tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post6068587225626231702..comments2023-04-14T04:28:54.000-04:00Comments on Reformed Apologist: Reformed Folk & The Power of Contrary ChoiceReformed Apologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comBlogger26125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-38452908200841861222019-11-21T02:14:00.053-05:002019-11-21T02:14:00.053-05:00Philosophy: Is there anything that is not a matter...Philosophy: Is there anything that is not a matter of phenomenology?<br />go through https://www.cairn.info/revue-internation... http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?scri...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-49780330903532045542015-12-31T17:06:50.385-05:002015-12-31T17:06:50.385-05:00Way too many questions in last ten minutes. You ma...Way too many questions in last ten minutes. You may list your number, I won't publish and I'll call. I'll publish this offer under all your questions today. Reformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-66263498499023416042015-12-31T15:53:31.906-05:002015-12-31T15:53:31.906-05:00if tempted, then fall – did he not?
It doesn'...<i> if tempted, then fall – did he not? </i><br /><br />It doesn't exclude the possibility of a fall with a different sufficient cause that was a 'tempter' though does it? Although I agree in this particular case (the actual world and the actual Fall), and with your formulation, that temptation was sufficient cause was it <i>necessarily</i> sufficient? Was temptation <i>necessary</i> for the fall?<br /><br />Thanks.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-80428807280243031952015-12-29T13:17:43.711-05:002015-12-29T13:17:43.711-05:00No possibility of sin in glorified state. We will ...No possibility of sin in glorified state. We will be confirmed in righteousness and like Christ. The first creation was perfect in that it was a perfect creation that offered the potentiality for both good and evil. It was a perfect place for testing for instance. Reformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-31631928175204914442015-12-28T17:46:18.150-05:002015-12-28T17:46:18.150-05:001 more question when God said it " was Good&q...1 more question when God said it " was Good" at the days of creation. Then, how do you interpret that? Do you think the world wasn't perfect because it had the possibility of sin? <br /><br />It kinda makes me think of the glorified state. Do you think in the Glorified state we will be free but not able to sin?( sorry 1 turned into 3 but i think they're interrelated)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-61534853272123155432015-12-28T09:41:33.831-05:002015-12-28T09:41:33.831-05:00Both man and Satan fell in their nature prior to a...Both man and Satan fell in their nature prior to acting in accordance with the fallen nature. After all, if Eve was tackled prior to eating or was constrained from eating only due to vanity over her figure, wouldn't sin have occurred just the same? We Malay safely conclude that actions proceed from inclinations and the quality of inclinations are consistent with one's nature. <br /><br />No will is perfect that is capable of sinning. <br /><br />God didn't "give" the sinful desire. The sinful desire came from within the soul when certain providences were brought before it. There's no contradiction here. Men sin by the predeterminate counsel and foreknowledge of God. Reformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-69757943237284422662015-12-28T06:42:32.347-05:002015-12-28T06:42:32.347-05:00A sinless will is a perfect will. To cause somethi...A sinless will is a perfect will. To cause something is to bring it about. Like if God gave Satan the desire to sin, then he brought it about. I'm just wondering on a compatiblist view how would Satan (being made perfect) choose to sin if he hasn't Fallen yet? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-20293250426224597652015-12-28T06:18:27.371-05:002015-12-28T06:18:27.371-05:00What's a "perfect" will? What does i...What's a "perfect" will? What does it mean to "cause" sin? Compatiblism turns on a different view of freedom than what incompatiblists hold to, which clutters more than clarifies. In any case, please feel free to clarify your thoughts and question. Reformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-67704240171183439352015-12-28T05:58:59.137-05:002015-12-28T05:58:59.137-05:00Since Satan and Adam have perfect wills and compat...Since Satan and Adam have perfect wills and compatibalism defends the view that man does what is consistent with his nature. How could they sin unless God caused them? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-850850643958690182008-08-22T20:18:00.000-04:002008-08-22T20:18:00.000-04:00I'm sorry that I was calling you by your last name...I'm sorry that I was calling you by your last name; I thought it was your first! :)<BR/><BR/>Nicholas,<BR/><BR/>Call me whatever you feel most comfortable calling me, within reason of course! :)<BR/><BR/>Now that we have our tenses right, let's move to your new question:<BR/><BR/>"<I>'Pure contingency' is, at least for me, easy to say yet hard to pin down precisely. Can I ask you to spell out, briefly, what you mean to be implied by it?</I>"<BR/><BR/>Not necessary. Need not occur.<BR/><BR/>RonReformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-35772854882731116182008-08-22T18:52:00.000-04:002008-08-22T18:52:00.000-04:00No, they don't think that one has the ability "to ...<I>No, they don't think that one has the ability "to have done other than you did" because the past is necessary. They think that one has the ability to act contrary to how they will (end up acting).</I><BR/><BR/>So they believe that one <B>had</B> the ability "to have done other than one did."<BR/><BR/>Here I've changed "have" to "had."<BR/><BR/>This is what I meant to imply. I'm naive, but not so naive as to suppose L's think the past is presently alterable. =)<BR/><BR/>This amended version I take to be equivalent (although framed as hindsight) to your "has the ability to act contrary to how they will (end up acting)."<BR/><BR/>Yes?<BR/><BR/>Two more questions...<BR/>a) I admittedly feel a little awkward/disrespectful addressing you as if we're on a first name basis. But I'm following what I take to be the standard parlance on your blog comments. I'd be happier with Mr. Digiacomo unless you object. <BR/><BR/>b) "Pure contingency" is, at least for me, easy to say yet hard to pin down precisely. Can I ask you to spell out, briefly, what you mean to be implied by it? <BR/><BR/>best,<BR/>Nicholas.Owenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11364929893068291749noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-31319355437495314292008-08-22T17:52:00.000-04:002008-08-22T17:52:00.000-04:00No, they don't think that one has the ability "to ...No, they don't think that one has the ability "to have done other than you did" because the past is necessary. They think that one has the ability to act contrary to how they will (end up acting). The reason they give is that although the future act is true (i.e. will occur), it is not metaphysically necessary. They hold to pure contingency, which means that they believe that Jones will do X, does not mean that Jones will necessarily do X. <BR/><BR/>Make sense?<BR/><BR/>RonReformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-86012168574363555252008-08-22T16:31:00.000-04:002008-08-22T16:31:00.000-04:00Thanks Ron,So bear with me as I work through this,...Thanks Ron,<BR/><BR/>So bear with me as I work through this, if you 'will.'<BR/><BR/>If in fact LFW is defined as "the ability to choose contrary to what you will," and if 'will' be taken in the future descriptive sense (yes, I'm making up my own terminology here), then I certainly see why it's a 'surd,' as you say. But at this point it seems so by reason of the way the definition is framed.<BR/><BR/>Certainly it's contradictory to say that I have the ability to do other than what I 'will' do, if what I "will do" refers to whatever - in general - I end up doing. It's trivially true that I can do no other than <I>that</I>. <BR/><BR/>I can't imagine a Libertarian would deny that, but I also think they would object to the generalized scope of 'will,' no?<BR/><BR/>Am I making sense?<BR/><BR/>Does not a Libertarian hold that you have the ability "to have done other than you did"?Owenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11364929893068291749noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-16639111371308133972008-08-22T14:28:00.000-04:002008-08-22T14:28:00.000-04:00I suppose I'm hung up on a possibly ambiguity in t...<I>I suppose I'm hung up on a possibly ambiguity in the term "will" in the phrase "how one will."</I><BR/><BR/>Hi Owen,<BR/><BR/>Thanks for the clarifying question. How one “will” choose is not referring to the faculty of choice, i.e. “man’s will” but rather to the outcome of what will be chosen. So to use your words, “future descriptive” is what I had in mind and not anything to do with man’s volition, and certainly not a legal-will. :)<BR/><BR/>Thoughts?<BR/><BR/>RonReformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-53633444354872074682008-08-22T12:37:00.000-04:002008-08-22T12:37:00.000-04:00Dear Ron,Forgive me for a potentially (likely) uni...Dear Ron,<BR/>Forgive me for a potentially (likely) uninformed and possibly confused question. Free will was the issue which spurred me into philosophy some years ago, but I must admit I do not presently keep up with it, thus nor do I think I'm conversant in the matter. That said, my question is regarding your opening paragraph...<BR/><BR/><I>Libertarian free will (LFW) can simply be defined as the <B>ability to choose contrary to how one will</B>. My position on the matter is straightforward. LFW is a philosophical surd. If it is true that one can choose contrary to <B>how he will</B>, then the future God believes will come to pass might not come to pass; and even if the future does come to pass as God believes, he will not have been justified in his belief. He would have just been lucky.</I><BR/><BR/>I suppose I'm hung up on a possibly ambiguity in the term "will" in the phrase "how one will."<BR/><BR/>My initial thought was that 'will' can be used to signify the truth of propositions about the future. "He will be picked third in the draft." Call this the <B>future descriptive</B> sense.<BR/><BR/>And it can also be used to refer to the hypothetical aspect of the mind to which we attribute the power of volition. "He has not the will to carry out such an arduous regimen." Call this the <B>volitional</B> sense.<BR/><BR/>(Of course it can mean other things too, like a legal document enumerating the specifications regarding the posthumous distribution of my assets, but obviously I'm concerned with the previous two senses.)<BR/><BR/>So when you say: <BR/>"(LFW) can simply be defined as the ability to choose contrary to how one will"<BR/><BR/>I'm unclear as to how you're using 'will' here. If it's in the former sense, then LFW seems prima facie and obviously intuitive. If it's in the latter sense, then LFW seems obviously (and uninterestingly) incoherent.<BR/><BR/>Can you help me out here?<BR/><BR/>-NMOOwenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11364929893068291749noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-10707908123442266582008-05-21T18:34:00.000-04:002008-05-21T18:34:00.000-04:00Hi John Mark (from Georgia),“WLC's correction to t...Hi John Mark (from Georgia),<BR/><BR/>“WLC's correction to the questioner starts What Molinism holds is that God knows logically prior to His decree to create a world what any person would freely do in any fully specified, freedom-permitting set of circumstances in which God might place him..”<BR/><BR/>Yes, this is the position of Molinism (and consequently that of William Lane Craig). The problem is that there are no creaturely choices that are free in the libertarian-Molinistic sense. If there were, then there would be no way of God knowing what would happen if it is indeed true that it might not happen. I unpack that a bit more on my refutation of Molinism. <BR/><BR/>“Now, in that statement doesn't "degree" sort of lose its definition? And on what grounds would the degree be "logically prior" to human actions? It almost seems as if he is saying that God imagines a purposeless world prior to creating, sees how it would turn out and then decides to decree a few things.”<BR/><BR/>I’ll assume you mean “decree” and not “degree”. I was stumped for a moment there but I think your fingers must have hit the wrong key. <BR/><BR/>Craig did not assert that the decree is logically prior to human action but that the decree is logically prior to the knowledge of what that action would be in any state of affairs. (The decree is even temporally prior to the actual action, if the world in which that action obtains is instantiated). With that aside, keep in mind that Calvinism requires that God’s knowledge of his decree must logically follow from what God knows he can bring to pass providentially. Accordingly, God’s knowledge of what is possible to bring to pass must be predicated upon a logically prior knowledge of what is possible for God to bring to pass. Where we part way with the Molinist-Arminian is that within Calvinism the divine knowledge of all possible (morally-relevant) creaturely-choices is contained within God’s necessary knowledge of what he himself can bring to pass in the lives of un-instantiated essences; whereas within the system of Molinism some morally relevant creaturely choices that are logically possible for creatures to make are not feasible for God to bring to pass. Such is the case when it is true that the creature would not have actually chosen that logical possibility. The point you are trying to make, however, is correct - if your point is that God’s decree would be constrained by what the uninstantiated essence would responsibly do, as opposed to what God would have the essence responsibly do. This is why that within Molinism not all possible worlds are feasible for God to instantiate. So, for example, if Judas was unwilling in all feasible worlds to sell out the Lord in a morally relevant way, God could not have instantiated a possible world within which Judas would do so while being held morally accountable for doing so. Accordingly, given Molinism, God’s “decree” would have to be according to what an un-instantiated essence would “freely” do under certain circumstances, as opposed to upon what God could sovereignly determine that the essence do in a morally relevant way under a specified state of affairs. Consequently, the totality of God’s eternal knowledge of what is true would in part be eternally informed by something outside himself. This is where “middle-knowledge” comes into play for the Molinist. God’s eternal knowledge of what men would responsibly do in any set of circumstances would not have been according to God’s necessary knowledge of what was possible for him to bring to pass, but rather would have have been according to ungrounded future-tense truth propositions pertaining to what creatures would do. God’s knowledge becomes eternally derivative, which gets to the heresy of Molinism. <BR/><BR/>If this is unclear let’s talk two-way if you’d like.<BR/><BR/>And yes, David is a wonderful blessing. He told me recently about you, and I told him I thought I had come across you before.<BR/><BR/>I was a bit rushed in all of that, but I think I hit the main points.<BR/><BR/>Blessings,<BR/><BR/>RonReformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-7264025679919141192008-05-20T22:21:00.000-04:002008-05-20T22:21:00.000-04:00Ron,I was reading WLC's answer to a question on Mi...Ron,<BR/><BR/>I was reading WLC's answer to a question on <A HREF="http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5979" REL="nofollow">Middle Knowledge and Free Will</A>. <BR/><BR/>WLC's correction to the questioner starts <I>What Molinism holds is that God knows logically prior to His decree to create a world what any person would freely do in any fully specified, freedom-permitting set of circumstances in which God might place him.</I>.<BR/><BR/>Now, in that statement doesn't "degree" sort of lose its definition? And on what grounds would the degree be "logically prior" to human actions? It almost seems as if he is saying that God imagines a purposeless world prior to creating, sees how it would turn out and then decides to decree a few things.<BR/><BR/>Even in that scenario, God's decree wouldn't be rendered as powerless to save free-will as the molinist would like.<BR/><BR/>If you read his whole answer there always seems to be an escape. Or am I missing something?<BR/><BR/>Thanks and I enjoy your blog.<BR/><BR/>Mark (from Georgia)<BR/><BR/>p.s. I hope you are blessed with DTK. :-)Markhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01410144337505012175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-76652610644809904922008-05-12T19:16:00.000-04:002008-05-12T19:16:00.000-04:00Joshua,Thanks for your support. My sincere hope is...Joshua,<BR/><BR/>Thanks for your support. My sincere hope is that people will not allow a religion that includes many mysteries to become a religion of irrationality. To be logical is a sin these days, yet to be inconsistent is a virtue. When one becomes too conistent, he runs the risk of being labeled a rationalist. <BR/><BR/>RonReformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-68842432167118851512008-05-12T09:03:00.000-04:002008-05-12T09:03:00.000-04:00Ron:I like this proof of yours the most! Who would...Ron:<BR/><BR/>I like this proof of yours the most! <BR/><BR/>Who would you say has influenced you the most in your thinking?<BR/><BR/>Establish the necessity of God’s belief about Adam’s choice:<BR/><BR/>1. Before Adam sinned, God believed Adam would sin<BR/><BR/>2. If x is believed in the past, it is necessary in the future that x was believed then<BR/><BR/>3. When Adam sinned, it was necessary that God believed he would<BR/><BR/>Establish the necessity of Adam’s choice, given the necessity of God’s belief:<BR/><BR/>4. Necessarily, if before Adam sinned God<BR/>believed Adam would sin, then Adam would sin<BR/><BR/>5. If p {p = God’s historical belief about Adam’s choice} was necessary when Adam sinned (3), and necessarily if p, then q; then q {q = Adam’s choice to sin was then necessary}: (consequent from 4 and transfer of necessity principle] <BR/><BR/>6. Therefore, it was necessary that Adam would sin when God believed he would [3, 4 and 5]<BR/><BR/>Establish that Adam does not act freely, given the necessity of Adam’s choice:<BR/><BR/>7. If before Adam acted it was then necessary that Adam would sin in the future, then Adam could not have done otherwise<BR/><BR/>8. Therefore, Adam could not have done otherwise than sin in the future<BR/><BR/>9. If one cannot do otherwise, then one does not act freely<BR/><BR/>10. Therefore, when Adam sinned, he did not do it freely (which is to say he could not have chosen to do right)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-60125692764010628722008-05-12T08:58:00.000-04:002008-05-12T08:58:00.000-04:00Excellent summary of the debate Ron, and the repli...Excellent summary of the debate Ron, and the replies to Mr. Mann are also superb. Thank you greatly for sharing these thoughts.Joshua Butcherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05762961484152028177noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-7014619249879975802008-05-12T08:26:00.000-04:002008-05-12T08:26:00.000-04:00“If Adam’s heart was indeed “pure,” then God’s law...“<I>If Adam’s heart was indeed “pure,” then God’s law in itself couldn’t possibly have generated a “sinful” desire in his heart. Moreover, if Adam’s heart was indeed “pure,” then the external temptation provided by Satan in itself also couldn’t have generated a “sinful” desire in his heart.</I>”<BR/><BR/>If we have three particulars, law, tempter and fall, and if by removing one of the first two particulars the third doesn’t occur, then that would mean that the a sufficient cause given the remaining particular would be the one that was removed. It simply gets back to God’s pre-interpretation of the particulars. God determined that in the presence of law: <I>if tempted, then fall</I> – did he not? Accordingly, the antecedent necessarily becomes the sufficient condition for the fall. (I may move from condition to cause because I moved from state of affairs to sequential order.)<BR/><BR/><I>In fact, a man can only be tempted “when he is drawn away by his own desires and enticed” (James 1:14). Therefore, an external temptation would have been to no effect against Adam’s “pure” heart that had only “pure” desires.</I>”<BR/><BR/>The verse is not attempting to give an explanation of the pre-lapasarian fall. James is speaking to the “brethren” – and it is they who are not to say that when they are tempted, they are tempted by God. Although that principle would apply to Adam, the second part of the verse cannot. With respect to the second part, they have no lust to be drawn by, which underscores that that the verse pertains to converted brethren and may not be used to try to explain the fall. Finally, the verse states a man is tempted when drawn away, which takes the form: “If tempted, then drawn away.” You have reworded the verse to: “If and only if tempted, then drawn away,” which makes the antecedent not only sufficient but necessary. <BR/><BR/>Also, Jesus was "tempted" but I don't think the verse may apply to him! :) In the like manner, I don't think you may apply to the verse to the first Adam either (for similar, relevant reasons). The verse presupposes that one has a sin nature when tempted, which Adam (and Jesus) did not have.<BR/><BR/>“<I>In other words, Adam’s sinful desire could not have been self-generated from a “pure” heart that was free from any such inclination, but would have had to have been directly and internally generated by God in Adam’s heart in order for the law and tempter to have any secondary effect at all.</I><BR/><BR/>This is fallacious as well. You are arguing, “If not self-generated, then God directly generated,” which is a fallacy of false dichotomy. Again, if we have three particulars, law, tempter and fall, and if by removing one of the first two particulars the third doesn’t occur, then that would mean that the a sufficient cause given the remaining particular would be the one that was removed.<BR/><BR/>I think that’s enough for now. <BR/><BR/>RonReformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-47905709008726939612008-05-12T02:41:00.000-04:002008-05-12T02:41:00.000-04:00In the case of Adam, I don't think we can say that...<I>In the case of Adam, I don't think we can say that God went into Adam's pure heart and created a sinful heart. He certainly used the tempter and the law as means to bring this to pass.</I><BR/><BR/>Of course I agree that God used Satan and His law as secondary means to bring about the sin of Adam. But how can those “external” means <I>in and of themselves</I> cause an “internal” sinful desire in “Adam’s pure heart,” to use your words? If Adam’s heart was indeed “pure,” then God’s law <I>in itself</I> couldn’t possibly have generated a “sinful” desire in his heart. Moreover, if Adam’s heart was indeed “pure,” then the external temptation provided by Satan <I>in itself</I> also couldn’t have generated a “sinful” desire in his heart. In fact, a man can only be tempted “when he is drawn away <I>by his own desires</I> and enticed” (James 1:14). Therefore, an external temptation would have been to no effect against Adam’s “pure” heart that had only “pure” desires. In other words, Adam’s sinful desire could not have been <I>self-generated</I> from a “pure” heart that was free from any such inclination, but would have had to have been <I>directly</I> and internally <I>generated by God</I> in Adam’s heart in order for the law and tempter to have any secondary effect at all.<BR/><BR/><I>As for his dealings with sinful men, for God to "turn" a heart to this sin or that, I don't think we can simply assume in any of those instances you quoted that God did so apart from means, though he certainly may do so directly, apart from means.</I><BR/><BR/>Well, since none of the passages I cited <I>mention</I> that God used any secondary means, I don’t see how we can legitimately assume that He used any secondary means. If God is quite capable of inclining men’s hearts to evil <I>apart from</I> any secondary means (WCF 5.3), then why would we assume that He used secondary means in passages that don’t <I>mention</I> any means? Especially when other passages <I>explicitly mention</I> when God indirectly causes sinful desires and actions using secondary agents, such as when He sovereignly sends evil spirits to tempt (1 Kings 22:19-23) and torment (1 Samuel 16:14-23, 18:10, 19:9) and blind men to the truth of the gospel (2 Corinthians 4:4).<BR/><BR/><I>For instance, sending strong delusion implies means.</I><BR/><BR/>God’s sending “strong delusion, that they should believe the lie” (2 Thessalonians 2:11) sounds more like His <I>direct</I> or <I>immediate</I> influence upon the minds of sinful men to me. The <I>secondary</I> means in the passage are “the working of Satan, with all power, signs, and lying wonders, and with all unrighteous deception” (vs. 9-10). But the “strong delusion” is explicitly stated <I>as coming from God Himself</I>. Again, in light of WCF 5.3, why would we assume a <I>mediate</I> cause here?Roger Mannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18350892815584257304noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-41424973784932057222008-05-11T22:26:00.000-04:002008-05-11T22:26:00.000-04:00In the case of Adam, I don't think we can say that...In the case of Adam, I don't think we can say that God went into Adam's pure heart and created a sinful heart. He certainly used the tempter and the law as means to bring this to pass. <BR/><BR/>As for his dealings with sinful men, for God to "turn" a heart to this sin or that, I don't think we can simply assume in any of those instances you quoted that God did so apart from means, though he certainly may do so directly, apart from means. For instance, sending strong delusion implies means. To say that God turns the hearts of kings does not necessarily mean that God acts directly. After all, Jesus warns that we can *cause* little children to stumble, but of course we do not have sovereign control to act directly over the hearts of children, yet God indexes the cause of the stumbling to immediate work of men. In the like manner, if God says he will "cause" this or that to happen, it need not mean that he does not use means to those ends. It just means that God is surely behind the hardening. It underscores, in other words, God's sovereign prerogative.<BR/><BR/>RonReformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-38088624366003839542008-05-11T21:07:00.000-04:002008-05-11T21:07:00.000-04:00Hi Ron,Thanks for the clarification. You wrote:I'm...Hi Ron,<BR/><BR/>Thanks for the clarification. You wrote:<BR/><BR/><I>I'm not sure what you meant in the last part of your question. You seem to be drawing a distinction between inclination and ultimate sinful desire and I cannot discern what you might be looking for.</I><BR/><BR/>No, that was just poor wording on my part I suppose. In the context of the Fall I would view Adam’s “strongest inclination” to be <I>the sinful desire itself</I>, which then caused him to eat the forbidden fruit. I agree with you that the sinful inclination/desire <I>preceded</I> the outward action of eating the fruit.<BR/><BR/><I>In sum, God brings these acts to pass through inclinations, which are brought to pass through the divine orchestration and presenting of divine-preinterpreted particulars to the soul of men.</I><BR/><BR/>While I agree that God providentially “causes” or brings these acts to pass through inclinations, you appear to be saying that God only does this by presenting “divine-reinterpreted particulars” <I>externally</I> to the souls of men (such as “the law and the tempter”). In other words, God only <I>indirectly</I> brings these sinful inclinations to pass using secondary means to influence man’s will, but the inclination or desire itself is self-generated <I>internally</I> by man’s own soul. Is that correct? If so, then I’m not sure I completely agree. For Scripture seems to teach that God also <I>directly</I> inclines men’s hearts to evil apart from secondary means. For example:<BR/><BR/>He [God] turned their heart to hate His people, to deal craftily with His servants. -- Psalm 105:25<BR/><BR/>The king’s heart is in the hand of the Lord, like the rivers of water; He turns it wherever He wishes. -- Proverbs 21:1<BR/><BR/>He [God] has blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts, lest they should see with their eyes, lest they should understand with their hearts and turn, so that I should hear them. -- John 12:40<BR/><BR/>Just as it is written: "God has given them a spirit of stupor, eyes that they should not see and ears that they should not hear, to this very day." -- Romans 11:8<BR/><BR/>Without any hint of trepidation Scripture boldly asserts, "<I>God will send</I> them strong delusion, that they should believe the lie" (2 Thessalonians 2:11). Yet, in all of this, God is righteous since <I>all</I> that He does is righteous by definition (i.e., there’s no “higher” law that prohibits Him from directly “causing” us to sin). Therefore God’s <I>direct</I> causation of Adam’s evil desire would have been perfectly holy, righteous, and good; for God only wills what is holy, righteous, and good. In other words, even though this makes God the <I>direct</I> “cause” of Adam’s sin, the “sinner” or “wrongdoer” was still Adam and not God. But if that is the case, then where's the difficulty in asserting that God Himself <I>directly</I> caused Adam to have the sinful desire to disobey His command? How is that in any way contrary to Scripture?Roger Mannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18350892815584257304noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24271776.post-73438674154811474772008-05-11T07:04:00.000-04:002008-05-11T07:04:00.000-04:00Hi Rgmann,All things come to pass according to God...Hi Rgmann,<BR/><BR/>All things come to pass according to God's foreknowledge and decree, yet it is by God's providence he orders all things to fall out. This providence extends itself even to the first fall, which was that of angels, and subsequently to the fall of Adam.<BR/><BR/>I would have to think that God pre-interpreted two primary particulars of providence (the law and the tempter) to the end whereby the two in that particular instance or state of affairs would trigger Adam's sinful inclination. With respect to the first fall, the fall of angels, God of course orchestrated the state of affairs that would result in sin without a tempter. <BR/><BR/>The point we must appreciate is that the first sin was the inclination otherwise the sinful action would have proceed from a righteous inclination, which would take away the moral relevance of the choice, making it a movement without an intention (i.e. an intelligible inclination to do so). Moreover, the mystery of the first sinful inclination is no less mysterious than the origin of any inclination. The mystery would seem to be in that God is able to present particulars to the soul and in doing so bring to pass inclinations that are precisely in accordance to his sovereign determination, and then movement of the body from that inclination. Just as it is consistent with your person, a regenerate man, to choose x-sin or y-not-sin, so it was with Adam. It was consistent with Adam to be inclined to sin. It will not be possible for us in glory to be so inclined because we will be like Christ. <BR/><BR/>In sum, God brings these acts to pass through inclinations, which are brought to pass through the divine orchestration and presenting of divine-preinterpreted particulars to the soul of men. <BR/><BR/>I'm not sure what you meant in the last part of your question. You seem to be drawing a distinction between inclination and ultimate sinful desire and I cannot discern what you might be looking for.<BR/><BR/>Good Lord's Day.Reformed Apologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17398596496540697639noreply@blogger.com