!) - yet without any appreciation for the implications of their religious philosophy as it pertains to free will. So many Reformed people (including Reformed ministers as John rightly observes) are willing to assert that Adam prior to the fall could have chosen contrary to how he did. They index this radical freedom to the pre-fall nature, which is thought to have afforded a kind of freedom that was eventually lost. What is not appreciated by those who affirm such a metaphysic is that man’s nature determines no specific action of choice. The nature simply determines the moral quality of the particular choice that will necessarily occur according to the inclination at the moment of choice. So then, an unregenerate man will sin; his nature determines that he must. His nature, however, does not determine what sin he will choose. Consequently, the philosophy of LFW is not concerned with the general category of choice (whether it is sinful or not), which is dictated by one’s nature, but rather it is concerned with the specific action of choice. If Adam could have just as easily not sinned when he did sin, then there is no reason why we should think that today we do not have the freedom to choose contrary to how we do choose. It is indubitable that Adam was created without a sin nature. He was created upright, in innocence and without any inclination toward sin. Yet he was mutable, so God could have decreed that Adam fall from innocence, which in God’s wisdom is the decree we live under. We may also note that it would have been consistent with Adam’s nature for God to have decreed (had He wanted) that Adam remain upright and innocent longer, or even indefinitely. Notwithstanding, in neither scenario could Adam operate contrary to the decree, just like we cannot act contrary to the decree today.

Prelapsarian considerations:

Consistent with Adam’s mutable pre-fall nature was his innocence; yet being mutable, he could fall from that innocence with utter consistency toward his mutable soul. Whereas after the fall, all we do must be tainted with sin and that cannot change outside of glorification. Therefore, it was available for God (had he wanted) to decree that Adam not sin, but given the fall it was not available to God to decree that we not sin since all our actions must be tainted with sin this side of glory. Notwithstanding, those are distinctions without a relevant difference that pertains to the question of whether Adam had a freedom to act contrary to how he would and in turn did. Let someone bring forth an argument rather than a mere assertion that concludes that the pre-fall / post-fall ontology of man is a relevant distinction with respect to Adam being more free than we to act contrary to God’s decree. Again, with respect to acting contrary to the truth of how we will act, not even God can do that, lest God can fool himself. Consequently, introducing the pre-fall state of Adam only clouds the issue of whether Adam could have chosen contrary to the decree. There is simply no additional freedom that Adam had relevant to us with respect to operating outside God’s decree. If Adam in his pre-fall nature could not act contrary to the decree that he would fall, then how can it be logically maintained (without equivocation) that Adam could have not sinned? It’s really as simple as 1, 2, 3.

1. Adam could not act contrary to God’s decree
2. God decreed that Adam sin
3. Adam could not act contrary to God’s decree that Adam sin

Or better yet:

1. If it is true that Adam could have acted contrary to God's decree, then it is true that God's decree could have been thwarted
2. It is false that God's decree could have been thwarted
3. Therefore, it is false that Adam could have acted contrary to God's decree

What inconsistent "Calvinists" do not appreciate is that they are really arguing like this: Adam would not act contrary to God's decree, but he could (in a metaphysical sense) have acted contrary to how he would. That combination of LFW and God's omniscience is not Calvinism but Molinism. Molinists assert that x will occur, not necessarily but contingently. Of course a contingent x, by definition, truly might not occur. Accordingly, Molinists are left with God knowing that x might not occur while knowing it will occur – but these are contradictory truths and, therefore, impossible for God to know. Accordingly, God’s foreknowledge of x presupposes the necessity of x for the simple reason that might and will are semantically antithetical and it is true that x will occur. Consequently, if x will occur, then it is false that it might occur.

Where these Christians also get tripped up is over this issue of Adam's "power to obey', which the Confession maintains. It is true that Adam, properly understood, had the power to obey. Nonetheless, the power to obey does not imply that Adam could have chosen contrary to how he did anymore than a car’s power to run can direct the car in a direction contrary to the way in which it ends up moving! The power the Confession speaks of is merely a potential. Indeed, it was possible that Adam could obey, but that only means that it would have been consistent with his nature to obey. In the like manner, it was also possible that he not obey. Yet since when does possibility inform us of actuality?

God is not a legalist:

If Adam intended to act sinfully and was tackled prior to acting upon his intention, wouldn't he have sinned just the same? Moreover, had Eve abstained from eating the forbidden fruit solely because she was concerned for her figure, would she not have sinned just the same in the eyes of God? Certainly God is not a legalist who overlooks the intentions of the heart! Consequently, the sin of eating came from a sinful intention that had occurred prior to the visible act that followed from that intention.

Mystery, mystery when there is no mystery:

The reason people call the first sin a mystery is because they begin their reasoning with the false premise that the act of taking and eating the forbidden fruit was the first sin. If we get back to first principles and focus on what precedes any volitional act, whether sinful or not, we can begin to recognize that the first sin was the desire to be like God and not the act that proceeded from that desire. Accordingly, the first sin was Adam’s nature upon becoming fallen, which correlates with his desire to be like God. Adam, in other words, had concupiscence prior to acting sinfully. To deny that Adam's first sinful act came from a nature that had already fallen is to affirm that a sinful act came from a non-sinful nature, a monstrosity indeed.The question that we should be concerned with is not how did an unrighteous act spring from an upright being (which is a question that proceeds from a false premise), but rather how did an upright being acquire a sinful intention to act sinfully? The answer is no different than the answer to the question of how does any intention and subsequent act come into existence. Doesn’t God providentially orchestrate circumstances that come before the souls of men thereby moving them by secondary causes to act in accordance with new inclinations that are brought into existence according to God’s providence that He decrees? By God's pre-interpretation of the otherwise brute particulars of providence, the intentions of men and their subsequent acts fall out as God so determines. For Calvinists to argue that an act of sin proceeded from an upright nature is to assert a contradiction – and no amount of mystery can save a contradiction! The only thing I find mysterious is that so many Calvinists find the entrance of sin into humanity so mysterious. Note well that I am not pretending to know how God pre-interprets particulars or how the mind of man relates to the movement of the body. That’s not in view at all. My simple point is that Calvinists do not generally find it mysterious that volitional acts necessarily follow from intentions and that God’s orchestrating of circumstances are an ordained means by which intentions that never existed before come into being. Why, therefore, should we not apply the same theological reasoning to the first sin as we do to God’s sovereignty over the intentions of fallen men? The mystery is the same. We don't know the details of how God brings to pass the intentions of the heart, but that is not peculiar to the first sin. It pertains to all intentions. Again, had Adam been tackled prior to eating the fruit, wouldn't his intention to eat have been sin? And wouldn't that intention have come from a fallen nature? Now did his intention to eat somehow not become sin because he was not tackled and actually did act according to his intention? Of course not! His sin was the intention of his heart (which could have only come from a nature that could produce such an intention), and he also sinned by acting on that intention. So the first sin was the fallen nature and the desire to be like God, then the intention to act and then the subsequent actions. Now is any good Calvinist going to say that we choose our intentions or our nature? No, but we are certainly responsible for them, for they are ours!

It's hard to know whether these professing Calvinists are just happily inconsistent with respect to the prelapsarian state, or do they carry their Arminian tendencies over into the postlapsarian era? I can't imagine that they carry it over into their theology of the converting work of the Spirit.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

Gospel, Blessings and Obedience

2009-10-24T14:31:00.028-04:00

There has been a debate raging for quite a while in the Reformed tradition regarding obedience and the gospel. In my estimation the terms are ill-defined, which might explain why the debate is not progressing very well. It might be helpful to make some initial observations regarding points of agreement that are unfortunately not often assumed by the opposing "camps" let alone articulated by them. I believe Escondido holds one view and it's hard to say who all holds the other. No institution does in my estimation. Both views are extreme (but in a sense noble); yet both contain truth.

1. The gospel as it is narrowly defined in 1 Corinthians 15 does not address obedience. The gospel in that context is an historical fact only. Jesus died for our sins, was buried and raised from the dead. Whereas the gospel that Paul is jealous to guard in Galatians has to do not with Christ’s work but rather the appropriation of that work: it is appropriated by grace through faith alone apart from ceremonial law-works. In neither of those two cases does the gospel address obedience. Both sides of the issue should agree.

2. Now leaving aside for a moment any discussion regarding (a) elect infants dying in infancy, (b) other elect persons incapable of being outwardly called by the word, and (c) infants God regenerates in infancy – both sides should also agree that adults who come to faith are justified upon appropriating Christ’s perfect obedience and satisfaction through the evangelical grace of faith alone, which is accompanied by the evangelical grace of repentance unto life, also a necessary condition for pardon. (WCF 15.3)

3. Both sides also agree that faith without works is dead.

4. With respect to the question of whether justifying faith is an obedient response to the gospel call - it should first be observed that a sinner who tries to obey the command to flee the wrath to come and turn to Christ does so either with a regenerate heart or out of enlightened self-interest. When the latter occurs, obviously no justifying faith is present, obedient or otherwise. Accordingly, what the discussion is about is whether faith from a regenerate heart is obedient. Both sides should agree here too.

5. The question that remains is whether repentance and faith are acts of obedience. Before finding an answer, I think there is at least one more point of agreement between the sides that should be mentioned. As committed Calvinists, both sides agree that God alone effects faith and repentance in the application of redemption.

Getting to the nub of the matter:

In one sense, if God alone effects justifying faith in dead sinners through the gifts of faith and repentance, then it is somewhat misleading to refer the such implanted graces as obedience. Consider the case of the sinner broken before God who all of a sudden is converted by the invading work of the Holy Spirit. Would we say that such a one who was burdened and heavy laden with his sin and finally found rest in Christ was being obedient, especially if conversion was wrought without even a whisper of a command! What would one be obeying in such a scenario? They would be fleeing into the arms of a loving Savior out of pure desire and without any command. That is why it's hard for me to believe that anyone who did not have a personal axe to grind would insist that we must always consider justifying faith obedient. Certainly Scripture will support the distinction between the mental "acts" of resting upon and receiving Christ, and the physical acts that proceed from such faith, such as feeding the poor, comforting the sick, loving our wives, serving in our churches, etc. Remember James' epistle?

Yet on the other hand, given that the grace of faith can be exercised in direct response to a command to repent and believe, then of course there is an appropriateness in referring to justifying faith as obedient in such cases, simply because it is a response to a command. Imagine another case - this time a person who was a hardened criminal and not burdened with his sin. Then imagine God quickening such a one in his tracks after his hearing the call to repent and believe. In such a case, it is most fitting to describe such a response as obedient to the command (while not forgetting that God granted the obedience).

The error that one is trying to guard against will often dictate the position he defends. If one is jealous to guard against the notion of merit, then of course he will recoil over the term obedient faith (in the realm of justification). If one wishes to fight against antinomianism, then he might prefer to speak in terms of the gospel's demands and use terms like obedient faith. However, we must be willing to notice that people come to Jesus in different ways - some by heeding God's command and others in utter shame. (Paul Helm touches upon this point in The Begginings (Word & Spirit in Conversion.)

Escondido certainly has the backing of the Confession in that the Confession distinguishes between faith and the acts that proceed from faith: “By this faith, a Christian believes… and acts differently upon that which each particular passage thereof contains; yielding obedience to the commands, etc. But the principle acts of saving faith are accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ alone…” WCF 14.2

So yes, by the faith that justifies sinners, men do act and obey, but the principle acts of justifying faith are accepting, receiving and resting, which I believe Escondido wishes to distinguish from obedience. We should have no problem with that distinction; it’s a good one.

Let's take another conversion scenario that clearly bolsters Escondido's position. In those cases in which God regenerates infants, those infants are not merely regenerated without also sharing in all the benefits of Christ, including justification. Accordingly, lest justification need not be accompanied by faith, we must conclude that the seed of faith that is implanted in those regenerate infants is justifying faith. Indeed, that faith must (and will) be exercised during years of discretion, but nonetheless justifying faith is present. In all fairness, Escondido’s paradigm fits those situations much better, for how does a baby obey in conversion?! Again, there is a place for referring to obedience to the gospel call upon men’s lives in the realm of conversion (and even more so in the work of progressive sanctification), but it would be a monstrosity to suggest that a woman converted through the shame of adultery and an infant converted in the mother's womb are obeying when God grants them rest.

Another related item - Covenant Blessings and Obedience:

Mike Horton [MH] wrote “Law And Gospel,” an article that appeared in the October, 2006 issue of Tabletalk. In that article he wrote:

“The new covenant, like the promise to Adam after the fall, renewed in the
covenants with Abraham and David, is not like the Sinai covenant. The blessings of the new covenant do not depend on our obedience, but on God’s grace: He will put His Law within us, so that it will not only be an external command that condemns us but an inward longing of our heart; He will be our God and we will be His people – yet another one-sided promise on God’s part. Instead of always giving imperatives (like ‘Know the Lord'), in the new covenant people will know the Lord because He has revealed Himself as their Savior.”

I’d like to take a look at one part only within the larger context of what MH wrote. “The blessings of the new covenant do not depend on our obedience, but on God’s grace…”

In order to try to understand MH's meaning, we should be quick to acknowledge what he clearly affirms and in doing so not let anything he wrote contradict what must be considered bedrock for him.

MH in practice is not antinomian! He appreciates that faith without works is dead. Accordingly, he is not saying that all blessings of the new covenant can be received without good works being present in the life of the believer. Moreover, being a committed Calvinist he also should appreciate that good works are not the product of libertarian free will but rather a result of God working in his redeemed both to will and do of his good pleasure. Consequently, whatever MH’s point is, it cannot pivot upon the question of whether man needs grace to obey, or whether obedience will be present in those who receive blessings in the new covenant. He clearly affirms both, our need for grace and the resultant obedience that comes by grace. Moreover, certainly MH appreciates through scripturally informed experience that obedience begets blessings, and that this too is a principle that transcends testaments. In other words, MH must appreciate that proverbs living will generally be a means to good things bestowed (blessings if you will).

There are many discontinuities between the old and new covenant, yet notwithstanding there is no break in the principle that sovereign grace effects creaturely obedience, which in turn places us in the path of realized covenant blessings. In fact, the "willing and the doing" that God is pleased to grant is in-and-of-itself a covenant blessing! It is God who works in us both to will and to do. Sure, the blessings are more extraordinary under the newer economy but so will be the obedience! Can God under the newer economy be our God without our walking in his ways and obeying His imperatives? Neither covenant operated under a quid pro quo for our obedience is nothing other than what John Murray called the "reciprocal responses of faith.” Our obedience, which too is a grace, is necessary in order to receive many blessings that the covenant contemplates.

On the other hand, maybe MH means this:

When the apostle says in Ephesians 1:3 that we have been blessed with every spiritual blessings in Christ, I am struck afresh by the indicative, that these blessings are ours now - and that we are not dependent upon God's works of future providence in order to gain them. Our task is by grace to appreciate the full blown reality of these blessings and when we do, we too with Paul will praise God for them - even in spite of our circumstances. These blessings include our election unto holiness, the forgiveness of sins, the gift of the Holy Spirit, adoption as sons and the hope of glory. (I am grateful that Pastor Robert Letham so often gave thanks in his pastoral prayer for these blessings.) I would like to think that these are the blessings to which MH is referring that are not dependent upon obedience. The reason I am somewhat reluctant to read him this way is that all those blessings belonged to God’s elect under Moses! Yes, these blessings were theirs in much smaller measure, but nonetheless they were still there and they had nothing to do with obedience. Maybe MH is just comparing the physical blessings under Moses (that came through obedience) with the spiritual blessings under Christ (that are 100% ours without remainder through union with Christ). Maybe he is just not footnoting that today we have physical blessings under Christ (through faithful obedience), just like under Moses they had spiritual blessings (upon conversion). I remain perplexed over what the Escondido crowd is trying to say, but I couldn't be more clear on what Scripture says on these matters.

(In passing... Dr. Letham also kept another balance always before his congregation; although the accent may have fallen on the spiritual blessings we have through union with Christ, he always guarded against any inclination we might have toward Gnostic-dualism, placing before us the physical: incarnation, Supper and Christ's desire to heal the sick (just as "for instances"). We must not forget the physical blessings of the covenant. As he recently reminded me, “God created the heavens and the earth.”)

As for Sinai and the covenant of life:

Under Moses there could not have been an offer of everlasting life through obedience that was anything but disingenuous given that God’s people had past sins, concupiscence and Adam’s guilt imputed to them. That apostate Israel assumed they could have been received as righteous by law-works does not imply that the covenant under Moses was to have been understood as making such an hypothetical / conditional offer. That Paul by grace finally counted his pedigree as loss and wanted to be found in Christ for his righteousness does not suggest the terms of the covenant under Moses! In other words, Israel's error should not be read back into the terms of the Mosaic covenant. Accordingly, I must reject any paradigm (for these and other reasons) that would suggest that Sinai was a republication of the Covenant of Life. In addition, the notion that the Covenant of Life held out the prospect of an ontological change that contemplated a glorified state is beyond any good and necessary inference that can be drawn from Scripture alone, making the notion speculative at best. Finally, the notion of personal merit not only goes beyond such speculation, it also confounds the creator-creature distinction and the very terms of the covenant. That any creature under any economy, even the prelapsarian state, could merit anything before his creator is obviously false as I argue here, lest we make merit a vacuous term and imply (unwittingly in Escondido's case) that Adam had the metaphysical ability (autonomy) to act contrary to how he did, a philosophical surd. Unfortunately, not only is Escondido advancing all these sorts of views, they are are trying to pass them off as confessional and even essential to the gospel. In a large respect, their insistence exceeds their error.

A Common Error Among Calvinists - Rationalism At Its Worst

2009-07-06T17:46:00.031-04:00

It is indeed true that Jesus died only for the elect and that all for which he died will be saved. Notwithstanding, it is not a matter of logical necessity that the Holy Spirit unites the elect to Christ.

As a five point Calvinist, I would argue that we can know from revelation that Universalism is false and that all who were chosen in Christ were purchased by Christ; and that the Holy Spirit will unite them and them only to Christ. And although it is true that the Triune God works in harmony, it is not a matter of logic that those for whom Christ died will be saved; yet it is true they will be saved.

First off, there is no universal principle that vicarious suffering and payment necessitates payment received. For instance, if I were to suffer and pay for something on behalf of someone I love yet require that the person willfully pick up the purchased possession, a refusal of one to do so would not obstruct justice. It is incumbent upon one to show why it is necessary that God apply redemption given that the reception of a purchase is not universally necessary for injustice not to obtain. (Again, it’s not a question of whether God determined to apply redemption to all the elect but rather whether not doing so would violate logic or justice.)

It is indeed true that:

“If Jesus' death atoned for everyone's sins, then everyone would go to heaven.” P*

Notwithstanding, the Calvinistic meaning of atonement is the issue of debate and penal substitution does not imply the consequent. In other words, P* is not deducible by solely considering the judicial, vicarious sufferings of Christ as penal substitute. It’s a bit more complex than that, obviously.

Narrowly considered, the nature of the cross does not in and of itself necessitate that redemption must be applied. (Rather, redemption must be applied due to God’s determination, which was not constrained by logic or justice but rather purpose.) As well, although P* is true (according to Scripture), it is not placed within a very interesting polemic because the common argument does not involve an internal critique of the Arminian position and it begs too many crucial salvific questions regarding: divine intent within the Godhead as it pertains to redemption accomplished and applied; the extent of the fall as it pertains to man's will; and the metaphysics of the will with respect to pure contingency and necessity.

The polemic attributed to Owen (I do not say it is Owen's) does not attack Arminianism because it begs crucial questions. For instance, if irresistible grace was not necessary for faith to be implanted, then P* could be false. If God did not desire to work in harmony with respect to election, redemption and application, then that premise could be false. If God does not by grace cause people to persevere in their sanctification (which too was purchased at the cross), then that premise could be false.

In the final analyses: (1) God’s revelation pertaining to the fullness of grace and the unity of the Godhead as it pertains to the divine redemptive intention is what informs us of the truth or falsity of P*. It's not enough simply to assert the P*. (2) Given the truth of P* (in light of all revelation), the often alleged logical necessity of the consequent in P* needs to be demonstrated as a part-and-parcel with the concept of penal substitution.

Now let me really put the cookies on the table. If penal substitution alone requires that another be set free, then why the need for existential union with the substitute in order for sinners to be forgiven? Why aren't the elect free from condemnation apart from being baptized into Christ - i.e. while outside Christ, if substitution alone requires justification? Accordingly, Owenites must at least argue that substitution logically requires that God regenerate sinners, a tall order to prove indeed from the doctrine of substitution.

I can't die for a serial killer and justice be served. In the like manner, substitution alone is not enough for redemption otherwise I would have been set free while unconverted, a clear violation of Ephesians 2. Regarding the serial killer example I would somehow have to be united to the killer (or rather he to me) in perfect union if we are to glean anything from Scripture in this regard. No doubt, the Trinity's harmonious intention as revealed in Scripture results in the gracious particular application of redemption. Moreover, for the intention of the substitution not to become effectual is of course impossible because limited atonement is biblical but that's the issue of debate and, therefore, may not be assumed in the definition of substitutionary atonement! We must deal with Arminians with intellectual honestly. What must be grasped is that the substitutionary death of Christ and particular redemption are not the same thing! The latter has to do with intention or design of the substitionary death and how it relates to redemption-applied i.e. with a view toward efficacy and application, which being the issue of debate may not be infused into the definition of substitution.

Lastly, that the Holy Spirit converts all that Jesus died for speaks to the harmonious plan of redemption as revealed in Scripture but says nothing about some supposed double jeopardy that would have occurred had Christ died for men who remained unconverted men. Double jeopardy occurs when the same man pays twice for the same sin and it would occur if one in existential union with Christ went to hell. One cannot pay for his sins once the sacrifice for his sins is his made his own or appropriated, which occurs upon union and not at the time of propitiation! Accordingly, baptism into Christ's work is what makes Christ's sacrifice the sinner's sacrifice. Consequently, it's only upon existential union with Christ that there is no condemnation. And it is only upon union that double jeopardy could come into view.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Theonomy & The Woman Caught in Adultery

2009-04-21T22:30:00.030-04:00

Anti-theonomists are often quick to point to the woman caught in adultery (recorded for us in John 8) as “proof” that the civil case law for adultery (if not by extension all civil case law) is no longer applicable. Before inferring whether Jesus’ handling of the situation abrogated the civil penalty for adultery, it might be appropriate to take a look at: (a) the implications of the law in this regard, (b) the Bible’s teaching regarding our responsibility to submit to the divinely appointed laws of anti-God government and (c) Jesus’ modus operandi for dealing with what he believed to be the more critical issue that was before him, even at the expense of ignoring what was being asked of him while knowing full well that some would infer erroneous conclusions that cannot be deduced.

A word or two about the law:

Leviticus 20:10 and Deuteronomy 22:22 require that both guilty parties are to receive the same civil sanction for adultery. That is the requirement of the law. Yet for some reason the mob was uninterested in following the law of God even to that small degree, but rather they replaced God’s law with a manipulation of it (one that suited their own personal gain), not having brought to Jesus the man who sinned. Coupled with this concealment of the whole truth, John 8 explicitly states that the mob’s intention was to test Jesus in order to accuse him. Accordingly, not only was the report false by Christian standards (because of the concealment of truth), it was also malicious toward Jesus and not accompanied by a godly desire for justice because it aimed to get Jesus to follow the masses in a perversion of justice. Accordingly, had Jesus the Savior acquiesced to the masses and partaken of their misuse of the law, he himself would have been in violation of God’s law! Exodus 23:1-4 teaches: “you shall not bear a false report”, nor “join your hand with a wicked man to be a malicious witness”, nor “follow the masses in doing evil” nor “pervert justice.” (Note: I do not say that it is necessary that both parties be brought forward for either one to receive their just penalty. What if one escaped, or even died? Such an interpretation that would require both parties to be brought forward is not needed to vindicate the perpetual validity of the law and Jesus' suspension of it in this case on other grounds as mentioned above and below. In this particular case, that only the woman was brought forward can only at best corroborate the ill-intention of the mob, which was explicitly noted in the text and is no mere inference.)

In passing we might also observe that since the woman was caught in the act, it is very probable that her habits were well known, making her an easy prey for entrapment. Such would only lend credence to the malicious quality of the scheme while also implicating the mob for not being concerned with the woman’s licentious behavior until such time that it could be used for evil rather than good. Yes, penalties can and are to be used for good but the design of good too often loses its effect when the law is not carried out by those lawfully called who possess a lowly servant’s heart. (These servants are not individual mavericks of society but civil servants appointed to such service who in the end serve God and men.)

Submission to God’s providential infliction of unruly government:

Romans 13 teaches that we are not to take the law into our own hands but rather submit to God’s providentially ordained government, even when that government is pluralistic. This principle was to be followed during Jesus’ earthly ministry and the Jews knew it all too well: “So Pilate said to them, ‘Take Him yourselves, and judge Him according to your law.’ The Jews said to him, ‘We are not permitted to put anyone to death’” John 18:31 Yet the Jews conveniently were not interested in obeying that precept of submitting to God ordained Roman rule when it did not suit them: “Is it lawful to pay a poll-tax to Caesar, or not? Shall we pay or shall we not pay?’ But He, knowing their hypocrisy, said to them, ‘Why are you testing Me? Bring Me a denarius to look at.’ They brought one. And He said to them, ‘Whose likeness and inscription is this?’ And they said to Him, ‘Caesar's.’ And Jesus said to them, ‘Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's.’ And they were amazed at Him.” Mark 12: 15-17 With respect to the John 8, it must be deemed that it was unlawful under those circumstances for the law of Moses to be implemented; yet that would not seem to be the main impetus behind Jesus' behavior.

Jesus’ modus operandi for dealing with the point that he wanted to deal with, even at the expense of ignoring what was being asked of him and even sometimes at the expense of having that which was false assumed true by his hearers:

John 3:1-3: When Nicodemus stated his inference to Jesus that he was a teacher sent from God, Jesus neither affirmed nor denied the assumption. Rather, he turned the tables by telling Nicodemus he must be born again. Depending upon one’s pre-commitment it might be inferred that Jesus was or was not who Nicodemus thought, a teacher sent from God. Yet we cannot deduce anything in that regard from the text.

Mark 10:17-18: When a rich young ruler called Jesus good, he neither affirmed nor denied that he possessed that quality of person but instead said nobody is good but God. Depending upon one’s pre-commitment it might be inferred that Jesus was not good and, therefore, not God; yet the text neither affirms nor denies either conclusion.

Acts 1:6, 7: When the apostles asked Jesus whether he was at that time going to restore the kingdom to Israel, he neither affirmed nor denied such an intention but instead said that it was not for them to know the times or epochs that the Father has fixed by his own authority. Dispensationalists, given their pre-commitment to a restored national Israel, infer from the answer a confirmation of their theology, that the kingdom will be restored. Notwithstanding, no logical conclusion can be deduced from the text with respect to the restoration Israel’s kingdom.

John 21:20-22: When Peter asked Jesus whether John would be alive at the time of Jesus’ return Jesus told him that if he wanted John to remain until such time it was no business of Peter’s. Jesus then put to Peter his task, which was to follow Jesus. Jesus’ answer did not logically imply that John would remain or not, let alone whether Jesus would even return one day! The answer even caused a rumor among the brethren that John would not die (John 21:23). John in this very epistle (same verse: 23) remarked on the unjustified inference that caused the rumor: “Jesus did not say to him that he would not die, but only, ‘If I want him to remain until I come, what is that to you?’”

There are many more examples but the point should be obvious. We cannot logically deduce that which is not deducible! And when it comes to Jesus, the master of making the point he wants to make regardless of what precedes it, we must be doubly careful when assuming what is not said. In the final analyses, if we could deduce that John 8 demands the repudiation of theonomy, then I would think that a syllogism to that end, comprised of premises that don't beg crucial questions, could be constructed rather readily from the text.

At the end of the day, the use of the text to refute theonomy is on par with concluding that (a) Jesus was not a teacher sent from God; (b) Jesus was not good and, therefore, not God; (c) Jesus intended to establish Israel as a political power but failed with the passing of John.

That Jesus did not condemn the woman caught in adultery does not logically imply that she did not deserve death at the hands of godly men, let alone that any laws, rightly interpreted, have been abrogated.

In Summary (and this is the best part...):

The sole intent of the mob was the entrapment of Jesus and whether a life was callously taken in the process, without regard for godly motive, was of no consequence to these wicked men. Accordingly, had Jesus acquiesced to their plea by condoning the woman’s death on their terms, he would have partaken in their scheming and wickedness according to Exodus 23:1-4. Moreover, had Jesus allowed for the penalty under Moses to be enacted in this particular case, he would have implied that men need not submit to God’s ordained government, a clear violation of the general equity of God’s lawful principle of rendering unto Cesar that which is Cesar’s (which equity is also affirmed later in Romans 13).

Jesus was in a predicament. He did not want to condone the woman’s execution given the motivation of the witnesses and accusers, lest he himself could be guilty of paving the way for their sin and become an accomplice with them according to Exodus 23:1-4. Nor did Jesus want to suggest that the woman did not deserve immediate punishment for her sin as prescribed by Leviticus 20:10 and Deuteronomy 22:22.

Her action was indeed worthy of death, (lest the law which he authored had been abolished; yet he had already stated most unambiguously that he had not come to abolish the law. Matthew 5:17) Let there be no mistake about it, Jesus was for the death penalty when his law required the death penalty. He also required that such penalties be carried out not by perfect men but rather by those who had removed the plank from their own eye. Execution was to be carried out in a spirit of godly humility. Anything less than that was to do God’s bidding with a murderous heart, which would reduce to self-serving vengeance as opposed to righteous justice. We are God’s servants, and we not our own. Indeed, Jesus was concerned not only with the letter of the law but also the spirit in which it was to be followed. This must be appreciated by all Christians, especially theonomists.

Let there be no mistake - the people of God should at all times desire that the civil Law of Moses be upheld. What Jesus opposed was not his law (how ridiculous is that?!) but rather the Pharisees’ desire to substitute for it their traditions: “Jesus replied, ‘And why do you break the command of God for the sake of your tradition? For God said, Honor your father and mother and Anyone who curses his father or mother must be put to death.’” Now did Jesus contradict himself? Did Jesus want laws carried out that were not in accordance with the Roman law that was placed into authority by divine providence? Clearly Jesus did not contradict himself by requiring that the Pharisees uphold civil laws that would have conflicted with God-ordained Roman law. Consequently, Jesus’ question of “why” cannot logically imply that they ought to have carried out the penalties prescribed by Moses at that time. Rather, the question is looking for the reason behind their motivation not to carry out the Law of Moses, which in the case of the Pharisees was that they preferred the traditions of men - hence Jesus’ leading question and rebuke. In other words, although the law was not to be carried out at that time (lest God contradicted himself), there should have been a desire to do so that was in submission to the greater principle of obeying Roman law per God’s precept. Accordingly, no answer would have been solicited by Jesus and no rebuke required had they desired in godly submission to carry out lawful executions yet were constrained only by another principle of scripture - that of obeying God ordained government. Such was not the case, not by a long shot. The same hardness of heart and misguided motivations apply to the mob in John 8.

The dilemma solved:

Given the circumstances of no witness-accuser who possessed a heart for righteous judgment - the only one who could have put the woman to death and satisfied the full intention of the law both in letter and spirit would have been God himself. Accordingly, Jesus, unwilling to exercise his divine prerogative, invited anyone without sin to throw the first stone. By handling the difficult providence as he did, Jesus upheld Moses’ intention pertaining to a godly accuser's spirit, yet without compromising the deserved, temporal penalty for the woman. We might say that the case was thrown out of court due to the greater sin of the witness-accusers (and the priority of Roman rule, which I believe was secondary). Yet by couching the invitation as Jesus did, the Lord acknowledged both the rightful penalty and the unworthiness of anyone within that mob that day to carry out God’s law as in the manner God would have it - as God’s servant.

God is concerned with the spirit of the law but not at the cost of abrogation. Now if anyone wants to make more of the passage as it pertains to theonomy and suggest that Moses has been abrogated because nobody is without sin, then in turn they prove too much by relegating all temporal justice to the Final Day, a most absurd and unworkable principle. The only question I have at this juncture is whether the anti-theonomists will go out one by one in shame for butchering the logical implications of the text. Or will the angry mob of Jesus' day prove themselves more worthy than these?

As Calvin keenly observes:

"Christ appears to take out of the world all judicial decisions, so that no man
shall dare to say that he has a right to punish crimes. For shall a single judge
be found, who is not conscious of having something that is wrong? Shall a single
witness be produced who is not chargeable with some fault? He appears,
therefore, to forbid all witnesses to give public testimony, and all judges to
occupy the judgment-seat. I reply: this is not an absolute and unlimited
prohibition, by which Christ forbids sinners to do their duty in correcting the
sins of others; but by this word he only reproves hypocrites, who mildly flatter
themselves and their vices, but are excessively severe, and even act the part of
felons, in censuring others. No man, therefore, shall be prevented by his own
sins from correcting the sins of others, and even from punishing them, when it
may be found necessary, provided that both in himself and in others he hate what
ought to be condemned; and in addition to all this, every man ought to begin by
interrogating his own conscience, and by acting both as witness and judge
against himself, before he come to others. In this manner shall we, without
hating men, make war with sins…

Neither do I condemn thee:
We are not told that Christ absolutely acquitted the woman, but
that he allowed her to go at liberty. Nor is this wonderful, for he did not wish
to undertake any thing that did not belong to his office. He bad been sent by
the Father to gather the lost sheep, (Matthew
10:6;) and, therefore, mindful of his calling, he exhorts the woman to
repentance, and comforts her by a promise of grace. They who infer from this
that adultery ought not to be punished with death, must, for the same reason,
admit that inheritances ought not to be divided, because Christ refused to
arbitrate in that matter between two brothers, (Luke
12:13.) Indeed, there will be no crime whatever that shall not be exempted
from the penalties of the law, if adultery be not punished; for then the door
will be thrown open for any kind of treachery, and for poisoning, and murder,
and robbery. Besides, the adulteress, when she bears an unlawful child, not only
robs the name of the family, but violently takes away the right of inheritance
from the lawful offspring, and conveys it to strangers. But what is worst of
all, the wife not only dishonors the husband to whom she had been united, but
prostitutes herself to shameful wickedness, and likewise violates the sacred
covenant of God, without which no holiness can continue to exist in the world."

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Green Baggins on Theonomy...

2009-04-12T21:45:00.010-04:00

It was recently brought to my attention that “Green Baggins” tried to argue “Why Theonomy Is Biblically-Theologically Wrong.” I interact with a couple of his points below.

“Lastly, there is nothing in Romans 13 that cannot be explained on the basis of natural law as explained above. The civil magistrate is there to punish evil. He is ordained by God to do that. The moral law has been implanted on his heart. Therefore, he should be a terror to those who do evil.”

It is evil to fantasize about murder and it is evil to murder. Are both evils to be punished by the sword? Which evils are civil magistrates to punish? What should be those punishments? How are we to justify the answers to those two questions? Natural law offers no answers to those questions and natural law proponents rarely try. Natural law is utterly impotent in this regard. We know from special revelation that general revelation reveals to us that all transgressions against God’s natural law deserve God’s wrath; so if we were to apply general revelation and natural law to the realm of the sword, then all sin would require immediate death, a monstrosity indeed. In other words, if "natural law" replaces the civil case laws, then all tansgressions require death by the sword. Is that what GreenBaggins wants to see? (Theonomy is most often construed as harsh. However, apart from theonomy, no argument with concrete, defensible premises can be levied to combat too harsh of punishments in a fallen world. For instance, how would an anti-theonomist combat a civil magistrate that determined stealing a loaf of bread was a crime worthy of death? The epistemologically conscious theonomist has an answer for too strict of laws in a fallen world; whereas the anti-theonomist is left to appeal to an idiosyncratic sense of justice, which reduces to subjectivism, arbitrariness and knowledge falsely called.)

“However, it is not the civil magistrate’s job to execute a boy for cursing his parents (as was true in the Old Testament civil laws).”

If Old Testament revelation informs us to execute a boy for cursing his parents, then general revelation cannot prescribe a lesser punishment for such a transgression let alone abrogate the penalty, lest God’s revelation (general and special) is contradictory. (Now one might dare to argue that general revelation affirmed the putting to death an incorrigible child under Moses but God has since time altered his general revelation on that point. That, however, would be a tall order to prove from Scripture, not that natural law proponents are particularly interested in employing Scripture to justify their philosophy of civil ethics.)

Since God’s forms of revelation cannot be contradictory, general revelation must either affirm special revelation by telling us that a boy ought to be executed for cursing his parents (which is impossible to prove from general revelation), or else general revelation does not prescribe any penalty for a boy who curses his parents; (it only reveals that is wrong to do so.) In either case, it cannot prescribe a different penalty than special revelation ever prescribed lest God is the author of confusion.

In the final analyses, even if the Old Testament case laws have been abrogated, all such would imply is that we are no longer required to prescribe laws and penalties that reflect the general equity of the Old Testament case laws. Now left to ourselves, what would the Christian want to prescribe if he could? I would like to think that the Christian would look to God’s word to justify which sins are best punished by the civil magistrate and what those sanctions in a fallen world might best be in order to please God. Even that, however, is inadequate because if God has indeed left us to our own in this regard, then there is no justifiable fault to be found with any sanction, for all sanctions would be, well, a matter of personal preference. At the end of the day, anything less than theonomy is tyranny.

What does God’s general revelation and natural law teach us with respect to the penalty for rape? Whatever your answer is, now prove it!

Anti-theonomists are simply arbitrary and inconsistent. In some instances they prefer Mosaic laws and in other instances they don't. In all instances they refuse to justify their preferences by the Old Testament scriptures, unless of course they can find a justification prior to Moses, say under Noah!

“It is the church’s job to instruct and to exercise church discipline. Nowhere in the New Testament does any writer say that the civil government is to rule itself according to Old Testament Israel’s civil law. Rather, every time the civil government is mentioned, it is in connection to the natural moral law.”

It is truly remarkable that any anti-theonomist could be a paedobaptist given such a hermeneutic. Latent dispensationalist-baptist - yes indeed.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

To Whom Did Mary Give Birth & Who Died Upon The Cross?

2009-04-07T23:45:00.009-04:00

I won’t bother to get into the historical debate that surrounds these two topics but a word or two will be offered as “food for thought” regarding Mary giving birth to God the Son and a divine person dying upon the cross.

Did Mary give birth to a divine person, or just a human nature? If birth implies the origin of someone new, then only humanity came forth in the virgin birth since the person born of the virgin always existed. However, Mary carried a person (and not just an embodied nature) in her womb, and after her water broke, she then labored to bring forth the person she had carried. In common parlance we call that giving birth. Since a divine person was born, we must let that reality inform our understanding of birth (rather then let our understanding of birth redefine what occurred in that manger in Bethlehem). Birth need not precede the origin of a new person, precisely because the eternal Son of God, a person, was born of a virgin. It's really quite easy when we start with Scripture. Question 37 of the Westminster Shorter Catechism puts it this way, or rather it simply assumes the point when making another:

“How did Christ, being the Son of God, become man? Answer: Christ the Son of God
became man, by taking to himself a true body, and a reasonable soul, being
conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the virgin Mary, of her
substance, and born of her, yet without sin.” (emphasis mine)

Who was born of of the virgin Mary is the question we should be asking, not what was born. Sure, Jesus became man by taking to himself body and soul but it was Christ who was born of Mary. Accordingly, Mary giving birth to her Savior-son is not ground for Protestant objection. Aside from that, no unbiblical Marian dogma can be rationally inferred from such teaching.

Now for the 2nd condundrum. Did God the Son die on the cross, or just his humanity? A divine person took upon a human body and soul in the incarnation. That body is now glorified but before that, it lay in the grave – dead, awaiting resurrection life. Accordingly, a divine person's body lay in the grave. The body died in the death of a person, which is what happens when any person dies. Yet does the soul ever die, whether divine or human? We are not annihilationists after all. Are things getting a bit clearer? What's the problem that a divine person died? When we die our bodies will lie in the grave but the soul will remain operative in the intermediate state. So then, how does the death of the Second Person impinge upon the doctrine of the Trinity? Was the death of the body sufficient to do away with Jesus’ sovereign rule over the universe anymore than his being born of a woman? Is death even sufficient to stop the Rich Man (from Luke 16) from trying to correct God? One would have to ask how the Lord managed prior to the incarnation if we may not say that the Second Person of the Trinity, at least in some sense, died upon the cross and his body lay in the grave.

The same person who was born, died - and is now risen and ascended to God's right hand.

Happy Easter!

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Truth, Delivery and Imperfect Ministers

2008-12-28T23:31:00.016-05:00

"Have I now become your enemy by telling you the truth?" Saint Paul

Imagine a man caught in the act of adultery by his wife and then responding more severely to the manner in which she reacted to his infidelity than to his own guilt. Even if the wife’s knee-jerk reaction were not to have taken into account her own sinfulness - is there a place for a husband to turn the tables on his wife without first dealing with the wretchedness of his own premeditated behavior? If the husband were to deal with the plank in his own eye, wouldn’t any perceived speck in his wife’s eye disappear, at least from his sight? Now imagine people “caught” in sin through the ordained preaching of the word and then becoming more disturbed, even outraged, by the manner in which the pastor delivered the message than their personal guilt before God. It seems to me that what is at work in both such cases is an avoidance of truth through a conveniently cultivated seared conscience. When feeling good about oneself (or at least the desire not to feel bad about oneself) takes precedence over a longing to be sanctified, there can be little chance of experiencing true contrition, the sine qua non of God-sent repentance. I have found that all too often mortification through the gospel-means of heart-felt, Spirit-wrought remorse is replaced by focusing on perceived imperfections in the messenger. One must question whether the evangelical graces of repentance, spiritual cleansing and biblical restoration can be present in such cases.

When subjective self-esteem becomes more important than developing objective Christian character, the crucified life becomes purely theoretical, an abstraction if you will. After all, wouldn’t one with a conscience that was laid bare before God be exceedingly more consumed with dealing truthfully and biblically with his own objective guilt than making an issue of any perceived flaw in the messenger’s bedside manner? Should not our first and greatest desire be to deal with our own sin before contemplating the imperfect instrument God is so often pleased to use to point it out? Indeed, would the manner in which the message was delivered be of any consequence whatsoever if we were in agreement with God and saw ourselves as we truly are, guilty before him? Not to belabor the point, but if the judge in the courtroom were even rude in the manner in which he interrogated a serial rapist, would we say the rapist "deserved" better? And assuming he did in some horizontal sense (i.e. creature to creature), would it not be true that if he were truly contrite he would not even notice - let alone complain about (!), the civility of the judge’s address? Of course not! If the guilty party were even in close proximity to thinking rightly about his sin, which is to say if he were dealing in reality, would he even notice any harshness at all, and if he did, would he not receive it as a divinely appointed, providential tempering of the justice deserved? If there were God-sent sorrow, would there even be any chance that the guilty party would become the messenger’s accuser? Sadly, in the church today this sort of thing has become all too common. When the Christian cloaks his guilt in the face of correction, the concealment is usually accompanied by the guilty party going on the offensive against God’s anointed; all in an effort try to extricate one’s own shame.

As David Wells rightly observes:

“To feel embarrassed because we were caught… deceiving, or (shamelessly)
self-promoting is an entirely good and healthy emotion! To argue, then, that we
need to be liberated from these uncomfortable feelings, that the ultimate
liberation is to become entirely shameless, is to sever our connection with the
moral law entirely.”

Unfortunately, all too often Christians are more concerned – even consumed, with ridding themselves - apart from any semblance of gospel formulation - of feeling shame. The objective reality of guilt is something that Christians are often pleased to live with as long as they don’t feel soiled. When shame is due to being found out by others, as opposed to agreeing with God’s objective verdict with a contrite heart, the cause of shame in the mind of the sinner is indexed to the messenger rather than to the holy demands of the Law-Giver. When one feels embarrassed and cloaks his guilt, the simple and obviously less painful solution becomes “kill the messenger!” The goal is to rid oneself from feeling bad. Contrition, something that is too often wrongly perceived as more Catholic than Protestant, is missing - otherwise the messenger would not be in danger!

I am aware of a pastor who (merely) stopped congregational singing in order to admonish the saints to sing out more loudly unto the Lord, as they were to have been engaged in the worship of the triune God. Yet sadly, there were some within the congregation who took great umbrage with the pastoral admonishment. Why was that? For those who were singing out as they ought, the correction obviously did not apply to them (other than being organically part of the whole congregation). However, for those who were not singing out, the correction was indeed appropriate. (I suppose if you throw a rock at a pack of dogs, the one who yelps the loudest is the one who gets hit most squarely.) Any number of examples could be cited. The general point is shouldn’t the guilty party be more concerned with receiving correction (and in this casing repenting of apathetic worship) than with the manner in which the pastor discharges correction? If a minister of God’s word dares to dare to speak the unvarnished truth, he better sugar-coat it and make sure to put the accent on his own need for grace. For a minister to reprove, rebuke or exhort without ensuring both in word and demeanor an acute understanding that he is the chief sinner, the one standing in need of admonishment might very well conjure up vain images (and assert them as dogma) of how far short the messenger falls from Jesus’ manner of conduct. Offense taken ends up being equated with an offense given, a monstrosity indeed. However, the ultimate deception results when the tables get turned, wherein the dismissal of guilt is exchanged for an attack on the messenger.

May God be pleased to protect his ministers and not allow them to cave into the pressures that would keep them from that part of their job description that requires them to be ready in season and out of season.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Good Works in Christ, Imitation or Transformation?

2008-09-13T20:38:00.019-04:00

Mark Garcia’s book Life in Christ has afforded me occasion to reflect more upon “union with Christ” in particular with respect to good works.

Scripture is clear that we are to be imitators of Paul (as he is of Christ), and of God. (1 Corinthians 11:1; Ephesians 5:1) Yet for the believer it is not only true that we are to imitate Christ - we are indeed destined to do so. Moreover, not only is our imitation of Christ unavoidable (Ephesians 2:10) - it is no mere imitation but rather an actual fellowship in Christ’s suffering granted to all believers virtue of their spiritual union with Christ. As Mike Horton rightly noted (over ten years ago in his timely book “In The Face Of God”), “Christ’s cross was more than God’s method of saving us; it is our own cross, our own death, burial, and resurrection. We are united to Christ… Not only are we identified with his victory but are also destined to share in the ‘fellowship of his suffering.’”

We have an inheritance that is unshakable, which in a real sense serves as an impetus in the believer’s life toward the faithful reception of what the promise of final adoption contemplates. It is our unalterable union with Christ that not only ensures the eschatological reality that awaits all believers - it also defines the very path by which we must enter into that glory. That foreordained path is none other than Christ’s path of faith-wrought works and suffering. Just as we have been foreordained unto good works (Ephesians 2:10), we have also been predestined to become conformed to the image of Christ. (Romans 8:29) However, being an imitator and becoming like must be distinguished but can never be separated in the life of the believer. For one thing, the former can be the product of hypocrisy whereas the latter is unique to the believer and in one sense the very telos of our salvation. The believer’s obedience, which will be evidenced in this life and openly acknowledged on the last day in all who love the Lord, is not merely an imitation of Christ’s obedience but rather a divinely appointed fruit of being baptized into the once suffering - now glorified - Savior of men. It is part of our salvation and as such should be embraced through faith and certainly not avoided (not that it can be). Moreover, just as the believer’s alien righteousness is more near than far (to paraphrase Richard Gaffin), our obedience through suffering is granted within the orbit of a reality of intimate union with Christ’s "historical-experience", as opposed to being experienced in the context of mere imitation through vastly different circumstances that have little or nothing to do with the righteousness of Christ's gospel.

As we received Christ, so too are we to walk in him, and so we shall. We did not find Christ but rather he us. So too will our trials come in Christ, when we least expect them. We need not seek them out, let alone work for them. Our task, as we try to live peaceable lives in Christ, is to receive such trials and in turn respond in the strength and power of the Holy Spirit in a manner well pleasing to the Father through Christ.

To be saved from our sin is not only to follow Christ’s example by walking in his steps (1 Peter 2:21), it also entails a true participation in Christ’s sufferings to the end that we might be “overjoyed when his glory is revealed.” (1 Peter 4:13) From the believer’s vantage point we imitate Christ by grace because he first loved us. But we have another perspective that we do well to reckon as fact, especially if we are to think Christ’s thoughts after him as we endeavor to imitate him as we ought: All things are divinely appointed and working together in order to conform believers not into mere imitators of Christ but into the very image of him in whom they are united so that he might be the firstborn of many brethren who share not only in his suffering but through that union-suffering, his glory. This suffering, which to our shame we too often so desperately try to avoid, is no less a gift than the faith through which our God-appointed suffering is to be interpreted. (Philippians 1:29) Being a gift, it is not something to be shunned but rather accepted in its proper season - if we are to desire and experience a more intimate fellowship with Christ.

Ron

Counter since: 9/6/2006

Rudy's Praise of McCain Went a Bit Too Far

2008-09-04T17:29:00.020-04:00

Last night Rudy Giuliani with his eminent flare delivered some of the most quotable lines of both conventions in his repudiation of Barack O’Biden and endorsement of the McCain-Palin ticket.

For instance:

“Then [Obama] ran for the state legislature and he got elected. And nearly 130 times, he couldn't make a decision. He couldn't figure out whether to vote "yes" or "no." It was too tough. He voted -- he voted "present."… You have to make a decision.”

“He is the least experienced candidate for president of the United States in at least the last 100 years. Not a personal attack, a statement of fact. Barack Obama has never led anything, nothing, nada. Nada, nothing.”

“Well, I'll tell you, if I were Joe Biden, I'd want to get that V.P. thing in writing.”

“So -- so he changed his position again, and he put out a statement exactly like the statement of John McCain's three days earlier. I have some advice for Senator Obama: Next time, call John McCain.”

But how many of us who listened to the speech were struck by this:

“And we can trust [McCain] to deal with anything, anything that nature throws our way, anything that terrorists do to us.”

The last thing I was looking for in any of the speeches was a mistake, let alone a near-blasphemy. What does it mean, after all, that John McCain can deal with anything – again anything (!) – that “nature throws our way”? My immediate thought was, “Oh my, this man is challenging God, most unwittingly.” Hyper-sensitivity on my part? Well, maybe, but then I must ask, could one who was living in close proximity to Coram Deo make such boast? Would we have been O.K. had Rudy said that Senator McCain can deal with anything that God (not nature) throws his way? If not, then why does the word “nature” soften the claim? Isn’t what nature can throw our way equivalent to what God can throw our way?

Now some might respond with “Then why not qualify every statement of what you plan to do in the future with ‘if God so wills’”? In other words, is it not equally presumptuous to think that anything can be accomplished apart from God’s grace. Accordingly, if we don’t speak that way with respect to running an errand, then why need we take such care with our words when dealing with anything “nature” might throw our way? The difference, as I see it, is that when someone states “I’ll see you tomorrow” a claim of self-sufficiency in the face of adverse providence is not necessarily being purported, let alone promulgated. Accordingly, to add “if God so wills” to “I’ll see you tomorrow” need not alter or undermine the sentiment since it does not so much promote self-sufficiency as it does communicate a mere intention. In other words, leaving out “if God so wills” does not imply that the intention can be fulfilled apart from God’s will; whereas Rudy’s comment was aimed not at promoting a man’s intention but his moral fiber. Therefore, to have said that Senator McCain can deal with anything nature throws his way - if God so wills, does not make Rudy’s point at all! Instead, such a qualifier would actually eclipse his very point because given such a qualifier it could equally be said of Obama, and even the weakest of men.

In a last-ditch effort to save Rudy from his own words, we might be inclined to render his meaning as “McCain is so obviously full of grace, it’s unimaginable that God would not sustain him through anything he can dish out.” That, however, would be to overstate the grace God has bestowed upon this man (affording a frothy basis to anticipate extraordinary future-grace), while underestimating what God could bring upon him. Let's get hold of the fact that Katrina was less than the finger of God and that no man is to be compared to lesser men but to Christ. A healthy view of God's omnipotence and sober view of the fraility of man and his need for grace prohibts such sentiments as Giuliani expressed in his address. Obviously when put this way, Mr. Giuliani could not have meant what he actually said. But that's the point, isn't it? He wasn't even conscious of what he was actually saying. Autonomy got the best of him. His unthinking praise was grossly overstated and more importantly, highly offensive.

At the very least, in the realm of judgment in crisis, make no mistake that we are often preserved and kept from despair, even disgrace, because God prevents us from being exposed to more than we've been trained to handle. For anyone to presume that even the godliest saint will endure under any unprecedented disaster that will challenge judgment in unimaginable ways implicitly denies that we can be challenged beyond our understanding and experiences.

Ron
Counter since: 9/6/2006

"Developing a Trinitarian Mind" - Sound Observations & Advice from Robert Letham

2008-09-04T08:32:00.012-04:00

In the August-September 2008 issue of Ordained Servant, a publication of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, Dr. Robert Letham had these brief yet worthy words for the church of Jesus Christ, especially its ministers, to reflect upon and put into practice.

Developing a Trinitarian Mind

Robert Letham

In one of the chapters of my book, The Holy Trinity, I describe at some length how the worship of the Western Church has been truncated by the comparative neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity. For most Christians—and I include members of Reformed churches—the Trinity is merely an abstruse mathematical puzzle, remote from experience. Despite our reservations about many aspects of the Eastern Church, Orthodoxy in contrast has maintained a pronounced Trinitarian focus to its worship through its liturgy, which has roots in the fourth century. This is no incidental matter; worship is right at the heart of what it means to be Christian and what the church should be doing. The sole object of worship is God. The God whom we worship has revealed himself to be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, three distinct persons in indivisible union. I have argued elsewhere that this is his New Covenant name (Matt. 28:19-20). It follows that our worship in the Christian church is to be distinctively Trinitarian. Yet if we were to thumb through any hymnbook, we would be hard pressed to find many hymns that contain clearly Trinitarian expressions, while many of our favorites could equally be sung by Unitarians—think of "Immortal, invisible" or "My God, how wonderful thou art." As for the average person in the pew, why not try a random survey next Sunday—ask a haphazard selection of half a dozen people what the Trinity means to them on a daily basis, and see what results you get? Then compare your findings with the words of Gregory of Nazianzus, who wrote of "my Trinity" and "when I say God, I mean the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit."

If this problem is as real as is generally recognized but yet as important as I have presented it, how do we go about seeking to redress it? There are no easy, slick solutions. This is not a matter to be resolved by a quick twelve-step program or in an adult Sunday school class. It will take much thought, careful teaching, and a concerted plan to put right what has for so long been askew—since I argue this has been a problem for centuries, with notable exceptions, at least since Aquinas. What is needed is to instill in our congregations a mindset directed, as of second nature, to think of God as triune. From there will come ripple effects on the way we think of the world around us, and of the people with whom we mix. What we need is to develop a thoroughly Christian view of God, the world, the church, ourselves, and others.

The first, and indispensable, steppingstone is ourselves as leaders of the church, and in particular those who are ministers of the Word. It is of the utmost importance that we saturate our minds with reflection and meditation on God, for we stand in the pulpit as no less than his representatives in speaking his Word. It means our consistently contemplating God in Trinitarian terms. John Stott has been accustomed to begin each day with a threefold greeting to the Holy Trinity; how far are your own prayers and thoughts of God shaped in this way? It takes disciplined thought and prayer, consistently day in, day out deliberately to think of God biblically, theologically, and ecclesially as triune. As leaders of the church you are called by God to do this. You cannot expect the congregation committed to your charge to follow suit unless you are leading the way. It means your being shaped and driven not by some man-made purpose or by the concoctions of management gurus but by the truth of the triune God himself drawing and molding you.

There are definite and particular ways in which your congregation can be taught to develop its grasp of the Trinity. The first such avenue is in your preaching and teaching. How often have you preached on the Trinity? The Church of England, in following the church year, has Trinity Sunday the week after Pentecost; this can provide an opportunity to draw attention to the Trinity at least once a year, as Advent is a reminder of the incarnation, Good Friday of the atonement, Easter Sunday of the resurrection, and Pentecost of the coming of the Holy Spirit. However, this is a bare minimum—just about starvation rations. Perhaps a short series may help, providing it is not something that is forgotten as you move on to other things. Much better is, on top of that, to refer consistently to God not always as "God" or "the Lord" but as "the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit," always bearing in mind that he is three in indivisible union.

The same principles apply to praying as to preaching. You may not be able to preach on the Trinity every week—it would be unbalanced if you did!—but you can pray every week. When you pray, pray "Our Father in heaven." What an amazing way to address God! It means that we, through Christ the Son, have been granted by adoption the same relationship to the Father that he has by nature! It immediately throws us into the context of prayer to the Father by the Holy Spirit (see Rom. 8:26-27) through the mediation of Christ the Son. We should bring this to expression regularly in our public prayers. We should show the congregation that this is the way we pray. We should show them that in prayer we are saturated in a Trinitarian atmosphere, given to share in communion with the triune God. We should impress upon our people that in the Holy Spirit, God the Trinity has come to dwell with us, indwelling—better, saturating—us and making his permanent residence with us (John 14:23).

This leads us to the nature of church worship and the structure of the service. In all the works of God he takes the initiative. He created in accordance with his free and sovereign will; no one was there to advise him. In grace, the Son became incarnate "for us and our salvation"; this too was the result purely of the grace of God, undeserved, unprompted. In our own experience, God himself brought us to new life by his Spirit; our faith and repentance is a response to his prior grace. We love him because he first loved us. Is it any different in worship? Is that primarily something we do? No, first of all God goes before us. He has called his church to himself. He is there to greet us. As we gather, it is to meet with him, but first he has drawn us. Moreover, our acts of worship are accepted because they are offered in union with Christ. He, in our nature, is at the Father's right hand. From this it follows that the elements of worship are a dialog in which the holy Trinity takes the initiative. Through his ordained servant, the Father through his Son by the Holy Spirit calls us to worship. He speaks to us in his Word read and proclaimed. He receives our praise and prayers. He communes with us in the sacrament. In the benediction he dismisses us with his blessing—which is far from a pious wish or prayer that such things might be, if it is the will of God. Rather, the benediction is a declaration of a real state of affairs, undergirded by his covenant promises. This is a dynamic view of worship, one that follows squarely in the Reformed tradition and is rooted in biblical teaching. Our congregations need to hear it, they need to understand it, they need to imbibe it and be permeated by it. At my previous church, our regular bulletin expressed this. Periodically we would draw everyone's attention to it and sometimes produce a written two-page memo explaining it, so as to keep it fresh in mind.

The call to worship is a good place to begin. I often use a congregational response to the call. It is based on Ephesians 2:18, where Paul says "For through him [Christ] we ... have access by one Spirit to the Father." These words impress on the mind the point that our worship can only be Trinitarian. So too does the famous passage in John 4:21-24, where Jesus says that those who worship the Father must worship in spirit and in truth. Every occurrence of πνεῦμα (pneuma, spirit) in John, except two, is a reference to the Holy Spirit, while the truth is consistently a reference to Jesus (John 1:9, 14, 17, 14:6). Hence, acceptable worship of the Father is in the Holy Spirit and in Christ, the Son. It is important that this is stamped upon the service right from the start. Christian worship is worship of the holy Trinity, nothing less.

The church where we now attend has, immediately after the call to worship, a short Trinitarian doxology which the congregation sings in response; it is varied from time-to-time so as not to get monotonous. Then the first hymn is very often, if not invariably, Trinitarian, a practice I have come to use myself as often as I can. Calvin thought this was the most appropriate way to begin too, so we are in good company. However, as I remarked, there is a considerable lack of explicitly Trinitarian hymns. Many from the ancient and medieval church have this focus. Our former music director in Delaware, Peter Merio—a graduate of the Sibelius Academy in Helsinki who also taught there—brilliantly arranged one gem from the fifth century that we dug up from the English Hymnal, edited by Ralph Vaughan Williams in 1933; but there are very few in Reformed circles with his capabilities. Some recent favorites try hard but fall into heresy—an ever-present danger in this area. The hymn "There is a redeemer," which I have heard sung in the OPC, is generally excellent but has a refrain, "Thank you, O our Father for giving us your Son, and leaving your Spirit till the work on earth is done." The Father does not leave the Holy Spirit; the Eastern and Western Churches divided over arguably less.

We have looked at preaching and teaching, prayers, the call to worship and benediction, hymns; there remain the sacraments. Baptism is into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Dare anyone say the Trinity is a recondite matter for advanced philosophers when every single member of the Christian church has the name of the Trinity pronounced over him or her? According to Matthew 28:18-20 it is the foundation for Christian discipleship. Similarly, in the Lord's Supper we receive and feed on Christ really and spiritually; this is by the Holy Spirit who makes the sacraments efficacious. Moreover, since the works of the Trinity are indivisible, in feeding on Christ by the gracious enabling of the Holy Spirit, we are given access to the Father in the unity of the undivided Trinity.

In short, every aspect of Christian worship is an engagement with the Trinity or, rather, a way in which the Trinity engages us. As leaders of Christ's church, we have the indescribable privilege of leading his people into the realization of something of what this entails. It is a task far beyond our capacities; we are utterly ill-equipped to deal in such transcendent matters. The Bible records that, when given a revelation of the veiled glory of God, human beings are brought to their knees, overcome, broken (e.g., Isa. 6:1-5, Ezek. 1:1-3:15, Acts 9:1-9, Rev. 1:9-18). Yet in his grace our God has admitted us to fellowship, communion, and union with him as his adopted children, so that we are being transformed from one degree of glory to another by the Spirit (2 Cor. 3:18). The Father and the Son have made their permanent residence with us in the person of the Holy Spirit (John 14:15-23). As ministers of the Word, we have been co-opted as instruments by which the flock of Christ are changed into his image by the Spirit so that Christ will be the first-born among many brothers. Doesn't that thrill you? Doesn't it make you want to know him better? Doesn't it impel you to develop a mind shaped by the knowledge of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit and to lead your congregation on to that goal too?

Robert Letham, a minister in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, teaches Systematic and Historical Theology at Wales Evangelical School of Theology. Ordained Servant, August-September 2008.
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